Deklin Darren Goeden, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0014

Deklin Darren Goeden,
Respondent,

vs.

The Minnesota State High School League,
Appellant.

Filed August 16, 2021
Appeal dismissed
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-20-13661

Justin M. Page, Mid-Minne sota Legal Aid an d Minnesota Disab ility Law Center,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Kevin M. Beck, Joseph A. Kelly, Patrick J. Kelly, Kelly & Lemm ons, P.A., St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Hooten, Presiding Judge; Co nnolly, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
This appeal challenges a temporary rest raining order that enjoined appellant
Minnesota State High School League (the league) from enforcing a bylaw preventing
respondent Deklin Darren Goeden from partic ipating in high school sports during his
senior year. Because respondent graduated fr om high school during the pendency of this
2
appeal, we conclude that the appeal is m oot. And because no excep tion to the mootness
doctrine applies, we lack jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
FACTS
The pertinent facts are undisputed and su mmarized in the district court’s order
granting a temporary restraining order. When th is appeal was filed, Goeden was a senior
at Ashby High School who sought to continue to participate in extracurricular athletics
governed by the league. Goeden is diagnosed with a “mixed receptive/expressive language
disorder,” and has been on an Individualized Education Plan since second grade. Goeden
first entered seventh grade in 2014. The distri ct court found that Goeden was required to
repeat his seventh year of educ ation because of his learning disability. In other words, he
attended seventh grade twice, from 2014 to 2016.
Goeden also began playing extracurricular sports governed by the league during his
first year enrolled in seventh grade. He participated in football in the fall, wrestling in the
winter, and track and field in th e spring. Goeden continued to participate in league sports
during his repeated year in seventh grade, eighth grade, and throughout high school.
Goeden, however, only participated in wrestling during his junior year in 2019-2020.
Before he started his senior year, Goed en asked the league for two additional
semesters of eligibility to allow him to partic ipate in sports. Goeden sought an exception
from the league’s eligibility byla ws. The league’s bylaws “res trict or grant eligibility to
high school student[s] to participate in hi gh school extracurricula r activities based on,”
among other things, the student’s enrollment in a school, age, grade level, seasons of
participation, and semesters enrolled.
3
Bylaw 110, which is the focus of this appeal, states that “[s]tudents shall be eligible
for participation in League-sponsored activ ities for twelve consecutive semesters (six
years) beginning with their initial entrance into the 7th grade.” The bylaw explains that “[a]
student’s eligibility begins when the studen t enters 7th grade for the first time and
continues, without interruption, for 12 co nsecutive semesters.” Because Goeden began
playing league sports in seve nth grade and repeated the seve nth grade, the district court
found that “[u]nder the plain language of Eligibility Bylaw 110 Goeden is ineligibl[e] to
participate in [league] activities during the 2020-2021 academic year,” his senior year.
The league denied Goeden’s request for an exception. Goeden appealed to the
league board, which also denied his request. Goeden then su ed the league, alleging that
enforcement of bylaw 110 violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA) and
requesting declaratory judgme nt and a permanent injunctio n “directing the [league] to
permit Goeden to participate in [league] activities during the 2020-2021 academic year.”
He then moved for a temporary restraining order “to allow him to play one additional
semester of high school sports.” Following briefing by the parties and a hearing, the district
court issued written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order temporarily enjoining
the league “from applying Rule 110 of its Elig ibility Bylaws as it applies to . . . Goeden.”
The league appealed.
Neither party addressed mootness in its briefing to this court. During oral argument,
we questioned whether this ap peal would become moot wh en Goeden graduated. We
ordered supplemental briefing on the issue, and Goeden later informed us that he graduated
from high school on May 30, 2021 and finished his track season on June 11, 2021.
4
DECISION
Minnesota courts “require the presence of a justiciable controversy as essential” to
the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. Schowalter v. State , 822 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn.
2012). “The doctrine of mootness requires th at [appellate courts] decide only actual
controversies and avoid advisory opinions.” In re McCaskill, 603 N.W.2d 326, 327 (Minn.
1999). A moot appeal will be dismissed unless an exception applies. Wayzata Nissan, LLC
v. Nissan North America, Inc., 875 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2016). “It is not necessary that
a party raise the issue of mootness; appellate courts must address the issue because it is a
constitutional prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction.” Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Schwan, 687 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
We first consider whether the league’s appeal raises a moot issue, and then
determine whether any exception to the mootness doctrine applies.
I. The league’s appeal is moot because the district court’s temporary restraining
order has expired.

