1
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A21-0082

St. Louis County Gildea, C.J.
Took no part, Chutich, Moore III, JJ.
Donna Bergstrom,

Appellant,

vs. Filed: June 9, 2021
Office of Appellate Courts
Jen McEwen,

Respondent.

______________________________

Donna Bergstrom, Duluth, Minnesota, pro se.

Charles N. Nauen, David J. Zoll, Kristen G. Marttila, Rachel A. Kitze Collins, Lockridge
Grindal Nauen P.L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota, for respondent.

________________________

S Y L L A B U S

1. Appellant was not prejudiced by the delay in providing notice of the election
contest to the chief justice, under Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 1 (2020).
2. Appellant’s claim asserting a violation of her civil rights under the Voting
Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101, was not asserted in the notice of election contest or before
the district court and, therefore, is not properly asserted on appeal.
2
3. The district court did not err in granting respondent’s motion to dismiss
appellant’s election contest , under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02, for failure to state a legally
sufficient claim upon which relief could be granted.
Affirmed.
O P I N I O N
GILDEA, Chief Justice.
This appeal is taken from the district court’s order that dismissed appellant Donna
Bergstrom’s election contest filed under Minn. Stat. § 209.021 (2020). On appeal, we
consider three claims: whether Bergstrom was prejudiced by the delay in providing notice
of the election contest to the chief justice , see Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 1 (2020)
(requiring notice of the election contest to be submitted to the chief justice within 3 days
of receipt); whether her claim alleging violation of her civil rights under the Voting Rights
Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101, is properly before us; and, whether the dist rict court erred in
dismissing Bergstrom’s election contest because it failed to state a legally sufficient claim
upon which relief can be granted. We affirm.
FACTS
Donna Bergstrom was a candidate for election to Senate District 7, 1 in the 2020
election. Following the election on November 3, 2020 and the canvass of the results by
St. Louis County, respondent Jen McEwen, her opponent, was certified as the winner of

1 Senate District 7 is entirely within the City of Duluth, in St. Louis County.

3
the election.2 Bergstrom requested a recount of the votes cast in one precinct in Senate
District 7, which resulted in a net increase of 3 votes for Bergstrom.
On December 11, 2020, after the recount was completed, Bergstrom filed a notice
of election contest in St. Louis County District Court, under Minn. Stat. § 209.021.
Bergstrom named McEwen and the St. Louis County Auditor as contestees. Bergstrom
alleged that “irregularities in the conduct of the November 3, 2020 state general election
and in the canvass of absentee ballot votes” raised questions over “who received the largest
number of votes legally cast” in the election in Senate District 7. She also asserted that the
contest was brought “on the grounds of deliberate, serious, and material viola tions of
Minnesota Election Law.”
The specific alleged irregularities in the conduct of the election included whether
the absentee ballot board established for the election was “properly constituted,” see Minn.
Stat. § 203B.121, subd. 1 (2020) (identifying the members of the board), and whether that
board allowed for bipartisan review of absentee ballot return envelopes; whether statutory
requirements that govern absentee ballots cast at nursing homes, assisted living, and similar
facilities were followed; whether the statutory requirements were followed by persons who
registered to vote on election day; whether there were discrepancies in vote totals due to
algorithm anomalies in voting software , an “egregious possibility” of fraud, or alleged
tampering with voting machines; and whether the State Canvassing Board and the St. Louis

