Suleiman Iraad, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0100

Suleiman Iraad,
Relator,

vs.

Amazon.com Services LLC,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed July 19, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Florey, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 42890304-3

Suleiman Iraad, Prior Lake, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Amazon.Com Service LLC, c/o Corporate Cost Control Inc., Londonderry, New
Hampshire (respondent employer)

Keri Phillips, Anne B. Froelich, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Relator Suleiman Iraad applied for unemployment benefits. DEED determined that
he was ineligible for benefits. Iraad appealed the decision to an unemployment-law judge
(ULJ) one day after the statutory deadlin e to appeal had passed. The ULJ dismissed the
appeal because it was untimely but did not consider whether Iraad had substantially
complied with the statutory deadline —the standard established by an executive order
issued in conjunction with the COVID-19 peacetime emergency. We reverse and remand
for the ULJ to consider whether Iraad substantially complied with the deadline, and
consequently, whether the ULJ should have considered the merits of his appeal.
FACTS
Iraad worked for respondent Amazon Service s LLC from 2019 to 2020. Amazon
fired Iraad, alleging that Iraad did not appear for work for several days without notification.
When Iraad applied for unemployment benefits, DEED determined that he was ineligible.
The determination of ineligibility that DEED mailed to Iraad clearly indicated that the
deadline to appeal the determination was October 19, 2020.
Iraad appealed the determination of ineligibility on October 20, 2020. Iraad
explained why his appeal was late as follows: “I had issues before I couldn’t do it but now
it let me do it.” A ULJ dismissed Iraad’s appeal as untimely, observing that the statutory
deadline to appeal determination of ineligibility is absolute, regardless of mitigating
circumstances.
3
Iraad timely requested reconsiderat ion of the ULJ’s decision. He claimed that he
was unaware of the appeal deadline because it was his first time applying for
unemployment benefits. The ULJ considered Iraad’s request but affirmed the dismissal as
untimely, again observing that the appeal deadline was “absolute.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
At issue in this appeal is whether the ULJ erred by dismissing Iraad’s appeal based
solely on the fact that Iraad appealed one day after the statutory deadline to appeal had
expired. We review de novo a ULJ’s decision to dismiss an appeal as untimely. In re
Murack, 957 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Minn. App. 2021). We may reverse or remand a ULJ’s
decision if it prejudiced the relator’s substantial rights and the decision was affected by an
error of law. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (2020).1
A person applying for unemployment benefits may appeal a determination that he
is ineligible to receive benefits within 20 days of the date that the determination is mailed
to the applicant. Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2020). Under ordinary circumstances,
Minnesota appellate courts have held that the statutory appeal deadline is “absolute” and
that the ULJ “must” dismiss an untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Murack, 957
N.W.2d at 127 (quotation omitted).

1 We observe that Iraad’s appellate brief is inadequately briefed and that he is only entitled
to relief if “prejudicial error is obvious upon mere inspection.” See Schoepke v. Alexander
Smith & Sons Carpet Co. , 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971). Ultimately, we conclude
that the ULJ did err, that the error is obvious upon mere inspection, and that it is appropriate
to consider the appropriate relief for that error. See id.
4
But on March 16, 2020, Governor Tim Walz issued an emergency executive order
that suspended strict compliance of Minnesota Statutes chapter 268. See id. at 128-29. In
Murack, we concluded that one effect of the order was to suspend strict compliance with
the 20-day deadline provided by Minn. Stat. § 268.101, subd. 2(f). Considering the order,
we concluded that an applicant need only substantially comply with the deadline while the
executive order was in effect. Id. at 130. We observed that an applicant may demonstrate
substantial compliance by showing that he “has a reasonable explanation for failing to
strictly comply, has taken steps to comply with the statute, and has generally complied with
the statute’s purpose; and there is reasonable notice and a lack of prejudice to other parties.”
Id. at 130.
The executive order was in effect when Iraad applied for, and DEED denied him,
unemployment benefits. Thus, the ULJ’s decision to dismiss Iraad’s appeal was affected
by an error of law —the appeal deadline was not absolute , as the ULJ concluded, and the
ULJ should have considered whether Iraad substantially complied with the deadline. Cf.
Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (allowing us to reverse if the ULJ’s decision was
“affected by an error of law”).
Still, to prevail on appeal to us, a relator must establish that the ULJ’s decision was
prejudicial. See Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (allowing us to reverse, remand, or
modify a ULJ’s decision if the ULJ erred and the error prejudiced the relator’s substantial
rights). DEED argues that we should affirm because the ULJ’s decision did not prejudice
Iraad, asserting that the record clearly demonstrates that Iraad did not substantially comply
with the statutory deadline. We disagree with DEED’s position on the clarity of the record.
5
Evidence in the record could support either a finding that Iraad did substantially
comply with the appeal deadline or that he did not. Notably, when Iraad initially appealed
the determination of ineligibility, he stated that he filed his appeal one day late because he
“had issues” that prevented him from timely appealing but that “it” eventually “let [him]
do it.” He later arguably contradicted that statement when he claimed that he appealed one
day late because he was not aware of the deadline. Given the ambiguity in the record and
the lack of findings by the ULJ concerning (1) Iraad’s efforts to comply with the statutory
deadline; (2) the reasonableness of Iraad’s explanation for filing his appeal one day late ;
(3) whether Iraad generally complied with the statute’s purpose; and (4) the level of notice
and prejudice to other parties, we cannot conclude that Iraad was not prejudiced by the
ULJ’s error of law. See Murack, 957 N.W.2d at 130.
We reverse the ULJ’s decision and remand for the ULJ to consider whether Ir aad
substantially complied with the statutory appeal deadline. Like in Murack, we offer no
opinion on whether Iraad substantial ly complied with the deadline. Cf. Murack, 957
N.W.2d at 131.
Reversed and remanded.