Roy Lee Smith, petitioner, Appellant, vs. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Paone v. State 658 N.W.2d 896
- Washington v. State 845 N.W.2d 205
- Willie Edd Reynolds v. State of Minnesota 888 N.W.2d 125
- Johnson v. State 801 N.W.2d 173
- State of Minnesota v. Dakari Michael Coles 862 N.W.2d 477
- Hooper v. State 838 N.W.2d 775
- State v. Raleigh 778 N.W.2d 90
- Junious Taylor, Jr. v. State of Minnesota 887 N.W.2d 821
- Dikken v. State 896 N.W.2d 873
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. l(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0071
Roy Lee Smith, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
State of Minnesota,
Respondent.
Filed October 4, 2021
Affirmed
Johnson, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-16-18357
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Kathryn J. Lockwood, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael 0. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Mark V. Griffin, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JOHNSON, Judge
In 2017, Roy Lee Smith pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct
pursuant to a plea agreement. The district court imposed a sentence of 156 months of
imprisonment. In 2020, Smith moved to correct his sentence and requested leave to
withdraw his guilty plea. The district court denied Smith's requests for relief. We affirm.
FACTS
In July 2016, the state charged Smith with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. l(c) (2014). In January 2017, Smith pleaded
guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. At the plea hearing, the prosecutor and Smith's
attorney stated the terms of the plea agreement on the record. The prosecutor stated that,
if Smith pleaded guilty, he could choose between two sentencing options. First, Smith
could elect to receive a "firm 156-month prison commit," which was a sentence at the mid
point of the presumptive range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. Second, Smith
could elect to receive a sentence in "a range of 144 to 172." Smith's attorney stated to him:
"I think we felt the better choice for you would be to take the firm 156, which is right in
the middle guideline case. Do you understand that?" Smith answered in the affirmative.
His attorney then asked, "And you still want to proceed with that option, the 156 firm then,
correct?" Smith again answered in the affirmative. Smith pleaded guilty. On the same
day, he signed a plea petition that referred to a plea agreement specifying a prison term of
156 months.
At sentencing in March 2017, the state requested that the district court sentence
Smith "pursuant to the negotiation, which is 156-month prison commit." Smith's attorney
requested that the district court "follow the plea agreement: 156 months." The district court
imposed a sentence of 156 months of imprisonment, with jail credit for time served. Smith
did not pursue a direct appeal.
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In April 2020, Smith filed a pro se motion to correct his sentence pursuant to rule
27.03, subdivision 9, of the rules of criminal procedure. He argued that he had not received
any jail credit, and he requested an award of 259 days of credit. The district court referred
Smith's prose motion to the office of the state public defender. See Minn. Stat. § 590.02,
subd. 1 ( 4) (2018) (requiring district court administrator to transmit post-conviction petition
to state public defender if petitioner is without counsel); Paone v. State, 658 N.W.2d 896,
899-900 (Minn. App. 2003) (reversing and remanding to allow post-conviction petitioner
to present claims to district court with assistance of public defender). In July 2020, Smith
wrote a letter to the assigned district court judge in which he requested that he be permitted
to withdraw his guilty plea on the grounds that he is innocent and that he had agreed to a
144-month sentence but had received a 156-month sentence. Two weeks later, a state
assistant public defender, by letter, entered her appearance on behalf of Smith. The
assistant state public defender requested that the district court consider and resolve Smith's
motion to correct his sentence and stated that Smith no longer was seeking to withdraw his
plea. The state filed a three-page letter brief discussing Smith's prison sentence and his
receipt of jail credit. Smith later wrote another letter to the assigned district court judge in
which he reiterated his request that he be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.
In November 2020, the district court denied Smith's motion to correct sentence and
his request for plea withdrawal. The district court determined that Smith had received 259
days of jail credit, which is the amount reflected on the warrant of commitment. The
district court also determined that Smith's request to withdraw his guilty plea is untimely
because it was made more than two years after he was sentenced. The district court further
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determined, in the alternative, that Smith's guilty plea is not invalid because Smith
voluntarily chose a prison sentence of 156 months. Smith appeals.