2 McEwen secured 30,526 of the 44,683 votes cast in the election.
4
County Canvassing Board were required to allow Bergstrom to make public statements
before those bodies certified the election results.
Bergstrom asserted three claims in her election contest: alleged violations of the
First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution based on
a constitutional right to participate in elections on an equal basis as other citizens, see U.S.
Const. amend. I; U.S. Const. amend. IV, § 1; an alleged violation of the Separation of
Powers Clause, see Minn. Const. art. III, based on “conflicting election rules” adopted by
the Minnesota Secretary of State for the 2020 election ; and a n alleged due process
violation, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I
of the Minnesota Constitution, based on disparate treatment as between in-person, day-of-
the election voters and voters who cast a ballot from home.
As relief, Bergstrom requested disclosure of voter data and records for “first time
voters” and “same day ballots” ; “guarding” and “inspection” of all absentee ballots and
“election materials” related to the ballots , under Minn. Stat. §§ 209.05–.06 (2020) ;
disclosure of information regarding voting machines and systems used in St. Louis County,
including the software, training protocols, and instruction manuals ; disclosure of th e
process used to facilitate voting at nursing homes, group homes, assisted living, or similar
facilities, under Minn. Stat. § 203B.11 (2020) ; and disclosure of names and other
information regarding persons who served on ballot boards in St. Louis County or worked
on the post -election review conducted under Minn. Stat. § 206.89 (2020) (establishing
procedures for a post -election review of voting systems). Bergstrom asked the district
court to allow “a true count of the legally cast votes through a process of discovery.”
5
On December 18, 2020, the district court sent notice of the election contest to the
chief justice by certified mail, see Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 1 (requiring the district court
to “submit one copy of” the notice “to the chief justice of the supreme court by certified
mail” within 3 days of receipt). The chief justice then provided the parties with the names
of the judges available in the Sixth Judicial District to preside over the election contest, see
Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 2 (2020), and the parties selected a judge through an alternating
strike process, id.
McEwen moved to dismiss Bergstrom’s notice of election contest on several
grounds.3 First, she asserted that Bergstr om’s contest was untimely because it was not
brought within 7 days after the St. Louis County Canvassing Board certified the results of
the election. Second, she asserted that she was not properly served by certified mail with
Bergstrom’s notice. Third, she asserted that the allegations in Bergstrom’s notice failed to
state a legally cognizable claim under Minnesota Statutes chapter 209 (2020).
Bergstrom opposed McEwen’s motion, asserting that her election contest was
timely filed and properly served. She also alleged that the notice of contest identified the
“grounds” on which she contested the election, namely “irregularities in the conduct” of
the election and in the “canvass of absentee ballot votes.” She explained that the contest
is brought “over the question of who received the largest number of votes legally cast, and

3 The St. Louis County Auditor also moved to dismiss the election contest, asserting
that she was not proper ly named as a party to the contest. The district court granted this
motion, concluding that the contestee in an election contest does not include an election
official, see Minn. Stat. § 209.021, subd. 3. Bergstrom has not challenged this decision on
appeal.
6
on the grounds of deliberate, serious, and material violations of Minnesota Election Law.”
She again asked the district court to allow an inspection of the ballots cast in all precincts
in Senate District 7, see Minn. Stat. § 209.06.
The district court held a hearing on January 4, 2021. In an order filed on January 5,
2021, the district court d enied McEwen’s motion to dismiss the contest as untimely,
concluding that the time to file an election contest ran from the certification of the results
after the recount in precinct 8 for Senate District 7. The court also concluded that service
of the election contest on McEwen was timely, declining to address McEwen’s challenge
to the particular form of certified service that Bergstrom used.
Finally, the district court granted McEwen’s motion to dismiss under Rule 12.02(e)
of the Rules of Civil Procedu re, concluding that the allegations of Bergstrom’s notice of
contest did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted, including under our
decision in Christenson v. Allen , 119 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1963). Reviewing each of the
allegations on which Ber gstrom relied to assert that irregularities in the conduct of the
election presented a question as to who received the highest number of votes legally cast
in the election, the district court concluded that even “if proof were provided on these issues
at trial,” Bergstrom did not claim that she would have won the election. Rather, the court
concluded, the allegations in total represented a “somewhat vague feeling that something
was not right” with the election.4

