In re the Estate of: Mark Kevin Egan, Deceased.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0115

In re the Estate of: Mark Kevin Egan, Deceased.

Filed September 20, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-PR-18-1084

John G. Westrick, Savage-Westrick, PLLP, Bloomington, Minnesota (for appellant Molly
Moriarty Egan)

Patrick J. Downs, Patrick J. Downs Law, Woodbury, Minnesota (for respondent Leah T.
Egan)

Considered and decided by Slieter, Presid ing Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
In this dispute regarding a change of beneficiary in decedent’s life insurance policy,
decedent’s spouse argues that the district court erred by determining decedent intended to
change his beneficiary designation to his eight children and her rather than, as she claims,
solely to herself. Because we discern no error in the district court’s analysis of decedent’s
intent, we affirm.

2
FACTS
Decedent Mark Kevin Egan was issued a 30-year term life insurance policy through
AAA Life Insurance Company in 2013, with a benefit amount of $200,000. The policy
listed decedent’s son, Matthew, as the policy’s sole beneficiary. In the days shortly before
and after decedent’s death in 2018, decedent’s spouse, a ppellant Molly Egan, submitted
two change-of-beneficiary -designation forms to AAA 1 changing the listed beneficiary.
The appellant and respondent Leah T. Egan (one of decedent’s children who was also the
personal representative), agree that decedent intended to remove Matthew as the sole
beneficiary, but disagree as to whether either of the two change-of-beneficiary-designation
forms submitted to AAA reflected decedent’s intent.
The first change-of-beneficiary form, which was completed by appellant on
November 28, 2018, signed by the decedent and submitted to AAA on November 29, 2018,
indicated that each of decedent’s eight child ren was to receive 10% of the benefit, an
additional 10% would go to the Church of St. Agnes, and the remaining 10% would go to
the personal representative of the estate to pay “funeral expenses.”
The second change-of-beneficiary form al so filled out by appellant on November
29, 2018 but submitted to AAA approximately one we ek after decedent’s December 3,
2018 death, designated appellant as the sole beneficiary.

1 The record indicates that appellant had also faxed additional change-of-beneficiary forms
to the insurer containing minor revisions to the beneficiaries’ social security numbers and
addresses, but were otherwise essentially identical to the first change-of-beneficiary form.
These revised forms did not change the bene ficiary designations or benefit amounts and
therefore are not considered here.

3
Following decedent’s death, the district court granted AAA’s petition to deposit the
policy proceeds with the court for a determination of distribution. Appellant petitioned for
an order deeming her the policy’s sole beneficiary.
During the trial, the district court heard testimony from appellant, respondent, and
three of decedent’s other children (whose testimony supported th e respondent). The
witnesses testified as to whether either of the two change-of-benefic iary forms reflected
decedent’s intent.2
The district court issued a written order finding that decedent intended that his eight
children receive $15,000 each and that a ppellant receive $80,00 0 and ordering this
distribution following the payment of funeral expenses. This appeal follows.
DECISION
“It is established by the great weight of authority that the question of whether a
change of beneficiary of an insurance policy may be effectuated with out delivery of the
policy to the insurer for endorsement is determined by (1) whether the insured intended to
change the beneficiary and (2) whether he took affirmative action or otherwise did
substantially all that he could do to demonstrate that inten tion without regard to whether
he complied with the change-of-beneficiary provisions in the policy.” Brown v. Agin, 109
N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn. 1961). A court’s inte rpretation of a change of beneficiary is

2 The parties initially disagreed as to whether decedent’s signatures on the two change-of-
beneficiary-designation forms were authentic, and the district court heard testimony from
two hand-writing experts. However, both ex perts agreed that the signatures were
decedent’s, and this is no longer an issue.
4
governed by “equitable principles” and “[t]he rule generally applied is that equity regards
that as done which ought to have been done.” Id. at 150.
In applying Brown, “a close examination of the facts before [the court] becomes
necessary.” Lemke v. Schwarz, 286 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Minn. 1979). “[W]here an insured
has clearly and unambiguously demonstrated an intent to change the beneficiary on a life
insurance policy, this intent should be give n effect unless prejudice to the insurer would
result. If there exists any confusion as to the insured’s intent or conflicting expressions of
intent, then the named beneficiary sh ould be entitled to the proceeds.” Id. at 696. This
court reviews the district court’s decision whether to grant such equitable relief for an abuse
of discretion, Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Belland , 583 N.W.2d 592, 593 (Minn. App. 1998),
and reviews the district court’s underlying findings of fact for clear error, Minn. R. Civ. P.
52.01.
In applying the clear error standard, the supreme court recently stated, “we view the
evidence in a light favorable to the findings. We will not conclude that a factfinder clearly
erred unless, on the entire evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” In re Commitment of Kenney , ___ N.W.2d ___, ___,
No. A20-1007, 2021 WL 3641450, at *5 (Minn. Aug. 18, 20 21) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Additionally,
[the] clear-error review does no t permit an appellate court to
weigh the evidence as if trying the matter de novo. Neither
does it permit [an appellate court] to engage in fact-finding
anew, even if the court would find the facts to be different if it
determined them in the first in stance. . . . Rather, because the
factfinder has the primary resp onsibility of determining the
fact issues and the advantage of observing the witnesses in
5
view of all the circumstan ces surrounding the entire
proceeding, an appellate court’s duty is fully performed after it
has fairly considered all the ev idence and has determined that
the evidence reasonably supports the decision.

