In re the Guardianship and/or Conservatorship of: Juliann E. Jaeger, Ward/Protected Person.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0153

In re the Guardianship and/or Conservatorship of:
Juliann E. Jaeger, Ward/Protected Person.

Filed September 7, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Wadena County District Court
File No. 80-PR-20-187

William J. Toulouse, Quarnstrom & Doering, P.A., Marshall, Minnesota (for appellant
Juliann E. Jaeger)

Lillian N. Sackett, Paul A. Jeddeloh, Jeddeloh & Snyder, P.A., St. Cloud, Minnesota (for
respondents Presbyterian Family Foundation and Wadena County Human Services)

Considered and decided by Johnson, Presiding Judge; Bryan, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in appointing a
conservator, or alternatively, failed to follow the statutory priority list in appointing a
conservator. We affirm.
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FACTS
Petition for Guardianship and Conservatorship
In March 2020, respondent Wadena County Human Services (the county) petitioned
for the appointment of a guardian and conservator over appellant Juliann E. Jaeger and
proposed the appointment of respondent Presbyterian Family Foundation, Inc. (PFF) to act
as both guardian and conservator.
The county’s petition provides:
[Jaeger] has psychiatric diagnoses of Generalized
Anxiety Disorder (“GAD”), Personality Disorder and has
multiple medical diagnoses including hypothyroidism, COPD,
Diabetes, Diabetic Polyneuropathy and Hyperlipidemia wh ich
make her vulnerable and at risk for receiving the appropriate
care. [Jaeger] is having significant impairment in regard to
navigating her financial situation in regard to housing and
appropriate care settings. The level of executive functioning
required for such matters is more than she can handle despite
superficial appearances that she can handle such matters. Her
bills are going unpaid, she is not connected with her family and
she has relied on banking personnel to help her in the past. She
has no plan on how to deal with her complex financial situation
and the handling of her bill paying and obtaining proper care.
[Jaeger’s] physicians have stated the need for a guardian to
assist her in appropriate decision -making.

. . . .

[Jaeger] has a sign ificant impairment in her ability to
navigate her financial situation in regard to housing and
appropriate care setting. . . . The level of executive functioning
this is requiring is challenging for her and [Jaeger] is not taking
care of her finances and b ill paying even though it is believed
she has the resources to pay. Currently she owes the facility
where she is staying in excess of $50,000 and part of that
amount has been sent to a collection agency. [Jaeger] is very
secretive about her finances and will not address any questions
and refuses to address the issue of her bill with the facility. It
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is believed she created a trust in the past where she has titled
real estate and other assets and authority is need[ed] in a
conservator to find her assets a nd manage them appropriately,
including the possibility of becoming trustee of the trust, if
found.