4 The district court sent a copy of this decision to the Chief C lerk of the Minnesota
House of Representatives and the Secretary of the Minnesota Senate. See Minn. Stat.
§ 209.10, subd. 3.
7
Bergstrom filed a timely appeal from the district court’s decision on January 15,
2021. See Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 4 (requiring an appeal to be filed “no later than ten
days after . . . entry” of the district court’s decision).
ANALYSIS
This appeal presents three issues: whether Bergstrom was prejudiced by the delay
in submitting a copy of her notice of election contest to the chief justice; whether
Bergstrom’s claim for an alleged civil rights violation in the election is properly before us;
and whether the district court erred in dismissing Bergstrom’s notice of election contest for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We review a trial court’s
conclusions on legal questions de novo. In re Contest of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4,
2008, 767 N.W.2d 453, 458 (Minn. 2009).
I.
Under Minnesota Statutes § 209.10, the district court must “submit one copy” of the
notice of election contest to the chief justice “within three days of receipt of the notice of
contest.” Id., subd. 1. Within five days of receiving that notice, the chief justice provides
the parties with a list of the judges available in the judicial district to preside over the case.
Id., subd. 2. Using that list, the parties “meet together and, by alternating strikes they . . .
remove the names of all judges until only one remains.” Id.
Bergstrom asserts that the district court failed to give a copy of her notice of election
contest to the chief justice within three days after the court received her filing. 5 She is

5 In a memorandum filed on December 20, 2020, Bergstrom notified the district court
about the delay in submitting a list of available judges to the parties, as required by Minn.
8
correct. Bergstrom filed the notice of election contest with the district court on Friday,
December 11, 2020; it was accepted by court administration and docketed on Monday,
December 14, 2020 . On Friday, December 18, 2020, a copy of the notice of election
contest was sent to the chief j ustice by certified mail. Whether the district court received
the notice of election contest when submitted for filing on December 11 or when accepted
and docketed for filing on December 14 is irrelevant; under either scenario, the notice
required by section 209.10, subdivision 1, was not sent to the chief justice “within three
days of receipt.”
Bergstrom contends that this lack of timely notice impeded the progress of her
election contest. She notes that the district court did not address her motion to proceed
with an inspection of the ballots, and states that the time av ailable to the district court to
resolve the election contest was shortened. See Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 3 (requiring
the district court to “convene the proceeding” within 15 days after a notice of contest is
filed and “decide the contest, issue appro priate orders, and make written findings of fact
and conclusions of law”). She asserts that the intent of the notice provision in
section 209.10 was “subverted” and, thus, due process was violated.
McEwen disagrees with this conclusion. She argues that B ergstrom was not
prejudiced by the untimely notice to the chief justice because the election contest was
dismissed based on its legal insufficiency, not based on timing concerns.

Stat. § 209.10, asking the court to “proceed in a timely manner.” The district court did not
address the timing of the notice provided to the chief justice, but given that the parties have
done so in their briefs to our court, we address it here to provide guidance to court
administration and parties in future contests brought under Minnesota Statutes chapter 209.
9
We have urged parties in election matters to proceed expeditiously in asserting their
claims in a judicial forum given the time constraints associated with elections. See, e.g.,
De La Fuente v. Simon, 940 N.W.2d 477, 485 (Minn. 2020); In re Youngdale, 44 N.W.2d
459, 464 (Minn. 1950) (“In contests over nominations and elections, it is highly important
that the dispute be disposed of speedily in order that the election machinery may not be
completely thrown out of gear.”) . We have urged the same attention to the statutory
requirements for election contests, given that “ the legislature convenes only a short time
after the canvass of an election.” Petrafeso v. McFarlin , 207 N.W.2d 343, 34 6
(Minn. 1973).6 Equally important to the timely resolution of dispute s over an election is
the interest of voters in the certainty and finality of election results. See id. at 347 (noting
that “voters themselves are entitled” to a decision on the election contest ); see also In re
Election Contest, Vill. of Alden, 142 N.W. 15, 15 (Minn. 1913) (stating that the purpose of
a statute establishing a deadline for a hearing to be held in an election contest is “to speed
the hearing” and “hasten contests”).
Despite the untimely notice and our insistence on attention to deadlines in election
matters, we cannot conclude that the delay in providing notice of the contest to the chief
justice in this case caused prejudice to Bergstrom. In re Child of B.J. -M. & H. W.,
744 N.W.2d 669, 673 (Minn. 2008) (stating that prejudice “is an essential component of

