State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0039

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Roger Bruce Nahl,
Appellant.

Filed December 13, 2021
Reversed
Bjorkman, Judge

Chisago County District Court
File No. 13-CR-18-923

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Janet Reiter, Chisago County Attorney, David Classen, Assistant County Attorney, Center
City, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public D efender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of attempted first -degree burglary, arguing that
the circumstantial evidence is insufficient. 1 Because the circumstances proved are
consistent with a reasonable inference other than guilt, we reverse.
FACTS
During the afternoon of October 4, 2018, several residents of rural Lent Township
encountered appellant Roger Bruce Nahl. At around 3:40 p.m., complainant K.B.-G. heard
yelling and banging at her f ront door. She went down to the first floor, saw a man later
identified as Nahl at the door, and hid from his sight. Nahl pounded on and tried to open
several doors on the side of the house and continued to yell in frustration. K.B.-G. called
911. As the responding police car pulled into her driveway, Nahl ran south into the nearby
woods.
Nahl next appeared at the home of a neighbor who was sitting in his garage
(neighbor 1). Nahl was wearing socks without shoes , and appeared winded and “[s]cared ,
nervous, wanting to get out of that area.” He asked neighbor 1 for a ride; neighbor 1
refused. As the two were talking, a sheriff’s vehicle approached, prompting Nahl to back
into the garage where the deputy could not see him. Neighbor 1 responded by retri eving a
gun. When he saw the gun, Nahl left, continuing south through the backyard.

1 Nahl also argues that COVID -related delays violated his constitutional right to a speedy
trial. Because we reverse based on insufficient evidence, we do not consider this argument.
3
A short time later, Nahl entered a five -acre property nearby. The owner (neighbor
2) heard her dogs “aggressively barking,” and saw Nahl enter the back of her property from
the woods. Neighbor 2 saw him walk quickly and deliberately past her house to the road
in front of her property, ignoring the dogs. Neighbor 2 was alarmed and immediately
warned her neighbors.
Nahl next approached a man who was taking a break from doing yardwork and
sitting next to his car (neighbor 3). Nahl said he “had been visiting a neighbor and had
gotten in a fight and had to leave the h ouse in a hurry ” and that he “[w] as hoping that
[neighbor 3 ] would be willing to give him a ride to the other side of Interstate 35.”
Neighbor 3 did not see a weapon but “felt that it was [Nahl’s] intention to drive away from
there with or without [him].” Accordingly, neighbor 3 agreed to take Nahl where he needed
to go. During the drive, they encountered two police cars. The second drove behind them
for a period of time, which caused Nahl to become “much more agitated ,” check “all of the
mirrors” and look out the back window. After finding a friend’s home unoccupied, Nahl
directed neighbor 3 to drop him off in a secluded, wooded area. Neighbor 3 did so, drove
away, and flagged down a police car to report the incident. 2
In February 2020, the state charged Nahl with attempted first -degree burglary
related to his actions at K. B.-G.’s house. After a delay due to the COVID -19 pandemic,
Nahl’s case was tried in August. The jury found him guilty. Nahl appeals, arguing that
the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.