The county also included in its filings a statement from Jaeger’s physician in support
of the appointment of a guardian or conservator and describing Jaeger’s need for assistance
as “imperative.” The physician explained that Jaeger’s “psychiatric diagnosis and medical
issues” placed her “in a vulnerable state ” and had caused a “significant impairment in
regard to navigating her financial situation .” The c ounty also included a letter from
Jaeger’s psychiatrist explaining that because of Jaeger’s “vulnerability ,” it was
“imperative” to Jaeger’s “best interest and well -being to have someone who could assist
her directly in navigating the decisions that need t o be made.”
The county also filed a 2012 power of attorney designating Gretchen Noon, Jaeger’s
youngest daughter, as Jaeger’s attorney -in-fact, a 2012 health-care directive designating
Noon as Jaeger’s health-care agent, and a 2017 trust for the benefit of Jaeger listing Jaeger
and Noon as co-trustees.
A March 22, 2020 letter authored by Noon was also filed in support of the petition.
Noon explained that Jaeger’s mental state had been deteriorating following a 2017
diagnosis of pre -dementia and that Jaeger experienced multiple evictions following that
diagnosis. Jaeger eventually moved into Fair Oaks Lodge, paying between $8,000 and
$10,000 a month “out of pocket,” which Noon stated Jaeger could “no longer afford.”
Noon explained that for over 20 years, she had attempted to assist Jaeger with her “finances
and affairs” and described that task as “difficult at times since [Jaeger] is ve ry
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uncooperative, controlling, and secretive .” Noon wrote that Jaeger was in “severe debt,”
but “refuse[d] to allow proper handling of her finance s.” Noon also wrote that Jaeger had
“been taken advantage of by many ‘scams’” despite police intervention. Noon wrote that
she wished to be appointed conservator but that she wanted someone else appointed
guardian “due to [Jaeger’s] on -going verbal abuse.”
Assessment by Visitor
The district court appointed a visitor , who recommended that a guardian and
conservator be appointed, in part to “search for [Jaeger’s] assets and help her manage
them.” The visitor reported that Jaeger believed she was “capable of doing everything
herself,” but that in light of Jaeger’s “most recent psychiatric diagnosis,” her “significant
medical issues that require daily oversight and assistance,” and “her verbal ramblings
during [their] conversation, it appear[ed] [Jaeger] suffered from enough mental impairment
to affect her ability to hand le her finances or safely care for herself.”
The visitor also reported that Jaeger did not seem to understand the consequences
of her actions on her well-being and several incidents of Jaeger being confused.
Vulnerable-Adult Maltreatment Report
On June 26, 2020, Fair Oaks Lodge completed a vulnerable -adult maltreatment
report due to Jaeger’s outstanding balance exceeding $100,000 with the facility for room
and board, medications, oxygen, and other necessary expenses. The facility explained that
it had taken over payments for Jaeger’s oxygen and medications “to ensure her safety”
because Jaeger claimed to lack funds . The facility stated that it would not continue to pay
these expenses because Jaeger had “the financial abilit[y] to pay for [her medical expenses]
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privately.” The facility noted that Jaeger was a “private pay” resident due to the “assets
and income she continue[d] to hold/receive ,” including monthly pension payments and
Social Security income. The facility expr essed concern that without “a guardian in place
to ensure her safety,” Jaeger might refuse to pay for or participate in necessary medical
interventions.
Fair Oaks Lodge described Jaeger’s “health, well-being, and place of shelter” as “at
risk” and explai ned that Jaeger would be unable to secure alternative housing until her
outstanding balance with the facility was paid . The facility stated a belief that the sale of
Jaeger’s lake home could at least partially cover the outstanding balance with the facility.
Fair Oaks Lodge also explained that it had “attempted to work” with Noon, as Jaeger’s
attorney-in-fact, but that Noon had been unsuccessful in managing Jaeger’s affairs “due to
[Jaeger] not wanting anyone involved.” The facility recommended that “a n on-family
member [be] appointed as guardian.”
Hearing on the Petition
In September 2020, the district court held a hearing on the county’s petition.
As to the outstanding balance with Fair Oaks Lodge, t he district court received
conflicting witness te stimony. Jaeger conceded that she had accrued an approximately
$111,000 outstanding balance with the facility for necessities and that she had refused to
pay this bill for some time due to a dispute with her long -term-care insurance. 1 Jaeger
further admitted that she was sued for the outstanding balance, but claimed that she had

