Brent Lanier Lynch, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0080

Brent Lanier Lynch, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed August 30, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CR-12-1801

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John J. Choi, Ramsey County Attorney, Alexandra J. Meyer, Assistant County Attorney,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Florey,
Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
In this appeal from the denial of his motion to correct his sentence for second-degree
murder, appellant argues that the district court erred by (1) construing his motion as a
petition for po stconviction relief and concluding that it was procedurally barred , and
(2) concluding that the modification to the restitution award was lawful. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2012, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Brent Lynch with
second-degree murder after his girlfriend was found dead at his home. Lynch subsequently
entered an Alford plea to one count of intentional second-degree murder and was sentenced
to 386 months in prison.
Restitution was not discussed in Lynch’s plea agreement. But it was ordered by the
district court on November 1, 2012, in the amount of $10,325.97, with the possibility of
more being added within 90 days. On December 17, 2012, Lynch was also ordered to pay
restitution to the Minnesota Crime Victims Re parations Board. Lynch’s attorney later
negotiated with the state, and between them, they agreed to a total restitution award of
$9,831.70, which the district court adopted. As part of the award, the victim’s sister
received $4,307.38 for travel expenses to the funeral and lost wages.
On direct appeal , Lynch challenged his conviction of intentional second -degree
murder, arguing that the district court erred in denying his presentence motion to withdraw
his Alford plea. State v. Lynch , No. A13 -0167, 2013 WL 6152187 , at *1 (Minn. App.
Nov. 25, 2013), review denied (Minn. Jan. 29, 2014). Lynch also challenged the district
3
court’s restitution order. Id. This court rejected Lynch’s argument, concluding that ,
because he did not object to the restitution at sentencing, he had waived the issue. Id. at
*6. This court also determined that the prosecutor and his attorney had reached an
agreement as to the amount of restitution and thus Lynch had waived that issue as well. Id.
at *7.
On March 14, 2014, the victim’s sister informed the state that she no longer wanted
to receive restitution. Consequently, the state filed a motion under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9, to reduce the amount of restitution that Lynch was required to pay. Lynch claims
that he was then pro se and was never served with a copy of the motion, and that he did not
notice the change in restitution until 2018, when he observed that a smaller amount was
being withdrawn from his prison paycheck.
In 2015, Lynch filed his first postconvic tion petition alleging several claims,
including ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Lynch v. State, No. A16-0801, 2017
WL 1046304, at *1 (Minn. App. May 30, 2017). He did not challenge the reduction in
restitution. This court affirmed the deni al of his petition for postconviction relief,
concluding that Lynch was not denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel and that
his remaining claims were procedurally barred. Id. at *4-5.
On November 1, 2020, Lynch filed a motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd . 9, arguing that the reduction in restitution impact ed his plea
agreement, which cannot be altered without his consent, and seeking a hearing at which he
could accept the reduction or withdraw his plea. The district court treated this motion as a
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petition for postconviction relief under Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020), and
summarily denied the petition. This appeal follows.
DECISION
I.
Lynch challenges the denial of his motion to correct his sentence under Minn. R.
Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. That rule allows a court “at any time” to “correct a sentence not
authorized by law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. But the district court characterized
Lynch’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief under section 590.01. Thus, whether
the district court properly characterized Lynch’s motion as a postconviction petition is a
threshold issue that requires us to interpret the rule and statute. We interpre t procedural
rules and statutes de novo. State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Minn. 2015).
A postconviction challenge based solely on a sentencing issue that does not
implicate the plea agreement or the conviction is reviewed under Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03,
subd. 9, and can be made at any time. Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125, 129-30 (Minn.
2016). And our supreme court has held
that a motion to correct a sentence under Minn. R. Crim. P.
27.03, subd. 9, is a proper method to challenge the court’s legal
authority to award restitution when the motion does not impact
the underlying conviction. But when a motion to correct a
sentence impacts more than simply the sentence, Rule 27.03
does not apply. Specifically, a motion to correct a sentence is
not the proper method to challenge a restitution award that is
entered pursuant to a defendant’s negotiated guilty plea in
which payment of restitution is a material part of the
negotiation.

