Ronald James Fairbanks, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0077

Ronald James Fairbanks, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Appellant.

Filed November 8, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

St. Louis County District Court
File No. 69DU-CR-16-1197

Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Kimberly J Maki, St. Louis County Attorney, Nick D. Campanario, Assistant County
Attorney, Duluth, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant State of Minnesota challenges an order declaring respondent eligible for
compensation based on exoneration, arguing that Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2 (2020), does
not apply to him. Because we conclude that it does apply, we affirm.
DECISION
“Whether a petitioner meets the statutory definition of ‘exonerated’ presents a
question of statutory interpretation which we review de novo.” Buhl v. State, 922 N.W.2d
435, 438 (Minn. App. 2019).
In 2017, this court concluded that respondent Ronald Fairbanks’ guilty plea to
failure to register as a predatory offender lacked an adequat e factual basis, reversed his
conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. State v. Fairbanks , No. A16 -1778
(Minn. App. May 8, 2017). At that time, Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(1) (2016), defined
“exoneration” to mean that “a court of this state (i ) vacated or reversed a judgment of
conviction on grounds consistent with innocence and the prosecutor dismissed the charges;
or (ii) ordered a new trial on grounds consistent with innocence and the prosecutor
dismissed the charges or the petitioner was found not guilty at the new trial.”
In September 2017, the supreme court severed subdivision 1(1)(i) on the ground
that having a prosecutor dismiss charges after a court had vacated or reversed the judgment
of conviction on those charges violated equal protection and was illegal. Back v. State, 902
N.W.2d 23, 25, 30 (Minn. 2017).
After Back severed subdivision 1(1)(i), “a petitioner [could] qualify as exonerated
only under Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 1(1)(ii),” which provided that the order for a new
trial was a prerequisite for exoneration. Buhl, 922 N.W.2d at 438. Despite Back’s holding,
however, a prosecutor in January 2018 dismissed all charges against respondent, whose
conviction had been reversed in May 2017.
In June 2019, respondent filed a petition for compensation based on exoneration
under Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2018). On July 1, 2019, the legislature’s amendments to Minn.
Stat. § 590.11 became effective. Two of them, one substantive and one procedural, are
relevant here. First, a new definition of “exonerated” replaced the one severed by Back
and defined “exonerated” to mean t hat a court: “(i) vacated, reversed or set aside a
judgment of conviction on grounds consistent with innocence and there are no remaining
felony charges in effect against the petitioner from the same behavioral incident, or if there
are remaining felony charges against the petitioner from the same behavioral incident, the
prosecutor dismisses th ose remaining felony charges.” Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd.
1(b)(1)(i) (Supp. 2019). Thus, the prosecutor was to dismiss only charges that had not led
to the vacated or reversed convictions.
The procedural amendment at the end of subdivision 2 enabled those who, before
July 1, 2019, did not meet the previous definition of “exonerated,” —i.e., either their
convictions had not been vacated or reversed by a court, or th e charges had not been
dismissed by a prosecutor, or both —to petition for exoneration under the new statute. It
read:
If, before July 1, 2019, a person did not meet both requirements
of Minnesota Statutes 2018, section 590.11, subdivision 1,
clause (1), item (i), and did not file a petition or the petition
was denied, that person may commence an action meeting the
requirements under subdivision 1, paragraph (b), clause (1),
item (i), on or after July 1, 2019, and before July 1, 2021.

Minn. Stat.§ 590.11, subd. 2.

In January 2020, the district court denied respondent’s petition, concluding that,
while respondent was not eligible for compensation under Minn. Stat. § 590.11 (2018), he
“may qualify for compensation under the amended version enacted in 2019” if he “refile[d]
a petition prior to July 1, 2021.”
In March 2020, respondent accordingly filed a second petition. The state moved to
dismiss it as untimely. The district court relied on the procedural amendment in Minn.
Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2, to conclude that the petition was timely; it then denied the state’s
motion and scheduled an evidentiary hearing. At the July 2020 hearing, respondent
testified credibly as to his cognitive and memory impairments, and evidence of those
impairments was presen ted. In December 2020, the district court granted respondent’s
petition and concluded that respondent was eligible to claim compensation for 274 days in
custody under Minn. Stat. §§ 611.362–.368 (2020).
The state argues that the district court erred by permitting respondent to file a second
petition because Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2, permits actions to be brought by those who,
before July 1, 2019, did not meet the two requirements of the 2018 statute defining
“exonerated”—i.e., that a court had revers ed or vacated their conviction and that the
prosecutor had dismissed the charges —and respondent did meet those two requirements:
his conviction was reversed by this court in September 2017 and his charges were
dismissed by a prosecutor in January 2018.
But that dismissal of charges after this court’s reversal of the conviction was illegal.
See Back, 902 N.W.2d at 30 (referring to such a dismissal as “legally impossible”). If the
prosecutor’s dismissal of those charges was not legally possible, the charge s were not
legally dismissed; therefore, respondent did not meet the second requirement of Minn. Stat.
§ 590.11, subd. 1(1)(i) (2018), and the last sentence of Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2,
permitting those who did not meet those requirements to file peti tions between July 1,
2019, and July 1, 2021, did apply to him.
To hold otherwise would be to hold that the legislature intended a prosecutor’s
illegal act to deprive otherwise eligible petitioners of the right to seek exoneration, an
absurd result. Co urts may presume that “the legislature does not intend a result that is
absurd.” Minn. Stat. § 645.17 (1) (2020). Back concluded that, under the former version
of Minn. Stat. § 590.11, “the Legislature has set up a regime under which a claimant’s
eligibility to file a compensation petition is contingent on whether the prosecutor has
performed a legally impossible act” and found a violation of equal protection “[b]ecause
there is no rational basis for such a classification.” 902 N.W.2d at 30. Denying eligibility
because a prosecutor’s illegal act caused a claimant to meet an illegal statutory requirement
also lacks any rational basis.1
Affirmed.

1 We note that this situation is not likely to recur: Minn. Stat. § 590.11, subd. 2, permits
filing of petitions between July 1, 2019, and July 1, 2021, which has now passed.