State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0020

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michele Anne Reimann,
Appellant.

Filed September 7, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-18-15403

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atto rney, Nicole Cornal e, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ro ss, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant Michele Anne Reimann, who was convicte d of multiple counts of
criminal vehicular homicide after a stipulated -facts court trial, appeals her sentences.
Reimann argues that the district court abus ed its discretion by de nying her requests for
2
downward dispositional and durational sentencing departures and by imposing consecutive
rather than concurrent sentences. We affirm.
FACTS
On the evening of June 15, 2 018, after using crack cocaine and alcohol, Reimann
got into the driver’s seat of a friend’s va n while they were stopped at a Minneapolis
convenience store. With one friend in the convenience store and another friend, F.C., in
the passenger seat, Reimann sped out of the parking lot. She hit a parked car but continued
to drive at a high rate of speed. Eventually, Reimann barreled down an alley, crashing into
another parked car before co lliding with a utility pole. Tw o people had just exited the
parked car in the alley, and th e impact of the crash propelle d the car into them. One of
these individuals, T.O., died at the scene, and the second person was injured. F.C. was also
killed. Subsequent testing of Reimann’s blood confirmed that she had used cocaine. Her
alcohol concentration was also over the legal limit for driving.
Respondent State of Minnes ota charged Reimann with four counts of criminal
vehicular homicide: two counts for causing F. C.’s death and T.O.’s death while driving
with an alcohol concentration over 0.08 (counts I-II), and two co unts for negligently
causing both deaths with co caine in her body (counts III-IV ). Minn. Stat. § 609.2112,
subds. 1(a)(3), 1(a)(6) (2016); see also Minn. Stat. § 152.02, subd. 3(a)(4) (2016)
(categorizing cocaine under schedule II). She was also charged with criminal vehicular
operation for injuring T.O.’s passenger while driving under the influence of alcohol and
cocaine (count V). Minn. Stat. § 609.2113, subd. 3(2)(iii) (2016).
3
About one month after Reimann’s first cour t appearance, the district court ordered
a psychological examination of her competency to proceed. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 20.01.
A forensic psychologist deemed Reimann competent in an October 2018 report filed with
the district court. Reimann disputed the psychologist’s opinion, and a contested hearing
was set. On the day of the hearing, new concerns led the district court to order an updated
psychological examination. The same ps ychologist prepared a second report in
March 2019, opining that Reimann was now incompetent to proceed.1 The psychologist’s
second report documented concerns about Re imann’s mental health diagnoses, her
cessation of prescribed medications, and recent observations of “bizarre perceptions” and
“auditory hallucinations” (e.g., “believing jail staff moved into the [adjacent] housing unit
and raised children there,” and “hearing ‘devil music’”). The psychologist also theorized
that Reimann was experiencing “[t]ransient psychosis” in connection with a past traumatic
brain injury and domestic abuse.
The district court issued an order findi ng Reimann incompetent and referred her for
civil-commitment prepetition screening. Ultimately, however, Reimann did not qualify for
civil commitment. She underwent another psyc hological examination in April 2019, and
a second psychologist determined she had been restored to competency. The
psychologist’s corresponding report notes that Reimann’s recent psychotic symptoms were
likely attributable to her abrupt cessation of prescribed medications. Additionally, the
report documented Reimann’s hi story of mental health diag noses, including alcohol-use

1 Because Reimann had refused to participate in the second examination, the psychologist
noted that the updated report largely depended on collateral information from jail staff.
4
disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, cognitive disorder due
to traumatic brain injuries, and borderline personality disorder. But the psychologist
concluded that Reim ann’s functioning had improved since th e May 2019 report and
ultimately reasoned that Reimann was “able to rationally consult with counsel, understand
the proceedings, and participate in her defense.” The district court found her competent to
proceed.
In July 2019, the parties ag reed to a stipulated-facts tr ial on counts I through IV.
The state agreed to dismiss count V, and th e parties agreed to a sentencing cap of 126
months if Reimann was found guilty. Reimann admitted to nine sti pulated facts as her
counsel read them into the record. 2 The district court found Reimann guilty on all four
counts and, after denying her motion for downward sentencing departures, sentenced her
to concurrent prison sentences of 117 months for count I and 126 months for count II.
Months later, the parties agreed to re sentence Reimann with a reduced criminal
history score. 3 At resentencing, Reimann agai n moved for downward sentencing

2 Reimann also submitted a “Norgaard Addendum” and advised the district court that she
could not remember certain details from the night of the offenses. A Norgaard addendum
generally accompanies a guilty plea when a defendant cannot remember all or part of the
offense because of amnesia or intoxication. State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d
867 (Minn. 1961); see also State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 716 (Minn. 1994) (explaining
that when the defendant pleads guilty with a Norgaard plea, “the record must establish that
the evidence . . . is sufficient to persuade the defendant and his or her counsel that the
defendant is guilty or likely to be convicted of the crime charged”).

