A21-0050

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0049
A21-0050

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:

J. B. and A. H., Parents (A21-0049),

and

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Children of:

J. B. and A. H., Parents (A21-0050).

Filed July 6, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Otter Tail County District Court
File No. 56-JV-20-789

Angela Sonsalla, Perham, Minnesota (for appellant father A.H.)

Michelle M. Eldien, Otter Tail County Attorney, Benjamin G. A. Olson, Assistant County
Attorney, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for respondent Otter Tail County Department of Human
Services)

Ruth A. Lee, Fergus Falls, Minnesota (for children)

Janice Amundson, Dalton, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and
Frisch, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district co urt’s decision to terminate his parental
rights. He argues that (1) the district cour t failed to make findings sufficient to allow
appellate review, (2) respondent -county failed to make adequate efforts to aid father in
correcting the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement of his children, and (3) the
record does not support the district court’s determination that termination of father’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
This matter involves seven joint children of appellant A.H. (father) and respondent
J.B. (mother)1: child 2, child 3, child 4, child 5, ch ild 6, child 7, and child 9 (referred to
collectively as “the children”). 2 Following a bench trial in late 2020, the district court
terminated father’s parental rights to the ch ildren. The district court also terminated
mother’s parental rights to child 9. Mother’s parental rights to children 2 through 7 were
previously terminated. At the time of trial, the children’s ages ranged from 7 to 17 years
old. We summarize the record as follows.
Father and mother were in a relationship for several years and lived together with
the children before separating in 2013. Following the breakup, father moved out of state,

1 Mother did not participate in this appeal.
2 Three additional children were involved in the underlying child-in-need-of-protection-or-
services (CHIPS) matters but are not subject to this app eal, including a now-adult joint
child of mother and father and two of mother’s non-joint children.

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and the children stayed with mother in Minnesota. In 2016, the children moved to Missouri
to live with father, while mother continued to live in Minnesota.
In 2018, mother gave birth to a non-joint child . Mother’s parental rights to that
child were involuntarily term inated in February 2019. The underlying bases for the
termination were mother’s untreated chem ical dependency, in adequately treated
mental-health issues, lack of functional stability, and lack of compliance and progress with
the out-of-home placement plan.
In August 2019, respondent Otter Tail C ounty Department of Human Services (the
county) received two separate maltreatment re ports that suggested that father and the
children had recently returned to Minnesota. One of the maltreatment reports alleged that
child 2 was involved in a serious car accident with mother and mother’s significant other,
which occurred while mother’s significant other was driving under the influence of
marijuana. The report further alleged that child 2 had been unde r the influence of a
nonprescribed benzodiazepine drug at the time of the accident, which the child received
from mother. The other maltreatment report involved allegations of a physical altercation
involving a knife between mother’s significant other and a now-adult child of mother and
father.
Following receipt of the reports, the county opened an investiga tion. The county
learned that father and children 2 through 7 were residing in a rental duplex in Fergus Falls
with mother and her significant other. Child 9 had remained in Missouri. Father and
children 2 through 7 were residing with mother, despite father’s knowledge that mother’s
parental rights to her newborn, non-joint chil d had been recently terminated. The duplex

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had a basement and an upstairs portion that were separated by a d oor, which was sealed
shut. All occupants of the duplex were living in the upstairs portion.3
On August 27, 2019, the county created an or al safety plan with father and mother.
The initial terms of the plan re quired (1) that all contact between the children and mother
be supervised and (2) that mother find her own residence by August 30. On or about
August 29, the county temporarily approved a plan whereby mother could reside in the
basement portion of the duplex. The county also agreed to give mother more time to move
either downstairs or to a different residence.
During two visits to the duplex during th is time period, a co unty child-protection
worker observed moth er at the duplex, unsupervised w ith several of the children in
violation of the oral safety plan. In September 2019, the county filed CHIPS petitions and
a motion for immediate custody of children 2 th rough 7. The district court granted the
county’s motion for immediate custody of the children, an d the county removed those
children from the home. The day after filing the CHIPS petitions, the county filed petitions
to terminate mother’s parental rights to children 2 through 7.
After the children were placed out of the home, the county proposed a second safety
plan. Among other provisions, the safety plan required the parties to live separately. The

3 The county also substantiated the allega tions in the August 2019 maltreatment report
concerning the car accident. Th e county learned that mother’s significant other had been
driving without a valid license at the time of the accident and had admitted to police that
he had smoked marijuana shortly before the accident. The county also learned that child 2
had reported to hospital staff that mother gave the child the nonprescribed benzodiazepine
drug. And the county substantiated the additional allegations in the report concerning the
physical altercation.

