In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: L. G. R., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0161

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
L. G. R., Parent.

Filed July 6, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Lyon County District Court
File No. 42-JV-19-125

Daniel L. Giles, Stoneberg, Giles & Stroup, P.A., Marshall, Minnesota (for appellant
mother L.G.R.)

Richard R. Maes, Lyon County Attorney, Nicole A. Springstead, Assistant County
Attorney, Marshall, Minnesota (for respondent Southwest Health and Human Services)

Alexis Watts, Office of the Public Defender, Marshall, Minnesota (for child)

Shanna Latterell, Marshall, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bjorkman,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant mother challenges the involuntary termination of her parental righ ts,
arguing that (1) the record does not support the finding that respondent agency made
reasonable efforts to reun ite appellant with the child, (2 ) the district court abused its
discretion by determining that respondent proved statutory grounds for termin ation, and
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(3) the district court abused its discretion by determining that termination is in the child’s
best interests. We affirm.
FACTS
In February 2007, appellant L.G.R. (mother) was living in California and gave birth
to the child who is the subject of this appeal. At some point in the child’s early years, she
was removed from mother’s care after being left unsupervised and spent several months in
foster care. Mother had two more children, born in 2011 and 2013. At the end of 2014,
the family moved to Mexico.
In August 2017, mother sent the child to live in Minnesota with an aunt. It was the
last time they saw each other in person. Mother did not provide the aunt any documentation
authorizing her to provide for the child’s health care or education. While the child resided
with the aunt, mother did not send money, clothes, or other items to contribute to the child’s
care. And they often went months without talking.
In May 2019, the child disclosed that she was physically and sexually abused in the
aunt’s home. Respondent Southwest Health and Human Services (the agency) removed
the child from the home and placed her in emergency foster care. At first, mother did not
believe the child and wanted her returned to the aunt’s h ome. But mother later admitted
that the child need ed protection or services. The agency developed a case plan requiring
mother to (1) demonstrate that she can “safely and appropriately care for the child ” by
contacting the Mexican Consulate and follow ing its recommendations, cooperating “with
a social worker in Mexico to determine if her home environment is safe for the child,” and
completing parenting classes to “learn appropriate communication techniques and
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discipline techniques other than corporal dis cipline”; (2) maintain contact with the child,
including a requirement that she have “appropriate interactions with the child ”; and
(3) cooperate with the agency and the guardian ad litem. The district court found that it
was in the child’s best interests to remain in foster care and ordered mother to comply with
the case plan to demonstrate that she “can provide a safe environment for her child.”
The agency encountered numerous hurdles as it implemented the case plan , and
mother did not consistently meet the agency’s expectations. The Mexican Consulate
informed mother that it could not assist her because she is a citizen of Guatemala. The
social worker assigned to the family urged mother, who had then resided in Mex ico for
nearly five years, to pursue Mexican citizenship as a means of obtaining assistance; she did
not. Both mother and the social worker looked for a local social worker and parenting
classes but could not find a qualified person or program near mother. The social worker
offered to do a home assessment through video conferencing, but mother did not download
the necessary phone application.
Mother’s contacts with the child also fell short of expectations, both in frequency
and substance. Supervised phone calls were scheduled to occur weekly, but mother often
missed calls or cut them short —sometimes because local conditions interfered with
reception, sometimes because she chose to tend to her other children instead. When the
calls did take place , mother’s comments routinely upset the child. For example, mother
told the child that when she returned to Mexico, she could just forget about what happened
to her in her aunt’s home and not talk about it anymore, which was “distressing” for the
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child.1 Indeed, comments like these led the child to end calls or act out afterward.
Sometimes, she asked to take a break from the calls, after which mother and the child did
not speak for w eeks. And mother told the social worker she would delete unnecessary
phone applications to enable video calls but never did so.
The social worker and the child’s therapist sought to educate mother about more
appropriate ways to communicate with the child, but the problems persisted, precluding
unsupervised contacts. The child’s therapist recommended family therapy but noted that
she would not be an appropriate provider since she was already working with the child
individually. The social worker tried to enlist a family therapist but was unable to secure
one because of concerns related to conducting the therapy virtually.
In December 2019, the agency filed a petition to terminate mother’s parental rights.
The petition alleges that mother neglects her parental duties, reasonable efforts have not
corrected the conditions leading t o the child’s out -of-home placement, and the child is
neglected and in foster care. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2), (5), (8) (2020).
Around that same time, mother traveled to Guatemala to renew her passport so she
could travel to Minnesota. She requested financial support. The agency declined, so
mother moved the district court to order the agency to pay for her travel. The court denied
the motion, noting that “mother cannot legally travel to the United States ” but stated that
if she obtained the required travel documents, she could renew her request. Mother asked
the social worker to write a letter on her behalf so she could get a travel visa. But she never

