In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. B. and C. J. W., Parents.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0021

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of: A. B. and C. J. W., Parents.

Filed June 14, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

LeSueur County District Court
File No. 40-JV-19-115

Adam L. Hinz, Megan L. Brooks Law, LLC, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant A.B.)

Connor B. Burton, Messick Law, PLLC, Woodbury, Minnesota (for intervenor J.W.)

Brent Christian, LeSueur County Attorney, Robert C. Whipps, Assistant County Attorney,
Le Center, Minnesota (for respondent LeSueur County Department of Human Services)

Linda Gerr, Faribault, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this termination-of-parental-rights case, appellant challenges the district court’s
interim decision to relieve respondent of reunification efforts pending a termination hearing
and the district court’s ultimate decision to terminate her parental rights. First, we conclude
that because respondent’s motion to relieve the county of reunification efforts includes
allegations that, if true, support the district court’s decision, the district court did not abuse

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its discretion when it granted that motion. Second, we conclude that the district court did
not clearly err in making factual findings or abuse its discretion in analyzing either the best
interests factors or respondent’ s efforts to reunify appellant and her children. We affirm
the district court’s decision.
FACTS
After execution of a search warrant at appe llant A.B.’s residence in January 2019,
law enforcement officers recovered methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia within reach
of A.B.’s minor children. Shortly thereafte r, respondent LeSueur County Department of
Human Services (the county) initiated child protection proceedings regarding the minor
children1 and on February 22, 2019, A.B. admitted that the minor children were in need of
protective services. The district court adjudi cated the children in need of protection or
services, and temporarily transferred custody of the children to the co unty. A.B. and the
county proceeded with a case plan intended to address A.B.’s chemical dependency, mental
health, employment, and housing.
On October 8, 2019, the county petitioned to terminate A.B.’s parental rights for the
two minor children. In Fe bruary 2020, the co unty amended its permanency petition,
seeking an involuntary transfer of custody rather than termination. On June 12, 2020, the
county moved to be relieved of reunification efforts, and on June 22, 2020, the district court
granted the county’s motion, determining that the county made a prima facie showing of

1 At the time, A.B. had three minor children, but one child has since reached majority. The
younger minor child is presently five years old and the older child is 15. While this appeal
was pending, the older child (J.W.) filed a motion to intervene in the appeal, and this court
granted the request.

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the futility of further reunification efforts. The county then fi led another amended
permanency petition, again requesting termination of A.B.’s parental rights, and the matter
proceeded to trial in November 2020. Following trial, the district court terminated A.B.’s
parental rights to the two minor children. Given the issues on appeal, we address the facts
concerning the district court’s June 22, 2020 order, the facts concerning the district court’s
ultimate determination that termination was in the children’s best interests, and the district
court’s ultimate determination that the county made reasonable efforts towards
reunification prior to the June 22, 2020 order.
A. Motion Regarding Further Reunification Efforts
In June 2020, the county requested an order allowing the county to cease
reunification efforts because further reunification efforts would be futile. The county based
its motion on an attached social worker’s report, which provided an update regarding
visitation, the out-of-home placement plan, th e services provided by the county, and the
county’s efforts to establish permanency. The report indicated that A.B. was not compliant
with portions of the case plan, included factual allegations that A.B. failed to abstain from
drugs, continued to associate with known dr ug users, did not successfully complete
treatment, and did not maintain stable employment, among other allegations of
noncompliant conduct. For example, the re port stated that although A.B. completed
“inpatient and outpatient treatment . . . , she has also been discharged as unsuccessful from
two treatment programs.” The report also stated that A.B. “has remained in contact and
having sexual relations with her [boyfriend] whom she used to use methamphetamine with
and remains in contact with non-healthy supports.” Additionally, the report stated that on

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May 12, 2020, a transition plan was created with a trial home visit scheduled for May 29,
2020, but that A.B. relapsed on two different occasions before the trial home visit could
start. Specifically, A.B. tested positive for methamphetamine on May 14, 2020, and the
county canceled the first scheduled visit. When questioned about the positive test result,
A.B. “denied any recent use and indicated that she has no idea how this sample was
positive,” and “indicated that the positive UA was from having sexual intercourse with [her
boyfriend].” A.B. again tested positive for methamphetamine on May 27, 2020, but
continued to deny using methamphetamine.
The report concluded that A.B. “continues to not take accountability for her actions
as she denied her use of Methamphetamine even after the lab confirmation was received,”
“is at high risk for relapse,” and that her “actions indicate that she lacks relapse prevention
and the impulsivity skills that are essential for extended recovery.” Thus, the report
recommended “that the court relieve the county of reunification efforts.” The social worker
also attested to the truth of the facts contained in the report, signing the report and vowing
that “[t]he Content of this report is true based upon information and belief, personal
observation, and firsthand knowledge.”
On June 22, 2020, the district court stated that “[a] memorandum of law and Social
Worker’s Court Report were submitted in support of [the county’s motion].” The district
court found that “permanency guidelines have been extended twice in this case, but the
parties are no further along than where the cas e initially started.” The district court
determined that “due to pos itive tests for methamphetamine and admissions to use of
methamphetamine, her continual relationship with [her boyfriend], and the repeated