6 We addressed the notice requirement to the chief justice in Petrafeso, 207 N.W.2d
at 346. We said there that the clerk’s failure to send notice to the chief justice “within the
time provided by statute ” is not “ chargeable to the contestant .” Id. O ur holdin g there
resolved an issue that is not presented by this appeal: whether the district court’s
jurisdiction over an election contest is lost when the notice to the chief justice is untimely.
10
the due process analysis”). The parties kept the district court apprised of their respective
positions while waiting for the judge selection process to begin: Bergstrom filed a petition
for an inspection of the ballots, McEwen moved to dismiss Bergstrom’s election contest
on multiple grounds, and Bergstrom filed a response in opposition to that motion.
Bergstrom had a full opportunity to assert her positions before the district court, in writing
and at the hearing on McEwen’s motion. Further, though a delay occurred, it was a matter
of days. Of course, the proceedings in this election contest were expedited, as all election
disputes are , and less than 4 weeks elapsed from the initiation of Bergstrom’s election
contest to the hearing on January 4, 2021. But we cannot conclude that a difference of 1 to
3 days in deliver ing the notice to the chief justice would have substantially altered the
timing of the proceedings in this contest.
We reiterate our expectation that proceedings in election disputes —whether
undertaken by the parties or through court processes —must adhere to statutory deadlines
and occur without delay. Nevertheless, in this case we conclude that the untimely notice
under Minn. Stat. § 209.10, subd. 1, does not warrant relief.
II.
In her brief filed in this appeal, B ergstrom asserts that election officials failed to
follow enacted election laws durin g the 2020 election with respect to absentee voters and
absentee ballots and, thus, she cannot be certain whether the votes cast in Senate District 7
were “counted and recorded as per each voter’s choice.” This irregularity, she asserts,
violates her civil rights under the Voting Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101, subd. 2.
11
This claim was not asserted in Bergstrom’s notice of election contest, nor did she
raise it before the district court. A claim that was not raised below and presented to the
district court for decision is n ot considered on appeal. In re Stadsvold, 754 N.W.2d 323,
327 (Minn. 2008) (declining to address an issue that was not presented and addressed
below); Toth v. Arason, 722 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2006) (declining to address a claim
alleging a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act that was first raised on appeal). We
therefore decline to address this claim.
III.
We turn now to the district court’s decision to dismiss Bergstrom’s election contest.
“Any eligible voter, including a candidate, may contest” the election of a person “for whom
the voter had the right to vote if that person is declared” elected to a state legislative office.
Minn. Stat. § 209.02, subd. 1. The contest may be brought “over an irregularity in the
conduct of an election or canvass of votes, over the question of who received the larg est
number of votes legally cast,” or “on the grounds of deliberate, serious, and material
violations of the Minnesota Election Law.” Id.
Bergstrom’s n otice of election contest asserted all of these challenges: alleged
“irregularities in the conduct of the November 3, 2020” election , a “question of who
received the largest number of votes legally cast,” and “deliberate, serious, and material
violations of Minnesota Election Law.” In addition to requesting an inspection of the
ballots cast, Bergstrom sought disclosure of voter records, voting systems information, and
other election -related materials. She asserted that the “validity of the results” of the
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election are at issue and asked for “a true count of the legally cast votes through a process
of discovery.”
The district court granted McEwen’s motion to dismiss . The court concluded that
the allegations of Bergstrom’s election contest did not “pass muster” under Minn. R.
Civ. P. 12.02(e), because she failed to assert, by a plain statement, that the result of the
election would be different if she prevailed on any of her claims. According to the district
court, the “vague feeling that something was not right” with the election “is not enough to
move forward.”
Bergstrom asserts that the district court erred in dismissing her election contest
without allowing the ballot inspection or requested discovery. Because her notice complied
