Nikita Nikel Dixon, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0072

Nikita Nikel Dixon, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-17-5420

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Amy Lawler, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Sarah J. Vokes, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this appeal from the pos tconviction court’s denial of his petition to withdraw his
guilty plea, appellant argues his plea was not intelligent because he did not understand that
the direct consequences of his plea could include an executed prison sentence. Appellant
2
understood that he could receive a presumptively executed prison sentence and, therefore,
his guilty plea was intelligent, and no manifest injustice o ccurred by the district court
accepting his guilty plea. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Nikita Nikel Dix on pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct,
in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(a) (2016). The district court accepted
appellant’s guilty plea following an inquir y during which appellant acknowledged an
understanding of his ri ghts, the charges against him, and the plea petition describing and
waiving those rights, which he signed. The district court senten ced appellant to 124
months’ imprisonment followe d by a ten-year conditional-re lease period—a downward
durational departure—because it found his crim inal conduct “somewhat less serious than
other criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.”
Appellant filed a petition for postconvicti on relief arguing that his guilty plea was
not intelligent.1 The postconviction court received te stimony from appellant and his trial
counsel and concluded that appellant had “not provided any new information which would
undermine the record made during the plea hearing” and that “his plea was intelligent . . .

1 Appellant requested “[i]n the alternative” that the postconviction court “reduce his
sentence, and impose a downward dispositional departure with a stay of execution.” The
postconviction court properly denied this request which was based upon appellant’s claim
that the district court did not consid er all possible mitigating factors. See State v. Pegel,
795 N.W.2d 251, 253-54 (Minn. App. 2011) (“[t]he mere fa ct that a mitigating factor is
present in a particular case does not obligate the court to place the defendant on probation
or impose a shorter term than the presum ptive term.”). Additionally, appellant has
provided no authority which obl igates “reconsideration” of a sentence other than one not
authorized by law. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03 subd. 9 (“The court may at any time correct
a sentence not authorized by law.”); Minn. Stat. § 590.01 (2018).
3
and therefore valid.” It further concluded th at the record supported the district court’s
sentencing decision and therefore denied the petition. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellate courts review a postconvi ction court’s denial of a petition for
postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion. Pearson v. State, 891 N.W.2d 590, 596
(Minn. 2017). “Legal issues are reviewed de novo, but [] review of factual issues is limited
to whether there is sufficient evidence in the reco rd to sustain the postconviction court’s
findings.” Id. (quotations omitted). The validity of a guilty plea is a question of law which
is reviewed de novo , and the defendant bears the burden of showing that the plea was
invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). Although a “defendant has no
absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it . . . the court must allow withdrawal
of a guilty plea if withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id. at 93 (quoting
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1). A plea is constitutionally invalid and works a manifest
injustice if it is inaccurate, involuntary, or unintelligent. Id. at 94.
For a plea to be intelligent, the defendant must understand “the charges against him,
the rights he is waiving, and th e consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96. Appellant argues
that he did not understand th e consequences of his plea because he believed he would
receive probation rather than the executed prison sentence.2 The record belies appellant’s
claim.

2 Appellant also argues that he did not understand the charges against him because he was
not informed of the intent criminal sexual co nduct requires. The criminal sexual conduct
statute “does not contain an intent requirement, making it a general intent crime.” State v.
Hart, 477 N.W.2d 732, 736 (Minn. App. 1991), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 16, 1992); see also
4
Appellant participated in a pre-plea investigation, which recommended the
presumptive executed prison sentence of 168 months. Before appellant pleaded guilty, the
prosecutor indicated that the state’s “offer would be 144 months at this time, which would
be bottom of the box.” After the district court accepted appellant’s guilty plea, the
prosecutor reminded the court that a pre-plea investigation recommended the presumptive
executed prison sentence of 168 months and “that the state will be asking for a presumptive
sentence.” Appellant’s counsel responded th at they “would be filing a motion for a
departure.” During the sentencing hearing appellant stated he understood the judge “could
give [him] 100-and-something months.”
Appellant’s testimony during the postconviction hearing reaffirmed that when he
made the plea of guilty, he understood he was “giving up [his] rights and putting [his] fate
in the judge to make a ruling on a straight plea” and determine his sentence. Appellant’s
trial attorney testified that he reviewed th e pre-plea investigation with appellant and the
presumptive guidelines sentences the judge coul d impose. In sum, the record indicates
appellant understood that an executed prison term was the presumptive consequence of his
guilty plea and that the ultimate determination of his sentence lay in the discretion of the
district court.3 Therefore, appellant’s guilty plea was valid.

State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 302 (Minn. 2015) (“Generally, criminal sexual conduct
offenses require only an intent to sexua lly penetrate, unless additional mens rea
requirements are expressly provided.”). A general intent crime only requires “the intent to
do the act that constitutes a crime.” Hart, 477 N.W.2d at 736. (citing State v. Kjeldahl, 278
N.W.2d 58, 61 (Minn. 1979)). The record refl ects that appellant admitted he intended to
engage in sexual contact. Therefore, his argument lacks merit.
3 Appellant separately argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary because he believed he
would receive probation. This argument la cks merit. Appellant appears to conflate
5
Appellant argues in a pro se supplemental brief that im position of the ten-year
conditional-release period violates his constitutional rights pursuant to Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2002), because it extends beyond his 124-month prison
sentence. This issue was not raised before the postconviction court, so we need not address
its merits. Roby v. State, 547 N.W.2d 354, 357 (1996). Moreover, appellant’s argument
would fail pursuant to State v. Jones, 659 N.W.2d 748 (Minn. 2003). Jones held that, for
Apprendi purposes, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence is the sum of the
statutory-maximum term of incarceration and the required conditional-release period. Id.
at 754. First-degree criminal sexual conduct requires a statutory maximum sentence of 30
years’ imprisonment, Minn. Stat. § 609.34 2, subd. 2(a), and a mandatory ten-year
conditional-release period. Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd. 6 (2016). Appellant’s combined
prison sentence and conditional -release period total just over 22 years, well under the
statutory maximum of 30 years’ imprisonment and ten years of conditional release.
Affirmed.

intelligence, which is the sole factual basis for his petition, with voluntariness. Nothing in
the record indicates appellant experienced improper pressures or inducements. Dikken v.
State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 876-77 (Minn. 2017) (“To be voluntary, a guilty plea may not be
based on any improper pressures or inducements.”).