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opportunities given to A.B. and her failure to comply, the County has made reasonable
efforts for reunification, but the reunifications have been futile.” Accordingly, the district
court granted the county’s motion and relieve d the county of its obligation to provide
further reunification efforts pending trial.
B. Facts Regarding Best Interests of the Children
Trial began on November 23 , 2020. The parties stipul ated to the admission of 60
exhibits, and the district court received tes timony from the child protection investigator,
A.B., the younger chil d’s foster mother, the guardian ad litem (GAL), the social worker,
two of A.B.’s children who have reached the age of majority, and A.B.’s current treatment
counselor. We summarize the ev idence presented and the dist rict court’s determinations
regarding the children’s best interests.
The evidence presented established the following facts. Law enforcement officers
executed a search warrant at a residence where A.B. lived. At that time, A.B. informed the
county that the children woul d reside with others until sh e could find a ne w, safe home
where she could live with the children. A.B. dropped off the younger child, who was not
quite three years old, with a caregiver, but provided that person with no contact information
for her and the caregiver was unable to take th e child to the doctor or dentist. The child
had a rash all over her legs, was “covered in bruises,” and had “a dead tooth.” In addition,
a hair follicle submitted for testing from the younger child tested positive for
methamphetamine. The county took emergency protective custody of the child and placed
the child in foster care in Fe bruary 2019. The child had st ayed with the foster care
providers occasionally since 20 16. The child “displayed a strong attachment to the

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providers” and “has been in the providers’ care off and on since she was born and has her
own room, toys, and clothing.” The foster mother testified that the child has been calling
her “mom” since she was a little over one year old. The county developed an out-of-home
placement plan for A.B. that identified the following basic needs for the ch ildren: food,
shelter, clothing, housing, therapy, childcare, and medical and dental care. The county was
particularly concerned with the children’s need for stable housing free of all illegal drugs
and free from drug users.
Due to several behavioral concerns, the younger child was enrolled in occupational,
speech, and play therapy. A progress report stated that while the child was initially making
quick progress, “[a]round 10/16/19, [the child] began to regress in her speech production,
exhibited the use of more baby talk, was very emotional, and needed extensive redirection
and feedback for speech articulation tasks.” A diagnostic assessment diagnosed the child
with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and stated that the child “directly experienced
and witnessed traumatic events . She exhibits recurrent distressing dreams in which the
content appears to be related to the trauma. [The child] displays physiological reactions to
reminders of the traumatic event and experien ces psychological distress at exposure to
external cues.” The assessment also stated that the child “attempts to avoid visits with
[A.B.] as indicated by the presence of cha llenging behaviors before and after these visits
occur,” and “is irritable, especially following or leading up to visits.” It was also reported
that the child “pointed to the scared and angry toys when talking about [A.B.]” and that the
child “appeared to have some difficulty with processing emotions related to [A.B.].”

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The foster mother also testified that the child would experience behavioral issues
following visits with A.B. This included “speech delays, things going on with her wanting
to eat or not wanting to eat, having meltdow ns, being mad and angry at daycare, being
mean and outburst at friends, things like that.” Additiona lly, the child experienced
difficulty sleeping and bed-wetting. The foster mother further testified that the child
“would have these issues ever y time she came back from a visit and then she would get
better a day or two, three days later, and then she would have another visit and she would
come back all emotional and everything again. ” The foster mother explained that these
issues and behavioral changes occurred afte r supervised visits with A.B. The GAL
corroborated this testimony, stating that after visits with A.B. ended in September 2020,
the child was “calmer, rarely has night terrors anymore or any extreme behaviors that she
previously had during the visits with [A.B.].”
The evidence also related to J.W., who experienced ongoing behavioral and mental
health challenges. A diagnostic assessment from November 20, 2019, stated that “he is
angry and irritable every day, that he isolates and presents withdrawn, and struggles with
falling and staying asleep every day.” The assessment also indicated that he engaged in
one-to-three fights or arguments per week; often felt hopeless, irritable, and annoyed; had
few interests; and found no pleasure in usua l activities. The assessment also diagnosed
J.W. with major depressive disorder and stated that J.W. “reported that his symptoms have
been present for the past year and currently impact his func tioning.” The social worker
reported that J.W. has also struggled with school and with using marijuana. J.W. testified
that he desired to return to A.B.’s care. The social worker and the GAL, however, testified

