State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0156

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Mark Franklin, Jr.,
Appellant.

Filed May 16, 2022
Affirmed
Wheelock, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-25910

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda M. Freyer, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Bryan , Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Wheelock ,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WHEELOCK, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction of two counts of third-degree murder, one count
of criminal vehicular homicide, and three counts of criminal vehicular operation, arguing
that the district court erred by not finding that his Miranda waiver was involuntary and by
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not granting his request for substitute representation. He also submits pro se supplemental
arguments alleging that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that improper
and falsified evidence was admitted at trial. Because the district court did not err by finding
his Miranda waiver to be voluntary or by denying his request for substitute representation,
and because the pro se issues were not adequately brief ed, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Mark Franklin Jr. was convicted of two counts of third -degree murder,
one count of criminal vehicular homicide, and three counts of criminal vehicular operation.
The state alleged that Franklin smoked phencyclidine (PCP), drove his vehicle the wrong
direction down a one-way residential street at a high rate of speed, and crashed into parked
cars and an occupied minivan , injuring Franklin, Franklin’s passenger , and the minivan’s
driver and killing the minivan’s passenger and her unborn child.
The state presented the testimony of several law -enforcement officers and fir st
responders who were on-scene and observed the crash site. Sergeant J.W. testified that he
responded to the accident and observed multiple damaged vehicles and a downed utility
pole and wires. His investigation revealed that Franklin’ s black Lincoln Na vigator had
been traveling southbound on a residential street in Minneapolis and crashed into a
minivan, causing the minivan to spin multiple times so that it hit a parked car and a utility
pole and then flipped over.
Officer D.S. testified that he found Franklin’s passenger, V.R., seated in the
passenger seat of the Lincoln Navigator. Her left leg was stuck in part of the vehicle, and
he did not believe she could move without assistance. A paramedic who assisted Franklin
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immediately after the accident te stified that Franklin admitted to using PCP and driving
the Lincoln Navigator when it crashed.
Data taken from the Lincoln Navigator showed that the driver had pushed the gas
pedal quickly down as far as possible, causing the car to accelerate rapidly to 8 9 miles per
hour, and that the pedal was held down for 17 to 19 seconds. Forensic analysts testified
that blood with DNA matching Franklin’s was found on the steering wheel, interior driver’s
window, driver ’s seat and headrest, driver ’s seatbelt, driver’s airbag, and passenger ’s
airbag; Franklin’s blood tested positive for PCP.
Franklin’s passenger, V.R., testified that on the evening of the accident , she and
Franklin sat in his vehicle smoking a cigarette dipped in PCP after she got off work. They
then drove around, and, after approximately half an hour, Franklin began driving very fast,
took off his seatbelt, and put his hands in the air. The car crashed and came to a stop.
Franklin attempted to exit the car from the driver -side door, but he was unable to get out,
so he climbed over V.R. and exited from the passenger -side door. During her testimony,
V.R. recalled that she was unable to move her legs after the vehicle came to a stop because
her ankles and legs were broken.
The driver of the minivan testified that he was driving his wife home from her job
on the evening of October 17. T hey were expecting a child to be born in late November.
He testified that he was driving do wn a one-way street when he saw car lights driving in
the wrong direction. He stopped so that the oncoming car could turn out of the one -way
street, but the car continued driving toward them at high speed. The collision flipped the
minivan upside down an d trapped the occupants, requiring that the man and his pregnant
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wife be pulled out of the wreckage and taken to the hospital. A medical examiner testified
that the female passenger of the minivan and her unborn child, who had a gestational age
of approximately eight months, both died of blunt -force injuries sustained in the crash.
A woman testified that she was watching television at home when she heard a loud
engine and a crash that sounded like a big boom or an explosion. She hurried outside and
saw the aftermath of the accident. She saw a man struggling to get out of the black car and
a woman sitting in the passenger seat of the same car, screaming about her ankles and legs.
The state played surveillance footage from the woman ’s front porch that recorded the loud
noise of the crash, the minivan spinning, and the spark of light from the utility pole falling.
The morning after the accident, Franklin woke up in the hospital where he was being
treated for injuries sustained in the crash. He was handcuffed to his hospital bed, and
Officer J.A. was guarding him. When Franklin woke up, he asked the o fficer what
happened. Officer J.A. told him there had been a motor -vehicle crash and a person had
died. Officer J.A. began recording Franklin on his body- worn camera as Franklin talked
about his memory of the night before and asked Officer J.A. questions about the crash. On
the video, Franklin told Officer J.A. that he smoked two or three hits of somet hing other
than weed and was driving V.R. around. Franklin stated that he should not have been
driving. He said that after the accident, someone told him he had been driving at 100 miles
per hour, but he did not remember and thought he had been driving a t 20 or 30 miles per
hour.
