State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0094

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

James NMN William,
Appellant.

Filed June 27, 2022
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Clay County District Court
File No. 14-CR-20-192

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Brian J. Melton, Clay County Attorney, Pamela L. Foss, Chief Assistant County Attorney,
Moorhead, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAЇTAS, Judge
Appellant James William challenges his conviction for third-degree criminal sexual
conduct, arguing that the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion for in camera
2
review of the complainant’s child-protection records and his postconviction request for a
hearing to inquire about potential juror misconduct. We affirm.
FACTS
In 2020, William’s adolescent daughter S.J.W. alleged that William had been
sexually abusing her since she was seven years old. Following an investigation, William
was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minnesota
Statutes section 609.342, subdivision 1(a) (2008) (penetration with person under 13 and
the actor is 36 months older); one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct und er
Minnesota Statutes section 609.342 , subdivision 1(h)(iii) (2014) (penetration with person
under 16 and actor has a significant relationship with person and multiple acts were
committed over an extended period of time); and one count of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct under Minnesota Statutes section 609.344, subdivision 1(g)(iii) (2018)
(penetration with person between 16 and 18 and actor has a significant relationship with
person and multiple acts were committed over an extended period of time), for repeatedly
sexually abusing his daughter over a period spanning nearly 12 years.
William’s pretrial motion requesting S.J.W.’s child-protection records.
At the outset of his criminal case, William filed a motion to compel disclosure of
S.J.W.’s child-in-need-of-protection-or-services (CHIPS) records or, alternatively, for in
camera review of those records. He argued that S.J.W.’s CHIPS records would contain
relevant evidence because the CHIPS case was based on the same sexual-abuse allegations
underlying the criminal charges. Following a hearing, the district court denied William’s
motion. The district court reasoned that the state would be obligated to disclose any
3
evidence in the CHIPS file that related to the criminal charges, and that William’s quest to
obtain any other materials in the file was a “fishing expedition.” Although the district court
ruled that William could renew his request for the contents of the CHIPS file if
circumstances changed, William did not bring an additional motion.
William’s trial.
William ultimately had a jury trial that spanned eight days. The state called seven
witnesses, including S.J.W., and played the video of S.J.W.’s forensic interview. William
testified on his own behalf and called one additional witness. He denied sexually abusing
S.J.W. The defense theory was that S.J.W. fabricated her allegations of sexual abuse as a
means of emancipating from William.
The jury began deliberating on September 23, 2020. Shortly after deliberations
began, the jury presented the district court with three factual questions. After consulting
with counsel, the district court reminded the jurors that they were to decide the facts from
the evidence introduced at trial. Five-and-a- half hours after beginning deliberations, the
jury submitted another communication to the district court stating, “We are unable to come
to a unanimous verdict. What are our next steps?” Again, the district court consulted with
the attorneys, who agreed that the jury should continue deliberating. The district court
reread one of its instructions to the jury:
In order for you to return a verdict, whether guilty or not guilty, each
juror must agree with that verdict and your verdict must be
unanimous. You should discuss the case with one another and
deliberate with a view toward reaching agreement, if you can do so
without violating your individual judgment. You should decide the
case for yourself, but only after you have discussed the case with your
fellow jurors and have carefully considered their views. You should
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not hesitate to reexamine your views, and change your opinion if you
become convinced they are erroneous, but you should not surrender
your honest opinion simply because other jurors disagree or merely to
reach a verdict.

See 10 Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 3.04 (2020).
The jury deliberated for another 45 minutes, and then relayed to the district court
that one juror was having anxiety and needed to stop deliberations for the night. After
consulting with the attorneys, the district court released the jurors overnight.1
The jury resumed deliberations on September 24. Shortly after, the jury asked to
review the transcript of S.J.W.’s forensic interview. By agreement of the attorneys, the
district court responded: “You were previously instructed that the transcript would not be
available to you during deliberations and, therefore, it will not be provided.” About four-
and-a-half hours later, the district court received another note from the jury stating, “We
have taken two written votes today and we have had a split vote both times. We are having
a hard time with the lack of evidence. There is no chance of reaching consensus.” After
consulting with the attorneys, the district court told the jury to continue deliberating and
again reread its instruction for reaching a verdict.