2 Later that evening, another neighbor returned home to discover that someone stole items
from their home. The jury acquitted Nahl of burglary charges related to th at incident.
4
DECISION
A person commits attempted burglary when they take a substantial step toward
entering an occupied building without consent and with the intent to commit a crime.
Minn. Stat. §§ 609.582 , subd. 1 (defining first-degree burglary), .17, subd. 1 (defining an
attempt) (2018). The intended crime must be something other than the illegal entry into
the occupied building. State v. Colvin , 645 N.W.2d 449, 45 4 (Minn. 2002) . Intent is
generally proved by circumstantial evidence. State v. Ring, 554 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Minn.
App. 1996).
In assessing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, we conduct a two -part
analysis. State v. Culver , 941 N.W.2d 134, 143 (Minn. 2020) . First, we identify the
circumstances proved, deferring to the jury’s credibility determinations and weighing of
the evidence. State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 600 (Minn. 2017). Circumstances proved
are those that are consistent with the jury’s verdict. State v. German, 929 N.W.2d 466, 472
(Minn. App. 2019). The absence of evidence is not a circumstance proved. Id. at 473. But
“where circumstances are uncontroverted, come from a state witness, and are not
necessarily contradictory to the verdict, they constitute the circumstances proved.” Id.
Second, we consider whether the circumstances proved are “consistent with guilt
and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis except that of guilt.” State v. Silvernail, 831
N.W.2d 594, 598-99 (Minn. 2013). “Circumstantial evidence must form a complete chain
that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to
exclude beyond a reasonable doubt any reasonable inference other than guilt.” State v.
Al-Naseer, 788 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Minn. 2010).
5
The parties agree that the state proved the following circumstances: (1) Nahl walked
toward K.B.-G.’s isolated ho use on October 4, 2018, at about 3:40 p.m.; (2) he banged on
the front door and yelled frustratedly; (3) he walked around the house to the other doors
and continued to bang on the doors and shout ; (4) Nahl attempted to open four doors using
the door handles but the doors were locked; (5) Nahl ran south into the woods when police
arrived; (6) Nahl approached neighbor 1 outside his garage, and said he needed a ride ;
(7) neighbor 1 saw Nahl duck further into the garage when a police car drove by so that he
was out of sight of the vehicle; (8) neighbor 1 retrieved a handgun from his house and Nahl
left after seeing it; (9) neighbor 2 saw Nahl walk swiftly across her property and ignore her
aggressively barking dogs ; (10) Nahl approached neighbor 3 and asked for a ride ;
(11) neighbor 3 felt threatened by Nahl’s appearance and agreed to give Nahl a ride;
(12) Nahl appeared jittery and was wearing ripped, wet jeans, and no shoes; (13) Nahl tried
to hide when neighbor 3 met a police car, and when a second police car appeared behind
them, Nahl became agitated and nervous; and (14) Nahl directed neighbor 3 to a side road,
got out of the car, and, after saying goodbye, walk ed into the woods. We agree that these
circumstances either support the jury’s verdict or are uncontroverted and established by a
state witness. See German, 929 N.W.2d at 473 (defining circumstances proved to include
circumstances that “are uncontroverted, come from a state witness, and are not necessarily
contradictory to the verdict”).
Nahl concedes that the circumstances proved support the jury’s guilty verdict. But
he contends that they also support a reasonable inference that he did not intend to commit
6
a crime in K.B.-G.’s house, he was merely trying to evade apprehension by the police. 3
This argument has merit.
The state cites State v. Roehl to support its argument that Nahl’s repeated efforts to
avoid the police are circumstantial evidence that he intended to commit a crime in
K.B.-G.’s house . 409 N.W.2d 44, 47 (Minn. App. 1987). In Roehl, a fitness center
employee had closed the center for the day and locked the front door. Id. at 45. While
cleaning the restrooms, she heard a loud banging noise from the front entrance. Id. When
she entered a mirrored room, she saw the reflection of a man standing behind a door across
the room. Id. She confronted the man, then ran out the front door . As she backed her car
out to leave, the employee saw the man exit the center and run away down the street. Id.
This court concluded that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the intent
required for third -degree burglary because the locked door had been forced open after
business hours and Roehl fled after he was discovered inside the building. Id. at 47.
Nahl contends that Roehl is distinguishable , pointing out that Roehl fled after
illegally entering an occupied building . Nahl has the better argument. Unlike Roehl,
Nahl’s apprehensive demeanor and evasive behavior was on display throughout the
afternoon in question. All of the state’s witnesses testified that Nahl appeared fearful.
Three of the witnesses saw him attempt to hide when police cars approached. And the two
witnesses with whom he spoke testified that Nahl asked for a ride away from the area. This
sustained nervousness reasonably supports an inference that Nahl was av oiding law

3 The district court instructed the jury that it could find Nah l guilty if it found that he
intended to commit theft or assault in K.B. -G.’s house.
7
enforcement in general, not because he had intended to commit a crime inside K.B. -G.’s
house. While Nahl’s actions at K.B. -G.’s house support the inference that he intended to
enter the house without permission, the circumstances proved equally support an inference
that he intended to commit a crime in the house and an inference that he wanted to avoid
police detection or simply wanted a ride.
In sum, the circumstances proved support the reasonable inference that Nahl
attempted to enter K.B. -G.’s house without permission to commit a crime. But the
circumstances proved also support the reasonable inference that Nahl was trying to enter
the house to hide from police or secure a ride from the resident. Because we do not defer
to a jury’s choice between reasonable inferences, we must reverse. Silvernail, 831 N.W.2d
at 599.
Reversed.