State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0144

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Sarah Jean Solien,
Appellant.

Filed November 29, 2021
Reversed
Worke, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-14-1128

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Julianna Passe, A ssistant County Attorney,
Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Michael McLaughlin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Cleary,
Judge.
*

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court lack ed jurisdiction to revo ke its deferral of
adjudication pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 152.18 (2014) because the revocation occurred after
the expiration of the imposed term of probation. We agree and reverse.
FACTS
In May 2015, appellant Sarah Jean Solien pleaded guilty to fifth-degree possession
of a controlled substance in violation of Mi nn. Stat. § 152.025, subd. 2 (2014). At
sentencing in June 2015, the district cour t deferred the adjudication of guilt pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1, and placed Solien on probation for five years.
In November 2019, the state alleged that Solien violated the terms of her probation.
A contested revocation hearing was scheduled for February 10, 2020, but it was continued
due to Solien being ill. Th e revocation hearing was then further postponed due to the
COVID-19 pandemic. On June 10, the five -year probationary period imposed by the
district court expired. A contested revocation hearing was ultimately held on November 2.
The district court found Solien in violation of her probation, adjudicated her guilty of the
offense, stayed imposition of sentence, a nd extended the term of Solien’s probation to
June 10, 2021. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Solien argues that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to revoke her
probation after the probationary term expire d on June 10, 2020. A court lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction when it “does not have the authority to hear and determine a particular
3
class of actions and the particular questio ns that the court assumes to decide.” Vang v.
State, 788 N.W.2d 111, 117 (Minn. 2010). “Subj ect-matter jurisdiction is a question of
law that we review de novo.” Daniel v. City of Minneapolis, 923 N.W.2d 637, 644 (Minn.
2019).
Following Solien’s guilty plea to fifth-de gree drug possession, the district court
deferred proceedings pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 152.18. In cases of qualifying first-time
drug offenders like Solien, a district court may withhold entering a judgment of conviction
upon a finding or admission of guilt, “and place the person on probation upon such
reasonable conditions as it may require and for a period, not to exceed the maximum
sentence provided for the violation.” Minn. St at. § 152.18, subd. 1(c). If the person
successfully completes the period of probation without violating its conditions, “then upon
expiration of the period the court shall disc harge the person and dismiss the proceedings
against that person.” Id. If, however, the person is found to have violated any condition
of probation, “the court may enter an adju dication of guilt and pr oceed as otherwise
provided.” Id.
When a defendant is alleged to have violated a condition of probation, a district
court may either revoke the stay and have th e defendant taken into custody or issue a
summons—at any point up to six months afte r the expiration of the stay. Minn. Stat.
§ 609.14, subd. 1(a), (b) (201 4). And once revocation proceed ings have been initiated,
“[t]he proceedings to revoke the stay sh all not be dismissed on the basis that the
[revocation] hearing is conducted after the term of the stay or after the six-month period.”
Id., subd. 1(c) (2014). In other words, if a defendant’s conduct that violates a condition of
4
probation occurs during the probationary term, the expiration of that term does not preclude
a district court from subsequently revoking probation so long as the revocation proceedings
are initiated before, or within si x months of, such expiration. See State v. Sagataw , 892
N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. App. 2017).
Solien does not dispute th at revocation proceedings were initiated during the term
of the original five-year stay, but she asserts that the district court lost jurisdiction to revoke
the stay when it expired in J une 2020 because section 609. 14 applies only to stays of
imposition or execution of a sentence and does not govern a disposition under section
152.18. As she notes, “[t]he expiration of a sentence operates as a discharge” that deprives
the court of jurisdiction to modify that sentence. See State v. Hannam, 792 N.W.2d 862,
864 (Minn. App. 2011). And prior to th e legislature’s 1994 amendment of section
609.14—which a dded the language specifically pe rmitting revocation proceedings to
continue beyond the expiration of the term of a stay
1—a district court was likewise without
jurisdiction to revoke probation beyond the expiration of that term. State v. Whitfield, 483
N.W.2d 102, 104 (Minn. App. 1992), superseded by statute, Minn. Stat. § 609.14 (1994);
see also In re Welfare of V.D.M. , 623 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Minn. App. 2001) (recognizing
that Whitfield was superseded by amendm ents to section 609.14), rev. denied (Minn.
May 15, 2001). Accordingly, Solien argues that, if section 609.14 is inapplicable to a term
of probation imposed pursuant to section 152.18, the district court’s jurisdiction to revoke