1 Before the district court released the jury, the defense moved for overnight sequestration
pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 5. The district court
denied the motion but instructed the jury not to talk about or investigate the case during the
recess. When the jury returned to resume deliberations in the morning, the district court
polled the jurors to ensure that they had complied with the instructions for the overnight
recess.
5
Five hours later, the jury reached a verdict. The jury found William guilty of third-
degree criminal sexual conduct and not guilty of each count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct.
Anonymous juror letter.
Six days after the jury verdict and before sentencing, the prosecutor received an
anonymous letter purporting to be from a juror at William’s trial. Although the letter
suggested that the anonymous juror was sympathetic to the prosecution, the letter identified
some concerns about the process. The letter stated that there were “nine solid votes for
conviction on all four counts,” with one juror wavering and two who refused to consider
William guilty without “irrefutable evidence that something happened.” According to the
letter, some jurors believed that they would not be allowed to leave until they reached a
verdict based on the district court’s responses to their questions. The letter stated that the
district court’s “demeanor in the jury room after the verdict reinforced this for me. She
was pretty happy, as though she got what she wanted, which was a verdict.”
Additionally, the letter alleged that there had been low morale and tension among
the jurors due to “family situations” and lost time from work. When a juror suggested a
compromise, the jurors agreed because of the “overriding pressure” to reach a verdict.
According to the letter, the part that “bothered” the anonymous juror most was that “the
last two people to give in were two of the youngest [jurors], trying to do what they believed
in . . . the pressure that was brought to bear on those two kids will stay with me for the rest
of my life.”
6
Once the prosecutor brought the anonymous letter to the district court’s attention, it
was addressed no further. William did not ask the district court to take any action in
connection with the letter before sentencing.
Sentencing, appeal, and postconviction proceedings.
Approximately one month after the trial, William appeared before the district court
for sentencing. The district court sentenced him to 57 months in prison, a sentence at the
top of the presumptive sentencing range.
William then filed a notice of appeal from the judgment. He later moved to stay the
appeal to pursue postconviction proceedings, and we granted the request.
William filed a postconviction petition in the district court, alleging that the
anonymous letter showed that his jury had engaged in misconduct. He sought a hearing to
question the jurors about any misconduct during their deliberations. The district court
denied the petition, concluding that William had failed to satisfy his burden to obtain such
a hearing.
Following the denial of his postconviction petition, William moved to dissolve the
stay of his direct appeal, and this court granted the motion.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying William’s motion for
in camera review of S.J.W.’s confidential CHIPS records.

William argues that the district court’s denial of his pretrial motion for in camera
review of S.J.W.’s CHIPS records was prejudicial error requiring reversal of his
conviction.
7
Criminal defendants are afforded a broad right of discovery, but that right is not
unlimited. State v. Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn. 2012). When a defendant
seeks privileged records, the district court may screen the records in camera to balance the
defendant’s right to prepare a defense against a victim’s right to privacy. Id. (citing State
v. Paradee, 403 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Minn. 1987)). The parties agree that S.J.W.’s CHIPS
records are privileged.
In camera review is not a right but rather a discovery option, and the defendant must
first make a “plausible showing” that “the information sought would be both material and
favorable to his defense.” State v. Hummel, 483 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 1992) (quotations
omitted). The request must be reasonably specific, State v. Lynch, 443 N.W.2d 848, 852
(Minn. App. 1989), rev. denied (Minn. Sept. 15, 1989), and the defendant’s argument that
the records are material and favorable to the defense must go beyond mere conjecture.
State v. Evans, 756 N.W.2d 854, 873 (Minn. 2008).
“On appeal, [appellate courts] review the limits placed by the district court on the
release and use of protected records for an abuse of discretion.” Hokanson, 821 N.W.2d
at 349 (citing Evans, 756 N.W.2d at 872-73). “A court abuses its discretion when its
decision is based on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the
record.” Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Minn. 2011).
William argues that he made a “plausible showing” that S.J.W.’s confidential
records would be both material and favorable to his defense, requiring the district court to
review the information in camera to determine its relevance to his defense. In his pretrial
motion, he argued that the records would be material and favorable to his defense because:
8
The records will likely contain: (1) statements made by the
alleged victim and others regarding the allegations against
William (both substantive and impeachment evidence),
(2) information regarding any mental health and/or therapy
programming of the alleged victim, (3) medical and/ or
psychological records not currently in the possession of the
defense, and (4) information regarding the alleged victim’s
living arrangements and/or emancipation plans put in place
following the filing of the CHIPS petition. The records will
likely contain other information that is relevant and material to
the defense in this case. It is difficult for the defense to
anticipate all information in the possession of Social Services
regarding a CHIPS file.