Approximately 15 minutes after Officer J.A. activated his body -worn camera, the
investigating sergeants entered the hospital room, informed Franklin of his Miranda rights,
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and began questioning Franklin. Officer J.A. continued r ecording while the sergeants
interviewed Franklin. Sergeant M .H. testified about his interview of F ranklin in the
hospital room. In Officer J.A.’s video of the interview, Franklin told the sergeants that he
remembered driving when he got off work and picking up V.R. Franklin said that V.R.
asked to buy PCP to smoke, and Franklin drove her to get it . They both took several hits
of a cigarette dipped in PCP. Franklin remembered driving down “ Penn and Glenwood ”
and taking a right turn onto “Fourth,” and then the PCP “must’ve kicked in ” because the
next thing he remembered was someone telling him to lie down and hearing someone
screaming.
Officer J.A. observed and recorded the investigating sergeants as they entered
Franklin’s hospital room and gave the Miranda warnings to Franklin, and as Franklin
waived his rights and expressed that he wanted to speak with the investigating sergeants .
Officer J.A. described both Franklin and the sergeants as “calm.” At an evidentiary hearing
that occurred more than three months before the trial, t he district court ruled that the video
taken in Franklin’s hospital room was admissible over Franklin’s objection, and the state
offered the video as evidence at the trial.
Franklin testified on his own beha lf during the trial. Although he admitted that he
smoked two or three hits of the cigarette dipped in PCP and that he was driving earlier in
the evening, Franklin claimed that he and V.R. switched places before the accident.
Franklin testified that while V.R. was driving his vehicle, he fell asleep, and the next thing
he remembered was “being thrown toward the dashboard of the truck” as it crashed.
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Franklin’s case went to a jury trial in September 2020. The jury returned a verdict
of guilty on all counts, and Franklin was sentenced to permissive consecutive sentences for
each of the four victims, totaling 360 months in prison. Franklin appeals.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by determining that Franklin’ s waiver of his
Miranda rights was voluntary.

The U nited States and Minnesota Constitutions allow individuals to avoid
self-incrimination and prohibit the government from compelling people to testify against
themselves. U.S. Const. amends. V, XIV ; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7; see also State v.
Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Minn. 2010). We review “findings of fact surrounding
an alleged Miranda waiver for clear error, and we review de novo the legal conclusions
based on those facts to determine whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.” Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 233.
A criminal suspect in custodial interrogation must be informed of the right to remain
silent and the right to consult an attorney. Id. The suspect may waive those rights if the
waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. The state has the burden of proving t he
waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the state has met that burden if it shows
the Miranda warnings were given and “the individual stated that he or she understood those
rights and then gave a statement. ” Id. (quoting State v. Camacho, 561 N.W.2d 160, 168
(Minn. 1997)). If the suspect claims that there is “credible evidence that a waiver was
invalid, we make a subjective factual inquiry, look at the totality of the circumstances , and
consider factors such as the [suspect’s] age, maturity, intelligence, education, experience,
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ability to comprehend, lack of or adequacy of warnings, the length and legality of the
detention, the nature of the interrogation, any physical deprivations, and limits on access
to counsel and friends.” Id. at 233-34.
Franklin claims that his responses to law enforcement after the y told him his
Miranda rights should have been suppressed because the state failed to prove by the totality
of the circumstances that Franklin ’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. To
support this argument , Franklin first asserts that he was not in his right mind when
investigators approached him in the hospital due to the lingering effects of PCP and
medications administered by the hospital. He further argues that the state was required to
prove that Franklin’s drug use or medications did not prevent Franklin from making a
voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights and failed to do so. Finally, Franklin argues that
he could not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights regardless of “his medical condition and
PCP intoxication” because he had never received a Miranda warning before this time .
These arguments are unavailing.
First, Franklin’s assertion that “he was not in his right mind ” when investigators
approached him in the hospital is unsupported by evidence. The district court found that
other than speaking quickly, Franklin did not display signs of intoxication or incoherence,
and his statements were instead coherent and linear. This finding is supported by video of
the interrogation, in which Franklin was obviously concerned and distraught but responded
to questions with appropriate, relevant answers.