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plan directed mother to term inate her lease on the duplex and provide evid ence that she
had secured separate housing. If mother was unable to do th ose things, the safety plan
required father to move to another residen ce that was large enough to accommodate the
children in hopes that the children later would be reunited with father. At a September 19,
2019 hearing, the district court adopted the sa fety plan and directed that the children be
returned to father if the plan’s terms were achieved.
The district court held a trial in Nove mber 2019 on the CH IPS petitions and the
petition to terminate mother’s parental rights to children 2 through 7. It found that mother
and father were still living toge ther at the time of trial. The district court adjudicated
children 2 through 7 to be in need of protection or services and continued their out-of-home
placement. The district court also terminat ed mother’s parental rights to children 2
through 7.
In March 2020, the county received a repor t alleging that child 9 had returned to
Minnesota and was living with mother and father. The county filed a CHIPS petition
concerning child 9, and the district court granted the county’s request for immediate
custody of child 9. Soon af ter, the county filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental
rights to child 9. In June 2020, child 9 was ad judicated in need of protection or services.
In July 2020, the county filed a petition to terminate father’s parental rights to all seven
children on three separate statutory grounds. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2),
(4)-(5) (2020) (identifying statutory grounds for terminating parental rights). The county’s
primary reason for filing the termination petition was father’s continued cohabitation with

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mother. The county was also concerned abou t reports that father had mistreated the
children and that father was unable to meet the children’s needs.
In October and November 2020, the distri ct court held a two-day bench trial on the
county’s petitions to terminate father’s parent al rights to the children as well as mother’s
parental rights to child 9. The district court heard testimony from three child-protection
specialists with the county who had worked with the family, a clinical psychologist, a
child-development-and-attachment expert, and father. Three of the children also testified
at trial, and two more submitte d written statements. All five of those children expressed
that they wanted to be reunited with father.
One of the county’s child-pro tection specialists testified that mother and father were
still living in the same duplex at the time of trial despite the mandate in the court-ordered
safety plan that they find separate housing. Father admitted during his own testimony that
he and mother were still living together in the duplex but asserted that they would be living
separately within about a week’s time. The expert witnesses provided conflicting opinions
about whether father and the children should be reunified. The clinical psychologist
testified to her opinion that reunification of father and the children was an appropriate goal,
while the child-development-and-attachment expert did not recommend reunification. Via
a written submission, the children’s guardian ad litem recommended termination of father’s
parental rights. Mother did not participate in the trial.
In December 2020, the district court issued written findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and an order terminating father’s parental rights to the children and mother’s parental
rights to child 9. The district court terminat ed mother’s parental rights to child 9 on the

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basis that she is palpably unfit. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(4) (defining
palpable unfitness). The court determined that clear and c onvincing evidence existed to
terminate father’s parental rights pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5), on the
basis that reasonable efforts by the county had failed to correct the conditions that led to
the children’s out-of-home placement. The court noted that there were two primary
conditions that led to the ch ildren’s out-of-home placement: (1) the previous involuntary
termination of mother’s parental rights to a non-joint child, and (2) the fact that father and
the children were residing with mother after that termination. The court concluded that the
county put forth reasonable efforts but those efforts failed to reso lve the housing issue
because father continued to c ohabitate with mothe r. The court emphasized that father’s
continued cohabitation with mother would pose a substantial risk of harm to the children
and that father’s statements that he intended to find a residence separate from mother were
not credible. The district court further determined that terminating father’s parental rights
is in the best interests of the children and ordered that father’s parental rights to the children
be terminated.
Father appeals.
DECISION
Parental rights may only be terminat ed for “grave and weighty reasons.” In re
Welfare of Child of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 87 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). To
involuntarily terminate parental rights, a district court must find that one or more statutory
conditions for termination exist an d that termination is in the best interests of the child.

