In the Matter of the Welfare of: P. C. U., Child.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0074

In the Matter of the Welfare of:
P. C. U., Child.

Filed August 30, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge

Cottonwood County District Court
File No. 17-JV-19-57

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Sara L. Martin, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant P.C.U.)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Nicholas A. Anderson, Cottonwood County Attorney, Windom, Minnesota (for respondent
State of Minnesota)

Considered and decided by Florey, Pres iding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
Appellant P.C.U. challenges his juven ile delinquency adjudication for second-
degree criminal sexual conduct involving multiple acts against his younger half-sister, C.S.
P.C.U. argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the district court deprived him of his
right to present a defense by prohibiting him from questioning C.S. and her father about
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C.S.’s alleged prior false allegations of sexual assault and by sustaining objections to other
questions meant to impeach C.S.’s credibility. We affirm.
FACTS
Respondent the State of Minnesota f iled a delinquency petition against P.C.U.,
charging him with three counts of criminal sexual conduct. The state alleged that, between
2015 and 2019, P.C.U. committed multiple sexual acts against C.S. when she was between
the ages of five and eight. The case was tried to the district court.
At trial, C.S. testified regarding thr ee specific incidents of sexual abuse, one
occurring when P.C.U. was showering and th e other two occurring in C.S.’s bedroom.
P.C.U. then cross-examined C.S., and the district court sustained objections by the state to
several questions. Relevant here, the district court sustained obj ections to questions
regarding alleged incidents in which C.S. falsely accused two other people of sexual abuse
and objections to several ques tions regarding C.S.’s credibility. At P.C.U.’s request, the
district court admitted the transcript of the CornerHouse interview as a prior inconsistent
statement.
C.S.’s father also testified at trial, as P.C.U.’s witness. The father’s longtime
girlfriend has a son, S. S. is one of the two people who P.C.U. alleges were falsely accused
by C.S. On direct examination, P.C.U. also asked C.S.’s father questions about S., but the
district court sustained the state’s objections.
Following closing arguments, the district court found P.C.U. guilty of three counts
of criminal sexual conduct. In its written findings, the district court said that it found C.S.’s
testimony credible. The district court adjudi cated P.C.U. delinquent for one count of
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second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 609.343,
subd. 1(h)(iii) (2016), and placed P.C.U. on probation until his 19th birthday.
P.C.U. appeals.
DECISION
P.C.U. argues that he was deprived of his constitutional right to present a complete
defense when the district court excluded testim ony that he sought to elicit from C.S. and
her father at trial.1
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a complete defense.
California v. Trombetta , 476 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2532 (1984); State v.
Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. 1992). Wh ile not all rights enjoyed by criminal
defendants apply to juveniles, juvenile -court proceedings “must satisfy the basic
requirements of due process and fairness.” In re Welfare of J.C.P., Jr. , 716 N.W.2d 664,
668 (Minn. App. 2006) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 17, 2006). Among
these basic due-process requirements is the ri ght to counsel, confrontation, and cross-
examination. Id.
Evidentiary rulings are within the district court’s “sound discretion,” and we do not
reverse evidentiary rulings “absent a clear abuse of discretion.” See State v. Ali , 855
N.W.2d 235, 249 (Minn. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is

1 In his appellate brief, P.C.U. also assert s that the district court wrongly excluded
testimony that he wanted to elicit from his and C.S.’s mother. But P.C.U. does not identify
questions to which the district court sustained objections or otherwise point us to the place
in the transcript that identifie s specifically the tes timony that he sought to elicit from the
mother. We thus do not address P.C.U.’s arguments that relate to the mother’s testimony.
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based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” State
v. Hallmark, 927 N.W.2d 281, 291 (M inn. 2019) (quotation omitte d). When the district
court’s evidentiary ruling resu lts in the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence in
violation of the defendant’s c onstitutional rights, the verdict must be reversed unless the
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Post , 512 N.W.2d 99, 102
(Minn. 1994).
Testimony Regarding Alleged Prior False Allegations
P.C.U. first argues that the district cour t erred by excluding testimony that P.C.U.
attempted to elicit from C.S. and from her father that C.S. made false accusations of sexual
abuse against two other people—a student at he r school and S. When P.C.U. sought to
elicit the testimony at trial, the state objected on the basis of the rape shield law. See Minn.
Stat. § 609.347 (2020); Minn. R. Evid. 412. The district court sustained the objections.
With respect to the alleged false allegation against a student, P.C.U. challenges the
district court’s rulings on the following qu estions posed by P.C.U. to C.S. on cross-
examination:
Q: Did you ever accuse anot her student at your school of
touching you in the privates?
. . . .
Q: Did you ever tell a lie a bout a student at your school
touching your privates?

With respect to the alleged false accusati on against S., P.C.U. challenges the district
court’s rulings on questions posed to C.S. and to her father. On cross-examination of C.S.,
and after establishing that C.S. was interviewed regarding sexual assault by P.C.U., P.C.U.
asked her the following about the recorded CornerHouse interview:
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Q: [D]uring that series of que stions, did you ever talk about
[S.]?

And, when C.S.’s father testified, P.C.U. asked him the following questions about S.:
Q: Now has there been any type of restraining order
relating to [S.]?
. . . .
Q: How ’bout some kind of contract where there was
supposed to be a no contact order between [S.] and [C.S.]?
. . . .
Q: [H]as your daughter [i.e., C. S.] ever told you she made
false claims about somebody else about sexual abuse?