At the evidentiary hearing, Franklin testified that he woke in the hospital room , was
disoriented and confused , and only knew he had been in a car crash. Franklin testified that
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he was receiving pain medications at the hospital and still felt the effect of PCP at the time
of his interview. He testified that he was confused because he has multiple mental-health
diagnoses and felt anxious and overwhelmed. However, he also testified that he was aware
that the men who entered his room were armed police officers, that he understood he was
under arrest, and that he heard the officers read him his Miranda rights.
Investigating Sergeant M.H. clearly identified himself and his partner, told Franklin
he was under arrest, advised Franklin of his Miranda rights, and ask ed Franklin if he
understood his rights. Franklin responded to the investigating sergeants’ statements and
questions with answers and reactions to those questions, indicating his ability to
comprehend. He repeatedly expressed that he wanted to talk to the sergeants during and
after they provided the Miranda warning to him.
In its order denying Franklin’s motion to suppress his post -Miranda statements, the
district court found that “[a]lthough [Franklin] was speaking at a quick pace, he was not
slurring his speech or otherwise showing signs that he was under the influence or otherwise
not in his right mind.” The court further found that Franklin’ s demeanor and manner of
speaking remained coherent and linear in his statements . Although he suffers from a
mental illness, Franklin was found competent to proceed following a competency
evaluation. The district court’s findings of fact are supported by the testimony and exhibits
that form the record of the evidentiary hearing on Franklin’s motion to suppress. Franklin
has not demonstrated that the district court ’s findings were in clear error.
Next, turning to his second argument asserting that his waiver was involuntary, we
observe that Franklin does not put forth any legal support for the argument that for the state
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to prove a Miranda waiver was v oluntary, it must present affirmative evidence beyond
conversational indicators that a defendant ’s capacity to waive his Miranda rights was not
impacted by injuries, medications, or intoxication. Franklin relies on Ganpat, Camacho,
and Kulseth, none of which required this type of evidence. State v. Ganpat , 732 N.W.2d
232, 240 (Minn. 2007) (holding that even though Ganpat was not given his requested
medications, may have been intellectually low functioning, and had no prior experience
with the criminal jus tice system, he voluntarily waived his right to remain silent);
Camacho, 561 N.W.2d at 169 (holding that evidence of borderline mental deficiency alone
does not automatically mandate a finding of incompetence to waive Miranda rights); State
v. Kulseth, 333 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Minn. 1983) (holding that intoxication is only one of
many factors to be considered in reviewing whether a waiver was involuntary and in that
case, the facts did not “compel the conclusion that defendant was so intoxicated as to be
unable to make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights”). Franklin’s argument that even when
a defendant appears coherent, the state must present affirmative evidence that the defendant
was not intoxicated when waiving Miranda rights is unsupported by law and is therefore
unconvincing.
Finally, Franklin argues that if a person has never been interrogated by law
enforcement and has therefore never heard their Miranda rights, then the person cannot
waive their rights. This argument fails. Familiarity with the criminal system is merely one
factor among several, and while it can inform the reviewing court of the person’ s
familiarity with their rights, the fact that a person has no prior experience with questioning
by police and has not received a Miranda warning in the past does not by itself render a
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waiver of those rights involuntary. The district court did not err by allowing Franklin ’s
post-Miranda statements to be presented to the jury.
Even if the district court had erred, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt because Franklin volunteered many of the same statements to Officer J.A. that he
then repeated to the investigat ing sergeants after they informed Franklin of his Miranda
rights. Franklin argues that his post -Miranda confession that he smoked PCP and was
driving the vehicle at the time of the crash was “the most damaging evidence” presented at
trial. But Frankli n concedes that other lay witnesses testified that Franklin told them he
had smoked PCP and that he was driving. Franklin also testified at trial that he had smoked
PCP and was driving earlier in the evening before the crash, though he deni ed driving at
the time of the crash. Thus, the statements Franklin made after the Miranda warning were
repeated and bolstered by the testimony of other witnesses, including Franklin.