1 The child’s therapist explained that “trauma research shows that it is not in a child’s best
interest to stop talking about the trauma or to pretend that they didn’t happen.”
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gave the social worker the name o r address of the person she needed to contact. And
mother did not renew her motion for financial assistance.
Despite these challenges, the agency continued its reunification efforts. Because
she was unable to locate a parenting educator near mother’s home, i n January 2020, the
social worker enrolled mother in a 12-hour online parenting-education course in Spanish.
She set up an account for mother, confirmed that mother was able to log in, and regularly
checked in with mother about her progress. In June, mother told the social worker she was
almost done. But by the end of the year, mother had completed only 7% of the course.
Mother explained that she did not progress because she has inconsistent internet service
and was “busy” with her other children and “chores.”
The agency also facilitated a neuropsychological evalua tion of the child in March
2020, which revealed that the child has a below-average IQ and significant mental-health
challenges. She receives physical therapy, occupational therapy, psychological services,
academic assistance, and speech therapy. The evaluator opined that the child will continue
to need these supports along with consistent and structured parenting. The foster parent
and social worker summarized this information for mother. The social worker concluded
mother did not understand the serious ness of the child’s needs , citing as an example that
mother dismissed her need for speech therapy because the child “could talk just fine.”
At a three-day trial in December 2020, the agency presented evidence of the efforts
it made to assist mother and her failure to satisfy many of the case plan’s requirements. By
that time, the child had been in foster care for 587 days. The child testified that she prefers
not to return to mother and would rather stay “with a kind and loving family” like her foster
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family. And the guardian ad litem opined that it would be in the child’s best interests to
honor the child’s preference and allow her to “remain in Minnesota and be adopted.” The
district court ordered termination of mother’s parental rights, finding clear and convincing
evidence that the agency made reasonable efforts to reunify the family, the agency proved
all three statutory grounds for termination, and termination is in the child’s best interests.
Mother appeals.
DECISION
On appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we consider whether the district
court’s findings address the statutory termination criteria and have substantial evidentiary
support. In re Welfare of Children of S.E.P. , 744 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2008) . We
review findings of “underlying or basic facts” for clear error. In re Welfare of Children of
J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d 895, 901 (Minn. App. 2011) , review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012). In
doing so, we defer to the district court’s credibility determinations. In re Welfare of Child
of J.K.T., 814 N.W.2d 76, 90 (Minn. App. 2012). But we will not disturb a district court’s
decision whether clear and convincing evidence supports a particular ground
for termination, absent an abuse of discretion. J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 899, 901. We will
affirm the decision to terminate parental rights when at least one statutory termination
ground is supported by clear and convincing evidence, the county has made reasonable
efforts to reunite the family, and termination is in the child’ s best inte rests. S.E.P., 744
N.W.2d at 385.

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I. The record supports the district court ’s finding that the agency made
reasonable efforts to reunite mother with the child.

