A21-0099 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Alaaldeen Mussa, Appellant,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed September 13, 2021

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0099

Alaaldeen Mussa,
Appellant,

vs.

Western Agricultural Insurance Company, et al.,
Respondents.

Filed September 13, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Nobles County District Court
File No. 53-CV-17-265

William J. Wetering, Hedeen, Hughes & Wetering, Worthington, Minnesota (for appellant)

Mark D. O’Leary, O’Leary Law Office, Sioux Falls, South Dakota (for respondents)

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After being seriously injured in a car acc ident in Worthington, Minnesota, appellant
Alaaldeen Mussa sued the driver for negligence. When it became clear that the driver was
unable to pay Mussa’s medical bills, Mussa in stead sought satisfaction of his claim from
the driver’s insurance provider, responde nt Western Agriculture Insurance Company
(Western Agriculture), in Minne sota district court. Wester n Agriculture th en brought a
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declaratory-judgment action in South Dakota district court to determine whether there was
coverage under the terms of the driver’s insurance policy. After a two-day trial, the South
Dakota district court determined—and the South Dakota Supreme Court later affirmed—
that the policy did not provide coverage.
Having prevailed in Sout h Dakota, Western Agricultu re moved to have that
judgment granted full faith and credit in Minnesota. Over Mussa’s objection, the
Minnesota district court granted the motion. Mussa appeals. Because the South Dakota
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit and because Mussa is precluded from relitigating
the issue of Western Agriculture’s liability, we affirm.
FACTS
In fall 2013, Altayeb Arbab-Azzein a nd appellant Alaaldeen Mussa, both South
Dakota residents working in Minnesota, were involved in a car accident near Worthington,
Minnesota. Arbab-Azzein had been driving Mussa and at least thirteen other coworkers to
a manufacturing plant in Worthington when he crashed. Mussa suffered significant injuries
and sued Arbab-Azzein in Minnesota district court for negligence. At the time of the
accident, Arbab-Azzein was insured by respondent Western Agriculture. But after learning
of the crash, Western Agriculture denied coverage.
After Western Agriculture’s denial of c overage and in light of Arbab-Azzein’s
inability to pay the amount Mu ssa sought in damages, Mussa and Arbab-Azzein entered
into a Miller-Shugart agreement.
1 Miller v. Shugart, 316 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 1982). In

1 “In a Miller-Shugart settlement, the insured, having been denied any coverage for a claim,
agrees claimant may enter judgment agai nst him for a sum colle ctible only from the
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doing so, Arbab-Azzein stipulated to judgme nt in favor of Mussa in the amount of
$1,500,000, and Mussa agreed to seek sa tisfaction of that judgment from Western
Agriculture’s policy. After the agreement, Mussa then su ed Western Agriculture in
Minnesota district court for breach of contr act, bad faith refusal to settle, and negligent
procurement of insurance coverage.
But instead of proceeding in the Minnesota action, We stern Agriculture sought a
declaratory judgment against Arbab-Azzein and Mussa in South Dakota to determine the
company’s coverage under the terms of Arba b-Azzein’s insurance policy. Despite his
pending Minnesota claim, Mussa appeared a nd fully participated in the South Dakota
action. Neither party disputed South Dakota’s jurisdiction over the claim. Nor did either
party deny the applicability of So uth Dakota law to the claim. The South Dakota district
court determined that Western Agriculture ha d “no contractual obligation to defend or
indemnify [Arbab-]Azzein for cl aims arising out of the motor vehicle accident. . . .”
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Mussa appealed this decision, but the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed.
While Western Agriculture’s declaratory- judgment action moved through the South
Dakota courts, Mussa’s Minnesota suit remain ed dormant. When the Minnesota district

