State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0095

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Scott Lee Nolden,
Appellant.

Filed January 31, 2022
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-20-699

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David L. Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Hannah Hanlon, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jason R. Steffen, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Pres iding Judge; Smith, Tr acy M., Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this direct appeal from a final judgment of conviction for driving while impaired
(DWI) following a stipulated-facts court trial, appellant argues that the evidence obtained
from the traffic stop must be suppressed and his conviction reversed. Appellant contends
2
that the district court erred by concluding that the deputy possessed a legal basis to stop his
vehicle after the deputy observed that a ppellant’s vehicle was “equipped” with an
inoperable center brake light. Because the record supports the district court’s finding that
appellant’s vehicle was “equipped” with a ce nter brake light and the brake light was
inoperable, the vehicle stop was proper and therefore we affirm.
FACTS
In March 2020, a Beltrami County Sheriff’s Office deputy conducted a traffic stop
of a Jeep Liberty driven by appellant Scott Lee Nolden because the deputy observed that
the center brake1 light on appellant’s vehicle did not illuminate when the vehicle’s brakes
were activated. The deputy approached appellant’s vehicle and observed that there was no
brake light cover over the center brake light housing cavity, and he could see the wiring
inside the cavity which appeared to have previously housed the brake light.
During his interaction with appellant, th e deputy observed that appellant showed
signs of impairment and ultimately arrested appellant for DWI. Appellant was charged
with first-degree DWI.
The district court denied appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a
result of the traffic stop. Th e parties agreed to a court tr ial on stipulated evidence to
accommodate appellant’s challenge of the dispositive issue involving the vehicle stop. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. Appellant was found guilty and convicted of first-degree
DWI, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.24, subd. 1(2) (2018). This appeal follows.

1 The transcript incorrectly us es “break” instead of “brake.” This opinion has corrected
this error in all recitations and direct quotes from the transcript.
3
DECISION
Minnesota law requires that “[w]hen a vehicle is equipped with stop lamps or signal
lamps, the lamps must at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2020). In State v. Beall , which also involved a stop based on an
inoperable center brake light, we held that “[a] vehicle with an inoperable center brake
light is operated unlawfully in violation of Minn. Stat. § 1 69.57, subd. 3(a)” and that an
“[o]bservation of such a violation gives rise to objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion
justifying a traffic stop.” 771 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Minn. App. 2009). We also concluded that
Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) “unambiguously applies to all lamps with which a vehicle
is equipped.” Id.
The crux of appellant’s argument is that his vehicle was not “equipped” with a center
brake light pursuant to the “plain reading” of Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) “because the
entire [brake light] fixture was absent from the vehicle at the time in question.” In short,
appellant argues, his “vehicle did not have a faulty or malfunctioni ng third brake light”
because “it simply had no light at all.”
The United States and Minnesota Cons titutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “To conduct a
limited stop for investigatory purposes, . . . th e police must have reasonable articulable
suspicion of criminal activity.” State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999). In
determining whether reasonable suspicion exis ts to justify a stop, Minnesota courts
“consider the totality of the circumstances and acknowledge that trained law enforcement
officers are permitted to make inferences and deductions that w ould be beyond the
4
competence of an untrained person.” State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Minn.
2001).
An officer who observes a traffic viola tion, no matter how insignificant, has the
necessary reasonable articulable suspicion to sustain a traffic stop. State v. Anderson, 683
N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004). An officer need only have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting a traffic violation to conduct a stop. State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575,
578 (Minn. 1997). Such suspicion, however, must be more than a mere hunch; the officer
must have objective support for the belief that the person is involved in criminal activity.
State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn. 1989).
To consider appellant’s argument, we must first interpret the relevant statute.
Appellate courts review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Christianson v. Henke,
831 N.W.2d 532, 535 (Minn. 2013). “The plain language of the statute controls when the
meaning of the statut e is unambiguous.” State v. Boecker, 893 N.W.2d 348, 351 (Minn.
2017). When determining whether a statute is ambiguous, we give words and phrases their
ordinary meaning. State v. Prigge, 907 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 2018). In doing so, we
may “look to the dictionary definitions of those words and apply them in the context of the
statute.” State v. Haywood, 886 N.W.2d 485, 488 (Minn. 2016).
Although “equipped” is not defined in the statute or elsewhere, its dictionary
definition is “[t]o supply with necessi ties such as tools or provisions.” The American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 602 (5th ed. 2018); Merriam-Webster’s
Collegiate Dictionary 422 (11th ed. 2014) (defining “e quip” to include “to furnish for
service or action by appropriate provisioning”); see American Heritage , supra, at 712
5
(defining “furnish” and other sy nonyms of “equip” as “to prov ide with what is necessary
for an activity or purpose” and providing examples of “f urnished the team with new
uniforms” and “equip a car with snow tires” ); see also Merriam-Webster’s, supra, at 508
(providing “furnish” as a synonym for “equip” and defining it as “to provide with what is
needed”). Therefore, based on these dictionary definitions of “equipped,” its plain meaning
is to supply or provide the necessities for a particular purpose.
The district court found that appellant’s vehicle was equipped with “the plug-in cord
that connects to a light bulb,” though it had “no plastic cove r.” Additionally, the deputy
credibly testified that:
 he “could see a wire inside of the brake light, mounting
area”;

 the brake light “did not illuminate”;

 there “was a void . . . where, typically, there’s a red, rear
light, lamp cover - - where a lightbulb would sit inside”;

 “there was wiring to incl ude the plugin where one
would plugin a lightbulb”; and

 the vehicle had “the ability to have a brake light . . .
[b]ut there was just no cover or lightbulb.”

See State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Minn. 1983) (declining to imply finding of lack
of credibility in light of officer’s undisputed testimony); see also Umphlett v. Comm’r of
Pub. Safety, 533 N.W.2d 636, 63 9 (Minn. App. 1995) (concludi ng that the district court
“implicitly found that the officer’s testimony was more credible” given its resolution of the
issue), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 30, 1995). Therefore, appellant’s vehicle was equipped
with a center brake light.
6
Appellant argues that “equipped” should be read to mean “if that component is
presently attached to the vehi cle,” such as a brake light, then that vehicle is “equipped”
with that component. According to appellant, this de finition is an “everyday life” and
“natural use” of the word “equipped.” We disagree. This definition requires us to add the
words to the statute. This we may not do. Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn.
2012) (“We cannot add words or meaning to a statute that were intentionally or
inadvertently omitted.”).
Accordingly, the deputy possessed a pa rticularized and ob jective basis for
suspecting appellant had committed a traffi c violation based on his observation of
appellant’s inoperable center brake light, thereby justifying the stop.
Affirmed.