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that they were concerned that J.W. did not have enough information to make that decision
and did not “necessarily understand the whole situation.”
The social worker and the GAL also both expressed concerns about returning J.W.
to A.B.’s care due to his impulsivity, his hist ory with substance abuse, and A.B.’s failure
to correct similar issues. For instance, A.B. continued treatment beginning August 5, 2020,
at Allina Health and through trial at Nystrom. Both facilities, however, expressed concern
about A.B.’s mental health. The evidence regard ing Allina Health indicated that while
participating in treatment, A.B. displayed th e following behavior: “[v]erbal aggression at
times, unwillingness to comply w ith group activities, [and] refusal of mental health
services despite diagnoses of anxiety, depr ession, and PTSD.” The report from Nystrom
indicated that A.B. has “difficulty with impul se control and lacks coping skills,” “lacks
mental health support,” and “has poor re cognition and understanding of relapse and
recidivism issues and displays moderately high vulnerability of further substance use or
mental health problems.” Nystrom also reported that A.B. “struggles to maintain sob[riety]
outside of a structured setting.” At trial, A.B. admitted to usi ng methamphetamine on
September 19, 2020, and Octobe r 14, 2020. A.B. also stat ed that she had not attended
sober support group meetings in a few weeks and attende d “[m]aybe three” since
September 2020. Ultimately, both the GAL and the social worker testified that because
A.B. had not adequately addressed her mental health and chemical dependency, it is not in
the children’s best interests to return to A.B.’s care.
Following trial, the district court made the following findings regarding the younger
child: (1) A.B. left the child wi th a caregiver and, at the time, the child’s hair follicle test

9
was positive for methamphetamine and the child had a dead tooth th at required medical
attention; (2) the child has been diagnosed with PTSD; (3) the ch ild now attends play
therapy, occupational therapy, and speech therapy; (4) the child pointed to the “scared and
angry toys” during play therapy when talking about A.B.; (5) the child exhibited negative
changes to her personality and behavior after visits with A.B., including temper tantrums,
regressive speech, night terro rs, and bed-wetting; (6) thes e behaviors “significantly
decreased or ceased entirely when visits with [A.B.] stopped or we re paused during the
case”; and (7) the child has lived with her foster parents for ha lf of her life and refers to
them as “mom” and “dad” while she refers to A.B. by her first name. Regarding J.W., the
district court made the followi ng findings: (1) he was not liv ing fulltime with A.B. when
the county took legal custody of him; (2) he has been diag nosed with major depressive
disorder; (3) he is often angry and irritable and feels afraid that something awful might
happen; (4) he frequently suffe rs from stomach aches and has difficulty falling asleep;
(5) he has struggled with chemical dependency issues, and (6) he stated a preference to be
returned to A.B.’s care.
The district court also made various findings regarding A.B., her chemical
dependency, and her mental health. The district court found that A.B. has been diagnosed
with Stimulant Related Disorder-Amphetamine type substance and has failed to adequately
address her chemical dependency. The dist rict court noted that she has “attended six
different treatment programs, yet continues to abuse methamphetamine,” “struggles to
maintain sobriety outside of a structured setting,” and “has failed to avoid the drug
community and drug users, specifically including her boyfriend.” The district court found