1 Jaeger testified that she no longer qualified for her long -term-care insurance due to her
age and denied losing coverage for failure to pay the premiums.
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since settled the matter and paid the balance in full. Jaeger testified inconsistently about
the amounts and dates of her alleged payments to the facility. Noon testified that , at the
request of Jaeger, she had mailed an initial payment to Fair Oaks Lodge and that she
believed Jaeger still owed the facility approximately $58,000. Melissa Hoffman, nursing
home administrator at Fair Oaks Lodge , testified that Jaeger had made a single payment of
$22,063 prior to the hearing and that she believed Jaeger then-currently owed t he facility
$89,423. Hoffman further testified that she understood that Jaeger had an additional check
written out to the facility for $33,000 but that Jaeger “never actually gave it to the facility.”
As to her necessary medical treatment, Jaeger admitted to having several medical
diagnoses and to refusing to pay for her medications once she “found out that [she] was
not getting paid by long-term care” insurance. Hoffman explained that Jaeger would often
refuse to take her medications after reviewing a medical bill and that the facility had to
“take on the bill so that [Jaeger] could continue getting her medications at the facility .”
Hoffman also testified that she “had to intervene on a couple [of] different occasions” to
prevent the oxygen company from collecting Jaeger’s necessary medical equipment and
supplies for nonpayment. This medical equipment included a continuous positive airway
pressure machine necessary to keep Jaeger alive when she would otherwise stop breathing
in her sleep and oxygen which Jaeger needed for “ambulating long distances, for helping
[to] keep her anxiety more level, [and] for breathing at night.” Jaeger testified that she had
believed she was paying for her oxygen and asserted that Fair Oaks Lodge staff had been
“very vague about many, many things” and never told her that she was not paying for her
oxygen.
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The district court also received evidence regarding Jaeger’s extensive real property
interests. Jaeger testified that she owns a 200 -acre farm in Sibley County with a vacant
house in “livable” condition in which Jaeger stores personal property and pays for
electricity and security. Jaeger also testified that she rents the land out to family at $50 per
acre, although market rent in that area is $300 per acre. Noon stated that she could not
attest to the current condition of th e property because she had not been there for “at least
ten to fifteen years.”
Jaeger testified that she also owns 80 acres of virgin timber out -of-state for which
she pays real estate taxes and does not rent out. Noon testified that she had never visited
the property.
Jaeger stated that she owns another unoccupied home, where she keeps her personal
belongings, in addition to two lots and an unoccupied trailer home in need of repair in
Cottonwood . Jaeger testified that she continue s to pay for electricity and insurance on
these properties. Noon testified that she had not visited the Cottonwood properties for at
least 10-15 years.
Jaeger also testified that she owns two lake cabins on Lake Miltona that she does
not rent out and which are available to her family for their use and enjoyment. Jaeger stated
that she pays for electricity, insurance, and heat for the cabins.
Additionally, Jaeger testified that she owns a property she referred to as “the Pizza
Ranch,” although the property had not been franchised as such for many years. Jaeger
stated that the property had been vacant for approximately seven years and was used to
store personal items and restaurant equipment.
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Noon testified that Jaeger had an issue with hoarding and that, although Noon had
“not been inside any of [Jaeger’s] properties for years,” she believed some were full of
personal property. Despite storing personal property in numerous homes, Noon testified
that Jaeger also rents storage facilities, although Noon did not know where the facilities
were located or the contents of any unit.
Noon testified that she had realtor friends who were willing to prepare some of the
properties for rent, but she conceded that she had not investigated what steps would need
to be taken to obtain the best sale price for any of Jaeger’s properties. Noon further
conceded that she had not conducted any investigation into the salability of the properties,
their condition, or the relevant markets.
Jaeger also testified to owning several inoperable vehicles stored at various
locations. Noon testified that she believed that Jaeger stored one or two vehicles at the
farm, but Noon conceded that she was unsure of the total number of vehicles because she
had not been on the property for “s everal years.” Although Jaeger claimed to have a valid
driver’s license, Noon testified that was untrue and that Jaeger had “received a letter from
the State stating that she was unable to drive.” Hoffman testified about an incident where
Jaeger attempted to have one of her vehicles jumpstarted after having been parked in the
only handicap parking spot at the facility for over a year. Police informed Hoffman that
Jaeger did not have a valid driver’s license, vehicle insurance, or current tabs. When Jaeger
was asked what she intended to do with her vehicles, she stated that “a man out in the
country that [Jaeger] used to know” wanted the vehicles. Noon testified that she had not
discussed a plan for the vehicles with Jaeger.
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Although Jaeger testified that staff at Fair Oaks Lodge assisted her with paying bills
on a single occasion, Hoffman explained that staff frequently assisted Jaeger with paying
bills, although it is not a service generally provided by the facility. Hoffman explained that
Jaeger “would often have a list of the bills that she would want [ facility staff] to pay,”
which included landscaping and electricity bills for various properties, time-share
membership fees, a “washer and dryer and various expenses” for a man that lived in Texas,
and “an instance of paying [Noon] some money .” Hoffman explained that despite staff
encouragement, Jaeger “never wanted to pay the facility room and board fees, and she also
did not want to pay the oxygen . . . [and] medication fee s so she would bypass t hose bills
and decide to have [staff] write [out checks for] all these other bills.”
Jaeger stated that she had given money to a former Pizza Ranch employee because
she saw it as her “Christian duty for a person who’s needing mone y.” Hoffman testified
that staff had reported those payments as possible elder abuse. Noon testified that the
former employee scammed Jaeger into sending him money for quite a while.
Jaeger testified that she had already designated Noon to make financial decisions on
her behalf if necessary and that if a conservator was to be appointed, she wanted Noon to
fill that role. Jaeger stated that she could handle her own finances, but “if that person is
willing to check with me about my initial doings, we have to get to the bottom of the things
and not just let it fly so to speak, yes, then I need somebody.”
Noon conceded that she had not been managing the trust assets or financial affairs
as of the date of the hearing and claimed that, although she was co-trustee of Jaeger’s trust,
she lacked an ability to act in that capacity due to Jaeger’s “ability to maintain things
10
herself.” Noon testified that she is also Jaeger’s attorney -in-fact, but stated that she had
only used that authority to pay one bill in r ecent years and that historically her authority
had been “[v]ery limited to maybe write out a couple of bills” because she needed Jaeger’s
permission to act.
Noon testified that she wanted to act as Jaeger’s conservator so she could “legally”
handle Jaeger’s finances without having to get Jaeger’s permission , but did not want to be
appointed guardian because Jaeger sometimes “manipulates” and does not listen to Noon.
Noon explained that in the past Jaeger had threatened to call the police on Noon and on
one occasion actually did call the police. When pressed to explain why Noon did not have
the same concerns about serving as conservator as she did about serving as guardian where
both would give her legal authority to act on Jaeger’s behalf, Noon responde d that she did
not want to act as guardian because of Jaeger’s past behavior , including difficulties in
obtaining Jaeger’s cooperation when Noon would attempt to obtain Jaeger proper housing.
Noon explained that she believed a non-relative would be “ able to get those things done
better.”
Noon also testified that her personal medical condition interfered with her
management of Jaeger’s affairs. Noon testified that before her personal medical diagnosis,
she had assisted Jaeger with her financial affairs “much more frequently,” but that after her
diagnosis, she “backed away” from managing her mother’s affairs and went so far as to
block Jaeger’s telephone number. Noon conceded that she had no contact with Ja eger for
over two years and only resumed contact recently. Noon also testified that Jaeger is in
significant debt, but admitted to lacking any specific information.
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Social worker Cheryl Genoch expressed her opinion that “a guardian and
conservator outside the family would be a better fit at this time” to allow them “time to get
[Jaeger’s] affairs in order” and because “family is personal.” Genoch explained that the
complexity required to arrange Jaeger’s affairs might be too much for a family member t o
handle and recommended the appointment of PFF as guardian and conservator.
Shirley Olson testified on behalf of PFF that it would not accept a split appointment
due to the complexity of the case and past issues with split appointments.
The district court issued an order appointing PFF as guardian and conservator .
Jaeger appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a conservator.