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Minn. Stat. § 260C.301 (2020); see also In re Welfare of L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d 393, 396-97
(Minn. 1996).
In reviewing a district court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we employ a
two-part standard of review. Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805 N.W.2d 895, 900-01
(Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). We review the district court’s
findings of the underlying or basic facts for clear error, but we review its determination of
whether a particular statutory basis for involuntarily terminating parental rights is present
for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 901. A factual finding is clearly erroneous “if there is no
reasonable evidence to support th e finding or when an appella te court is left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.” In re Welfare of Child of D.L.D. ,
865 N.W.2d 315, 322 (Minn. A pp. 2015) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn.
July 20, 2015). An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court’s factual findings are not
supported by the record, if the district court misapplies the law, or if it resolves the matter
in a manner that is against logi c and the facts on the record. Sinda v. Sinda ,
949 N.W.2d 170, 175 (Minn. App. 2020).
Father raises three arguments on appeal. He contends that (1) the district court
failed to make findings of fact sufficient to allow appellate review, (2) the district court
abused its discretion by concluding that the county made reasonable efforts to aid father in
correcting the conditions that led to the children’s out-of-home placement, and (3) the
record does not support the district court’s determination that termination of father’s
parental rights is in the children’s best interests. We address each of father’s arguments in
turn.

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I. The district court made sufficient findi ngs of fact to allow appellate review.

Father argues that the district court’s te rmination of his parental rights must be
reversed because the court failed to make sufficiently particularized findings. Specifically,
father asserts that the majority of the district court’s findi ngs are merely recitations or
summaries of witness testimony. He contends that the district court failed to affirmatively
state the facts it determined to be true or identify what testimony it determined to be
credible.
To facilitate effective appellate review, th e district court’s findings must “provide
insight into which facts or opinions were mo st persuasive of the ultimate decision” and
demonstrate the court’s consideration of the statutory bases for termination. In re Welfare
of M.M., 452 N.W.2d 236, 239 (Minn. 1990). It is insufficient for a district court to merely
recite what others have observed because such a recitation “is not a finding of fact that
those observations are true.” In re Civil Commitment of Spicer , 853 N.W.2d 803, 810
(Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted). Similarl y, it is insufficient for a district court to
merely summarize portions of testimony without commenting independently on the
witnesses’ opinions, the found ation for those opinions, or th e relative credibility of the
witnesses. M.M., 452 N.W.2d at 239.
We conclude that the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law,
considered together, do more than merely recite or summarize the evidence. For instance,
in reaching its conclusion th at the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home
placement have not been corrected, the district court affirmatively found that mother was
still residing in the duplex with father at the time of trial a nd noted that it did not find

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credible father’s assertions at trial that he planned to find separate housing from mother.
In reaching its determination th at the county had made reas onable efforts to correct the
conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement, the district court made specific
findings concerning the resources that the county had provided to father and mother to aid
them in finding separate housing. Furthermore, in concluding that termination of father’s
parental rights would serve the children’s best interests, the district court assessed the
relative credibility of various w itnesses, including the expert witnesses and father. And,
based on the testimony and reports summarized in its findings of fact , the district court
made specific findings regarding father’s ability to parent the children and meet their basic
needs.
Considered as a whole, the district cour t’s decision sufficiently identifies the facts
and opinions that the district court found to be persuasive in reaching its conclusion to
terminate father’s parental rights. Thus, we conclude that th e district court’s findings are
sufficient to facilitate appellate review. That said, we acknowledge that a number of the
district court’s findings include mere recitati ons of testimony. We encourage the district
court to include less recitation of testimony and more particularized findings in future
orders.
II. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by concludi ng that the county
made reasonable efforts to correct the conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement.