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that A.B.’s “chemical dependency directly impacts her ability to provide safe, sober, and
stable parenting” and that “her chemical depe ndency is likely to continue to affect her
ability to safely parent her children for the reasonably foreseeable future.” Regarding her
mental health, the district court found that A.B. has been diagnos ed with Unspecified
Depressive Disorder and Unspecified Anxiety Disorder, and that A.B. “has failed to
adequately address her mental health needs.” The district court found that this contributed
to her difficulties in maintaining sobriety and being able to provide a safe and stable home
for the children. The district court determined that A.B. “is not able to care for the children
and meet their specific needs at this time or within the foreseeable future.”
The district court then weighed each of the best interests factors. The district court
noted that both A.B. and J.W. wa nt to preserve the parent-child relationship. The district
court determined that the yo unger child’s interest in pr eserving the relationship is
negligible because she has lived with her foster parent for half of her life, refers to them as
“mom” and “dad” while she refers to A.B. by her first name, suffers from PTSD, and has
experienced significant behavioral issues after visiting with A.B. The district court also
determined that “the children have compe ting interests in having caregivers who
themselves are safe, sober, and stable individua ls.” Specifically, the district court noted
that A.B. “has failed to maintain her sobrie ty, failed to establish connections with sober
supports, failed to avoid the drug community and drug users, and has failed to adequately
address her mental health needs.” The dist rict court also expr essed concern over how
J.W.’s “mental health and chem ical dependency issues woul d be addressed when [A.B.]
has failed to address her own identical issues.” The district court concluded that these

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competing interests outweighed J.W.’s desire to live with A.B. and that it was in the
children’s best interests to terminate A.B.’s parental rights.
C. Facts Regarding Reasonable Efforts
The district court received the county’s out-of-home placement plans into the trial
record. According to the plans, A.B. was requir ed to undergo and follow the
recommendations of both a needs assessment and a chemical dependency assessment. In
addition, the social worker testified that because the county was also concerned with A.B.’s
mental health, A.B. also had to undergo a psychological assessment and follow those
recommendations. The social worker further te stified that the purpose of referrals and
assessments is to obtain recommendations from specialists based on a person’s history and
personal references. The various recommendations in the initial and updated assessments
included outpatient and inpatient chemical dependency treatment as well as mental health
treatment through therapy.
Pursuant to the case plan, A.B. also ha d to satisfy the following requirements:
submit to drug testing, obtain and maintain stable employment, re main law abiding and
free of all nonprescription chemicals, avoid the drug community and drug users, follow
through with any services needed or reco mmended for the children, attend scheduled
supervised visits, and remain in contact w ith the social worker. The social worker
explained how the county assisted A.B. to sa tisfy those requirements. For example, the
social worker explained how the county coordinated with various service providers to
begin meeting with and treating A.B., provided A.B. with transportation, provided A.B.
with gas cards, made the down payment for an apartment, assisted A.B. to attend

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appointments, and generally worked with A.B. to “achieve what needed to be done.” The
trial record also indicates th at the county endeavored to satisfy the dental, medical,
developmental, behavioral, and mental health needs of A.B.’s children.
The GAL and the social worker testified regarding A.B.’s relapses, which impacted
her progress toward reunification. The social worker noted that each time A.B. relapsed,
the county’s efforts would stall and they would have to start all over again. For instance,
in May 2019, A.B. tested positive for metham phetamine, but she cont inued to deny that
she had used methamphetamine. Then, A. B. submitted an altered UA sample and
subsequently tested positive for methampheta mine in July 2019 a nd two more times in
August 2019. A.B. was subsequently discharged from treatment due to her continued use
and her lack of interest in mental health c ounseling that the treatm ent facility observed.
A.B.’s relapse and discharge from treatment interrupted the co unty’s efforts for
reunification. A.B. transiti oned to unsupervised visits in June 2019, but the county
reinstated the supervision re quirement due to A.B.’s con tinued positive drug tests.
Likewise, although the county initially oppo sed A.B.’s requests to schedule trial home
visits, the county ultimately developed a transition plan permitting unsupervised visitation
in April 2020 followed by trial home visits by the end of May 2020, conditioned in part on
A.B.’s sobriety. Shortly afte r the transition to unsupervised visits, but before her first
unsupervised overnight visit, A.B. relapsed ag ain. She also initially denied using drugs
and attributed the test results to physical contact between her and her boyfriend. Based on
A.B.’s continued drug use, the county suspended unsupervised visits and, as noted above,
changed course, requesting to cease further reunification efforts.

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Based on this evidence, the district court found that the county made the following
reasonable efforts: chemical dependency asse ssments, outpatient trea tment at House of
Hope, inpatient treatment at Wellcome Manor, outpatient treatment at Northstar, outpatient
treatment at Christian Family Solutions, mental health assessments and referrals,
diagnostic assessment at Associated Psychological Services, frequent supervised visitation,
drug testing, payment of $895 towards A.B.’s rent, transportation and gas cards, referral to
parent coaching, diagnostic assessment for J. W., mental health therapy for the younger
child, and relapse prevention and trial home visit plan. The district court determined that
this “was relevant to the safety and protecti on of the children, was believed to have been
adequate to meet the needs of the children and family, wa s culturally appropriate, was
available and accessible, was consistent and timely, and was realistic under the
circumstances.”
Consistent with the above findings, the di strict court terminated A.B.’s parental
rights, and A.B. appeals.
DECISION
I. Determination that the County Made a Prima Facie Showing of Futility
A.B. argues that the district court erred when it relieved the county of reunification
efforts in its June 22, 2020 order. Becaus e the county’s motion includes allegations that,
if true, support the district court’s determ ination that the county made a prima facie
showing of futility, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it relieved the county
of reunification efforts.