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Regarding the first prong of the Brown test, the district c ourt found that decedent
“intend[ed] to change his original Benefici ary Designation so that Matthew would not
receive 100% of the Policy proceeds. No interested party, not even Matthew, suggests that
he should be entitled to the entirety of the Policy proceeds.” We discern no clear error with
the district court’s finding as to the first prong: it is supported by the record and not
contested by either party.
Regarding the second prong of the Brown test, the district court found that, contrary
to the signed change-of-beneficiary forms that were submitted to AAA, the “[d]ecedent’s
intent was to make [appellant] a Primary Beneficiary to receive $80,000 and to make each
of his eight children Primary Beneficiaries to receive $15,000 apiece from the AAA Policy
proceeds.” The district court explained that fr om “[appellant]’s testimony, it is clear . . .
that the [second form] making [appellant] the sole beneficiary, was not an expression of
Decedent’s intent, but rather was an expression of [appellant’s] intent.” The district court
found that the first change-of-beneficiary fo rm also did not reflect decedent’s intent
because it did not name appellant as a beneficiary. We discern no error in these findings,
which are detailed and supported by the record.
First, as noted above, appella nt testified that in the mo nths preceding decedent’s
death, decedent had expressed to her his inte nt to divide the policy proceeds amongst his
6
spouse and his children. Appellant testified that “[decedent] talked with [her ] about the
division of the life insurance policy . . . and [s aid] he wanted $15,000 to go to each child
and $80,000 to go to [her].” The district c ourt found that “[a]pparently, [appellant] was
the only person to whom [decedent] made this intention known” and that, “[o]ther than
[appellant] there is no interested party who has expressed an objection to this distribution.”
The district court relied on appellant’s tes timony on this point, which it found to be
credible, in determining appellant’s intent.
The district court then assessed both change-of-beneficiary forms—which appellant
alone completed—and found that appellant di d not comply with decedent’s expressed
intent in completing either form.
As to the first change-of-b eneficiary form, the distri ct court determined that
although appellant correctly listed the eight children as beneficiaries, appellant also
“inexplicabl[y]” did not include herself as a be neficiary. Appellant testified that she did
not do so to, in her words, “see what [decedent’s] reaction would be” and to give her “an
indication of whether [decedent] wanted to leave [her] destitute.” The district court found
appellant’s behavior “inexplic able, pointless, and cruel,” a nd, more import antly, to be
“defying Decedent’s expressed intention.”
As to the second change-o f-beneficiary form, the distri ct court determined that it
also did not reflect decedent’s intent. Appella nt testified that dece dent had essentially
changed his mind about his intent on November 29, 2018, after learning that he purportedly
did not have money in his bank account (or ha d less money that he had believed) and so
decided to name appellant the sole beneficiary. But the district court recognized that this
7
testimony was not corroborated by “any other witness” and found appellant’s testimony
“moderately credible.” The district court found that, in the context of the record, “it does
not follow that Decedent would believe that the solution [to not having money in his bank
account] would be to eliminate all of the children as beneficiaries.”
We give great deference to credibility findings of the district court. Sefkow v.
Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988); Gada v. Dedefo, 684 N.W.2d 512, 514 (Minn.
App. 2004) (stating that appellate courts “neither reconcile conflicting evidence nor decide
issues of witness credibility, wh ich are exclusively the provin ce of the factfinder”). In
deeming appellant’s testimony only “moderately credible,” the district court pointed to
various other parts of the record that “call[ed ] into question the vera city of [appellant’s]
testimony and her testimony rega rding Decedent’s final intent.” These factors included
appellant’s testimony that she was concerned about becoming “destitute” after decedent’s
death, that she had “forced” decedent to sign the first form, that she did not accurately date
the second form, and that she waited until seven days after decedent’s death to submit the
second form to AAA. In contrast to appella nt’s testimony, it found the testimony of the
other witnesses “credible.” This included testimony from decedent’s son Matthew that he
“just assum[ed] that [distributing the procee ds among the children] was always kind of
[decedent’s] intent,” and testimony from resp ondent that she “only spoke to [appellant]
about [the distribution of proceeds among th e children]” and “never spoke to [decedent]
about it.” We do not disturb these credibility findings on appeal.
The record supports the district court’s finding that, pursuant to the equitable nature
of interpreting change-of-benefic iary forms, decedent intended to designate each of his
8
children as well as his spouse as beneficiaries. Because the district court’s findings are
supported by record and there was no error in its legal conclusion, there was no abuse of
discretion.3
Affirmed.

3 Appellant also argues that the district court abused its discretion by “essentially [making]
a claim of undue influence de spite the issue not being rais ed by Respondent and despite
the facts not supporting such a holding.” Appe llant asserts that “[t]hough the court never
used the words ‘undue influence,’ its rulin g is consistent with an undue influence
argument—an argument that was never raised by Respondent.” We disagree. The district
court stated that it did not believe “undue influence and the decedent’s intent are the same
thing. I construed this as a decedent’s intent issue and that’s ultimately the decision that I
made.”
Because undue influence was not raised by the parties and is not required by Brown,
the district court rightfully did not address whether decedent was subject to undue influence
and neither do we.