Father next argues that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that the
statutory basis for termination of his pa rental rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,
subd. 1(b)(5), was met. To terminate pare ntal rights under Minn. Stat. § 260C.301,

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subd. 1(b)(5), the district court must find by clear and convincing evidence “that following
the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the direction of the court,
have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’s placement.” This statutory basis
for termination of parental rights contains two distinct requirements: (1) that the conditions
leading to the child’s placement were not corrected and (2) that the county used reasonable
efforts to correct those conditions. Father appears to argue that the district court abused its
discretion by concluding that the county dem onstrated by clear and convincing evidence
that both of those requirements were satisfied in this case.
Here, the district court found that the primary conditions leading to the children’s
out-of-home placement were (1) mother’s prior involuntary termination of parental rights
and (2) the fact that father and the children were living with mother. The district court
determined that the county made reasonable efforts to help father address these conditions
and secure separate housing. The district court further determined that those efforts were
reasonable in light of the circumstances of this case but that father (and mother) nonetheless
failed to correct the housing situation.
Father raises three argumen ts to support his position that the statutory basis for
terminating his parental rights was not met. First, father argues that the county imposed
“confusing and conflicting” expectations regarding the requi rement that he find separate
housing from mother. He asserts that the co unty’s initial approval in August 2019 of a
plan in which mother would move to the basement unit of the duplex misled him to believe
that such an arrangement would satisfy the separate-housing requirement. This argument

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appears to challenge the district court’s dete rmination that the conditions leading to the
children’s out-of-home placement were not corrected. We are unpersuaded.
Father does not dispute that the initial oral safety plan established by the county—
under which mother was permitted to move to the basement of the duplex—was temporary
in nature. And father does not challenge the district court’s finding that the subsequent
court-ordered written safety plan required either mother or father to move out of the duplex
and to secure separate housing. Under those circumstances, father’s contention that he did
not understand the county’s expect ation that he and mother live in separate buildings is
unconvincing. Moreover, father’s repeated statements to the county and the district court
that mother had plans to move out of the duplex further be lie his assertion that he was
confused about the mandates of the separate-housing requirement. The record supports the
district court’s finding that the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement
were not corrected.
Second, father argues that the record does not support the district court’s
determination that the county made reasonable efforts to re unite father with the children.
Father argues that the record shows that th e county’s efforts were inadequate because
father’s “case plan fail[ed] to set forth specific steps desi gned to assist [f]ather with
successfully accomplishing the goal or requ irement of finding separate housing from”
mother. Father asserts that the “only” service provided by the county with regard to
housing was a referral to a local agency that was unable to assist father.
When assessing whether the county has made reasonable efforts to reunify parent
and child, the district court must consider whet her the services were “(1) relevant to the

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safety and protection of the ch ild; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the child and family;
(3) culturally appropriate; (4 ) available and accessible; (5) consistent and timely; and
(6) realistic under the circumstances.” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). “The county’s
efforts must assist in alleviating the co nditions that gave rise” to the out-of-home
placement. In re Welfare of H.K., 455 N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied
(Minn. July 6, 1990). “Whether the county has met its duty of reasonable efforts requires
consideration of the length of the time the coun ty was involved and th e quality of effort
given.” Id.
In light of the record in this case, we are not persuaded by father’s argument. The
record reflects that the county did more than o ffer father just a referral to a local housing
agency. The county also offere d father transportation services. There is no indication in
the record that father was precluded from using the transportation services to find housing.
The record also reflects that the county provided a family resource worker to father who
was available to help father find housing. Furthermore, father’s own statement at trial that
he had been “in the process of buying . . . a $500,000 home” in 2012 suggests that father
has the skills to obtain housing when desired. And the record amply supports the district
court’s conclusion that father had no intent ion to find separate housing from mother, and
that further efforts by the count y to aid father in finding hous ing would have been futile.
For example, the record reflects that father and mother were both still residing in the duplex
at the time of trial in Novemb er 2020 and had lived there t ogether almost continuously
since the children were rem oved from the home in September 2019; father had made
repeated claims to both the county and the court that mother had plans to move to a different

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residence; in each instance “such action ha[d] not taken place”; and father had told one of
the county’s child-protection specialists that the duplex was his home and that he was not
moving. Father did testify at trial that he would be living separately from mother within
about a week’s time, but the district court did not find this testimony to be credible. Based
on those findings, the district court determined that father had no intention of finding a
residence separate from mother. The district court thus concluded that the county’s efforts
were reasonable because “there were no ot her efforts that the [county] could have
implemented to solve the housin g situation.” Under the circumstances of this case, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county made reasonable
efforts to assist father with addressing his housing situation.
Third, father argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by determining that
the county’s reunification efforts were reas onable because the district court identified
“multiple issues and concerns” regarding the family’s situation othe r than housing “for
which reasonable efforts towards reunificatio n were not made.” But those additional
considerations—including the di strict court’s concerns about father’s ability to meet the
children’s basic needs, allegations that fa ther had mistreated the children, and the
children’s lack of secure attachment to fa ther—were cited by the district court in its
analysis of the best-interests factor. Those concerns did not play a role in the district court’s
analysis of whether the county demonstrated th at reasonable efforts had failed to correct
the conditions that led to the out-of-home placement as required under Minn.
Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). We therefor e do not consider the county’s efforts to

