State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0127

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Noah Steven Sovde,
Appellant.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Beltrami County District Court
File No. 04-CR-20-251

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

David Hanson, Beltrami County Attorney, Ashley A. Nelson, Assistant County Attorney,
Bemidji, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and
Cleary, Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of A ppeals, serving by appoi ntment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this direct appeal, appellant challenges his convictions of vi olation of an order
for protection and threats of violence. Appell ant seeks reversal of his convictions and a
new trial, arguing that the district court ab used its discretion by admitting relationship
evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (2020). Be cause the district court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the evidence, we affirm.
FACTS
By an amended complaint, respondent Stat e of Minnesota charged appellant Noah
Steven Sovde with one count of felony violation of an order for protection under Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(d)(1) (2018), and two counts of threats of violence under Minn.
Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2018). The amended complaint alleged that on January 23, 2020,
an officer received a report of a violation of an order for protection. At the time, there was
an active order for protection prohibiting Sovde from contacting B.A., a woman with whom
he has a child. The complaint alleged that Sovd e told a third party, C.S., to relay a threat
of violence to B.A. The co mplaint further alleged that C. S. relayed Sovde’s message to
B.A. and that the message caused B.A. to become fearful. The amended complaint charged
Sovde with two counts of threats of violence on the basis that both C.S. and B.A. were
victims of Sovde’s threatening statement.
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In anticipation of trial, th e state filed a notice indicati ng that it intended to offer
evidence of prior domestic conduct by Sovde against B.A., or “relationship evidence,”
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20. In the noti ce, the state specified that the relationship
evidence would show that Sovde had previously committed felony domestic assault against
B.A. “by breaking into her home, grabbing her by the neck while covering her mouth and
nose, and preventing her from breathing.” The state further intended to offer evidence that
Sovde “was convicted for [that] offense.” In response, Sovde filed a motion in limine
arguing that the evidence was inadmissible because “notice and disclosure was not timely
provided, the evidence is not being offered for a permissible purpo se, the evidence is
substantially more prejudicial than probativ e, and permitting the evidence would violate
Mr. Sovde’s right to a speedy trial.” At a contested omnibus hearing in September 2020,
Sovde’s counsel again argued that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial and had “little to
no” probative value. After taking the matter un der advisement, the district court issued a
written order in which it ruled that the stat e’s proffered evidence was admissible as
relationship evidence.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. Both C.S. and B.A. testified for the state. C.S.
testified that Sovde is her half-brother a nd that, on January 23, 2020, she was at a gas
station and saw Sovde’s truck. She had not seen Sovde “in a while” so she pulled her car
next to Sovde’s truck, rolled down her wind ow, and the two began to talk. During the
conversation, Sovde noticed that C.S. had a car seat in her ve hicle. Sovde asked C.S. if
she had a child. C.S. responde d “no” and told So vde that the car seat was for Sovde’s
daughter. C.S. testified that Sovde “appeared to get very angry” and asked if C.S. had been
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in contact with B.A. and his daughter. C.S. re sponded that she had been. C.S. also told
Sovde that she makes an effort to see B.A. “regularly.” Accordin g to C.S., Sovde then
instructed C.S. “to tell [B.A.] that he is going to find her, kill her and her whole family and
take his child back.” C.S. testified that Sovde used a “serious” tone when he communicated
this threat. According to C.S ., she texted B.A. right away to tell her what had happened
because she had concerns for B.A.’s safety. B.A. then called C.S. crying and asked her to
meet at the police station. C.S. testified that she proceeded to the police station where she
met B.A., who was shaking and “seemed terrified.” While at the police station, C.S. made
a police report concerning her interactions with Sovde at the gas station.
B.A. testified at trial that she previous ly dated Sovde for approximately two years
and that Sovde is the father of her child. Ac cording to B.A., in January 2020, she had an
active order for protection against Sovde that prohibited him from having any contact with
her. B.A. testified that C.S. texted her in late January 2020 with a message from Sovde.
The message was that Sovde was “gonna kill [B.A.] and [her] whole family and kidnap his
kid back.” B.A. stated that, after receiving the message, she felt “terrified and did not feel
safe at all.” She further testified that she could “see him, actually, trying to do something
like that.”
The state then questioned B.A. about a prior incident involving Sovde. B.A.
testified as follows. In Marc h 2019, Sovde sent a text messa ge to her, telling her that he
was going to come over to her house. B.A. responded to his text message, “no, you’re
not,” and Sovde answered, “yes, I am.” Late r that day, Sovde arrived at B.A.’s house,
knocked on the locked door, and then let hims elf into the house. S ovde then came into
5
B.A.’s bedroom. B.A. told him to leave, but Sovde sa id, “[W]ell, I’m here[,] I might as
well just stay.” Sovde then “t ried to grab” their daughter a nd “tried to hol d her.” B.A.
repeatedly “pushed his hand away” and told him not to grab the child. Sovde then “ended
up pulling [B.A.’s] hair” and “putting his hands around [B.A.’s] neck.” Sovde also threw
a lamp across the room, shattering the lightbulb. Sovde “put his hand over [B.A.’s] mouth
and [her] nose” and “pushed [her] where [she] was laying on [her] bed.” B.A. “almost
couldn’t breathe and felt like [she] was going to pass out.” After B.A. began crying, Sovde
left the house. B.A. testified that the Ma rch 2019 incident made her take Sovde’s
January 2020 message more se riously because she felt like “he would have done it
again . . . put his hands on me or anybody; like my family.”
Following B.A.’s testimo ny about the March 2019 incident, the district court
provided a cautionary instruction concerning the admission of the re lationship evidence.
The cautionary instruction directed the jury that the evidence of Sovde’s March 2019
conduct was introduced for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent of
his relationship with B.A. The district court emphasized that the ju ry was not to convict
Sovde on the basis of his Marc h 2019 conduct. The state th en offered a certified copy of
Sovde’s convictions arising from the March 201 9 incident as an exhibit. There was no
objection, and the exhibit was received. The exhibit showed that Sovde had been convicted
of second-degree burglary and felony domestic assault. Th e district court permitted the
jury to view the exhibit during its deliberations.
Sovde testified in his own defense. He denied making any threats against B.A., her
family, or his daughter. And he denied telling C.S. to relay any message from him to B.A.
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The jury also heard testimony from a friend of Sovde’s who was in Sovde’s truck at the
time Sovde spoke with C.S. on January 23, 2020 . Sovde’s friend testified that he did not
hear Sovde make any threats or ask C.S. to communicate a message to B.A. Finally, the
jury heard testimony from the police officer who took a st atement from Sovde following
the incident. The officer testified that S ovde did not admit to ma king any threatening
statements.
The jury found Sovde guilty of violating an order for protection and of making
threats of violence against B.A.1 This appeal follows.
DECISION
Sovde argues that he is entitled to a new tr ial because the district court abused its
discretion by admitting, as re lationship evidence under Mi nn. Stat. § 634.20, B.A.’s
testimony that Sovde broke in to her home and assaulted he r in March 2019, as well as
Sovde’s subsequent convictions arising out of this conduct.
Evidence falling within the scope of Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is commonly referred to
as relationship evidence. See State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 638 n.4 (Minn. 2006) (noting
that “evidence admitted under section 634.20 is a subtype of general relationship
evidence”). Section 634.20 provides that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct by the accused
against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household members, is
admissible unless the probative value is substantia lly outweighed by the danger of unfair