1 1994 Minn. Laws ch. 636, art. 2, § 17, at 2198-99.
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probation extinguished in June 2020, and the district court’ s November 2021 order must
be reversed.
Whether the provisions of section 609.14 apply to probation imposed pursuant to
section 152.18 presents questions of statutory interpretation that this court reviews de novo.
Roberts v. State , 945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Minn. 2020 ). The ultimate goal of statutory
interpretation is to “ascertain and effect uate the intent of the Legislature.” Id. (quotation
omitted). The first step in doing so “is to de termine whether the language, on its face, is
ambiguous”—that is, whether “the disputed language is subject to more than one
reasonable interpretation.” Id. (quotation omitted). “Multiple parts of a statute may be
read together so as to ascertain whether the statute is ambiguous,” and we will construe its
undefined words and phrases “according to their plain and ordinary meaning.”
Christianson v. Henke, 831 N.W.2d 532, 536-37 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted). “If a
statute is unambiguous, we apply the statute’s plain meaning.” State v. Powers , 962
N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn. 2021).
Section 609.14—which is titled only “Revoca tion of stay”—makes no explicit
mention of the specific types of dispositions to which it applies and frequently refers only
to “the stay” in its provisions without furthe r qualification. Indeed, in subdivision 1(c)—
the applicability of which is at issue in this appeal—the legislature uses the term “the stay”
exclusively when providing for revocation proceedings to be “conducted after the
expiration of the stay.” Minn. Stat. § 609.14, subd. 1(c).
6
Section 609.14, subdi vision 2, provides:
Notification of grounds for revocation. The defendant shall
thereupon be notified in writin g and in such manner as the
court directs of the grounds alle ged to exist for revocation of
the stay of imposition or execution of sentence. If such grounds
are brought in issue by the defendant, a summary hearing shall
be held thereon at which the de fendant is entitled to be heard
and to be represented by counsel.

Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added). And in subdivision 3—entitled “Sentence”—the legislature
established only two permissible dispositions in the event of a district court finding grounds
for revocation, making no provision for a situation in which adjudication had been deferred
under section 152.18:
(1) if imposition of sent ence was previously stayed,
again stay sentence or impose sentence and stay the execution
thereof, and in either event place the defendant on probation or
order intermediate sanctions purs uant to secti on 609.135, or
impose sentence and order execution thereof; or

(2) if sentence was previously imposed and execution
thereof stayed, continue such stay and place the defendant on
probation or order intermediate sanctions in accordance with
the provisions of section 609.13 5, or order execution of the
sentence previously imposed.

Id., subd. 3. These portions of the statute, Solien argues, would not make sense if the entire
section was deemed applicable to stays of adjudication, and thus suggests that the
legislature intended the term “stay” to uniformly include only stays of imposition or
execution of a sentence. We agree and conclude that the statute is unambiguous and plainly
stated, as the above-quoted sections appear to contemplate only such situations.
In addition, although section 609.14 does no t define the term “stay” specifically, its
consistent use of the definite article “the” suggests that the iden tity of the stay being
7
discussed in the remaining parts of the statute is somehow known to the reader at the time
of its usage or has otherwise been specified. As noted, statutory provisions are not intended
to be interpreted in isolation, and we examine their words and phrases “in the light of their
context.” State v. Gaiovnik , 794 N.W.2d 643, 6 47 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted).
When, as here, such context is not provided by the statute itself, we may “consider other
statutes relating to the same subject matter as far as they shed light on the question.”
Carlson v. Dep’t of Emp. & Econ. Dev. , 747 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. App. 2008)
(quotation omitted). Here, Minn. Stat. § 609.135 (2014) appears to provide this alluded-to
context for section 609.14.
Section 609.135 is titled “S tay of imposition or execution of sentence” and begins:
“Except when a sentence of life imprisonment is required by law, or when a mandatory
minimum sentence is required by section 60 9.11, any court may stay imposition or
execution of sentence . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1(a). When explaining the
conditions, durations, and limitations of such stay s, the statute repeatedly uses the phrase
“the stay.” See id., subds. 2, 5, 6. And at no point in the statute does the legislature mention
stays of adjudication or any disposition other than stays of imposition or execution of a
sentence. Given, then, that section 609.14 follows shortly after, concerns the same subject
matter, references section 609.135, and does not itself provide any explicit context for its
use of “the stay,” it is evident that this phrase refers to—and is limited to—only those
established by section 609.135: stays of imposition of sentence and stays of execution of
sentence.
8
This interpretation is buttressed further by the fact that section 152.18 does not
actually use the term “stay” to refer to any as pect of the disposition; it mentions only the
deferral of prosecution and the deferral of proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 152.18, subd. 1. In
addition, as previously noted, section 152.18 independently provides for a district court’s
actions in the event of a defendant’s viol ation of any imposed condition and makes no
reference to section 609.14.
We therefore conclude that the language of section 609.14, subdivision 1(c), is not
ambiguous, and that its provision permitting the revocation of probation after the expiration
of its term does not apply to a disposition deferring judgment pursuant to section 152.18.
As such, the district court’s jurisdiction to amend its disposition was extinguished in June
2020, when Solien’s five-year probationary period expired. See Hannam, 792 N.W.2d at
864; Whitfield, 483 N.W.2d at 104.
Reversed.