The appointment of a conservator is governed by Minn. Stat. § 524.5-401 (2020),
which provides , in pertinent part , that a district court may appoint a conservator if it
determines “by clear and convincing evidence, the individual is unable to manage property
and business affairs because of an impairment in the ability to rece ive and evaluate
information or make decisions, even with the use of appropriate technological assistance”
and
by a preponderance of evidence, the individual has property
that will be wasted or dissipated unless management is
provided or money is needed f or the support, care, education,
health, and welfare of the individual or of individuals who are
entitled to the individual ’s support and that protection is
necessary or desirable to obtain or provide money.

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In appointing a conservator, a district court must also find that the individual’s “identified
needs cannot be met by less restrictive means” and “must make specific findings particular
to the respondent why less restrictive alternatives do not work. ” Minn. Stat. § 524.5 -409,
subd. 1(3) (2020).
“The appointment of a conservator is a matter within the district court’s discretion
and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” In re Guardianship of
Pates, 823 N.W.2d 881, 885 (Minn. App. 2012) (quotation omitted). We will only se t
aside a district court’s factual findings if they are clearly erroneous and we are left “with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. ” Id. (quotation omitted).
Jaeger argues that the district court abused its discretion in appointing a conservator
because it “ignored” the less -restrictive alternative s available, specifically the delegation
of Noon as attorney-in-fact and co-trustee. Jaeger asserts that Noon, as attorney-in-fact,
can exercise “[a]ny and all powers authorized under the conservatorship statute .”
We have carefully reviewed the findings by the district court. T he district court
specifically recognized the less-restrictive options proposed by Jaeger and issued detailed
findings explaining why those less-restrictive options were insufficient alternatives to the
appointment of a conservator. The district court found, by clear and convincing evidence,
that Jaeger was unable to manage her property and business affairs because of an
impairment in her ability to receive and evaluate information or make decisions. By way
of example and not limitation, the district court found that Jaeger consistently faile d to pay
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her Fair Oaks Lodge nursing home bill2; Jaeger lost property in Colorado to avoid facing a
condemnation proceeding; and Jaeger took no action to manage any of her properties with
the exception of renting out farmland at a below-market rate. The district court specifically
found that the power of attorney, health -care directive, and trust agreement in place “had
not prevented any of the issues.”
The district court then found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Jaeger has
property that will be wasted or dissipated in the absence of appro priate management. The
district court cited Jaeger’s own testimony that a “large slate” of her properties generated
expenses but no income or income at a below -market rate. The district court also found
that the absence of active management of any of Jae ger’s properties has resulted in “a
significant state of disrepair” and “risk of significant deterioration.” The district court
found that some of Jaeger’s properties had not been managed in more than a decade and
that Jaeger’s numerous vehicles ha d not been driven or maintained for many years.
The district court also found that the less -restrictive means identified by Jaeger —
the status quo—had proven insufficient to assist Jaeger. The district court found that Noon
had taken no action to manage the tru st property and had only used her attorney -in-fact
authority to pay a single bill recently . The district court further reasoned that “[Noon]
would be expected to perform similar duties” under the delegations of the trust, health-care