with the plain language of section 209.021, by identifying alleged irregularities in the
conduct of the election and alleged violations of Minnesota election laws , Bergstrom
argues that her election contest should not have been dismissed before a trial on the
allegations. She also contends that a contest can be brought under chapter 209 to determine
whether the election “was conducted legally, ethically, and materially correct.”
A contestee may move to dismiss under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted to challenge the legal sufficiency of the g rounds
on which an election contest is based. See, e.g., Derus v. Higgins, 555 N.W.2d 515, 516
n.4 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a motion to dismiss an election contest was properly brought
under Rule 12.02(e)); Franson v. Carlson, 137 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1965) (explaining
that an election contest is a “special proceeding,” and the Rules of Civil Procedure govern
unless those rules are inconsistent with the procedures in the statute). We review a decision
13
to dismiss a claim under Rule 12.02 de novo. Halva v. Minn. State Colls . & Univs. ,
953 N.W.2d 496, 500 (Minn. 2021).
We begin with a review of pleading standards and requirements generally and for
election contests specifically. Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 8.01 requires the pleader
to “set[] forth a claim for relief” that “contain[s] a short and p lain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A notice that challenges the election of a
person to office “must specify the grounds on which the contest will be made.” Minn. Stat.
§ 209.021, subd. 1. “We accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. ” Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. ,
851 N.W.2d 598, 606 (Minn. 2014). We consider whether the facts alleged in the
complaint set forth a legally sufficient claim for relief. Halva, 953 N.W.2d at 503. But we
are not bound by legal conclusions stated in a complaint. Id. at 501 & n.2 ; Walsh,
851 N.W.2d at 603 ; see also Hancock v. Lewis , 122 N.W.2d 592, 595 (Minn. 1963)
(rejecting allegations in an election contest that sought to “declar[e] the whole election
invalid”); Soper v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Sibley Cnty., 48 N.W. 1112, 1112 (Minn. 1891)
(rejecting allegations in an election contest that were “too general, uncertain, and
indefinite”).
Bergstrom contends that the allegations of her contest notice comply with the
standards set by the Legislature: she alleged based on the specific “grounds” set out in her
notice that irregularities occurred in the conduct of the election, or there were deliberate,
serious, and material violations of election laws, or there was a question as to who received
the highest number of votes legally cast in the election.
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McEwen argues that the district court correctly concluded that Bergstrom’s
allegations of alleged irregularities and violations of election law failed to state a claim on
which relief can be granted, because those alleg ations are mere speculation, unsupported
by facts or evidence . McEwen asserts that none of the allegations support a claim that
Bergstrom is entitled to a decree that she won the election.
The right to contest the results of an election is “purely statutory. ” Phillips v.
Ericson, 80 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Minn. 1957). In Christenson v. Allen, when considering the
sufficiency of allegations contesting an election with a difference of 66 votes between the
candidates, we said that merely surmising errors may have occurred in counting votes was
not a “short and plain statement .” 119 N.W.2d 35 , 38 –39 (Minn. 1963) . Instead, in
addition to alleging irregularities in the conduct of the election or a violation of election
laws, there mu st be a “ plain statement showing that the contestant is entitled to a decree
changing the declared result of the election.” Id. at 40 –41. The pleading standard we
articulated in Christenson has been the law for election contests for over 150 years. See,
e.g., Hahn v. Graham , 225 N.W.2d 385, 386 (Minn. 1975) (explaining “the rule in this
state for well over 100 years,” which requires that an alleged irregularity in an election
“affected the outcome or was the product of fraud or bad faith”); Janeway v. City of Duluth,
68 N.W. 24, 25 (Minn. 1896) (noting that the allegations of irregularities in the election
framed in “the most general terms” had “not alleged in what manner” those irregularities
“affected the result”).7

