State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0017

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Nicholas Chad Friese,
Appellant.

Filed October 25, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Chippewa County District Court
File No. 12-CR-20-286

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Matthew Haugen, Chippewa Co unty Attorney, Christopher Reisdorfer, Assistant County
Attorney, Montevideo, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his fourth-
degree-assault and domestic-assault convictions. We affirm.
FACTS

Throughout the day on June 8, 2020, appellant Nich olas Chad Friese argued with
his girlfriend, M.W. At one point, Friese “chucked part of [a] sectional sofa at” M.W. and
she put her hand out so she would not get hit. M.W. decided to leave. As she walked out
of the residence, Friese threw a plastic contai ner holding cat food at her. M.W. left with
her two daughters and called 911.
When the responding officer arrived, M.W. was “crying” and appeared “very
disturbed, and upset.” As M.W. and the officer discussed the incident, Friese approached
the officer. Friese “got up in front of [the officer’s] face” and “chestbutt[ed]” him. Friese
continued to “yell,” “scream,” and “spit” in th e officer’s face. The officer told Friese to
calm down or be charged with obstruction becau se the officer was attempting to talk to
M.W. The officer unholstered his taser. When Friese saw the officer’s taser he threatened
to get his “AR,” a type of rifle, and went back to the residence. M.W. told the officer that
she feared for her safety, and the officer decided to arrest Friese.
The officer approached the residence and saw Friese holding a brick. The officer
directed Friese to drop the brick and talk to him. Friese dropped the brick, but he went
inside the residence and yelled from a window that the officer threatened to shoot Friese’s
dog. Friese eventually ran out of the resi dence screaming “hands up, don’t shoot.” The
3
officer told Friese many times to put his hands behind his back and that he was under arrest
for domestic assault. Friese resisted. The officer pushed Friese against the porch and
handcuffed him. While the officer escorted Friese to the squad car, Friese kicked the
officer’s knee and they both fell. The officer got Friese into the squad car, but Friese
remained “combative” and “kick[ed] everything he could.” As the officer reached around
Friese to buckle the seatbelt, Friese “veered his head back and headbutted [the officer].”
Friese was charged with fourth-degree assault committed against a peace officer,
obstruction of legal process, and domestic assault—intent to cause fear or immediate bodily
harm or death. At Friese’s jury trial M.W. testified about the incident and stated that she
felt “[s]cared” and “[u]pset.” The officer testified that it wa s painful when Friese kicked
him. He also testified that Friese did not headbutt him accidentally and that afterward he
felt “dizzy” to the point of almost losing consciousness. The officer testified that he feared
for his safety. Friese did not testify. The jury found Friese guilty as charged.
The district court sentenced Friese to 365 da ys in jail, with 335 days stayed for two
years, and 30 days on work release or sent ence-to-service for his fourth-degree-assault
conviction, and to a concurrent 90 days in jail, with 60 days stayed for his domestic-assault
conviction. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Friese challenges the sufficiency of th e evidence supporting his convictions, arguing
that the state failed to prove the intent el ements of each offense. In reviewing an
insufficient-evidence claim, we analyze the record to dete rmine whether the evidence,
viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is sufficient to allow the jury to reach
4
the verdict that it did. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn. 1989). We assume that
“the jury believed the state’s witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” State
v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 108 (Minn. 1989).
Intent, because it involves a state of mind, is generally established circumstantially.
State v. Davis, 656 N.W.2d 900, 905 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. May 20, 2003).
Circumstantial evidence is “evidence from which the [jury] can infer whether the facts in
dispute existed.” State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
“Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a
whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude beyond a reasonable
doubt any reasonable infere nce other than guilt.” State v. Taylor , 650 N.W.2d 190, 206
(Minn. 2002).
We apply a heightened standard of review when presented with a challenge to the
circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction. State v. Porte , 832 N.W.2d 303, 309
(Minn. App. 2013). This review requires application of a two-step test. State v. Silvernail,
831 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Minn. 2013). First, we identify the circumstances proved. State v.
Andersen, 784 N.W.2d 320, 329 (Minn. 2010). In doing so, we defer “to the jury’s
acceptance of the proof of these circumstances” and its rejection of evidence that conflicted