P.C.U. argues that the district court improperly sustained objections to these
questions. He contends that the evidence that he sought to elicit related to prior false
allegations of sexual assault and that eviden ce of false allegations was not barred by the
rape shield law but rather wa s admissible under our decision in State v. Goldenstein, 505
N.W.2d 332 (Minn. App. 1993), review denied (Minn. Oct. 19, 1993).
In Goldenstein, we determined that a defendant’ s constitutional right to present a
complete defense includes, in certain circumstances, the right to present evidence of prior
false allegations by the alleged victim. See Goldenstein, 505 N.W.2d at 340. Admissible
evidence of prior false allegations may be used both to attack the credibility of the
complainant and as substantive evidence that the current offense did not occur. Id. For the
evidence of prior false reports of sexual abuse to be admissible, however, the district court
must first make a “threshold determination” th at there is a reasonable probability that the
falsity exists. Id.
P.C.U. brought no pretrial motion asking th e district court to make the threshold
determination that the alleged prior accusations were probably false. P.C.U. argues, though,
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that he should have been permitted to inquire about the alleged false allegation against S.
because C.S. admitted in her Co rnerHouse interview that the allegation was false. As for
the alleged false allegation against a student, P.C.U. argues it should have been admitted
because “[t]he defense was not given the opportunity to have the court make a
determination” regarding that allegation “because the court sustained the objection without
hearing argument from the parties.”
We reject the argument that the defense had no opportunity to obtain a determination
regarding the claimed allegation against a stud ent. P.C.U. did not br ing a pretrial motion
to obtain the threshold determination that the allegation was probably false, and he provides
no explanation for why he did not do so. Moreover, P.C.U. does not point us to where in
the trial transcript he sought but was denied the opportunity to make an offer of proof
regarding that allegation. “Where a party makes no offer of proof at trial, a reviewing court
can have no basis for holdin g that exclusion of eviden ce was reversible error.” State v.
Gerring, 378 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Minn. App. 1985). The district court did not abuse its
discretion by sustaining objectio ns to questions regarding the alleged false allegation
against a student. See id.
As for the questions regarding S., we likewise disagree that the district court abused
its discretion by excluding the testimony. Af ter objections were sustained to P.C.U.’s
questions of C.S. about S., P. C.U. argued to the district c ourt that evidence of a false
allegation against S. was admissible because C.S. acknowledged in her CornerHouse
interview that she made that false allegation. P.C.U. cited to C.S.’s brief statement in her
interview that her mother “one time . . . said to blame it on [S.] so [her] brother wouldn’t
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get in trouble” and that “[t]hat was the first time that [she] tell on [S.]” P.C.U. points to no
other place in the record suppor ting his claim that he establis hed that C.S. made a false
allegation against S. Although the brief statement by C.S. in the CornerHouse interview is
some evidence supporting the existence of a false allegation against S., in context—when
no other statements in the interview addresse d S. and P.C.U. presented no other evidence
of a false allegation against him—we cannot co nclude that the district court abused its
discretion by excluding the evidence.
General Impeachment Questions
P.C.U. also argues that the district c ourt abused its discretion by sustaining
objections to questions intende d to impeach C.S.’s credibility . On cross-examination of
C.S., P.C.U. asked her whether her guardian ad litem had ever talked to her about lying,
and C.S. said, “Yes.” P.C.U. then asked the following questions:
Q: [S]o do you think that [the guardian ad litem] was
correct in what she was saying about you and lying?
. . . .
Q: What was the issue about the lying?

The state objected, and the district court sustained the objections.
The district court did not a buse its discretion in sustaining the state’s objections.
P.C.U. claims that he was using these questions to elicit information about C.S.’s reputation
for dishonesty. Minn. R. Evid. 608(b) allows for inquiries into the “[s]pecific instances of
the conduct of the witness” on cross-examination if the conduct is probative of the
witness’s character for truthfulness. But P.C.U .’s questions did not relate to any specific
instances when C.S. lied; instead, the questi ons generally referenced C.S.’s “issue about
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the lying.” Thus, the district court did not abuse its discreti on in sustaining the state’s
objections to these questions.
Later in his cross-examination, P.C.U. al so asked C.S. the following regarding the
CornerHouse interview:
Q: [I]f we have the video of you saying that it was
[P.C.U.]’s hand [that touched you], is that video a lie?
. . . .
Q: [I]f we saw a video of you saying [P.C.U. touched you
with his hand], would it just be not true?

The district court sustained the state’s objections.
Again, the district court did not abuse its discretion. Whether a video was “lying”
or whether something would or would not be true if C.S. “saw a video” are questions that
would be hard for any witness to understand, much less a nine-year-old child. The district
court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining objections to those questions.
In any event, the exclusion of any of th e testimony sought through these general
impeachment questions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Post, 512 N.W.2d at
102. The district court heard evidence that C.S. had lied on occasion, saw inconsistencies
between C.S.’s CornerHouse interview and her trial testimony, and heard testimony from
the mother that in some resp ects was inconsistent with C. S.’s. Yet the district court
nevertheless found C.S.’s trial testimony credible. The attempted additional impeachment
of C.S. would have not have meaningfully added to the already present impeachment
evidence, and the exclusion of that additional evidence does not warrant reversal. See State
v. Garden, 404 N.W.2d 912, 916 (Minn. App. 1987) (concluding that minor inconsistencies
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between a victim’s testimony and prior st atements was not a basis for reversal), review
denied (Minn. June 28, 1987).
Affirmed.