II. The district court did not err by denying Franklin’ s request for substitute
counsel.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the
right to an attorney for their defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; State
v. Munt, 831 N.W.2d 569, 586 (Minn. 2013). Indigent defendants who cannot employ
counsel are entitled to appointed counsel, but this right is “not an unbridled right to be
represented by counsel of the defendant ’s choosing.” Munt, 831 N.W.2d at 586 (quotation
omitted). If a defendant complains ab out their appointed counsel ’s ineffective
representation and requests substitute counsel, the district court must grant the request
“only if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made. ”
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Id. (quotation omitted). Exceptional circumstances are circumstances that affect the
appointed counsel ’s “ability or competence to represent the client, ” not the defendant ’s
mere “general dissatisfaction ” with their counsel. Id. (quotation omitted). The district
court should conduct a se arching inquiry if a “defendant voices serious allegations of
inadequate representation ” in order to determine “whether the defendant ’s complaint s
warrant the appointment of substitute counsel.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review “the
district court’s decision to appoint substitute defense counsel for an abuse of discretion.”
Id.
Franklin argues that the district court erred (1) by failing to conduct a searching
inquiry into Franklin’s concerns about his attorney’ s representation during his evidentiary
hearing and (2) by erroneously telling Franklin that the court was powerless to appoint new
public defenders. 1 Because Franklin’s request was untimely and because any error in the
court’s statement was harmless, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying Franklin’s
request for substitute counsel, and his argument here fails.
In a pretrial hearing the day before trial was scheduled to start, Franklin told the
district court that he did not want to plead guilty and wanted to go to trial. The follow ing
afternoon, when his trial was scheduled to begin, Franklin raised his request for new public
defenders for a variety of reasons, including that his attorneys advised him to take the plea
deal, that he wanted the attorney assigned to him at his initial hearing, that his attorneys

1 To the extent that Franklin argues his counsel was ineffective, this argument is not
properly before this court because it is mere assertion and is not supported by argument or
authority. State v. Andersen, 871 N.W.2d 910, 915 (Minn. 2015).
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did not review evidence he gave to them, and that his attorneys did not get evidence he told
them to compile. The district court questioned Franklin about each allegation in turn. The
court then called the public defenders ’ supervisor, who had a private conversation with
Franklin and then gave the court her opinion that the public defenders were acting properly.
The court told Franklin that he could either go forward with his current team or he could
represent himself because there were no grounds to substitute new attorneys. Franklin then
said that he would represent himself, that he would find a pro bono lawyer, that a previous
judge “cursed [him] out,” that the system is corrupt, and tha t he wrote to the Chief Public
Defender directly but had not heard back. Franklin said that his attorney “blew it ” at his
evidentiary hearing because she did not present evidence to the judge that he was taking
medication that rendered his Miranda waiver involuntary and because she raised arguments
about racial harassment.
The district court told Franklin that his options were to go to trial with his current
attorneys, to represent himself, or to continue the trial for a few months and attempt to get
a different attorney. The state opposed a motion for continuance, arguing that Franklin had
had time before the trial to obtain new attorneys and as recently as the day before had said
he wanted to go forward with trial. As they reached the end of the day, the court directed
Franklin to call potential attorneys while the court recessed to see if he could obtain an
attorney. Franklin responded:
FRANKLIN: You are the judge, you can tell them—order that
I can have another n ew public defender.
THE COURT: No, sir. I told you, remember, what I said this
afternoon. I appoint the Public Defender ’s office, and they
appoint the attorneys. And Ms. [S.] is a supervisor who
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appoints the attorneys, and she and you had a private
conversation where she explained that to you. I appoint their
office, I do not appoint the attorneys.

The next morning, Franklin said that he would proceed with the assigned public defenders.
He confirmed that it was his decision to proceed with them and no one was forcing him to
proceed with them, that he believed they were ready to represent him, and that he wanted
them to be his attorneys.
It was untimely for Franklin to wait until the day of his trial to raise his concerns
about his attorneys ’ representation at the evidentiary hearing . In State v. Worthy, the
supreme court found a substitution request was untimely when the defendants requested
substitution for their court-appointed attorneys on the morning of trial because even though
it was their first court appearance after scheduling the consolidated trial, the defendants
had requested the consolidated trial and had both made speedy-trial demands. 583 N.W.2d
270, 278-79 (Minn. 1998) ; see also State v. Clark , 722 N.W.2d 460, 465 (Minn. 2006)
(holding that the defendant ’s request for substitute counsel was untimely when the request
was made the morning that trial was to begin, after jury selection had begun, and when the
defendant had made a speedy -trial demand) .