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“Reasonable efforts to prev ent placement and for rehabilitation and reunification
are always required except upon a determination by the court that a petition has been filed
stating a prima facie case that,” in relevant part, “the provi sion of services or further
services for the purpose of reunification is futile and therefore unreasonable under the
circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(a)(7) (2020). “When statutes explicitly entrust the
district court to determine what is appropriat e, we review for an abuse of discretion.” In
re Welfare of A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 660 (Minn. App. 2018); see also Boland v. Murtha,
800 N.W.2d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011) (stating that, in the contexts of motions to restrict
parenting time and motions to modify custody, “we review de novo whether the district
court properly treated the alle gations in the moving party’s affidavits as true” and “we
review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s determination as to the existence of a
prima facie case”). “In such cases, we will not conclude that a district court has abused its
discretion absent a resolution of the question that is against logic and the facts of record.”
A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 660.
A.B. first argues that the district court erred because the dist rict court did not
specifically find that a “petition has been filed stating a prima facie case” that further efforts
would be futile. We disagree. The district court’s order states that the county’s motion is
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 260.0 12(a)(7) and includes the social worker’s
report. The district court then accepted the allegations in the report as true and determined
that reunification efforts to that point had been futile. On th is record, we infer that the
district court ruled that the county filed a petition alleging a prima facie case of futility.

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We are not convinced that the absence of th e specific language A.B. requests amounts to
an abuse of discretion.
A.B. also argues that the district court ab used its discretion in determining that the
county made a prima facie showing of futility . Again, we are not convinced. “At the
prima-facie-case stage of the proceeding, [the movant] need not establish anything. [The
movant] need only make allegations which, if true, would allow the district court to grant
the relief he seeks.” Amarreh v. Amarreh, 918 N.W.2d 228, 231 (Minn. App. 2018), review
denied (Minn. Oct. 24, 2018). This court has upheld a district court’s futility determination
when a parent failed to utilize many of the services the county offered, the county used
available resources to try and reunite the parent and the child, and the child’s needs would
not be met if returned to the parent. See In re A.R.M., 611 N.W.2d 43, 46, 50 (Minn. App.
2000).
Here, the county’s motion alleged that A.B. was not compliant with portions of the
case plan, including failure to abstain fro m mood-altering chemicals, avoid the drug
community and drug users, maintain stab le employment, and refer for treatment
coordination. Specifically, the county alle ged that A.B. had been “discharged as
unsuccessful from two treatment programs, has remained in contact and having sexual
relations with her [boyfriend] whom she used to use methamphetamine with and remains
in contact with non-healthy supports.” The county also alleged that A.B. relapsed on two
different occasions before the trial home visit could start, one of which was a week before
the first scheduled unsupervised overnight visit. The report also stated that A.B. “continues
to not take accountability for her actions as she denied her use of Methamphetamine even

16
after the lab confirmation was received,” “is at high risk for relapse,” and that her “actions
indicate that she lacks relapse prevention and the impulsivity skills that are essential for
extended recovery.” All these concerns addr ess the situation that resulted in the out-of-
home placement in the first instance. Because these allegations, if true, would allow the
district court to rule that additional reunification efforts would be futile, the district court’s
decision that the county made a sufficient pr ima facie showing of futility was not against
logic or the facts in the record. We concl ude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion and affirm its decision to relieve the county of reunification efforts.
II. Best Interests Factors
We construe A.B.’s argument on appeal to include a challenge to the district court’s
factual findings underlying its analysis of the children’s best interests. In addition, we
understand A.B. to separately ch allenge the weight that the di strict court afforded to the
best interests factors. We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in its factual
findings and did not abuse its discretion in conducting the requisite best interests analysis.
To ensure the welfare of minor children, Minnesota law authorizes the termination
of parental rights for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re Welfare of M.D.O., 462 N.W.2d
370, 375 (Minn. 1990). When a statutory basis to terminate parental rights exists, “the best
interests of the child must be the paramount consideration.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd.
7 (2020). To determine the best interests of the child, the district court “must balance three
factors: (1) the child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s
interest in preserving the pare nt-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the
child.” In re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (M inn. App. 1992); see also Minn. R.