1 During trial, the district court granted Sovde’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
other count of threats of violence, which alleged C.S. as a victim. The district court granted
the motion on the basis that there was no evidence that Sovde had threatened C.S.
7
prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (emphasis added). “‘Domestic conduct’ includes, but is
not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse.” Id. “[T]he rationale for admitting relationship
evidence under section 634.20 is to illuminate the relationship between the defendant and
the alleged victim and to put the alleged cr ime in the context of that relationship.”
State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16,
2010). “We review the district court’s decision to admit relationship evidence for an abuse
of discretion.” State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d 438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017). To be entitled
to a new trial, “an appellant must demonstrate that the district court erred by admitting the
evidence and that the erroneous ly admitted evidence substan tially influenced the jury’s
decision.” Id.
Sovde challenges the admission of his prior convictions and the testimony
concerning his March 2019 conduct as relati onship evidence on two bases. His first
argument is limited to the admission of eviden ce related to his prio r burglary conviction
for breaking into B.A.’s home in March 2019. He contends th at the district court erred
when it admitted this ev idence as relationship evidence under section 634.20 because the
burglary-related evidence is not evidence of “dom estic conduct” with in the meaning of
section 634.20. Second, Sovde challenges the admission of all of B.A.’s testimony
concerning his March 2019 conduct and his related convictions on the basis that the
evidence was unfairly prejudicial. We address each argument in turn.
8
I. Sovde forfeited his argument that th e evidence related to his burglary
conviction for breaking into B.A.’s home is not evidence of “domestic conduct”
under section 634.20.

