State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0073

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Michael Anthony Ramirez, Sr.,
Appellant.

Filed August 23, 2021
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Brown County District Court
File No. 08-CR-13-991

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Charles W. Hanson, Brown County Attorney, Andrea J. Lieser, Assistant County Attorney,
New Ulm, Minnesota (for respondent)

Steven P. Groschen, Madeline K. Baskfiel d, Kohlmeyer Hagen Law Office, Mankato,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Re illy, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order denying appellant’s petition to restore
his right to possess firearms, appellant argues that the district court erred in concluding that

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he failed to show good cause to restore this right. Because the district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied appellant’s petition, we affirm.
FACTS
On October 23, 2006, appellant Michael An thony Ramirez, Sr., pleaded guilty to
and was convicted of first-degr ee drug sale, in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
152.021, subdivision 1(1) (2006 ), resulting in an 80-month prison sentence. This felony
conviction is considered a “crime of violence,” see Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (2006),
and therefore made Ramirez ineligible to possess firearms or ammunition under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.165, subdivision 1a (2006). Ramirez was discharged from supervised
release on May 9, 2013. Approximately six months later, on November 6, 2013, Ramirez
was charged with fifth-degree drug possession in violation of Minnesota Statutes section
152.025, subdivision 2(b)(1) (2 012). In November 2014, Ramirez was convicted of that
offense. This felony conviction is also considered a “crime of violence.” See Minn. Stat.
§ 624.712, subd. 5 (2014). Ramirez was placed on probation for this offense for a term of
ten years.
In December 2019, Ramirez was discharged early from probation. Six months later,
Ramirez petitioned the district court to restore his right to possess firearms. The district
court held a hearing in August 2020. At the hearing, Ramirez testified that he was seeking
firearm restoration to “bond with [his] kids. Show ‘em hunting” and to “learn firearm
safety.” Ramirez explained th at he had ten children at home with his fiancée, including
four biological children, ages 7, 14, 28, and 29. When asked why he wanted to hunt with

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his children, Ramirez responded that his children have asked to go hunting and that he felt
a responsibility because other relatives were not willing to take the children hunting:
Sir, because I believe that it’s—it ’s something that they have
been asking me for, for quite some time, that they want to go
hunting. They’ve asked thei r uncles, they’ve asked their
friends, and, you know, nob ody wants to take that
responsibility, you know, when they’re going to go out and do
something on their own. Until then, it’s my responsibility to
show ‘em, and to teach them, Sir.

The district court questioned Ramirez about his hunting history. Ramirez testified
that he began hunting in Texas when he was 13, and that he last hunted wild hog 25 years
ago, in 1996. He explained that he moved to Minnesota in 1998 and that he had never
hunted in Minnesota. The district court asked Ramirez if he had possessed firearms prior
to his offense in 2006 and he replied, “No.” Ramirez stated that he “never owned” a firearm
himself and that he used his “friend’s” or “brother-in-law’s” firearms in the past. Ramirez
was also asked about his criminal history. Ramirez testified that he was convicted of first-
degree controlled substance crime in 2006, se rved 80 months in prison, and was under
supervised release until May 9, 2013. Ramirez confirmed that his second offense occurred
six months later in November 2013. Ramirez also confirmed that although he was placed
on probation for ten years, he was discharged from probation in December 2019.
The district court ultimately denied Ramirez’s petition. The district concluded that
it was “not convinced that a weighing of the public safety interest against the private
interest in possessing firearms comes out in Ramirez’s favor.” The district court also had
“some doubt” regarding whether Ramirez was “genuine in his explanation, or whether that
explanation is instead a subterfuge.” The district court noted that Ramirez acknowledged

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that he had not hunted since 1996, and that his involvement in hunting was “sparse,” so
that his “‘commitment’ to the sport may reasonably be questioned.” The district court also
reasoned that it had public-safety concerns based on Ramirez’s past convictions of selling
controlled substances. The district court e xplained that the “danger to the public from
engaging in such activities can hardly be ignored.” The district court also concluded that
the nature of Ramirez’s convictions, the fact that Ramirez reoffended only six months after
completing his supervised release term, and the fact that Ramirez was recently discharged
from probation all weighed against the petition. The district court reasoned that a “longer
period of time after discharge [was] necessary” for the court to be convinced that Ramirez
is not a danger to the public. Ramirez appeals.
DECISION
Ramirez challenges the district court’s de termination that Ramirez failed to show
that his private interests outweighed the public safety concerns. Because the district court’s
determination that public safe ty concerns outweighed Ramire z’s stated interest was not
against logic or the facts, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied the petition.
District courts have discretion to grant petitions to restore a person’s right to possess
firearms if the petitioner “show s good cause to do so.” Minn. Stat. § 609.165, subd. 1d
(2020).1 To determine whether the petitioner satis fies the good cause standard, district
courts balance public safety concerns agains t the petitioner’s stated private interests.

1 Minnesota Statutes section 609.165, subd. 1d, also requires that the petitioner be released
from confinement. There is no dispute that Ramirez meets this requirement.

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Averbeck v. State, 791 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Minn. App. 2010). We defer to the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly errone ous, but where, as here, the factual findings
are not challenged, we review the decision to grant or deny the pe tition for an abuse of
discretion. Id. A district court abuses its discretion if its decision is against logic and the
uncontested factual findings in the record. See State v. Jaros, 932 N.W.2d 466, 472 (Minn.
2019); Rutten v. Rutten , 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (M inn. 1984). We also defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations. Cf. In re Civil Commitment of Ince, 847 N.W.2d 13, 23-
24 (Minn. 2014).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined
that the public-safety concerns outweighed Ramirez’s private interests. Initially, we find
no error in the district court’s credibility determination regarding the veracity of Ramirez’s
stated private interest. Ramirez did not hunt often prior to 1996, had not hunted since 1996,
and had never owned a firearm. Based on these facts, we cann ot find error in the district
court’s decision to question Ramirez’s “‘co mmitment’ to the sport” and to question
whether the stated interest “is instead a subterfuge.” We al so find no abuse of discretion
in the weight given to the public safety concerns identified by the district court. The district
court duly emphasized the brief six-month pe riod of time that had lapsed since Ramirez
was discharged from probation, as well as the six-month period of time between Ramirez’s
completion of supervised release in May 20 13 and his conviction fo r a new offense in
November 2013. The district court also co rrectly considered the severity of the two
controlled substance crimes when describing the public safety concerns in this case. While
the district court did not address the lack of violence associated w ith each offense, the

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district court determined that the selling of controlled substances creates a “danger to the
public” that can “hardly be ignored.” Given the uncontested factual findings, we conclude
that the district court did not act against logic when it denied the petition.
Affirmed.