with these circumstances. Id. Second, we examine “the re asonableness of all inferences
that might be drawn from the circumstances proved,” including “inferences consistent with
a hypothesis other than guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). During this independent
examination, we do not defer to the jury’s choice among reasonable inferences. Loving v.
State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643 (Minn. 2017).
5
Fourth-degree assault
The jury found Friese guilty of phys ically assaulting a peace officer. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.2231, subd. 1(b) ( 2018). This requires a finding that Friese intentionally
inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily harm on the officer. See id.; see also Minn. Stat.
§ 609.02, subd. 10 (2018). “B odily harm” is “physical pain or injury, illness, or any
impairment of physical condition.” Id., subd. 7 (2018). The officer testified that he
experienced physical pain or impairment when Friese kicked and headbutted him. Friese
does not challenge the evidence establishing that the officer experienced bodily harm;
rather, he challenges the eviden ce establishing that he intended the officer to experience
bodily harm.
“[A]ssault-harm, as defined by Minn. Stat. § 609.02 . . . is a general-intent crime.”
State v. Fleck , 810 N.W.2d 303, 309-10 (Minn. 2012). A general-intent crime does not
require an “intent to cause a particular result.” Id. at 308 (quotation omitted). What is
required is “only that the defendant engaged intentionally in specific, prohibited conduct.”
In re Welfare of C.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 802, 808 n.10 (Minn. 2000) (emphasis omitted). The
defendant must have engaged in a volitional act and not merely acted accidentally. Fleck,
810 N.W.2d at 312.
Here, the circumstances proved show that when the officer responded to the dispatch
of a possible domestic assault, Friese got in the officer’s face and “chestbutt[ed]” him;
Friese yelled, screamed, and spit in the officer’s face; Friese th reatened to retrieve a rifle
when the officer unholstered his taser; Frie se picked up a brick; Friese ran into the
residence when the officer atte mpted to talk to him; Frie se ran out of the residence
6
“screaming hands up, don’t shoot”; Friese resisted when the officer attempted to handcuff
him; Friese “kicked [the officer] in [his] knee” when they walked to the squad car; Friese
was “combative” and “kicking ever ything he could” in the s quad car; and Friese “veered
his head back and headbutted [t he officer]” as the officer at tempted to attach Friese’s
seatbelt.
Friese claims that the circumstances proved show that, instead of intending to inflict
bodily harm, he tripped and accidentally kick ed the officer or was pushed by the officer.
He also claims that, instead of intending to inflict bodily harm by headbutting the officer,
“their heads came into contact during a chao tic scene as [he] moved and struggled to
breathe.” But the evidence does not support these theories. The officer testified that Friese
did not accidentally headbutt him. But even if there was evidence supporting these acts
being accidents, “possibilities of innocence do not require reversal of a jury verdict so long
as the evidence taken as a whole makes such theories seem unreasonable.” State v. Stein,
776 N.W.2d 709, 719 (Minn. 20 10) (quotation omitted). The evidence taken as a whole
shows that Friese acted intentionally in inflicting bodily harm upon the officer.
Domestic assault
The jury found Friese guilty of domestic assault—committing an act with intent to
cause fear of immediate bodily harm or death. See Minn. Stat. § 609.2242, subd. 1(1)
(2018). Assault-fear is a specific-intent crime. Fleck, 810 N.W.2d at 309. The state was
required to prove that Friese intended to cause a particular result—to place M.W. in fear
of immediate bodily harm or death. See id. The state generally proves intent “from the
7
defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.” State v.
Cooper, 561 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997).
The circumstances proved show that Frie se and M.W. fought throughout the day;
Friese “chucked part of [a] sectional sofa at” M.W.; M.W. put her hand out to stop the sofa
from hitting her and hurt her hand; Friese threw a container of cat food at M.W.; and M.W.
left because she felt scared for her and her daughters.
These circumstances proved, considering the totality of the ci rcumstances, show
that Friese threw these items at M.W. intending to cause her to fear immediate bodily harm.
Friese claims that the circumstances proved show that, instead of intending to cause M.W.
to fear bodily harm, he only threw a section of a sofa and a container of cat food. But he
did not simply throw items. First, if he did not intend for M.W. to fear bodily harm, he
surely could have thrown something other than a section of a large piece of furniture.
Second, he threw the items at M.W. and he hit her. Finally , M.W. testified that she was
scared. The evidence taken as a whole shows th at Friese intended to cause M.W. to fear
immediate bodily harm or death. The ev idence was sufficient to sustain Friese’s
convictions.
Affirmed.