State of Minnesota, Respondent, vs. Chadwick Alan McCorquodale, Appellant.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. l(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0047
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Chadwick Alan McCorquodale,
Appellant.
Filed November 22, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Johnson,Judge
Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-CR-19-3434
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Mark A. Ostrem, Olmsted County Attorney, James E. Haase, Assistant County Attorney,
Rochester, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathry n Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Rachel F. Bond, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bry an,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
An Olmsted County District Court judge found Chadwick Alan McCorquodale
guilty of first-degree controlled substance crime. The conviction is based on evidence that
McCorquodale possessed methamphetamine with intent to sell it and that he sold it to an
acquaintance during a controlled buy. We conclude that the evidence introduced by the
state at trial is sufficient to support the conviction. But we also conclude that the district
court deprived McCorquodale of his right to an impartial fact-finder by relying on facts
that were not introduced into evidence at trial but were otherwise known by the district
court judge. Therefore, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
FACTS
On June 5, 2018, Investigator Ryan of the Rochester Police Department asked S.M.
to participate in a controlled buy of methamphetamine. At the time, S .M. was charged with
first-degree controlled substance crime. Investigator Ryan suggested that S.M.'s
cooperation with another investigation might result in leniency with respect to his pending
charge. S.M. agreed. Investigator Ryan and S.M. decided that the target of the controlled
buy would be McCorquodale, whom S.M. had known for two years.
S.M. called McCorquodale to arrange for a purchase of methamphetamine. The
conversation was brief. S.M. asked McCorquodale whether he was "good," and
McCorquodale responded in the affinnative. Before S.M. met McCorquodale, Investigator
Ryan searched S.M. and his car for methamphetamine and found none. Investigator Ryan
provided S.M. with $2,500 in cash, a GPS location tracker, and a video-recording device.
S.M. drove directly to a residential property, which S.M. had led Investigator Ryan to
believe was McCorquodale's home. In reality, the property was owned by
McCorquodale's father, and S.M. was residing there temporarily.
After S.M. arrived at the residential property, he and McCorquodale began a
conversation that lasted approximately 45 minutes. The conversation was audio-recorded
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by the recording device that S.M. carried, but very little video was captured, apparently
because the camera lens was inadvertently covered or blocked. S.M. testified at trial that,
during his conversation with McCorquodale, he gave McCorquodale "some money and
then got four ounces to go." S.M. drove directly back to a pre-arranged meeting place,
where he delivered to Investigator Ryan and another law-enforcement officer four plastic
bags containing a crystalline substance. The substance was tested and determined to be
112.3 grams ofmethamphetamine.
Nearly a year later, in May 2019, the state charged McCorquodale with first-degree
controlled substance crime, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1) (2018). The
case was tried to the district court on one day in August 2020. The state called five
witnesses: S.M., Investigator Ryan, two other police officers, and a forensic scientist who
had tested the methamphetamine. McCorquodale did not testify and did not present any
other evidence.
S.M. testified about his interactions with McCorquodale on June 5, 2018, at the
property owned by McCorquodale's father. S.M. testified that McCorquodale gave him
four ounces of methamphetamine, which he later provided to law enforcement, and that
S.M. gave McCorquodale $2,500 in cash. The state also introduced the recording of S.M. 's
conversation with McCorquodale, which was played in open court. On the recording, S.M.
can be heard saying "25 right there." S.M. testified at trial that he was referring to the
$2,500 in cash that he had brought to the meeting. In addition, McCorquodale can be heard
saying that he charges S.M. "exactly what" he pays, which is "eight thousand a pound,"
and that, as a consequence, he receives less money when he sells "it" to S.M. than when he
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sells "it" to someone else. S.M. testified at trial that McCorquodale was referring to
methamphetamine in that exchange. During another part of the conversation, S.M. asked
McCorquodale "what kinda dope" a third party had, and McCorquodale responded that
"mine' s better than his right now."
After the trial, the district court filed an order in which it found McCorquodale
guilty. In its findings of fact, the district court determined that S.M. was not credible
because he did not tell Investigator Ryan that he was residing at the property where the
controlled buy occurred and because S.M. was under the influence ofmethamphetamine at
the time of the controlled buy. Consequently, the district court found that McCorquodale
"could not be convicted on [S.M.'s] trial testimony alone." But the district court found that
S.M. 's testimony was corroborated by the recording in various ways, including
McCorquodale's discussion of "several people known to the court to be users of
methamphetamine." The district court found that McCorquodale "was involved in the sale
of drugs generally" and that he sold 112 grams of methamphetamine to S.M. on June 5,
2018. The district court also found that McCorquodale "constructively possessed the 112
grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell it."