insurance policy.” Alton M. Johnson Co. v. M.A.I. Co. , 463 N.W.2d 277, 278 n.1 (Minn.
1990).
2 The South Dakota district court determin ed that Arbab-Azzein ’s insurance policy
excluded from coverage losses incurred when the insured vehicle was being used to carry
people for a fee. Carpools were not included in this exclusion. After a two-day trial, the
court found that because Arbab-Azzein had ch arged his passengers a weekly flat fee in
exchange for transportation to and from the manufacturing plant, he was operating the
vehicle to carry people for a fee, not as a carpool. As such, the court concluded that Arbab-
Azzein’s insurance policy did no t provide coverage for the ac cident that injured Mussa.
W. Agric. Ins. Co. v. Arbab-Azzein, 940 N.W.2d 865, 868 (S.D. 2020).
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court sent the parties a deficiency notice in October 2019 because no action had been taken
since June 2019, Western Agriculture notifie d the court of the ongoing South Dakota
proceedings. No further action was taken on Mussa’s Minnesota claim until March 2020.
With the South Dakota ju dgment in hand, Western Agriculture moved in the
Minnesota district court to dismiss the action against it. Mussa objected, arguing—for the
first time—that Minnesota law controlled the question of insurance coverage for incidents
occurring in Minnesota. At a hearing on the motion, West ern Agriculture clarified its
request, asking the court to grant full faith and credit to the S outh Dakota judgment
pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 548.27 (2020) and dismiss Mussa’s pending claim.
Noting Mussa’s full participation in the South Dakota declaratory-judgment action
and the dormancy of his pending Minnesota cl aim, the district court granted Western
Agriculture’s motion to grant full faith and credit to the South Dakota judgment.
Mussa appeals.
DECISION
Mussa’s central argument is that the dist rict court erred by granting full faith and
credit to the South Dakota judgment. Because the accident happened in Minnesota and the
claim was brought in Minnesota district cour t, Mussa asserts that Minnesota law should
apply. He further asks us to conclude that, applying Minnesota law, Western Agriculture
is liable for satisfaction of the stipulated ju dgment in the amount of $1,500,000. We
address each argument in turn.
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I. The district court did not err by granting full faith and credit to the South
Dakota judgment.