Sovde contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of
his prior burglary conviction and B.A.’s testimony that he broke into her home in
March 2019 under section 634.20 because that evidence is not ev idence of “domestic
conduct” within the meaning of the statute. Sovde does not appear to challenge the
admission of his prior domestic-assault convic tion or the portion of B.A.’s testimony
concerning his assaultive conduct in March 2019 on this same basis. Rather, this argument
pertains only to the evidence of his burglary conviction and the specific testimony that he
previously broke into B.A.’s home. The state, in turn, argues that Sovde cannot now
challenge the admission of that evidence on the ground that burglary is not “domestic
conduct” because Sovde failed to object to the evidence on that ground to the district court.
“Appellate review of an evidentiary issu e is forfeited when a defendant fails to
object to the admission of evidence.” State v. Vasquez, 912 N.W.2d 642, 649 (Minn. 2018).
“A defendant’s objection to the admission of evidence preserves review only for the stated
basis for the objection or a basis apparent from the context of the objection.” Id. However,
even if a party forfeits an evid entiary issue, we will ordinarily review that issue for plain
error. Id. at 650.
In his motion in limine and at a hearing concerning that motion, Sovde provided the
following grounds for his objection to the state’s proposed relationship evidence: the state
failed to provide timely notice and disclosure of the evidence; th e evidence was not
offered for a permissible purpose; the eviden ce is substantially mo re prejudicial than
9
probative; and admitting the evidence would violate Sovde’s right to a speedy trial. Sovde
did not argue that the evidence was inad missible because burglary is not “domestic
conduct” under section 634.20, and this basis for challenging the admission of the evidence
is not apparent from the context of Sovde’s objection to the district court.
Because he failed to raise the issue to th e district court, we conclude that Sovde
forfeited this particular ground for cha llenging the admission of his prior burglary
conviction and B.A.’s testimony that he broke into her home. We still, however, review
this forfeited issue for plain error. Id. Plain error exists where there is (1) an error, (2) that
is plain, and (3) that affects th e defendant’s substantial rights. Thoresen v. State ,
965 N.W.2d 295, 308 (Minn. 2021). “An error is plain when it is clear and obvious.” Id.
Our review confirms that the district court did not plainly err by admitting that evidence.
Section 634.20 provides that “‘[d ]omestic conduct’ includes, but is not limited to ,
evidence of domestic abuse.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20 (emphasis added). This definition is
broad enough to include burglary where the bur glary was related to an assault against a
person covered under the statute. Cf. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2(a)(1), (b)(5) (2018)
(providing that “[d]omestic abuse” encompasses assault on a person with whom the
defendant shares a child). The conduct underlying Sovde’s burglary conviction was related
to an assault against a person covered by th e statute, namely B.A., because it involved a
continuous event in which Sovde broke into B.A.’s home and assaulted her. Accordingly,
we discern no plain error in the district co urt’s conclusion that the evidence related to
Sovde’s burglary conviction is “domestic conduct” within the meaning of section 634.20.
We therefore conclude that Sovde is not entitled to relief on this ground.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of Sovde’s
March 2019 conduct and the related convictions.

