State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0044

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Kenneth Carl Hamilton,
Appellant.

Filed June 21, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-CR-20-440

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail Count y Attorney, Benjamin G. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)

Luke T. Heck, Drew J. Hushka, Vogel Law Firm, Fargo, North Dakota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, P residing Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of driving while impaired, arguing that the
deputy lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion for the traffic stop that resulted in the

2
conviction. Because we see no clear error in the findings of fact and conclu de that the
arresting deputy had a reasonable suspicion to stop appellant, we affirm.
FACTS
At about 10:37 p.m. on August 13, 2020, a sheriff’s deputy was driving south on a
county highway. He noticed another vehicle going south ahead of him. It was travelling
below the posted speed limit, i ts lights were fluctuating, and it was weaving between the
center line and the fog line of its lane. The squad car video shows the vehicle w eaving
from one side of the lane to the other ; the deputy testified that the vehicle’s left rear tire
crossed the center line and its right rear tire crossed the fog line.
The deputy initiated a stop of the vehicle, which was being driven by appellant
Kenneth Hamilton, who was arrested a fter he admitted consuming alcohol at a bar and at
home and displayed indicia of intoxication. A breath test about two hours after the stop
revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.17.
Appellant was charged with two counts of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and one
count of possession of an open bottle. Prior to trial, he moved unsuccessfully to suppress
the evidence, arguing that the stop of his vehicle was not supported by a reasonable,
articulable suspicion. He was found guilty at a trial conducted under Minn. R. Crim. P.
26.01, subd. 4 (setting out the procedure to preserve a dispositive issue for appellate
review).
Appellant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that
the deputy did not have a reasonable suspicion for the stop.

3
DECISION
Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable
facts that all ow the officer to be able to articulate at the
omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal
activity. The reasonable suspicion standard is not high . But
although it is less demanding than the standard for probable
cause or a preponderance of the evidence, reasonable suspicion
requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for
making the stop. A hunch, wit hout additional objectively
articulable facts, cannot provide the basis for an investigatory
stop.

State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 842 -43 (Minn. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted).
“We undertake a de novo review to determi ne whether a search or s eizure is justified by
reasonable suspicion.” State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). “We review
a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress de novo, accepting the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.” Soucie v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 957
N.W.2d 461, 463 (Minn. App. 2021).
It is undisputed that the squad car video of app ellant’s vehicle is of poor qual ity.
However, while the district court noted that “the squad [car] video does not fully
corroborate [ the deputy’s] testimony” and that it was not clear from the video whether
appellant’s vehicle crossed or touched the center and fog lines, the distri ct court also
observed, “[i]t is clear . . . that the vehicle was weaving in a suspicious manner, and that
the road was clear of obstacles that would explain this behavior.” Weaving within a lane
has been held to justify an officer’s stop of a vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Richardson, 622
N.W.2d 823, 826 (Minn. 2001); State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983); State
v. Ellanson, 198 N.W.2d 136, 137 (Minn. 1972) (concluding that officer who had observed

4
a vehicle “weaving within its lane . . . had a right to stop [the vehicle] in order to investigate
the cause of the unusual driving”); see also Soucie, 957 N.W.2d at 464 (concluding that “a
lane is comprised of the area between the painted lines that demark it and does not include
the lines themselves”).
The deputy’s testimony corroborates the squad car video as to the fact that
appellant’s vehicle was weaving within its lane. This provided the deputy with a
reasonable suspicion that appellant w as driving under the influence; his stop of appellant
was not based merely on a “hunch.” See Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 843. Because the stop was
supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we affirm appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.