“It is well settled that if, pending an a ppeal, an event occurs which renders it
impossible to grant any relief to appellant, or which makes a decision unnecessary, the
appeal will be dismissed as presenting a moot question.” Village of Savage v. Minn. Mun.
Comm’n (In re Resolution for Consolidation) , 180 N.W.2d 925, 927 (Minn. 1970). “An
appeal is moot when a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective
relief is no longer possible.” State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell , 933 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Minn.
2019) (quotation omitted). “But an appeal is not moot when a party could be afforded
5
effective relief.” Wayzata Nissan, LLC, 875 N.W.2d at 283. Mootness is a legal issue which
this court addresses de novo. Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. 2015).
“Mootness has been described as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The
requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing)
must continue throughout its existence (mootness).’” Id. at 4-5 (quoting Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S. Ct. 693, 708-09
(2000)). The test for mootne ss is “a comparison between the relief demanded and the
circumstances of the case at the time of deci sion in order to determ ine whether there is a
live controversy that can be resolved.” In re Application of Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d 706,
710 (Minn. 1997). “Issues which have no exis tence other than in the realm of future
possibility are purely hypothetical and are not justiciable.” Lee v. Delmont, 36 N.W.2d 530,
537 (Minn. 1949).
In their supplemental briefing filed with th e court, the parties agree that Goeden’s
high school graduation and completion of par ticipation in league-sponsored sports makes
this appeal moot. We also agree. The temporar y restraining order on appeal is specific to
Goeden because it enjoins the league “from applying Rule 110 of its Eligibility Bylaws as
it applies to . . . Goeden.” While the temporary restraining order has no express expiration
date, the league acknowledges that Goeden can no longer participate in league-sponsored
sports after he graduates from high school. 1 Because Goeden has graduated from high

1 The league’s supplemental brief to this court states that “it is unclear when [mootness]
will occur” because the temporary restraining order is in effect “as long as [Goeden] is in
high school.”
6
school, the temporary restraining order has e ffectively expired. If we compare the relief
demanded by the league, i.e. reversal of the temporary restraining order, to the
circumstances of the case afte r Goeden’s graduation, i.e. expiration of the temporary
restraining order, there is no live controversy. See Minnegasco, 565 N.W.2d at 710. Thus,
the league’s appeal is moot.2
II. No exception to the mo otness doctrine applies.

“The mootness doctrine is not a mechanical rule that is au tomatically invoked
whenever the underlying disput e between the parties is settled or otherwise resolved.”
Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 4. Rather, our caselaw recognizes two exceptions to the jurisdictional
rule requiring dismissal of a moot appeal: (1) “when an issue is capable of repetition, yet
will evade judicial review,” State v. Brooks , 604 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn. 2000), and
(2) when a case is “functionally justiciable” and of “statewide significance.” State v. Rudd,
359 N.W.2d 573, 576 (Minn. 1984). Both exceptions are discretionary. See Dean,
868 N.W.2d at 4-5.