Sovde next argues that the district cour t abused its discretion by admitting the
entirety of B.A.’s testimony concerning hi s March 2019 conduct and evidence of his
convictions arising from that conduct because the evidence, taken as a whole, was unfairly
prejudicial. In addition to challenging Sovde’s argument on its merits, the state contends
that Sovde forfeited his argument concerning the admissibility of his prior convictions
because he failed to object to the court document listing his convictions when it was offered
as an exhibit at trial. Assuming, without deciding, that Sovde pr eserved this issue for
appeal, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion when it admitted this
evidence under section 634.20.
Evidence of prior domestic conduct is admissible under section 634.20 to shed light
on the relationship of the parties so that juro rs can put the charged crime in context and
better judge the credibility of the pr incipals in the relationship. State v. McCoy ,
682 N.W.2d 153, 161 (Minn. 2004). Such evidence “is admissible unless the probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat. § 634.20.
Sovde contends that the district court ab used its discretion when it admitted this
evidence because the evidence was minimally probative and had great potential for unfair
prejudice. Specifically, he argues that the relationship evidence had low probative value
because the evidence was not ne cessary to put the current o ffenses—threats of violence
and violation of an order for protection—in context. He no tes that both C.S. and B.A.
testified about the current alleged offenses . He also emphasizes that there was no
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interaction between Sovde and B.A. on the date of the alleged offenses and that “[t]he jury
heard enough testimony about Sovde and B.A .’s relationship withou t the evidence of
Sovde’s prior bad acts.” On this basis, he contends that the relationship evidence
introduced by the state had low probative value. Sovde also argues that the risk of unfair
prejudice was high because the evidence “reflected only on hi s bad character and not on
his relationship with B.A.” and therefore “allo wed the jury to infer that because he had
engaged in violence and assau lts on her in the past, he must have also committed the
charged crimes or, at the very least, deserved to be punished.” We are not persuaded.
The evidence of Sovde’s March 2019 cond uct and related convictions was highly
probative because it provided context for the charged offenses and aided the jury in judging
the credibility of th e witnesses. The ev idence illustrated Sovde’s past abusive and
threatening behavior toward B.A. by showing that Sovde had previously entered B.A.’s
home without her permission and assaulted her. This evidence put the charged offenses—
threats of violence and violation of an order for protection—into the context of Sovde and
B.A.’s relationship history. In particular, this evidence of Sovde’s prior actions against
B.A. helped to explain why So vde’s statement to C.S. made B.A. fear for her safety.
Moreover, as Sovde acknowledges in his brief, the trial turned on the jury’s determination
of whether to credit the testimony of B.A. and C.S. or the testimony of Sovde and his friend.
The relationship evidence aided the jury in making that determination.
Further, the probative value was not subs tantially outweighed by the potential for
unfair prejudice. “[U]nfair prejudice is not merely damaging evidence, even severely
damaging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that persuades by illegitimate
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means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d at 641 (quotation
omitted). Here, the district court gave the following cautionary instruction regarding the
relationship evidence:
The State has just introduced evidence of conduct by the
Defendant on March 4, 2019. This evidence is being offered
for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and extent
of the relationship between the Defendant and [B.A.]. In order
to assist you in determining whether the Defendant committed
those acts with which the Defendant is charged in the
complaint [sic]. The Defendant is not being tried for and may
not be convicted of any beha vior other than the charged
offenses. You are not to convict the Defendant on the basis of
conduct on March 4, 2019. To do so might result in unjust,
double punishment.

(Emphasis added.) “A district court’s limiting instruction lessens the probability of undue
weight being given by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Ware , 856 N.W.2d 719, 729
(Minn. App. 2014) (quotation omitted).
Sovde argues that the contents of the district court’s instruction did not mitigate the
risk of unfair prejudice because “[t]he court to ld the jury the evidence was to be used to
determine whether Sovde committed those acts w ith which he was charged.” (Emphasis
added.) But this argument misstates the district court’s instruction. As the quoted passage
above indicates, the district court did not in struct the jury that the relationship evidence
“was to be used to determine whether Sovde committed” the crimes; rather the district
court told the jury that the evidence could “assist” the jury in determining whether Sovde
committed the acts with which So vde was charged. (Emphasi s added.) To “assist” is
different than to “determine.” The term “a ssist” means “[t]o give help or support to,”
whereas the term “determine” means “[t]o de cide or settle . . . conclusively and
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authoritatively.” The American Heritage Dic tionary of the English Language 108, 494
(5th ed. 2018). And, as noted above, the court’ s instruction also advised the jury that the
relationship evidence was “offered for the limited purpose of demonstrating the nature and
extent of the relationship between the [d]efe ndant and [B.A.]” and cautioned the jury not
to convict Sovde based on his prior conduct. This court “presume[s] that jurors follow the
court’s instructions.” Zornes v. State, 880 N.W.2d 363, 373 (Minn. 2016).
Lastly, Sovde contends that the district court’s instruction was insufficient because
it was provided after B.A.’s testimony, rather than before, and was not repeated in the
court’s final instructions to the jury. While Sovde is correct that the district court provided
the cautionary instruction after B.A.’s testimony regarding Sovde’s March 2019 conduct,
the instruction closely followed B.A.’s testimony in that regard. And the instruction was
provided right before the district court admi tted the exhibit showing Sovde’s convictions
of domestic assault and burglary arising out of the March 2019 conduct. Given that the
instruction was close in time to the evidence related to Sovd e’s March 2019 conduct, we
conclude that the district court’s cautionary instruction sufficiently mitigated the risk of
any unfair prejudice.
In sum, the relationship evidence relating to Sovde’s 2019 conduct assisted the jury
in putting the charged offenses into context and in judging the credibility of the witnesses,
and the district court’s instruction to the jury reduced the risk of any unfair prejudice. The
district court therefore acted within its discretion by concluding that the probative value of
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the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice and properly
admitted the relationship evidence.2
Affirmed.

2 Sovde also appears to suggest that the district court erred by not expressly analyzing, in
its order, whether the probative value of th e relationship evidence was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. To the extent that he is challenging the
admission of the relationship evidence on that basis, his argument fails because district
courts are not required to expressly make such findings on the record. Bell, 719 N.W.2d
at 640-41.