The district court ruled that William had failed to satisfy his burden. It observed
that because the criminal and CHIPS cases involved a joint investigation, “[a]ll of the
records related to the investigation of the incident, including a medical examination of
[S.J.W.], have been provided to the state and disclosed to the defense.” Moreover, the
district court noted, any remaining documents in the CHIPS file “would be related to case
planning and services for the family,” and William did not show “how that information
would be material or relevant to the criminal case.” The district court explained that
William had made no showing that S.J.W. suffered from mental-health issues and had
failed to demonstrate how her mental-health records would relate to his criminal case.
Likewise, the district court rejected William’s claim that S.J.W.’s living arrangements,
which were under the control of social services, advanced the defense theory that S.J.W.
fabricated the allegations of sexual abuse to obtain early emancipation. The district court
concluded that, although William explained the “general logic behind his request,” he did
not offer any evidence to support a belief that the requested records existed or contained
material information favorable to his case. However, the district court stated that William
9
could renew his motion for in camera review if he supplied additional information about
the records “he believes are contained in the social services file and how they would be
material to his case.”
William argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to review the
CHIPS file to ensure that it did not contain information pertinent to his defense. He
contends that, without reviewing the CHIPS file, the district court had no way of knowing
its contents. According to William, the district court’s assumptions about the contents of
the file were “purely speculative” and the “summary denial” of his motion was therefore
an abuse of discretion.
But William, and not the district court, had the burden to make a plausible showing
that records existed that would be material and favorable to his defense. Hummel, 483
N.W.2d at 72. And beyond the bald assertion that there could be records relating to the
criminal charges that had not already been disclosed, William made no showing that such
records existed.
William attempts to illustrate the district court’s error by contrasting his case with
the circumstances in Hummel, where the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district
court’s denial of a motion for in camera review of confidential records. There, the
defendant, who was accused of murdering his girlfriend, requested in camera review of the
victim’s psychiatric records. Id. at 69-71. In affirming the district court, the supreme court
observed that the defendant had failed to provide a single theory for how the victim’s
psychiatric records would relate to the defense or would be “reasonably likely to contain
information related to the case.” Id. at 72. William asserts that his motion for in camera
10
review, by contrast, explained precisely how S.J.W.’s confidential records might relate to
his defense. We agree that William did offer the district court a theory—he alleged that
the records potentially contained S.J.W.’s “emancipation plans,” which would have
supported his defense that S.J.W. fabricated her allegations to gain independence from
William.
But William’s citation to Hummel does not persuade us that the district court abused
its discretion in concluding that William failed to make the requisite plausible showing. In
reaching this conclusion, we consider another supreme court case— State v. Burrell, where
the supreme court did find an abuse of discretion. 697 N.W.2d 579, 605 (Minn. 2005). In
Burrell, a murder case involving three codefendants, Burrell moved for in camera review
of any documents relating to plea negotiations between the prosecution and two
codefendants, who had pleaded guilty. Id. at 603. Burrell alleged that the plea negotiations
could show that the state had failed to comply with its constitutional discovery obligations
because the codefendants’ plea agreements contained some unusual terms. Id. The district
court denied Burrell’s motion, but the supreme court reversed. Id. at 603-05. Although
the supreme court determined that it was a “close call” as to whether Burrell had made the
requisite “plausible showing,” it concluded that the district court should have reviewed the
plea negotiations in camera. Id. at 605.
Unlike William’s motion, which simply speculated that favorable evidence might
exist, Burrell alleged specific facts showing that the evidence he sought plausibly existed,
namely the codefendants’ plea agreements, where one codefendant was warned that any
inconsistent testimony could impact his plea agreement and another codefendant was
11
required to disclaim prior statements that Burrell was not involved in the murder. Id. at
603-05. And unlike the evidence that William sought, the evidence at issue in Burrell was
not otherwise available. Here, as the district court determined, the prosecution was
required to produce material evidence that was related to William’s criminal case.
Moreover, evidence that S.J.W. no longer lived with William after alleging that he had
sexually abused her for 12 years was not a fact solely available in confidential records.
Indeed, William’s attorney cross-examined S.J.W. about her “emancipation plan” at trial.
Finally, we note that the district court encouraged William to renew the request for in
camera review of the CHIPS records if he could make the required plausible showing. He
did not renew his motion before or during trial.
William did not show with reasonable specificity or with more than mere conjecture
that the CHIPS file contained additional records that would be material and favorable to
his defense. See Lynch, 443 N.W.2d at 852; see also Evans, 756 N.W.2d at 873. We
therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying William’s
motion for in camera review of those records.
II. The di strict court did not abuse its discretion by denying William’s
postconviction request for a hearing to question jurors about their
deliberations.

William contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying his
postconviction request for a hearing to question jurors about their deliberations for the
purpose of determining whether misconduct occurred.
When there is evidence of juror misconduct, the court may, in its discretion, order a
hearing, which is often called a “Schwartz hearing” after the leading Minnesota Supreme
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Court decision regarding claims of jury misconduct. State v. Church, 577 N.W.2d 715,
720 (Minn. 1998); see also Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 104 N.W.2d 301,
303 (Minn. 1960) (establishing procedure for investigating claims of juror misconduct).
The rules of evidence prohibit juror testimony about jury deliberations, including “any
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury’s deliberations,” “the effect of
anything upon [a] juror’s mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent
from the verdict,” or anything “concerning the juror’s mental processes” in reaching a
verdict. Minn. R. Evid. 606(b); State v. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d 905, 910 (Minn. 1994). But
there are several exceptions to this general rule. Jurors may testify about (1) “extraneous
prejudicial information that was improperly brought to the jury’s attention,” (2) any outside
influence improperly weighing on any juror, (3) threats of violence or violent acts against
jurors, (4) false statements made during voir dire that concealed prejudice or bias toward a
party, and (5) information necessary to correct an error made in notating the verdict on the
verdict form. Minn. R. Evid. 606(b).
To obtain a Schwartz hearing, a party “must establish a prima facie case of jury
misconduct” by pointing to facts that “standing alone and unchallenged would warrant the
conclusion of jury misconduct.” State v. Starkey, 516 N.W.2d 918, 928 (Minn. 1994). The
moving party bears the burden of making a prima facie case. State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d
481, 484 (Minn. 1979) . Appellate courts review a district court’s denial of a Schwartz
hearing for an abuse of discretion. Church, 577 N.W.2d at 721. Where the basis for
seeking a Schwartz hearing is “wholly speculative” and would intrude on the jury’s
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deliberative process, the district court does not abuse its discretion by denying a hearing.
State v. Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. 2000).
Here, the district court rejected William’s claim that the anonymous letter created a
prima facie case of jury misconduct. At most, the district court concluded, the letter
revealed that jurors experienced ordinary stresses that are inherent to jury service.
Moreover, the district court ruled that its instructions to the jury to continue deliberating
did not amount to an “outside influence” on the deliberations. The district court pointed
out that it had relied on a pattern jury instruction to encourage continued deliberations, the
attorneys agreed with the approach taken, and the duration of the deliberations was
appropriate given the length of the trial and the complexity of the charges.
William argues that the district court’s refusal to order a Schwartz hearing was an
abuse of discretion. He contends that the letter establishes a prima facie case of juror
misconduct because it shows that the jurors pressured each other to compromise for
personal reasons, the district court pressured the jurors to reach a verdict, and the
“combination of outside pressures” worked “in concert to force the jurors to relinquish
their individual judgments about the case for the sole purpose of reaching a verdict so they
could go home.”
We disagree. A juror’s second thoughts about a verdict after trial ordinarily do not
warrant a Schwartz hearing. State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363, 367 (Minn. App. 1991), rev.
denied (Minn. July 24, 1991). Likewise, communications between jurors that involve
psychological intimidation, coercion, or persuasion, do not constitute misconduct unless
there are threats of violence or actual violence. State v. Jackson, 615 N.W.2d 391, 396
14
(Minn. App. 2000) (citing Minn. R. Evid. 606(b) cmt.). It is also well established that a
district court may reread CRIMJIG 3.04 —the pattern instruction that the district court
reread to the jury here—when a jury claims to be deadlocked.2 See Kelley, 517 N.W.2d at
909-10 (explaining that rereading CRIMJIG 3.04 is an appropriate practice for a district
court confronted with a purported jury deadlock). And we agree with the district court that,
due to the duration and subject matter of William’s trial, the jury did not deliberate for an
unreasonable length of time. See State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 912 (Minn. 1996)
(stating that appellate courts will look to the nature, complexity, and length of the trial to
determine the reasonableness of requiring the jury to continue its deliberations). Even
considering all of the circumstances alleged in the anonymous letter, William did not make
a prima facie showing of jury misconduct. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying William’s postconviction request for a Schwartz hearing.
Affirmed.

2 William cites to a nonprecedential case, State v. Schwendeman, to support his argument
that the district court inappropriately forced the jurors to reach a verdict. No. A20- 0762,
2021 WL 2645468 at *7-8 (Minn. App. June 28, 2021) (reversing and remanding for a
Schwartz hearing where the jury may have received instructions from the district court to
“compromise” after alerting the court to a deadlock). We are not bound by nonprecedential
opinions. See Jackson ex rel. Sorenson v. Options Residential, Inc., 896 N.W.2d 549, 553
(Minn. App. 2017) (“[W]e are bound by precedent established in the supreme court’s
opinions and our own published opinions.”). Nonetheless, we have reviewed the case cited
and conclude that it is factually distinguishable from the circumstances in William’s case.