The district court conducted a sentencing hearing in October 2020. After
McCorquodale spoke in allocution, the district court explained to him the reasons for its
sentence, including the following statement:
[I]t was clear to me by the audio that you were right in it with
[S.M.], that you were, in fact, selling methamphetamine. The
way you were talking about selling, and how your stuff is better
than his stuff, and talking about all of these people that are
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very well known to the Court, I knew that you were in the thick
of this operation. (Emphasis added.)
The district court sentenced McCorquodale to 128 months of imprisonment.
McCorquodale appeals.
DECISION
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
McCorquodale first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction.
Specifically, he argues that the state did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he either
possessed methamphetamine or sold it to S.M. on June 5, 2018.
McCorquodale was convicted of violating a statute that makes it unlawful to "sell[]
one or more mixtures of a total weight of 17 grams or more containing cocaine or
methamphetamine." Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 1(1). The word "sell" is defined by
statute to mean "to sell, give away, barter, deliver, exchange, distribute or dispose of to
another, or to manufacture" or "to possess with intent to perform" one of the listed acts.
Minn. Stat.§ 152.01, subd. 15a(l) , (3) (2018). The district court found that McCorquodale
sold 112 grams of methamphetamine to S.M. and, in addition, found that McCorquodale
"constructively possessed the 112 grams of methamphetamine with intent to sell it." Either
finding is sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. The question before the court is
whether the evidence presented at trial supports the district court's findings and
conclusions.
In analyzing an argument that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction,
this court ordinarily undertakes "a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether
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the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to
permit the" fact-finder to reach its verdict. State v. Friese, 959 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Minn.
2021) (quotation omitted). We assume that the fact-finder "believed the state's witnesses
and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary." Id. (quotation omitted). This standard of
review applies so long as a conviction is adequately supported by direct evidence. State v.
Horst, 880 N.W.2d 24, 39 (Minn. 2016). Direct evidence is "evidence that is based on
personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact without inference or
presumption." State v. Harris, 895 N.W.2d 592, 599 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted).
Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, is "evidence from which the factfinder
can infer whether the facts in dispute existed or did not exist." Id. (quotation omitted). A
conviction necessarily depends on circumstantial evidence if proof of the offense, or a
single element of the offense, is based solely on circumstantial evidence. See State v.
Fairbanks, 842 N.W.2d 297, 307 (Minn. 2014). If a conviction necessarily depends on
circumstantial evidence, we apply a heightened standard of review, which consists of two
steps. Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. First, we identify the circumstances proved,
disregarding evidence that is inconsistent with the verdict. Id. Second, we consider the
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved. Id. "To sustain
the conviction, the circum stances proved, when reviewed as a whole, must be consistent
with a reasonable inference that the accused is guilty and inconsistent with any rational
hypothesis except that of guilt." Id. ( quotation omitted). At the second step of the analysis,
we give no deference to the fact-finder's verdict. Loving v. State, 891 N.W.2d 638, 643
(Minn. 2017). In assessing the circumstances proved and the inferences that may be drawn
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from them, we consider the evidence as a whole rather than examining each piece of
evidence in isolation. State v. Taylor, 650 N.W.2d 190, 206 (Minn. 2002). We apply the
·heightened standard of review in the same manner after a court trial as after a jury trial.
State v. Palmer, 803 N.W.2d 727, 733 (Minn. 2011).
The parties disagree as to whether McCorquodale's conviction is based on direct
evidence or circumstantial evidence. S.M. testified that McCorquodale sold him
methamphetamine. His testimony is direct evidence of a crime. See Harris, 895 N.W.2d
at 599. But the district court found that S.M. was not credible and that his testimony, by
itself, was not capable of proving the charge. The recording, by itself, does not clearly
reflect a sale of methamphetamine. Thus, there is no direct evidence that McCorquodale
possessed or sold methamphetamine. Accordingly, we will analyze the sufficiency of the
circumstantial evidence.