2 We note that our determination is in accord with similar federal cases considering other
students’ challenges under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to other leagues’
eligibility rules for participation in high school sports. See McPherson v. Mich. High Sch.
Athletic Ass’n, Inc. , 119 F.3d 453, 455, 458-59 (6th Ci r. 1997) (determining appeal was
moot as to high school student athlete who had graduated, but also that “the case as a whole
is not moot” because the association had be en enjoined from taking action against the
school and team); see also Bingham v. Ediger , 20 Fed. Appx. 720, 721 (9th Cir. 2001)
(vacating temporary injunction for mootness after determining that high school student had
graduated and the association had complied with the temporary injunction); Pottgen v. Mo.
State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 40 F.3d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1994) (determining appeal was
moot as to high school student athlete who had graduated, but also live controversy existed
over the association’s ability to sanction high school). In contrast to other injunctions that
affected the student’s school or team, the di strict court’s temporary restraining order
applies only to Goeden and does not affect other parties.
7
The league argues that both exceptions apply, so we address each in turn.
A. A future appeal involving the same issue is not likely to evade review.
Issues are “capable of repetition, yet evading review” when two elements are met:
“(1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its
cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjec ted to the same action again.” Kahn v. Griffin ,
701 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. 2005) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149,
96 S. Ct. 347, 349 (1975)).
1. Capable of repetition
Minnesota Supreme Court precedent instructs that appellate courts must conduct a
“careful analysis of all aspects of the issues presented before we determine whether to
dismiss the case or exercise our discretion to consider the appeal as an exception to the
mootness doctrine.” In re Guardianship of Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d 728, 738 (Minn. 2014).
The key legal issue raised by the league’s appeal centers on the MHRA’s application to
bylaw 110. Goeden argues that the bylaw 110, as applied to him, violates the MHRA’s
prohibition on discrimination. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.11 (2020) (by a public
accommodation); Minn. Stat. § 363A.13, subd. 1 (2020) (by an educational institution “in
any manner”). According to the league, the exception process and bylaw 110 did not violate
the MHRA as to Goeden because he had equa l opportunity to partic ipate in high school
sports for six years.
The league argues that, if we dismiss this appeal as moot, “there is a reasonable
expectation that the [league] will be subjected to the same action again.” Goeden argues
8
that there is no likelihood of repetition, becau se he is the “complaining party, not the
[league]” and he will never again participate in high school sports.
We agree with the league. While Goeden will not make another challenge to bylaw
110, there is a reasonable expectation that th e league may face a similar challenge in the
future: a student may repeat a year between seventh and twelfth grade due to a disability,
and may request an exception from the league to play additional semesters. The league
points to two district court cases, three news articles, and the district court’s finding that
the league “has provided exceptions to Bylaw 110 to high school students in the past,” as
evidence that the issue will likely recur. While the league does not detail the allegations in
those cases, the parties also cite federal opi nions considering similar discrimination and
reasonable accommodation claims by high school students to similar eligibility rules. See
Washington v. Ind. High Sc h. Athletics Ass’n, Inc. , 181 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 1999)
(student’s challenge to Indi ana High School Association’s se mester eligibility rule under
the ADA); McPherson, 119 F.3d at 455 (same challenge to Michigan association); Pottgen,
40 F.3d at 928 (same challenge to Missour i association). Altho ugh these challenges
involved the ADA and not the MHRA, they show that an issue like the one involved in this
appeal is capable of repetition.
2. Unlikely to evade review
While the issue on appeal is capable of re petition, it is not likely to evade review.
“Traditionally, cases that have been found to ev ade review involve disputes of an
inherently limited duration . . . .” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 5-6 (determining that case initiated
three years before appeal was not sufficiently “short-lived” to evade review). The league
9
claims that challenges to the bylaw 110 eligibility rule “almost always presents itself during
a student-athlete’s senior year when they have exhausted their semester eligibility.” Here,
Goeden requested a modification of the bylaw in early 2020, the spring of his junior year,
and filed his district court action in October 2020, the fall of his senior year.
The league argues that it was “not possi ble to fully litigate this case prior to
[Goeden’s] likely graduation da te/the end of the spring sports season.” We disagree. An
appellant may seek expedited review from the court of appeals by motion. See Minn. R.
Civ. App. P. 127. We may expedite the scheduling of a case “based on a showing of good
cause.” Minn. App. Spec. R. Prac. 1; see Leonard, St. & Deinard v. Marquette Assocs. ,
353 N.W.2d 198, 199 (Minn. App. 1984). The league co uld have sought expedited
scheduling of this appeal, but it did not.3 Had the league sought expedited review, this court
may have found good cause to issue a decision before Goeden graduated. Thus, future
appeals challenging the validity of bylaw 110 will not likely evade review.
B. The appeal does not have statewide significance because it is limited to
Goeden’s participation in high school sports.