7 We said in Holmen v. Miller, in which the contestant lost election to the Minnesota
House by 20 votes, that Christenson’s holding was “altered” by a later statutory
15
The allegations of Bergstrom’s election contest do not satisfy this pleading standard
for several reasons.8

amendment. 206 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. 1973). The amendment referred to in Holmen
was to the statute governing the contestee’s answe r to an election contest, see Minn. Stat.
§ 209.03 (1969). In 1971, the Legislature amended this statute to eliminate the requirement
to file an answer when the only question raised by the contest is “which of the parties to
the contest received the highest number of votes legally cast at the election.” Act of June 4,
1971, ch. 733, § 5, 1971 Minn. Laws 1410, 1412 (codified as amended at Minn. Stat.
§ 209.03 (2020)). Christenson and Holmen involved election contests that sought, in
essence, a recount of the election results based on allegations that mistakes occurred in
counting votes. See Holmen, 206 N.W.2d at 921; Christenson, 119 N.W.2d at 37. Unlike
the current statutory provisions for mandatory and discretionary recounts, see Minn. Stat.
§ 204C.35, subds. 1 –2 (2020), there was no express statutory procedure for a recount in
most legislative races, see Minn. Stat. §§ 204.29, .31 (1969) (describing procedures for
canvassing votes without allowing for a recount); Christenson, 119 N.W.2d at 40 (noting
that the Legislature had not “provide[d] for a recount of votes independent of an authorized
election contest”). Thus, any alteration Holmen made to Christenson’s legal rule was
narrow: to the extent that Christenson determined that courts did not have jurisdiction over
a contest that sought only a recount of the votes, the Legislature, by a subsequent statutory
amendment, conferred that jurisdiction on the courts. Holmen, 206 N.W.2d at 922 (stating
that an election contest challenging only who received the highest number of votes “is
within the jurisdiction of the courts”).
Consequently, Christenson states the controlling pleading standard here .
Bergstrom’s notice of contest encompasses more than simply which party received the
highest number of votes legally cast in the election. In addition, we have never expressly
overruled the Christenson pleading standard. Instead, we have applied it, both before and
after Holmen, to cases that involve d allegations similar to Bergstrom’s . See Hahn ,
225 N.W.2d at 386; Janeway, 68 N.W. at 25; Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Minn. 107, 114 (Minn.
1865).

8 In reaching this conclusion, we consider only the allegations set out in the notice of
election contest filed on December 11, 2020. See Park Nicollet Clinic v. Hamman ,
808 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn. 2011). We do not consider allegation s made at the hearing
before the district court that were not asserted in the notice of election contest, see Hancock,
122 N.W.2d at 595 (recognizing that an invalid notice of contest cannot be validated by a
later amendment), or that were rai sed for the first time on appeal. See Funchess v. Cecil
Newman Corp. , 632 N.W.2d 666, 673 (Minn. 2001) (stating that “a reviewing court
generally may consider only those issues that the record shows were presented to and
considered by the trial court”).

16
First, nothing in Bergstrom’s notice alleges that any of the listed irregularities or
errors affected the outcome of the election for Senate District 7, nor does she allege that if
any of the claims asserted in her election contest succeeds, she would have been e lected
rather than McEwen. Hahn, 225 N.W.2d at 386 (stating that “the rule in this state” has
been “that violation of a statute regulating the conduct of an election is not fatal to the
election in the absence of proof that the irregularity affected the outcome”).
Second, the allegations in Bergstrom’s election contest—regarding party affiliation
of appointed election judges , “concerns” about the “process” for absentee voting at some
facilities, questions regarding the canvassing board’s summary statements ,9 and the
possibility of fraud given “credible reports” of “anomalies” in the software used in voting
machines—are simply too vague to warrant embarking upon the discovery and trial process
she seeks. We have rejected vague and general allegations that essentially challenge the
validity of an election. See, e.g., Hancock, 122 N.W.2d at 595 (explaining that an election
contest that “sought to defeat” the outcome “by declaring the whole election invalid” is
insufficient to warrant granting relief); Soper, 48 N.W. at 1112 (stating that “the entire vote
of the township” would not b e disenfranchised because of an alleged irregularity in the
conduct of the election “which it is not claimed changed the result of the election”); Hahn,
225 N.W.2d at 386 (noting the absence of allegations that the brother of a candidate,
appointed to serv e as voter registration deputy, “at any time tampered with ballots or in