2 The district court found Jaeger’s testimony regarding payment of the Fair Oaks Lodge
bill to be inconsistent and therefore not credible, with one exception. A district court “is
in the best position to evaluate witness credibility,” and we will not disturb those findings
so long as they are supported by “ reasonable evidence.” Bobo v. State, 860 N.W .2d 681,
684-85 (Minn. 2015).
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directive, and power of attorney as would be required of her as guardian, and “Noon [had]
repeatedly stated that she would not want to serve as guardian for [Jaeger], based on
[Jaeger’s] contrariness and hostility .”
Based on these findings, which are well-supported by the record, the district court
determined that the existing delegations to Noon were “not a viable” alternative to a
conservatorship. See Pates, 823 N.W.2d at 887 (holding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion by appointing a conservator where the district court found the power of
attorney was not “an appropriate alternative to protect [the person subject to
conservatorship’s] finances”). We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in its
appointment of a conservator upon finding that less -restrictive alternatives were
insufficient to meet Jaeger’s needs.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a professional
conservator.

Jaeger argues that the district court abused its discretio n by appointing PFF as
conservator in lieu of Noon in contravention of the statutory priority list. Minn. Stat.
§ 524.5-413(a) (2020) requires a district court to consider candidates for conservator in
order of priority, with the adult child of a person subject to conservatorship having priority
over a professional conservator. The statute also expressly provides that the district court
may “decline to appoint a person having priority and appoint a person having a lower
priority or no priority” if “acting in the best interest of the person subject to
conservatorship.” Minn. Stat. § 524.5-413(c) (2020).
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A district court does not abuse its discretion when it appoints the party it finds to be
the “most qualified to serve as [c]onservator” and makes “specific findings” in support of
its determination. Pates, 823 N.W.2d at 887. We will only set aside a district court’s
factual findings if “they are clearly erroneous, giving due regard for the district court’s
determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses.” Id. (quotation omitted). “A finding
of fact is clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation omitted).
In its order, the district court expressly acknowledged the s tatutory priority,
considered whether Noon should be appointed as conservator, found that PFF was most
qualified to act as conservator, and concluded that appointment of PFF as conservator was
in the best interests of Jaeger.
As an initial matter, the di strict court “strongly believe [d]” that Jaeger needed a
guardian. PFF was the sole candidate for guardian and would not agree to serve as guardian
if another candidate acted as conservator. Faced with the choice of appointing Noon as
conservator and leaving Jaeger without a guardian or appointing PFF as both guardian and
conservator, the district court determined that Jaeger’s best interests were served by the
appointment of PFF as both guardian and conservator . Although Jaeger argues that the
district court placed an “unfound emphasis” on PFF’s willingness to serve as guardian only
if also appointed as conservator, our review shows that the district court considered the
need for a guardian among other factors in determining Jaeger’s best interests. We discern
no abuse of discretion by the district court in its best -interests determination.
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Second, the district court determined that a professional conservator was best suited
to meet Jaeger’s needs because of her “extensive and complex estate, containin g at least
six properties in two states, numerous vehicles, and four households of surplus personal
property,” all of which “are in disuse and disrepair” and will require “an extensive team of
cleaners, contractors, and real estate agents” for proper management. Although Noon “had
done some very preliminary and informal investigation of the sale of [Jaeger’s] property,”
she “had failed to hire or consult the necessary professionals.” And the district court found
that although Noon had the ability to take certain steps to manage Jaeger’s estate for the
past three years, she had failed to do so. We find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s conclusion that appointment of a professional conservator was in Jaeger’s best
interests.
Third, t he district court also expressed a lack of confidence in the sustainability of
Noon as conservator due to the volatile history between Noon and Jaege r. The record
supports this finding. Noon testified that she experienced such “significant difficulty and
stress interacting with [Jaeger]” that Noon blocked Jaeger’s phone number. Noon testified
that “she had not had significant contact with [Jaeger] for the past two years.” And the
district court’s order set forth the history of challenges Noon faced in attempting to assist
Jaeger, including verbal abuse, threats of physical assault, and police intervention. We see
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that a professional conservato r
was a more sustainable arrangement and in Jaeger’s best interests.
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Accordingly, t he district court acted well within its discretion in making specific
findings supported by the record to conclude that the appointment of a conservator with a
lower priority was in the best interests of the person subject to conservatorship.
Affirmed.