3 Reimann appealed her sentences in Decemb er 2019, claiming that the district court
miscalculated her criminal history score and erroneously denied her departure requests.
But then Reimann’s 2010 conviction for first-degree DWI test refusal was vacated pursuant
to Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), effe ctively reducing her criminal
history score and invalidating a statutory sentencing enhancement factored into the district
5
departures. She argued that she has a serious and persiste nt mental illness that warranted
an alternative placement to prison. Additiona lly, she argued that she lacked substantial
capacity for judgment at the time of her offenses due to her mental illness. See Minn. Stat.
§ 609.1055 (2016); Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D. 3.a(3) (2016). In support of her motion,
Reimann submitted multiple documents regard ing her mental health, including an
independent neuropsychological evaluation re port discussing her reduced functional
capacity. The district court denied Reimann’s downward departure requests, sentencing
her to the presumptive sentence of 48 mont hs in prison for count I and imposing a
permissive consecutive term of 42 months for count II.
Reimann appeals.
DECISION
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines aim to foster “uniform ity, proportionality,
rationality, and predictab ility in sentencing.” State v. Misquadace , 644 N.W.2d 65, 68
(Minn. 2002). Sentences prescribed by the sentencing guidelines—or presumptive
sentences—are “presumed to be appropriate” in every case. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1
(2020); State v. Soto, 855 N.W.2d 303, 308 (M inn. 2014). A district court must impose
the presumptive sentence or a sentence with in the presumptive range unless there are

court’s original sentences in this case. We granted the parties’ joint motion to stay the
appeal and to remand to the di strict court for resentencing. State v. Reimann , No. A19-
2061 (Minn. App. July 29, 2020) (order). After resenten cing, we dismissed Reimann’s
first appeal at her request. State v. Reimann, No. A19-2061 (Minn. App. Oct. 23, 2020)
(order).
6
“identifiable, substantial, and compelling circumstances” that support a departure from the
guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1; Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 308.
Here, the district court followed the sentencing guidelines in sentencing Reimann’s
two convictions for criminal vehicular homicide. But Reimann argues that the district court
should have imposed less serious sentences because there were substantial and compelling
circumstances to support departures from the sentencing guidelines.
A district court has broad discretion in sentencing. State v. Walker , 913 N.W.2d
463, 468 (Minn. App. 2018). As the appellate court, we must give significant deference to
the district court’s sentencing decision. Id. We only reverse sentencing decisions in rare
cases when the district court has abused its discretion. See id. If the record shows that the
district court carefully evaluated all of the information presented before sentencing, we will
not disturb the district court’s decision. State v. Pegel, 795 N.W.2d 251, 255 (Minn. App.
2011).
Reimann contends that this is one of the rare case s where a district court’s
sentencing decisions should be reversed. She argues that the district court abused its
discretion by refusing to depart from the sentencing guidelines based on her mental health
and cognitive impairments, and by imposing permissive consecutive sentences that
unfairly exaggerate the criminality of her cond uct. For the reasons discussed below, we
disagree.
7
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Reimann’s requests
for downward departures from the sentencing guidelines.