In identifying the circumstances proved, we must respect the district court's
credibility determinations. State v. Hawes, 801 N.W.2d 659, 670 (Minn. 2011). Because
the district court found that S.M. was not credible and that his testimony alone was not
capable of satisfying the state's burden of proof, we do not find any circumstance to be
proved if the circumstance was evidenced solely by S.M. 's testimony. But the district court
relied on S .M.' s testimony to the extent that it was corroborated by the recording.
Accordingly, we may find a circumstance to be proved if the circumstance was evidenced
by S.M.'s testimony and the recording.
McCorquodale contends that the district court improperly relied on the recording as
propensity evidence. McCorquodale focuses on the district court's finding that
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McCorquodale "was involved in the sale of drugs generally." At trial, McCorquodale did
not object to the admissibility of the recording, and it was admitted without any limitations
on its purpose. Consequently, the district court was free to draw any reasonable inferences
from the recor ding. During the recorded conversation, McCorquodale made statements
that referred to conversations he had had with other persons concerning drugs that
McCorquodale had sold to them, and McCorquodale also compared the quality of drugs he
had sold to the quality of drugs sold by other persons. The district court was not foreclosed
from using such evidence to find that McCorquodale "was involved in the sale of drugs
generally."
The relevant circumstances proved are as follows: On June 5, 2018, S.M. called
McCorquodale and confinned that he was "good." S.M. then drove to a residential
property and met and spoke with McCorquodale for approximately 45 minutes. Before
S.M. drove to the residential property, Investigator Ryan provided S.M. with $2,500 in
cash and searched his car and person but did not find any methamphetamine. During
S.M. 's recorded conversation with McCorquodale, S.M. referred to "25," which S.M.
testified was a reference to the $2,500 in cash. During the recorded conversation,
McCorquodale said that he had bought something at the price of$8,000 per pound and had
sold it to S.M. at cost. McCorquodale also talked about whether other persons have good
"dope" and proceeded to compare the quality of his to that of others. After meeting with
McCorquodale, S.M. drove directly to a meeting with Investigator Ryan and provided law­
enforcement officers with four plastic bags containing a total of 112.3 grams ( or 3 .96
ounces) of metham phetamine.
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At the second step of the analysis, we must consider whether there are reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the circumstances proved that are consistent with guilt.
Harris, 895 N.W.2d at 601. The state's theory is that McCorquodale sold S.M. four bags
of methamphetamine in exchange for a payment of $2,500. We agree that this is a
reasonable inference in light of the circumstances proved.
At the second step of the analysis, we also must detennine whether there are
reasonable inferences that are inconsistent with guilt. Id. McCorquodale contends that the
circumstantial evidence is consistent with three such inferences: first, that S.M. "himself
provided the methamphetamine that he later gave to police"; second, that S.M. "obtained
the drugs from his vehicle, his person, the shed or other nearby location to which he had
access during the time that he was outside visual surveillance"; or, third, that S.M. "stashed
the buy money that police gave him in the shed or other nearby area that he had access to
and while police were not watching him."
McCorquodale's first proposed inference is not a reasonable inference because it
does not account for the fact that Investigator Ryan searched S.M. and his vehicle
immediately before S .M. drove directly to the residential property where he met
McCorquodale. The second proposed inference is unreasonable for the same reason: the
circumstances proved do not allow for a reasonable inference that S.M. had 112 grams of
methamphetamine hidden on his person or in his vehicle. The proposed inference that S.M.
obtained methamphetamine from a shed or "other nearby location to which he had access"
on the residential property is inconsistent with the statements made by McCorquodale on
the recording, in which he referred to drugs as his, stated that he has sold something to
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S.M. at cost, and acknowledged receiving money from S.M. during their conversation. The
third inference is not necessarily inconsistent with guilt because the disposition of the
money is not relevant to an essential element of the offense. The question is whether
McCorquodale sold methamphetamine to S.M. or possessed methamphetamine with intent
to sell it. McCorquodale would not be entitled to a not-guilty verdict simply because S.M.
hid the controlled-buy money. In short, none of the inferences proposed by McCorquodale
is a reasonable inference in light of the circumstances proved.
Thus, the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support McCorquodale' s
conviction.
II. Impartial Fact-Finder
McCorquodale also argues that the district court violated his right to an impartial
fact-finder by relying on facts that were not in evidence.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution confers on criminal
defendants the right to be tried by an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amend. VI; see also Minn.