Mussa argues that the district court erred by granting the South Dakota judgment
full faith and credit because doing so allowed a foreign court to “control ongoing litigation
in Minnesota.” Whether a foreign judgment can be granted full faith and credit is a
question of law which we review de novo. Blume Law Firm PC v. Pierce ,
741 N.W.2d 921, 925 (Minn. App. 2007), review denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 2008).
Generally, “full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.” U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1. See also
Minn. Stat. § 548.27 (“A [foreign] judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to
the same procedures, defenses and proceedings fo r reopening, vacating, or staying as a
judgment of a district court or the supreme c ourt of this state, a nd may be enforced or
satisfied in like manner.”). But exceptions to the grant of full faith and credit exist. If the
foreign court lacked jurisdiction over the pa rties or claim, the judgment will not be
enforced. Matson v. Matson, 333 N.W.2d 862, 867 (Minn. 1983). Nor will the judgment
be granted full faith and credit if it was obtained by fraud or has already been satisfied, or
if the defendant was denied due process during the proceedings. Id. But these exceptions
are limited. A challenge to th e enforceability of a foreign judgment cannot be used to
collaterally attack that judgment on its merits. Id. And where the “parties submitted to the
jurisdiction of the original forum, the parties cannot s ubsequently challenge personal
jurisdiction.” Blume Law Firm PC, 741 N.W.2d at 925.
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Here, Mussa does not explicitly argue th at any of the excep tions outlined above
apply. In fact, he concedes that South Dakota had proper jurisdiction over the parties and
the action and does not dispute that he had the opportunity to fully participate in that case.
Nor does he claim—or the record reflect—that his due-process rights were violated or that
the South Dakota judgment was obtained fraud ulently. Instead, Mussa contends that
granting full faith and credit to the South Dakota judgment would allow a foreign court to
control a pending action in Minnesota. This is improper, Mussa claims, because “the
present case is a Minnesota case, thereby, Minnesota law should apply.”
For support, Mussa cites to a Montana Supreme Court decision, Wamsley v. Nodak
Mut. Ins. Co. , 178 P.3d 102 (Mont. 2008). In Wamsley, the Montana Supreme Court
considered whether a North Dakota judgment declaring that North Dakota law applied to
an ongoing insurance dispute was entitled to full faith and credit in Montana. Id. at 113.
Determining that a wholesale app lication of the rule to the sp ecific facts of the case was
“problematic,” the Montana Supreme Court did not grant full faith and credit to the North
Dakota judgment. Id. at 114, 116. Specifically, the court concluded that Nodak Insurance
used the North Dakota judgment to prevent th e Montana district court “from exercising
control over the judicial processes necessary to resolve [the] dispute.” Id. at 116.
Additionally, the court noted that the cases “proceeded simultaneously in two state courts,
with competing rulings being s ought and obtained within weeks, and sometimes days, of
each other.” Id. at 115.
We are not persuaded. Wamsley is not binding on our court. State by Ulland v. Int’l
Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am., 527 N.W.2d 133, 136 (Minn. App. 1995) (“[T]his court is
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not bound by precedent from other st ates or the federal courts.”), review denied (Minn.
Apr. 18, 1995). And, even if we follow the Montana Supreme Court’s analysis in Wamsley,
Mussa’s case is distinguishable. Here, ther e is no evidence that Western Agriculture
brought the declaratory-judgment action in South Dakota district court as a means of
applying South Dakota law “through the back door” in Minnesota. Wamsley,
178 P.3d at 116. And although both claims were ongoing, Mussa’s Minnesota district
court claim remained dormant during the So uth Dakota proceedings. Despite Mussa’s
arguments otherwise, Wamsley does not support his assertion that the South Dakota
judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit.
In sum, Mussa does not allege, and the record does not sugge st, that the South
Dakota courts lacked jurisdiction, that th e judgment was obtained fraudulently or was
already satisfied, or that Mussa’s due-process ri ghts were violated. As such, the district
court did not err by granting full faith and credit to the South Dakota judgment.
II. Res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Mussa’s remaining arguments.
In his remaining claims, Mussa assert s that, under Minnesota law, Western
Agriculture is liable for satisfaction of the $1,500,000 judgmen t pursuant to the
Miller-Shugart agreement reached by Arbab-Azzein and Mussa. Specifically, he argues
that: (1) Western Agriculture could not file the declaratory-judg ment action after the
Miller-Shugart agreement was reduced to judgment in Minnesota; (2) a conflict-of-laws
analysis shows that Minnesot a law is controlling; (3) the language of Arbab-Azzein’s
insurance policy is ambiguous under Minnesota law; (4) Mussa is entitled to recover under
Minnesota’s theory of “reasonable expectati ons”; (5) Western Agriculture had a duty to
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defend Arbab-Azzein in the initial Minnesota ac tion; and (6) Mussa is entitled to recover
under Minnesota’s “no-fault coverage.”
We do not reach these arguments. Mussa raised these issues for the first time—in
either Minnesota or South Dakota—after litigating the issue of coverage in South Dakota
courts. At no point during the South Dakota proceedings did Mussa argue that Minnesota
law should be applied. And because, as expl ained above, the South Dakota judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit, res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude Mussa from
relitigating these claims.
Res judicata bars subsequent litigation of a claim when: “(1) the earlier claim
involved the same set of factual circumst ances; (2) the earlier claim involved the same
parties or their privies; (3) there was a final judgment on the merits; [and](4) the estopped
party had a full and fair opport unity to litigate the matter.” Hauschildt v. Beckingham ,
686 N.W.2d 829, 840 (Minn. 2004 ). Res judicata applies to claims actually litigated and
claims that could have been liti gated in the earlier action. Id. Collateral estoppel is
narrower in scope and bars relitigation of a specific issue. Id. at 837. A party is collaterally
estopped from relitigating an issue when: (1) the issue is identical to one in a prior
adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a
party or in privity with a party to the prio r adjudication; and (4) the estopped party had a
full and fair opportunity to be heard on the issue. Id.
Here, the South Dakota judg ment involved the same factual circumstances at issue
in Mussa’s Minnesota district court claim: Mussa, injured in a car accident, sought
satisfaction of a stipulated judgment in the amount of $1,5 00,000 from Western
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Agriculture, the driver’s insurance provider. The precise issue raised in the Minnesota
district court claim is identical to the on e litigated in South Dako ta: whether Mussa was
entitled to coverage under Arbab-Azzein’s insurance policy. Mussa and Western
Agriculture were named parties in both the South Dakota and Minnesota claims. The South
Dakota judgment was final and was affirmed by the South Dakota Supreme Court. And
finally, Mussa had the opportunity to fully a nd fairly participate in the South Dakota
litigation—even going so far as to appeal the judgment to the South Dakota Supreme Court.
Because the elements of res judicata and co llateral estoppel are met, Mussa is precluded
from relitigating his claims concerning Western Agriculture’s liability in Minnesota district
court.
Affirmed.