9 See Minn. Stat. § 204C.24 (2020) (requiring election judges to prepare “summary
statements” for each precinct, certifying that “the ballots cast were properly piled, checked,
and counted” and that the statement shows the votes cast for each candidate “correctly”).
17
any way acted to influence” voters) ; Janeway, 68 N.W. at 25–26 (stating that allegations,
including those regarding the political affiliation of election judges , made “in the most
general terms” were insufficient to set aside the election). We have also rejected election
contests based on allegations of conduct that do not violate the law, such as Bergstrom’s
allegation that she was not allowed to make a public st atement before the canvassing
boards. See Soper, 48 N.W. at 1112 (rejecting an allegation based on public access to the
ballot box during voting because the law did not require “that during the casting of ballots
the box shall be kept” in public view).
Third, the public record of canvassed and certified vote counts is prima facie
evidence of the results of this election. Berg v. Veit , 162 N.W. 522, 522 (Minn. 1917) ;
Moon v. Harris, 142 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1913) (“The official returns are evidence of the
votes cast” and are presumed to “correctly state the result of an accurate count of the
ballots”); Taylor v. Taylor , 10 Minn. 107, 112 (Minn. 1865) (stating that the certified
results of an election are “prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated”). The votes cast
in some precincts in Senate District 7 were also subject to a post-election review, see Minn.
Stat. § 206.89, subd. 2, and the votes cast in precinct 8 were recounted at Bergstrom’s
request, see Minn. Stat. § 204C.35, subd. 2 (2020). As a result, multiple steps were taken
to verify the accuracy of the votes in Senate District 7 before Bergstrom filed her election
contest. The vague sense, as the district court said, that something was not right with the
election does not disturb the prima facie evidence of the results of this contest. See Walsh,
851 N.W.2d at 60 3 (noting that we require more than legal conclusions in a complaint );
18
Hancock, 122 N.W.2d at 595 (rejecting allegations in an election contest that sought to
“declar[e] the whole election invalid”).
Finally, we note that Bergstrom asserts that the procedures authorized by
chapter 209—an inspection of ballots and discovery—must be allowed when an election is
contested. We disagree. The question presented by this appeal—whether the allegations
of Bergstrom’s notice state a claim upon which relief could be granted—must be answered
before moving forward with other procedures in chapter 209. We have rejected the
argument that chapter 209 confers an “absolute right” to a ballot inspection. In re Contest
of Gen. Election Held on Nov. 4, 2008, 767 N.W.2d at 469–70 (rejecting contestant’s claim
of an absolute right to inspect ballots , stating that an inspection is al lowed only upon a
showing that it is needed to prepare for trial). And nothing in the ballot inspection statute
authorizes the disclosure Bergstrom requested, of “voter rolls or other election materials.”
Id. at 469 ; see Minn. Stat. §§ 209.05–.06 (describing procedures for guarding and
inspecting “ballots”).
Bergstrom argues that transparency and public confidence in the integrity of the
election requires the inspection and discovery she seeks. This concern, even if it is one
that can be address ed in an election contest, must be supported by allegations that are
sufficient to state a claim upon which the relief provided by chapter 209 can be granted.10
Given the expectation for an expeditious resolution of an election contest, see Minn. Stat.

10 In reaching this conclusion, we do not address whether claims of the type Bergstrom
asserted in this election contest are better suited for another procedure, such as that
provided by Minn. Stat. § 204B.44 (2020); or, as a declaratory judgment action, see Minn.
Stat. § 555.01 (2020).
19
§ 209.10, subd. 3 (requiring proceedings to be held within 15 days), we will not lightly
disturb the canvassed, certified, and recounted results of a fair electio n in the absence of
allegations that comply with the well -established pleading standard for election contests.
This is because once ascertained, “the most important consideration” is to give effect to
“the will of the voters .” Holmen v. Miller, 206 N.W.2d 916, 922 (Minn. 1973). We are
confident that the will of the voters in Senate District 7 is accurately reflected in the result
that has been upheld through multiple reviews of the ballots cast in that election.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the district court is affirmed.
Affirmed.

CHUTICH and MOORE III, JJ., took no part in the consideration or decision of this
matter.