DECISION
With the assistance of his assistant state public defender, Smith argues that the
district court erred by denying his "postconviction petition asking the court to resentence
him in accordance with his reasonable understanding of the plea agreement." He contends
that his guilty plea is invalid on the ground that he understood that he would receive a
sentence of only 144 months.
We begin our analysis by identifying the issue or issues that are properly before this
court. An offender may challenge a sentence either by petitioning for post-conviction relief
under chapter 590 of the Minnesota Statutes or by moving to correct the sentence under
rule 27.03, subdivision 9, of the rules of criminal procedure. Washington v. State, 845
N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. App. 2014). A post-conviction petition must be filed no more
than two years after a judgment of conviction becomes final, unless certain exceptions
apply. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020). But a motion to correct sentence pursuant
to rule 27.03, subdivision 9, may be filed "at any time." Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9;
see also Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 133 (Minn. 2016). For that reason, an offender
seeking relief more than two years after his sentencing may wish to rely on rule 27.03,
subdivision 9.
However, an offender may rely on rule 27.03, subdivision 9, only to the extent that
the offender's challenge is limited to his sentence. If an offender challenges both his guilty
plea and his sentence, rule 27.03, subdivision 9, does not apply, and the offender must seek
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relief under the post-conviction statute. Johnson v. State, 801 N. W.2d 173, 175-76 (Minn.
2011). Similarly, if an offender challenges a sentence that was imposed pursuant to a
negotiated plea agreement, rule 27.03, subdivision 9, does not apply because "a motion to
change that sentence impacts more than simply the sentence." State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d
477, 481 (Minn. 2015). Because Smith's 156-month prison sentence was a term of his
negotiated plea agreement, he may not challenge his sentence under rule 27 .03, subdivision
9. The only proper vehicle for his claim or claims is a post-conviction petition.
As stated above, a post-conviction petition must be filed within two years of final
judgment, unless certain exceptions apply. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a); Hooper v.
State, 838 N.W.2d 775, 780-82 (Minn. 2013). The district court ruled that both Smith's
motion and his informal request were filed more than two years after final judgment, and
the district court further noted that Smith had not argued for an exception to the two-year
statute of limitations. On appeal, Smith does not challenge that part of the district court's
order. Thus, it is undisputed that Smith's informal request for post-conviction relief is
untimely. That conclusion is a sufficient basis for affirming the district court's order.
Even if Smith's post-conviction request were timely, it would not have merit. To
prevail on a post-conviction motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a petitioner must establish
that withdrawal is necessary to "correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05,
subd. 1. "A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid." State v. Raleigh, 778
N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). To be constitutionally valid, "a guilty plea must be accurate,
voluntary, and intelligent." Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016). A guilty
plea is intelligent if the defendant, at the time he entered the plea, "understood the charges
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against him, the rights he waived, and the consequences of the plea." Dikken v. State, 896
N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017) (quotation omitted). Similarly, a guilty plea is voluntary if
it is not "based on any improper pressures or inducements." Id. at 87 6-77. A defendant
bears the burden of proving that his guilty plea is invalid. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. This
court applies a de nova standard of review to a district court's determination of the validity
of a guilty plea. Id.
As an alternative ground for denying post-conviction relief, the district court
determined that Smith's guilty plea is not invalid because Smith elected a prison sentence
of 156 months at the sentencing hearing. Smith contends on appeal that the 156-month
sentence is contrary to his understanding of the plea agreement. But the record is clear that
Smith had a choice between a "firm 156-month prison commit" and "a range of 144 to
172," that he chose a 156-month sentence, and that the district court sentenced him
accordingly. Smith has not pointed to any facts in the record that would support his
contention that he believed that he would receive a sentence of 144 months. See id. at 96.
Because it is clear from the transcript of Smith's plea hearing that he agreed to a prison
sentence of 156 months, he cannot prove that he reasonably understood that he would
receive a prison sentence of only 144 months. Accordingly, the district court did not err
by determining, in the alternative, that Smith has not satisfied his burden of establishing
that his guilty plea is invalid. See id. at 94, 96.
Thus, the district court did not err by denying Smith's informal request for post
conviction relief.
Affirmed.
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