State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0019

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Ross William Bryniarski,
Appellant.

Filed July 26, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Morrison County District Court
File No. 49-CR-18-1930

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Middendorf, Morrison County Attorney, Little Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
In this direct appeal from the order revoking his probation, appellant argues that the
district court abused its discretion in revok ing his probation by determining the need for

2
his confinement outweighed the policies favori ng his continued proba tion. Because the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked appellant’s probation, we affirm.
FACTS
In December 2018, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Ross William
Bryniarski in a criminal complaint with felony violation of a harassment restraining order
(HRO) for having contact with the protected person in violation of the HRO. In February
2020, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charged count. The district court sentenced
appellant to a downward dispositional de parture of a 24-month commitment to the
department of corrections with imposition stay ed for five years, and placed appellant on
supervised probation for five years. As c onditions of his probati on, the district court
required that appellant remain law abiding, not use or possess alco hol or nonprescribed
controlled substances, and submit to chemical testing as directed by probation.
Six days after the sentencing hearing, probation filed a violation report alleging
appellant had violated the terms of his probation by failing to remain law abiding and using
controlled substances. The report specified that the state charged appellant in a criminal
complaint with domestic assault and damage to property for conduct that occurred just one
day after the district court granted a downward departure and placed him on probation, and
that appellant admitted to law enforcem ent during his arrest that he had used
methamphetamine. Police reports from the incide nt describe that appellant had “struck”
his mother “in the face under her chin” while at her home.
Appellant then underwent a chemical dependency evaluation which recommended,
among other things, that he complete a resi dential treatment program, submit to random

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testing, and not use alcohol or nonprescribed controlled substances. About a month after
his evaluation, probation filed an addendum to the violation report alleging appellant failed
to follow the evaluation recommendations by being discharged as unsuccessful from his
treatment program, failing to submit to random testing, and using methamphetamine and
THC.
The district court held a revocation hearin g. Appellant admitte d to violating the
conditions of his release by using methamphe tamine, not completing treatment, and not
submitting to random tes ting. The district court then revoked appellant’s probation and
executed his 24-month prison sentence. The district court determined that appellant
violated the conditions of hi s probation, that his viola tions were intentional and
inexcusable, and that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Before revoking probation, the district court must “1) designate the specific
condition or conditions that were violated; 2) find that the violation was intentional or
inexcusable; and 3) find that need for confinement outweighs the policies favoring
probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 250 (Minn. 1980). “The purpose of probation
is rehabilitation and revocation sh ould be used only as a last resort when treatment has
failed.” Id. “The [district] court has broad discre tion in determining if there is sufficient
evidence to revoke probation,” and appellate c ourts will reverse only “if there is a clear
abuse of that discretion.” Id. at 249-50. Whether the dist rict court made the required

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findings to revoke probation is a question of law, whic h we review de novo. State v.
Modtland, 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Minn. 2005).
Appellant does not challenge the district court’s findings on the first and second
Austin factors. He challenges only the third Austin-factor finding, arguing the need to
confine him does not outweigh the policies favoring probation.
The district court determined that the need for confinement outweighed the policies
favoring probation under the third Austin factor. When evaluating this factor, the district
court must make Modtland findings by “balanc[ing] the probationer’s interest in freedom
and the state’s interest in insuring hi s rehabilitation and the public safety.” Id. at 607
(quotation omitted). The district court considers whether “(i) confinement is necessary to
protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or ( ii) the offender is in
need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not
revoked.” Id. (quotation omitted). Only one subfactor is necessary to support revocation.
See Goldman v. Greenwood , 748 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Minn. 2008) (recognizing that
appellate courts “normally interpret the c onjunction ‘or’ as disjunctive rather than
conjunctive”). The district court found that the first and third subfactors supported
revocation. The record supports these findings.
As for the first subfactor, appellant’s confinement is necessary to protect the public
from further criminal activity. The record establishes that less than a week after being
placed on probation, appellant was charge d with assaulting hi s mother and had
methamphetamine in his system. The record also establishes that appellant failed to

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complete the recommended treatment program and submit to random testing. The district
court found based on this record that the “seriousness of [appellant’s] violations and the
blatant rejection of the Court’s direction and orders indicates” that appellant is “simply not
going to be compliant with the Court’s orders or the directions of [appellant’s] agent.” The
record supports the district court’s finding th at confinement is nece ssary to protect the
public from further criminal activity.
As for the third subfactor, declining to revoke probation would unduly depreciate
the seriousness of appellant’s violations. Af ter the first violation report in August 2020,
the district court warned appellant that it would “not . . . tolerate [appellant] walking out of
this courtroom and a day or two later being right back in here getting in legal trouble” and
that appellant would “go sit in prison if it is proven that [appellant had] done that.”
Appellant argues that the district court’s warning him of the consequences of future
violations shows that the decision to revoke probation was impermissibly “reflexive.” The
supreme court stated in Austin that the “decision to revoke cannot be a reflexive reaction
to an accumulation of technical violations but requires a showing that the offender’s
behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity.”
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (quotations omitted). But here, the district court gave specific
reasons based on the record explaining its Austin and Modtland findings that the need for
confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. When the district court reviewed
the addendum to the violation re port in September 2020, the di strict court found that not
revoking probation “would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violations” because
appellant had “multiple violations” following the initial violation report, which suggested

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“that [appellant] [isn’t] going to comply with probationary terms, and [appellant will]
continue to be noncompliant.” The record supports this finding. The findings were not a
reflexive reaction to appellant’s violations and instead stemmed from appellant’s failure in
treatment, continued use of c ontrolled substances, and enduri ng noncompliance with the
district court’s orders.
Because the record supports the district court’s factual finding s, and because the
district court made the findings required by Austin and Modtland to revoke probation, we
conclude that the district court did not a buse its discretion when it revoked appellant’s
probation and executed his sentence.
Affirmed.