In re the Marriage of: Bryan Larry Lovas, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0060

In re the Marriage of:
Bryan Larry Lovas, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Stacy Ann Lovas, n/k/a Stacy Ann Gades,
Respondent.

Filed December 13, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Slieter, Judge

Olmsted County District Court
File No. 55-FA-19-1814

Jill I. Frieders, O’Brien & Wolf, L.L.P., Rochester, Minnesota (for appellant)

Sharon R. Markowitz, Kathryn M. Bjorklund, Stinson LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Kirk,
Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this marital-dissolution appeal, appellant challenges the district court’s rulings to:
(1) proceed by default because he arrived late to trial, (2) deny his motion to vacate the

 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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default judgment, (3) order him to pay resp ondent permanent spousal maintenance, and
(4) order him to pay conduct-bas ed attorney fees. Because the district court abused its
discretion by proceeding by default, we reverse and remand for trial, and we do not address
the remaining issues.
FACTS
Appellant-husband Bryan Larry Lovas and respondent-wife Stacy Ann Lovas
married in 2008 and have four minor children. Husband petitioned for dissolution in 2019.
The parties engaged in several mediation sessions preceding the dissolution trial. Through
mediation, the parties reached an oral ag reement regarding cust ody and parenting time
though it was not reduced to writing.
The district court 1 delayed the start of trial by on e day so that the parties could
continue mediating the remaining issues. After mediating the entire day and into the
evening without reaching settlement, wife’s attorney asked the district court to again delay
the trial for a few hours because she believe d “that a tentative ag reement [had] been
reached.” The district court, through sta ff email communication and less than one hour
before the trial start time, denied the request to delay trial and told the parties to report for
trial by 9:00 a.m.
Wife and her attorney timely appeared for the dissolution trial at 9:00 a.m. Husband
and his attorney were not pr esent because husband’s attorney, who did not see the email

1 This case was heard by a referee who recomme nded findings and orders to the district
court. Once the district court confirms the referee’s findings, the findings become the order
of the court, Minn. Stat. § 484.70, subd. 7 (2020), and we re view the order like any other
district court order.
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from court staff denying further delay, told husband to meet at her office to discuss the
terms of the pending settlement agreement. The district court waited 30 minutes, told wife
it was “going to default this matter out,” and began the hearin g with only wife testifying
and in response to questions by her attorney. Husband arrived 19 minutes after the district
court commenced the proceeding and his attorney arrived a few minutes after that.
Following completion of the default hearing, the district court issued the judgment
and decree (J&D) dissolving the marriage between husband and wife. As part of the J&D,
the district court ordered that husband pay temporary spousal maintenance to wife in the
amount of $1,500 per month fo r one year and $1,000 per month for two additional years,
terminating on June 30, 2022.
In July 2019, husband moved to vacate the judgment ba sed on excusable neglect.
In September 2019, the district court granted husband’s motion in part and denied it in part
and reopened the J&D only as to the issues regarding division of personal property and
allocation of marital debt. In March 2020, husband separately moved to modify his spousal
maintenance obligation due to the impact to his income because of the COVID-19
pandemic. In a May 2020 order, the distri ct court temporarily suspended husband’s
spousal-maintenance obligation “until 60 days after the peacetime emergency [declared by
the governor because of the COVID-19 pandemic] has ended, or the sale of the homestead,
whichever occurs first.”
Following an evidentiary hear ing regarding the reopened issues, the district court
issued its order modifying the J&D in November 2020. In its order, the court sua sponte
ordered husband to resume paying wife $1,000 in spousal maintenance “until further order
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of the court.” The district court also ordered husband to pay wife $4,000 in conduct-based
attorney’s fees. Husband appeals.
DECISION
Though husband raises four issues on appeal, our analys is begins and ends with
husband’s first argument—that the district c ourt abused its discre tion in proceeding by
default. Because we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in proceeding by
default—and that issue is dispositive—we need not reach the merits of the other issues
husband raises on appeal.2
At the outset, we note that the district court did not make findings explaining why
it was proceeding by default. The district court explained to appellant and his counsel, who
were not allowed to take part during the proc eeding, that default wa s “a tough lesson to
learn and a tough lesson to learn this way, but that’s just the way things work.” Generally,
a district court may not enter a default judgment absent notice to the parties. Minn. R. Civ.
P. 55.01(b); see also Lindberg v. Lindberg, 331 N.W.2d 479, 479 (Minn. 1983) (applying
rule 55.01 to a marital dissolution case). Because there was no such notice to husband, the
district court in this case could not enter a default judgment pursuant to rule 55.01. But a
district court does have the inherent authority to proceed by default as a sanction. Peterson