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Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (re quiring the district court to consider these factors in
termination proceedings). “Competing intere sts include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” Id. In weighing these
factors, the district court must “explain why termination is in the best interests of the child,”
In re Welfare of the Child of D.L.D. , 771 N.W.2d 538, 545 (Minn. App. 2009), but is not
required to “go into great detail,” In re Welfare of Child of W.L.P. , 678 N.W.2d 703, 711
(Minn. App. 2004).
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, In re Welfare of Child
of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012), and we review the district court’s ultimate
determination regarding the best interest s factors for an abuse of discretion, W.L.P., 678
N.W.2d at 711. “A finding is clearly erroneous if it is manifestly contrary to the weight of
the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d
at 87 (quotation omitted). We give considerable deference to the district court’s credibility
determinations because “a district court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of
witnesses.” In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1996). The district court
abuses its discretion when its decision is against logic or contrary to the factual findings of
the district court. A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at 660.
A.B. argues that the district court erred in two respects when it made its factual
findings. First, A.B. asserts that the reco rd does not contain evidence to support a
conclusion that visits with A. B. caused the younger child’s PTSD. Second, A.B. claims
that the record does not contain evidence to support the findings regarding A.B.’s inability

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to address J.W.’s mental health needs and drug use. Neither of these arguments supports
reversal.
We disagree with A.B.’s first argument be cause it mischaracterizes the district
court’s findings. Contrary to A.B.’s argume nt, the district court did not find that A.B.
caused the child’s PTSD or behavioral issues. Instead, the district court found that the
child suffers from PTSD and that the child exhibited problematic behavior after visits with
A.B. Moreover, we conclude that the record supports this finding. For instance, the child’s
diagnostic assessment stated that the child su ffers from PTSD and that the child “directly
experienced and witnessed trau matic events.” The assess ment also emphasized “the
presence of challenging behaviors before and after these visits [with A.B.] occur.” In
addition, the foster mother testified that the child’s challenging behaviors included speech
delays, temper tantrums, difficulty sleeping, bed-wetting, and irrita bility. According to
this witness, these issues only occurred after visits with A.B. The GAL also testified that
since visits with A.B. ended, the child is “calmer, rarely has night terrors anymore or any
extreme behaviors that she previously had dur ing the visits with [A .B.].” Given this
evidence, the district court did not clearly err when it made findings regarding the younger
child’s PTSD diagnosis and behavior before and after visits with A.B.
We also find no clear error in the district court’s factual findings regarding A.B.’s
inability to address J.W.’s mental health ne eds and drug use. Th e evidence presented
includes a report diagnosing J.W. with major de pressive disorder, and the social worker
reported that J.W. has also struggled with school and with using marijuana. The evidence
also indicates that A.B. has failed to adequa tely address her similar issues. According to

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the report from A.B.’s most recent treatment program, A.B. has “di fficulty with impulse
control and lacks coping skills,” “lacks mental health support,” “struggles to maintain
sob[riety] outside of a structured setting,” and “has poor recognition and understanding of
relapse and recidivism issues and displays moderately hi gh vulnerability of further
substance use or mental health problems. ” In addition, A.B. admitted to using
methamphetamine on September 19, 2020, a nd October 14, 2020, and to missing most
support group meetings over the past few months. In light of these circumstances, both the
GAL and social worker expressed concerns about returning J.W. to A.B.’s care due to his
impulsivity and history with substance abus e, and because A.B. had not adequately
addressed her own mental health and chemical dependency. Based on this evidence, the
district court did not clearly err.
A.B. next argues that the district court abused its discretion when it concluded that
the interests in preserving the parent-chi ld relationship were outweighed by other,
competing interests of the children.2 We disagree and discern no abuse of discretion. In
its order, the district court weighed and analyzed each of the best interests factors, noting
that both A.B. and J.W. want to preserve the parent-child rela tionship. The district court
determined that the younger ch ild’s interest in preserving th e relationship is negligible

2 To the extent that A.B. or J.W. argue that the district court erred by failing to make
additional findings regarding J. W.’s preferences, we note th at neither party moved for
amended findings, thereby forfeiting appellate review of whether additional findings were
necessary. E.g., Frank v. Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. , 336 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Minn. 1983)
(holding that if a district court fails to make required findings of fact, “the burden is on the
parties to alert the court by a motion for amended finding[s]”); Anderson v. Peterson’s N.
Branch Mill, Inc. , 503 N.W.2d 517, 518-19 (Minn. Ap p. 1993) (declining to review
sufficiency of findings because appellant did not move for amended findings).