Minnesota caselaw also provides appellate courts with “authorit y to decide cases
that are technically moot when those case s are functionally justiciable and present
important questions of statewide significance.” Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d at 736. Appellate

3 The league submits that “[a] motion for e xpedited review was not made because this
appeal has proceeded in an e xpedient fashion,” with the lea gue initiating its appeal eight
days after the district court’s order, and the transcripts delivered two days later. While true,
this appeal could have avoide d becoming moot had it been expedited at the league’s
request.
10
courts “apply this exception narrowly.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 6. Each requirement is
addressed in turn.
1. Functionally justiciable
“A case is functionally justiciable if the record contains the raw material (including
effective presentation of both sides of the i ssues raised) traditionally associated with
effective judicial decision-making.” Rud, 359 N.W.2d at 576. The supreme court has
determined that this requirement is met when both parties “made outstanding oral
arguments in support of their respective positions, and, significantly, both agreed that the
appeal should not be dismissed.” Id. (emphasis added). Goeden does not dispute that the
appeal is functionally justiciable. We concl ude that the parties made helpful arguments,
both in writing and orally, in support of thei r positions on the merits. Thus, the appeal is
functionally justiciable.
2. Statewide significance
The supreme court has described cases that have statewide significance as those that
present “urgency or significance.” Dean, 868 N.W.2d at 7. In Jasper v. Comm’r of Pub.
Safety, for example, the supreme court determin ed the issue on appeal was not moot, in
part, because the issue had statewide significance. 642 N.W.2d 435, 439-40 (Minn. 2002).
The appeal centered on the suitability of “the only breath-testing instrument currently in
use in this state.” Id. at 439. The supreme court also noted that “there has been substantial
litigation in the district courts as to whet her the instrument was properly approved.” Id.
Thus, the court reasoned, “the issue is one of public importance and statewide significance
that should be decided immediately.” Id. at 439-40. Similarly, in Brooks, the supreme court
11
addressed a cash-only bail issue even though the controversy had been mooted by the
appellant’s release, in part because the uns ettled issue could have “create[d] a class of
defendants with constitutional claims but no remedy.” 604 N.W.2d at 348. And in
Tschumy, the supreme court addressed a moot issue about a guardian’s authority to end life
support for an incapacitated person partly beca use the case presented “issues of life and
natural death and the ability of incapacitated Minnesotans to exercise self-determination
when it comes to declining further medical treatment.”4 853 N.W.2d at 740. The issue here,
in contrast, is far less significant.
We recognize that the league governs an important aspect of life for high school
students, parents, and faculty. The league bylaws affect high school sports across the state,
with more than 500-member high schools. But ev en if we assume, as the league argues,
that “application of bylaw 110 affects mo re than 200,000 [Minnesota high school
athletes],” the league only identifies a few isolated incidents in which students have
requested an exception to bylaw 110. And it is unclear on this record if any previous
challenges have been similar to Goeden’s MHRA argument. Thus, we cannot conclude that
the issue raised by this appeal is of statewide importance.
Also, the issue is not urge nt. The MHRA was adopted in 1973. 1973 Minn. Laws,
ch. 729, § 2, at 2160. Based on our research and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the
MHRA’s application to bylaw 110 is an issue of first impression. While the league requests

4 The supreme court’s decision to address the moot issue in Tschumy was not without
controversy: two justices dissented from the majority’s opinion to hear the appeal, arguing
that it “stretches the mootness doctrine beyond mere flexibility, into the realm of infinite
elasticity.” Tschumy, 853 N.W.2d at 763 (Stras, J., dissenting) (joined by Page, J.).
12
guidance for future cases, appellate courts do “not issue advisory opinions, nor decide cases
merely to establish precedent.” In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn. 1989).
In sum, a future appeal involving the sa me issue is likely, but probably will not
evade review given the availability of exped ited consideration. Also, this appeal, while
functionally justiciable, lacks statewide si gnificance and urgency because the temporary
restraining order was limited to Goeden. Because the league failed to show the applicability
of any exception to the mootness doctrine, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal.
Appeal dismissed.