Const. art. I, § 6. Likewise, a criminal defendant being tried in a court trial has a right to
an impartial judge. State v. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d 238, 249 (Minn. 2005). The right to an
impartial judge "requires that conclusions reached by the trier of fact be based upon the
facts in evidence ... and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on
evidence sought or obtained beyond that adduced in court." Id. at 249-50 (citing Johnson
v. Hillstrom,, 33 N.W. 547, 548 (Minn. 1887), and Spinner v. McDermott, 251 N.W. 908,
908 (Minn. 1933)). These principles are reiterated in the code of judicial conduct, which
provides that a judge "shall consider only the evidence presented and any facts that may
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properly be judicially noticed." Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9(C). We apply a de
nova standard of review to the question whether a district court denied a criminal defendant
the right to an impartial fact-finder. Dorsey, 701 N.W.2d at 249.
McCorquodale contends that the district court made an important finding of fact that
is not based on any evidence introduced at trial but, rather, is based on facts otherwise
known or believed by the district court judge. Specifically, McCorquodale refers to the
district court's finding that, during the recorded conversation, McCorquodale "discuss[ed]
several people known to the court to be users of methamphetamine." McCorquodale
contends that no evidence was introduced at trial concerning the drug habits of any of the
persons referenced by McCorquodale during the recorded conversation. The state does not
dispute McCorquodale's assertion that no such evidence was introduced at trial.
McCorquodale's argument is similar to the appellant's argument in Dorsey, m
which the supreme court held that the district court denied the appellant his right to an
impartial fact-finder at a criminal court trial. 701 N.W.2d at 253. In Dorsey, the district
court judge doubted the testimony of a defense witness and shared her concerns with
counsel. Id. at 243. The district court judge asked a law clerk to investigate the fact that
had caused her to doubt the witness, which was detennined to be different from what the
witness had stated in her testimony. Id. The district court judge noted the discrepancy on
the record and in a written order. Id. at 243-45. The district court found Dorsey guilty,
based in part on the defense witness's lack of credibility. Id. at 245. On appeal, Dorsey
argued that the district court judge was not an impartial fact-finder because she had openly
questioned a defense witness's testimony, independently investigated a fact to which the
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witness had testified, and revealed the results of her investigation in open court. Id. at 249.
The supreme court found error and reversed the conviction, concluding that, "when a judge
possesses extra-record knowledge that is prejudicial to a defendant in a criminal trial, the
judge may not disclose that knowledge" but, rather, "must either disqualify herself or set
the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence adduced in deciding the case." Id. at
252.
In this case, the district court judge committed an error of the same type as the error
in Dorsey. The district court judge possessed extra-record knowledge that was prejudicial
to McCorquodale but did not "set the knowledge aside and consider only the evidence
adduced in deciding the case." See id. The extra-record facts were incorporated into the
district court's findings of fact. The extra-record facts were prejudicial to McCorquodale
because they were relied on to support the district court's finding that McCorquodale sold
metham phetamine to S.M. The significance of the extra-record facts is reinforced by the
district court's comment to McCorquodale at the sentencing hearing that, because he was
"talking about all of these people that are very well known to the Court," the district court
judge "knew that [he was] in the thick of this operation."
The state attempts to distinguish Dorsey on the ground that the district court judge
m this case did not obtain the extra-record facts by conducting an independent
investigation, as in Dorsey. Indeed, there is no indication in this case that the district court
judge independently sought out information as to whether the persons mentioned by
McCorquodale during the recorded conversation were drug users. But the absence of an
independent investigation does not allow a district court judge to consider or rely on extra-
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record facts. The relevant provision of the code of judicial conduct contains two
independent prohibitions: first, a judge "shall not investigate facts in a matter
independently " and, second, a judge "shall consider only the evidence presented and any
facts that may properly be judicially noticed." Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 2.9(C).
More importantly, the supreme court stated in Dorsey that the right to an impartial judge
"requires that conclusions reached by the trier of fact be based upon the facts in evidence
.. . and prohibits the trier of fact from reaching conclusions based on evidence sought or
obtained beyond that adduced in court." 701 N.W.2d at 249-50. The district court in this
case did not comply with Dorsey.
Thus, the district court denied McCorquodale his right to an impartial fact-finder.
The district court's error is a structural error, which is not subject to harmless-error analysis
but, rather, requires automatic reversal of the conviction and a new trial. See id. at 252-53.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial before a different district court judge.
Reversed and remanded.
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