20
because she has lived with her foster parent for half of he r life, refers to them as “mom”
and “dad,” while she refers to A.B. by her first name, suffers from PTSD, and has
experienced significant behavioral issues after visiting with A.B. The district court also
determined that “the children have comp eting interests in ha ving caregivers who
themselves are safe, sober, a nd stable individuals.” Specifically, the district court
expressed concern over how J.W.’s “mental health and chemical dependency issues would
be addressed when [A.B.] has failed to address her own identical issues.” The district court
concluded that these competing interests outweighed A.B.’s and the children’s interest in
maintaining the parent-child relationship. Because the decision is not against logic or the
facts as found by the district court, we concl ude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it concluded that the inte rests of the children ultimately favored
termination of A.B.’s parental rights.
III. Reasonable Reunification Efforts
Next, A.B. makes two arguments regarding the district court’s analysis of the
county’s reasonable efforts. First, A.B. argues that the record compels alternative factual
findings that the district court declined to make regarding the county’s efforts towards
reunification. We conclude, however, that we are unable to make the factual findings
requested by A.B. and that th e record supports the factual findings made by the district
court. Second, A.B. argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that
these efforts were reasonable. We conclude that because the district court’s determination
that the county made reasonable efforts is not against logic or the factual findings, the
district court did not abuse its discretion.

21
Before a district court can terminate a pers on’s parental rights, it must specifically
find that the county made reasonable efforts to reunify the children and parent or that
reasonable efforts for reunification were not required under section 260.012.3 Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8 (2020). “The county’s efforts must be aimed at alleviating the
conditions that gave rise to out-of-home placement, and they must conform to the problems
presented.” J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 87. “Services must go beyond mere matters of form so
as to include real, genuine assistance.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn.
App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). In determining whether the county made
reasonable efforts, the district court must c onsider whether the serv ices offered were
“(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020).4

3 As discussed above, the district court al so previously relieved the county from its
obligation to make reasonable reunification efforts. Pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section
§ 260.012 (a)(7), the district c ourt could have reinstated th is obligation, but only after
finding that the allegations supporting the co unty’s prima facie show ing of futility were
not established by clear and convincing evidence. Minn. Stat. § 260.012(g) (2020).
Neither party requested that the district court revisit the determination that the county made
a prima facie showing of futility, and appellant does not assert any error in the district
court’s futility determination in its posttrial termination order. Thus, we review the
reasonable efforts findings and analysis in the district court’s termination order as
pertaining to reunification efforts that predate the June 22, 2020 order relieving the county
of an obligation to provide ongoing reunification efforts.
4 A.B. also appears to argue that the county’s failure to perform other statutory duties
indicates a failure to provid e reasonable efforts. However, A.B. does not support this
proposition with legal authority. Absent su ch support, we decline to consider this
argument. See State Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc. , 558 N.W.2d
480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to reach inadequately briefed issues); see also In re
Welfare of Child of P.T., 657 N.W.2d 577, 586 n.1 (Minn. App. 2003) (applying Wintz in
a termination of parental rights appeal).

22
We review the factual findings underlying this determination for clear error. In re
Welfare of Children of S.E.P., 744 N.W.2d 381, 387 (Minn. 2008); J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at
87 (applying clear error review and defining clear error as “manifestly contrary to the
weight of the evidence or not reasonably supported by the evidence as a whole”). A district
court does not clearly err when evidence in the reco rd might also support findings other
than those made by the district court. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474
(Minn. App. 2000) (“[T]he mere existence of evidence that could su pport findings other
than those made by the trial court does not render these findings defective.”). We review
the ultimate determination that the county made reasonable efforts to reunite the family for
an abuse of discretion . See In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. , 865 N.W.2d 315, 322-23
(Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. July 20, 2015); see also A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d at
660 (defining an abuse of discretion as a determination that is against logic or contrary to
the facts).
First, A.B. argues that we should reverse the district court’s reasonable efforts
determination because the evid ence presented supported a lternative findings that the
district court declined to make.5 We are not persuaded that the district court clearly erred.
We note that this court cannot make its own findings and it cannot review findings that

5 Specifically, A.B. argues that the distri ct court erred by not adopting the following
findings: the social worker lied to A.B. when she said A.B. made minimal progress at a
particular treatment program; the county’s acti ons caused A.B. to relapse, the county did
not provide sufficient transportation or employment services, the county made insufficient
efforts to address A.B.’s mental health needs, and the county acted in bad faith when it
decided not to begin trial home visits and when it failed to adequately inform A.B.
regarding the nature of a particular treatment program, causing her to leave the program.