2 Among the other issues raised by husband is that the district court erred by its sua sponte
modification of its initial order awarding wife temporary spousal maintenance. We agree
this was an error. The district court may amend a spousal maintenance obligation sua
sponte only to correct a clerical error. See Rogers v. Rogers, 622 N.W.2d 813, 822 (Minn.
2001) (allowing the district court to sua sponte modify a child support obligation to correct
a clerical error); Hamann v. Hamann , 479 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Minn. App. 1992) (“Trial
court findings are required when the court addresses modification issues.”).
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v. 2004 Ford Crown Victoria VIN: 2FAHP74WX4X158445, 792 N.W.2d 454, 462 (Minn.
App. 2010) (“[D]istrict courts possess inherent authority to impose sanctions as necessary
to protect their vital function . . . .”). Henc e, from this record and because we have no
specific findings from the district court, we presume the court procee ded by default as a
sanction for husband’s late arrival for trial. Based upon this re cord, we now analyze
whether proceeding by default is a proper sanction.
We will not reverse a district court’s deci sion to enter defau lt judgment absent an
abuse of discretion. Black v. Rimmer , 700 N.W.2d 521, 52 5 (Minn. App. 2005), rev.
dismissed (Minn. Sept. 28, 2005). “A district court abuses its discretion by making findings
of fact that are unsupported by the evidence, misapplying the law, or rendering a decision
that is against logic and the facts on record.” Knapp v. Knapp, 883 N.W.2d 833, 835 (Minn.
App. 2016) (quotation omitted).
A district court must “act cautiously when the sanction imposed is that of default
judgment, which is the most severe in the sp ectrum of sanctions provided by statute or
rule.” Chicago Greatwestern Office Condo. Ass’n v. Brooks, 427 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Minn.
App. 1988) (addressing default as sanction for failure to comply with discovery rules). As
a result, the district court’s discretion is more constrained in imposing default judgment as
a sanction than in imposing less severe sanctions. Id. In determining th e severity of the
sanction to be imposed, the district court sh ould consider as the primary factor any
prejudice to the benefitting party caused by the sanctionable conduct. Id. at 730-31 (citing
cases in which prejudice to be nefitting party was emphasized). Other factors to consider
may include the nature of the sanctioned party’s noncompliance and whether it would
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deprive the other party of a fair trial. Id. at 731. Finally, the district court must explain its
reasons for imposing its chosen sanctions. Id.
As we have explained, we infer that th e district court sanctioned husband with
default due to his lateness for trial. See, e.g., Modaff v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 664 N.W.2d
400, 402 (Minn. App. 2003) (stating that remand for additional fact finding is unnecessary
when we are able to infer findings from district court’s conclusions). The sanctionable
conduct is that husband arrived less than one hour late to the original 9:00 a.m. trial-start
time. But because the district court delayed the start of trial to 9:30 a.m., husband arrived
only 19 minutes after the trial st arted. The facts in this re cord preceding husband’s late
arrival, which facts also reveal minimal prejudice to wife, lead us to conclude that imposing
the sanction of a default judgment was an abuse of discretion.
First, husband was directed by his attorney to come to her office on the morning of
trial rather than report to court. Caselaw has generally expressed reluctance to penalize a
party for an attorney’s mistake or other matters outside of their control. See Duenow v.
Lindeman, 27 N.W.2d 421, 429 (Minn. 1947) (stating that “[c] ourts will relieve parties
from the consequences of the neglect or mistak es of their attorney, [sic] when it can be
done without substantial prejudice to their adversaries”) (citations omitted); Nguyen v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 558 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Minn. 1997) (citing this aspect of
Duenow).
Second, prior to the instruction from husband’s attorney to report to her office, both
parties had been actively attempting to reso lve all issues by participating in several
mediation sessions. Of note, the parties c ontinued their final mediation session the day
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before trial and the district court was awar e of and had supported this effort. At
approximately 4:30 that afternoon, court staff told the parties that, “if [they] reached an
agreement; and it was in writing, and [they] both had signed it” that the parties should file
that agreement with the district court. Otherwise, the parties were told “to report for trial
at 9:00 a.m.” when the parties would “put th e full agreement on th e record” or proceed
with trial. The record indicates that both parties believed settlement was imminent. It was
wife’s attorney who, the even ing before trial was to begi n, sought the additional delay
because “a tentative agreement [had] been reached,” and husband’s attorney stated, when
she was allowed to provide an explanation to the district court of their late arrival, that she
was reviewing the proposed agreement with husband.
Based upon the facts in this record, which reveal minimal prejudice to wife caused
by husband’s late arrival, and because default judgment is the most severe sanction that a
district court can impose, the district court abused its discretion. Therefore, we reverse and
remand to the district court to vacate the judgment and proceed to trial.3 This decision does
not impact the portion of the judgment disso lving the parties’ marriage, which husband
explicitly does not contest.
Reversed and remanded.

3 Our ruling does not preclude the parties from resuming settlement efforts prior to trial.