To depart from the senten cing guidelines, the district court must find that
“aggravating or mitigating circ umstances are present and th ose circumstances provide a
substantial and compelling reason not to impose a guidelines sentence.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d
at 308 (quotations and citations omitted). S ubstantial and compelling circumstances are
those that “overcome the presumption in favor of the guidelines sentence” by making the
case distinguishable. Id. Because “[a] departure is not mandatory,” we are reluctant to
reverse a district court’s refusal to grant a departure. Walker, 913 N.W.2d at 468.
Reimann moved for both di spositional and durational departures. We first examine
her requests for downward dispositional departures.
“A dispositional departure is one that st ays a presumptively executed sentence, or
executes a presumptively stayed sentence.” State v. Stempfley, 900 N.W.2d 412, 415 n.5
(Minn. 2017). Reimann argues that she was entitled to downward dispositional departures
for her two criminal vehicular homicide convictions—in other words, probation instead of
the prison sentences called for by the sentenci ng guidelines. At sentencing, Reimann
identified two grounds for her dispositional-departure requests.
First, under the authority of Minnesota Statutes section 609.1055, Reimann argued
that she has a serious and pers istent mental illness requiri ng treatment in a probationary
setting rather than prolonged incarceration. Under section 609.1055, a district court may
place an offender with a serious and persiste nt mental illness on probation instead of in
prison, conditioned on successful completion of “an appropriate supe rvised alternative
8
living program [with] a mental health treatment component,” so long as the arrangement is
“consistent with public safety.” Minn. Stat. § 609.1055.
At resentencing, the district court care fully evaluated this proposed departure
ground. The district court noted that it had thoroughly reviewed the many documents and
reports that Reimann had submitted in suppor t of her departure requests. It weighed
Reimann’s mental health and need for trea tment against her criminal history and the
severity of the crimes being sentenced. Th e district court noted that Reimann had not
submitted a proposal for a placement that would satisfy section 609.1055. And the district
court stated that “the public is simply in danger when [Reimman] is not in a secure setting.”
The district concluded, based on its review of the record and the statute, that dispositional
departures were unwarranted. Because the district court evaluated the facts and the law,
and reached a reasoned decision regarding th e applicability of s ection 609.1055 to
Reimann’s case, there was no abuse of discretion. See State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917,
925 (Minn. App. 2013) (explaining no abuse of discretion generally occurs when the
district court carefully considers informati on in the record befo re imposing a guideline
sentence), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013).
Reimann argues that the district court ab used its discretion by also noting that she
is not particularly amenable to probation. According to Reimann, she was not required to
establish her particular amenability to proba tion to obtain a dispositional departure under
section 609.1055. Although Reimann correctly observes that amenability to probation is
not a prerequisite for a depart ure under the statute, we see no abuse of discretion in the
district court’s remark. Section 609.1055 requires a district court to conclude that
9
probation would be “cons istent with public safety.” Th e district court’s comment that
Reimann is not amenable to probation parallels its finding that Reimann is a threat to public
safety when she is not in a secure setting.
As a second basis for her requested dow nward dispositional departures, Reimann
argued to the district court that she lacked substantial capacity fo r judgment due to her
mental health and cognitive impairment s when she committed the offenses. See Minn.
Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a(3). This is a r ecognized departure ground under the sentencing
guidelines. Id. “The degree to which [a defenda nt] lack[s] substantial capacity for
judgment is the type of factual issue best decided by the [district] court.” State v. Barsness,
473 N.W.2d 325, 329 (Minn. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Aug. 29, 1991).
The district court considered and ackno wledged Reimann’s mental health and
cognitive challenges before and during the offenses. But th e district court ultimately
rejected Reimann’s requests for probation on this ground. The district court explained that
Reimann’s “long documented intellectual defi cits” were exacerbated by her “voluntary
drug and alcohol use.” Furthermore, the district court remarked that despite opportunities
for treatment, Reimann had not improved. Fina lly, the district court noted that placing
Reimann on probation “would significantly undermine the seriousness of this case.”
Again, the district court— which was in the best positio n to evaluate the proposed
departure ground—did not abuse its discretion. The district court considered Reimann’s
requests, determined that the circumstances di d not justify a departure, and explained the
bases for its decision.
10
Reimann also argues that the district court abused its disc retion by denying her
requests for downward durational departures. “[A] durational departure is a sentence that
departs in length from the pres umptive guidelines range.” State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d
618, 623 (Minn. 2016). At sentencing, Reim ann argued that her crimes were less serious
because her brain injury and mental illness made her less culpable. Citing two cases for
the proposition that severe mental illness is a mitigating factor that supports a sentencing
departure—State v. Martinson, 671 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn.
Jan. 20, 2004), and Barsness, 473 N.W.2d at 329—Reimann contends that the district court
erred in imposing the presumptive prison terms.
The district court gave Re imann’s motion due considerati on and, in its discretion,
chose not to depart. The caselaw that Reiman n offers does establish that severe mental
health diagnoses may provid e substantial and compelling grounds for a departure.
Martinson, 671 N.W.2d at 891-92; Barsness, 473 N.W.2d at 329. In both cases, we
affirmed decisions to depart based on severe mental illness. But these cases do not require
a district court to grant a departure on this gr ound. A district court has discretion to deny
a departure motion, even in the presence of a valid basis for departure. See State v. Wall,
343 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Minn. 1984) (“The fact that a mitigating factor [is] clearly present
[does] not obligate the court to place [a] defe ndant on probation or impose a shorter term
than the presumptive term.”). The district c ourt therefore did not abuse its discretion by
sentencing Reimann to the presumptive sentences provided by the sentencing guidelines.4

4 Reimann also argues that the district cour t clearly erred by concluding that she initially
failed to accept responsibility for her offenses because she had a stipulated-facts court trial.
11
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive
sentences.