23
were never made. 6 S . E . P., 744 N.W.2d at 387 (reversing court of appeals for making
findings of fact, overstepping the bounds of as a reviewing court); see also, e.g., Hoyt Inv.
Co. v. Bloomington Commerce & Trade Ctr. Assocs., 418 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1988)
(“[A]n undecided question is not usually amenable to appellate review.”); Kucera v.
Kucera, 146 N.W.2d 181, 183 (Minn. 1966) (“It is not within the province of [appellate
courts] to determine issues of fact on appe al.”). The proper procedure when a party
believes the district court made inadequate findings, failed to make findings required by
law, or declined to make findings compelled by the record is to move for amended findings.
As noted above, failure to do so forfeits appellate review. See Frank, 336 N.W.2d at 311;
Anderson, 503 N.W.2d at 518-19.
In addition, the existence of evidence that could support alternative findings does
not compel reversal, Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 474, and there is evidence in the record to
support the factual findings that the district court did make. Here, the district court found
that the county provided effo rts in the forms of the follo wing programs and assistance:
chemical dependency assessme nts; chemical dependency treatment at House of Hope,
Wellcome Manor, Northstar, and Christian Family Solutions; mental health assessments
and referrals; an additional diagnostic assessm ent at Associated Psychological Services;

6 We are also concerned that the proposed a lternative findings conflict with and are not
supported by the evidence in th e record. For example, we do not agree that the record
compels a finding that A.B. relapsed “due to the county’s actions,” as A.B. argues in her
brief to this court. Similarly, the record does not include evidence of the county acting in
bad faith when it canceled the scheduled trial home visits. Even if this court could properly
make the requested alternativ e findings of fact, the eviden ce does not support A.B.’s
alternative factual statements.

24
drug testing; a payment of $895 for A.B.’s rent; transportation and payments for gas costs;
referral to parent coaching; relapse preven tion; a trial home vis it plan; and additional
services for the children. This list includes efforts discusse d in more detail in previous
sections of the district court’s order regarding A.B.’s chemical dependency, mental health,
housing instability, and parenting history.7 The district court determined that these efforts
were relevant to the safety and protection of the children, believed to be adequate to meet
the needs of the chil dren and family, culturally appropr iate, available and accessible,
consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances.
Evidence in the record supports these findings. The social worker testified that the
county assisted A.B. by coordinating with various service providers, providing A.B. with
transportation and with gas cards, paying th e down payment for an apartment, assisting
A.B. to attend appointments, and generally working with A.B. to “achieve what needed to
be done.” The county also undertook efforts to satisfy the dental, medical, developmental,
behavioral, and mental health needs of A.B.’s children, which are important prerequisites
for reunification with A.B. Testimony at trial supports the determination that these goals
were adequate to meet the needs of the children and family, cu lturally appropriate,
available and accessible, consistent and timely, and realistic under the circumstances. The
county’s efforts were hindered by A.B.’s continued drug use, and the social worker testified
that when A.B. relapsed, pr ogress toward reunification nece ssarily slowed. The county

7 A.B. argues that we should reverse the de termination of reasonable efforts because the
analysis is conclusory. Given the detailed fi ndings made elsewhere in the district court’s
order, we disagree with A.B.’s characterization of the district court’s analysis. The district
court is not required to repeat those specific findings in separate parts of its decision.

25
coordinated chemical dependency treatment on four separate occasions, two of which were
after A.B. tested positive for using drugs and after she left a treatment program against the
county’s advice. Throughout the proceedings , A.B. continually re fused to address her
mental health, repeatedly te sted positive for methamphetami ne, and continued to deny
using drugs. Based on this evidence, the di strict court did not clearly err when it made
factual findings regarding the county’s reasonable efforts.
Second, A.B. also challenges the district court’s ultimate determination that the
county made reasonable efforts. We discern no abuse of discretion. The efforts detailed
above and in the district court’s findings of fact included multiple attempts to provide A.B.
with a variety of services and assistance from February 2019 through June 2020. Based on
these findings and the ev idence presented, it was not agai nst logic to conclude that the
county made reasonable efforts to reunify the children and A.B. See A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d
at 660.
Affirmed.