15
remedy those issues in our analysis of whet her the county used reasonable efforts within
the meaning of Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the county
used reasonable efforts to correct the conditions leading to the children’ s out-of-home
placement and that the conditions leading to the children’s out-of-home placement were
not corrected.
III. The district court did not abuse its di scretion by concluding that terminating
father’s parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

Lastly, father contends that the district court abused its discretion by concluding that
terminating his parental rights is in the children’s best interests. He argues that the district
court failed to make findings that demonstrat e it considered the impa ct of its decision on
each individual child based on that child’s age and unique circumstances. And he argues
that the district court failed to assign ap propriate weight to the children’s stated
preferences. Again, we disagree.
When deciding whether to terminate parent al rights, the interests of the child are
paramount. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7. “The ‘best interests of the child’ means all
relevant factors to be considered and evaluated.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.511(a) (2020). “We
review a district court’s ultimate determination that termination is in a child’s best interest
for an abuse of discretion.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905. And we grant “considerable
deference” to the district court’s determination. J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d at 92.
In analyzing the best intere sts of a child, the district c ourt must consider “(1) the
child’s interest in preserving the parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’s interest in

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preserving the parent-child relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” In
re Welfare of R.T.B. , 492 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1992); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P.
58.04(c)(2)(ii). “Competing inte rests [of the child] include such things as a stable
environment, health considerations and the child’s preferences.” R.T.B., 492 N.W.2d at 4.
The district court’s order demonstrates that the district court considered the relevant
factors including the impact of its decision on each child and the stated preferences of the
children. The district court made many findi ngs of fact specific to the needs of the
individual children. For instance, the c ourt made specific findings concerning the
educational needs of children 2 through 7, the dental and eye care needs of child 3, 5,
and 6, and the mental health diagnoses of every child. The district court also made
numerous findings and determinations relevant to the interests of all of the children
regardless of their age and unique circumstances. The court found that father had severely
neglected the children’s educational and medi cal needs while living in Missouri and that
“at least some” of the allegations against fath er of “inappropriate forms of discipline” are
true. The court further found that father has demonstrated deficits in meeting the children’s
mental health needs and that if the children were returned to father, their basic needs would
go unmet. And the court concluded that fa ther has failed to re cognize his role in
contributing to the children’s level of functi oning, which led the court to conclude that
father is unable to make meaningful changes in his parenting style.
The district court further acknowledged that five of the children had expressed their
wishes to be reunified with father and noted that it assi gned those stated preferences
“considerable weight.” Nonetheless, after weighing the relevant factors, the district court

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determined that the children’s stated preferences were not in their best interests. In
reaching that determination, the court concluded that the statements of three of the children
that they wished to return home were likely influenced by the fact that those children were
living in residential treatment, shelter care, or a similar facility. The court also agreed with
the guardian ad litem that all of the children’s stated preferen ces are “most likely due to
the fact that they want to reside together as siblings, and less likely due to the fact that they
want to be reunified with [father].” This court defers to a district court’s credibility
determinations. In re Welfare of Child of T.D., 731 N.W.2d 548, 555 (Minn. App. 2007).
Based on a balancing of the relevant considerations, the district court determined
that “[c]lear and convincing evidence indicat[es] a termination of [father’s parental] rights
is in [the children’s] individual best interest s.” And the district court specifically noted
that it “does not take lightly the decision that is made here today and the [e]ffect it will
have on the children going forward.” But it concluded that “[t]he children’s need for a safe
and stable home, and a caregiver that can meet their needs, can be best met by a termination
of parental rights and a subsequent adoption or other permanent placement.”
The district court’s findings demonstrat e that the court appr opriately considered
both the individual and collective interests of the children and assigned appropriate weight
to their stated preferences. The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that
terminating father’s parental rights to the children is in the children’s best interests.
Affirmed.