When a defendant commits separate offenses against separate victims, a district
court may impose consecutive sentences for each offense. State v. Rhoades, 690 N.W.2d
135, 139 (Minn. App. 2004). Whether to impose permissive consecutive sentences under
these circumstances is a decisi on within the district court’s discretion that we review for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Ali, 855 N.W.2d 235, 258 (Minn. 2014); see Minn. Stat.
§ 609.15 (2016). Appellate courts are reluctant to interfere with a district court’s decision
to sentence consecutively unless the aggregate sentence “is disproportionate to the offense
or it unfairly exaggerates the criminality of the defendant’s conduct.” Ali, 855 N.W.2d at
259; see also Minn. Stat. § 244.11, subd. 2( b) (2016). “In cases with multiple victims,
consecutive sentences are rarely, if ever, disproportionate to the offense.” Ali, 855 N.W.2d
at 259 (emphasis added); see also State v. McLaughlin , 725 N.W.2d 703, 715-16 (Minn.
2007). The appellate court determines whether consecutive sentencing unfairly
exaggerates the criminality of a defendant’s actions by considering sentences in similar
cases. State v. Lee, 491 N.W.2d 895, 902 (Minn. 1992).

She suggests that the district court improperly used this finding as a basis for denying her
downward dispositional departure requests. We see no error in the remarks, which were
made in passing while the district court ar ticulated its many reasons for imposing the
presumptive sentences. The record supports the district court’s finding. Reimann did elect
to have a stipulated-facts court trial. More over, the record shows that Reimann initially
denied she was the driver of the vehicle when she spoke with police at the scene of the
crash. We also note that the district c ourt credited Reimann’s ultimate acceptance of
responsibility following the verdicts.
12
Reimann argues that the district court’ s consecutive sentences unfairly exaggerate
her culpability. She contends that a 90-month prison sentence—the aggregate duration of
her two consecutive sentences—ignores her underlying mental health struggles. She also
highlights other cases where defendants char ged with similar crim es received lighter
sentences. See State v. Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d 225, 226 (Minn. 1995); State v. Johnson, No.
A19-0041, 2020 WL 4 13345, at *1 (Minn. App. Jan. 27, 2020), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 14, 2020). And she mainta ins that the reduction of her original sentence from 126
months to 90 months is unfairly disproportionate becaus e her criminal history score was
effectively reduced to zero when she was resentenced.
We disagree with Reimann that the aggr egate sentence of 90 months in prison
unfairly exaggerates her culpability. Although Reimann has experienced trauma in her life
and she has a documented hist ory of mental health and co gnitive issues, these challenges
do not mitigate the severity of her crime. Reimann killed tw o people while driving after
she had voluntarily consumed alcohol and cocain e. In each of the cases Reimann cites,
there was one life lost. See Chaklos, 528 N.W.2d at 226; Johnson, 2020 WL 413345, at *1.
And we have affirmed lengthier aggregate sent ences in cases involving multiple victims.
See State v. Watson , No. A18-1362, 2019 WL 2415016 (Minn. Ap p. June 10, 2019)
(affirming 111-month aggregate sentence wh ere defendant was convicted of criminal
vehicular homicide and two counts of crimin al vehicular operation for killing one person
and injuring two others), review denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2019); see also State v.
Fredrickson, No. A14-0689, 2015 WL 1959695, at *3 (Minn. App. May 4, 2015)
(affirming 96-month aggregate sentence imposed for two criminal vehicular homicide
13
convictions, 48 months for each death), review denied (Minn. Oct. 20, 2015). Because
Reimann’s aggregate sentence is not dispropor tionate to her crimes, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.
Finally, we reject Reimann’s contention that the district court was required to apply
a specific formula upon resent encing to ensure that Re imann’s new sentences were
proportional to her original sentences, which were based on an incorrect criminal history
score. Reimann cites no authority to support this argument and we are unaware of any case
or rule that imposes such an obligation.
Affirmed.