Evans v. State, 880 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. 2016).
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Here, Lynch filed a motion to correct his sentence, asserting that the reduction in
restitution was an illegal modification of his sentence because he was not notified of the
hearing. The district court treated Lynch’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief
because he sought to withdraw his guilty plea . But restitution was never part of Lynch’s
plea agreement, which only addressed jail time. Because restitution was a separate part of
the sentence, Lynch’s plea agreement was not implicated, and therefore the district court
should not have treated Lynch’s motion as a petition for postconviction relief.1
II.
Lynch contends that his restitution could not be reduced without his consent.
District courts have “wide discretion in ordering restitution and determining the appropriate
amount of restitution.” State v. Anderson, 507 N.W.2d 245, 246 (Minn. App. 1993), review
denied (Minn. Dec. 22, 1993). Because a plea agreement is considered analogous to a
contract between the state and a defendant, alteratio n of one term may alter the nature of
the entire agreement. State v. Meredyk , 754 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Minn. App. 2008).
Accordingly, this severely limits the district court’ s otherwise broad discretion to modify
restitution after the district court accepts a plea agreement that expressly calls for a specific,
bargained-for restitution amount. Id. “[A] district court generally should not alter the
terms of a restitution obligation negotiated as part of a plea agreement if it materially
changes the expectations of the parties to the bargain.” Id. at 604.

1 Even if the district court did not err by treating the matter as a petition for postconviction
relief, Lynch’s petition still fails for the reasons discussed below.
6
In State v. Chapman, the plea agreement similarly did not mention restitution. 362
N.W.2d 401, 403 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. May 1, 1985). The agreement
called for the defendant t o plead guilty to two counts in exchange for the prosecutor’ s
promise to dismiss the remaining six counts. Id. The two counts to which the defendant
pleaded guilty were embezzlement and theft of funds totaling $15,747.97. Id. at 402. The
district court ordered the defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $47,656.95, the full
amount of losses from all the crimes originally charged against her. Id. This court
concluded that “[t]he diffe rence in this case between the restitution ordered and that
proposed by [the defendant], a difference of approximately $31,000, is substantial.” Id. at
404. Although some amount of restitution was contemplated by the parties, this court did
“not believe that a plea agreement, voluntarily and intelligently entered into, should include
such a gamble on the amount of restitution. The better practice would have been for the
parties to enter on the record their unde rstanding of the plea agreement’ s effect on
restitution.” Id. The court therefore concluded that “[t]he restitution ordered was beyond
the terms of the plea agreement” and reversed and remanded. Id.
Here, similar to Chapman, restitution was not part of Lynch’s plea agreement; rather
it was added to his sentenc e later by the district court. But u nlike the defendant in
Chapman, Lynch is paying restitution only for the crime to which he pleaded guilty. And
with the cancellation of restitution to the victim’s sister, Lynch is paying $5,524.32, as
opposed to $9,831.70, which was originally ordered. He cannot claim that his current
restitution is unexpectedly high. While his expectations may have been altered, the
alteration was not prejudicial to him.
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Moreover, other cases in which terms for conditional release were added w ithout
the defendant’s consent were reversed because those sentences prejudiced the defendant
and it was important for the defendant to have an opportunity to object. See, e.g., Reynolds,
888 N.W.2d at 130; State v. Garcia, 582 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn. 1998). Lynch’s case is
different. No new penalties were imposed on him by the district court’s order; he was not
prejudiced by its decision. The amount of restitution owed went down, not up. Because
Lynch was not prejudiced by the district court’s order decreasing restitution, the court acted
within its discretion by reducing the restitution amount.
Affirmed.