As in Worthy, Franklin raised his request for substitute counsel on the day his trial
was set to begin. Unlike in Worthy, however, this was not Franklin’s first opportunity after
his attorney’s alleged inadequate representation to raise his request to the court. Not only
had the evidentiary hearing in question occurred months earlier, but Franklin had been
present at a pretrial hearing the day before trial began and had expressed his desire to
continue to trial. A district court is only re quired to grant a request for substitute counsel
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“if exceptional circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.” Munt,
831 N.W.2d at 586 (emphasis added). Because Franklin ’s request was untimely and
unreasonably made, the district court did not err by denying Franklin’ s request for
substitute counsel.
Franklin also argues the district court erred by telling him the court was powerless
to appoint new public defenders. This misconstrues the district court ’s statement quoted
above that “[the district court] appoint[s] the Public Defender ’s office, and they appoint
the attorneys. . . . I do not appoint the attorneys.” In context, this statement was more likely
intended to mean that the district court could not assign the specific public defender whom
Franklin preferred to his case. The district court does have the power to decide to appoint
a substitute attorney, and , to the extent that the district court said that it could not appoint
substitute counsel, it was incorrect. However, the transcript as a whole makes it clear that
the district court considered whether to appoint substitute attorneys to Franklin’ s case,
investigated his concerns, and found that “exceptional circumstances” did not exist and
that the demand was not “timely and reasonably made.” Id. Thus, to the extent the district
court’s statement was in error, it was harmless. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 31.01 (“Any error
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” ).
III. Sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, and the evidence was properly
admitted.

In Franklin’s supplemental pro se brief, he argues that there was insufficient
evidence to support his convictions because he did not cause the death of the woman and
15
her unborn child a nd because there was improper evidence at trial. 2 “An assignment of
error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in
appellant’s brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection. ” Andersen, 871 N.W.2d at 915 (quoting State v. Yang,
774 N.W.2d 539, 552 (Minn. 2009)). None of the issues raised in Franklin’ s pro se brief
were sufficiently supported by argument or authority, so we need not consider his claims,
but they would fail even if we did reach the merits.
Franklin argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that he
caused the victims ’ death, although he does not point to specific evidence or lack of
evidence supporting this claim. We evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by “ carefully
examin[ing] the record to determine whether the facts and the legitimate inferences drawn
from them would permit the jury to reasonably conclude that the defendant was guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of which he was convicted.” State v. Griffin ,
887 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted) . Here, Franklin argues that “a
superseding cause did in fact occur, also the District Court . . . [saw] evidence of a
superseding cause because it was included in jury instructions.” This argument is
unavailing. The facts and the record before the jury contained testimony from witnesses

2 Minnesota courts require pro se crimina l defendants to comply with standard rules of
court procedure, and “[n]o extra benefits will be given to pro se litigants.” State v. Seifert,
423 N.W.2d 368, 372 (Minn. 1988) ; see also Minn. R. Gen. Prac. 1.04. “When an
appellant acts as attorney pro se, appellate courts are disposed to disregard defects in the
brief, but that does not relieve appellants of the necessity of providing an adequate record
and preserving it in a way that will permit review.” Thorp Loan & Thrift Co. v. Morse ,
451 N.W.2d 361, 363 (Minn. App. 1990), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 13, 1990).
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with various perspectives of the crash that supported a finding that Franklin was driving
the vehicle that hit the victims’ minivan, physical evidence that supported a finding that
Franklin was driving, and Franklin’s own statements that he had been driving the vehicle .
Thus, the facts and legitimate inferences would permit the jury to conclude Franklin was
guilty.
Second, Franklin identifies numerous pieces of evidence from the trial as
improperly allowed, improperly omitted, or false. He argues that law enforcement ’s
testimony was false and discredited by a video in evidence, that the state and law
enforcement gave false information “with the sole intent to obtain a conviction (by any
means),” and that the state withheld a picture of his vehicle ’s damaged passenger -sid e
window and a report on seatbelt use from the crash data recorder. He further argues tha t
the state did not submit all pieces of evidence to the jury. Finally, Franklin asks this court
to review the evidence and credit Franklin ’s testimony that the incident was in fact a
high-speed chase in which law enforcement crashed into Franklin ’s vehicle, causing the
crash, and that the victims’ minivan was involved in a separate, later crash.
These arguments were not raised at trial, and we generally will not consider matters
not argued to and considered by the district court. Roby v. State , 547 N.W.2d 354, 357
(Minn. 1996). To the extent that Franklin asks us to make credibility determinations or to
investigate the evidence, that is not within the scope of review on appeal. State v. Mems,
708 N.W.2d 526, 531 (Minn. 2006). Thus, the arguments in Franklin’s pro se brief are
unavailing.
Affirmed.