Termination of parental rights requires clear and convincing evidence that
“reasonable efforts were made to reunite the parent with the child. ” Id. at 655. Whether
the responsible social services agency made reasonable efforts turns on “the length of the
time the [agency] was involved and the quality of effort given.” In re Welfare of H.K., 455
N.W.2d 529, 532 (Minn. App. 1990), review denied (Minn. July 6, 1990). In evaluating if
the efforts were reasonable, a district court must consider whether services were:
“(1) relevant to the safety and protection of the child; (2) adequate to meet the needs of the
child and family; (3) culturally appropriate; (4) available and accessible; (5) consistent and
timely; and (6) realistic under the circumstances. ” Minn. Stat. § 260.012(h) (2020). But
reasonable efforts do not include service s that would be futile. Id. The court must make
“individualized and explicit findings regarding the nature and extent of efforts made by the
social services agency to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family .” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.301, subd. 8(1) (2020).
Mother challenges the district court’s determination that the agency made
reasonable efforts toward reunification. She contends the agency ’s failure to offer two
services—family therapy and financial assistance for her to travel to Minnesota—renders
the overall efforts unreasonable. We disagree. Because the court -ordered case plan did
not provide for either service , we presume the agency acted reasonably in not providing
them. See In re Welfare of Children of T.R., 750 N.W.2d 656, 665 (Minn. 2008) (stating
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that court -ordered case plan is presumed reasonable) .2 And our review of the record
confirms the district court’s determinations as to the reasonableness of the agency’s actions
with respect to both services.
Regarding family therapy, mother is correct that the record shows the social worker
was initially confused about whether the child’s therapist recommended family therapy.
But despite that confusion, the social worker ultimately did pursue family therapy. It did
not materialize because she was unable to secure a provider’s agreement to conduct the
therapy under the available circumstances —virtual therapy, with an interpreter, and
without a secure connection to ensure confidentiality. Mother’s conduct also supported the
agency’s decision not to pursue this service further. The fact she was unable to complete
12 hours of online parenting instruction over the course of almost 12 months suggests she
was unprepared to engage with the more intensive family therapy . So does her failure to
respond to education regarding how to communicate with the child. As t he guardian
ad litem observed, in light of the “lack of forward progress in communication between
[mother] and [the child],” family therapy would not have been beneficial.
The record also belies mother’s contention that the agency unreasonably refused to
assist her in traveling to Minnesota . The guardian ad litem acknowledged that it might
have been beneficial for mother and the child to meet in person, but it was not part of the
case plan or necessary for reunification. Nor did mother genuinely pursue travel assistance.

2 To the extent mother believes the case plan was unreasonable because it did not include
family therapy or travel funding, she could have asked the district court to change it. S.E.P.,
744 N.W.2d at 388.
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She never provided the social worker the necessary information to assist her in obtaining a
visa. And she did not renew her motion to require the agency to pay for her airfare, despite
the district court’s express invitation to do so.
Moreover, the record contains ample and largely undisputed evidence of the
agency’s continued efforts toward reunifications over a period 19 months, including nearly
a year after the agency petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights. The agency worked
diligently with mother to improve the consistency and quality of her communication with
the child. It also sought to facilitate local services to support mo ther in completing
parenting education and a home visit. When those efforts proved unsuccessful, the agency
offered virtual substitutes at no cost to mother. And the agency provided the extraordinary
service of facilitating communication between mother and her attorney, to accommodate
for her remote location and language barrier. On this record, we discern no clear error or
abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the agency made reasonable
efforts to reunify the family.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the agency
proved statutory grounds for termination.

A district court may terminate parental rights wh en clear and convincing evidence
shows “that following the child’s placement out of the home, reasonable efforts, under the
direction of the court, have failed to correct the conditions leading to the child’ s
placement.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(5). A parent’s failure to comply with “a
reasonable case plan” can establish that the conditions leading to the child’s placement
have not been corrected. Id., subd. 1(b)(5)(iii).
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As noted above, the record supports the district court’s finding that the agency made
reasonable efforts to address the conditions leading to the child’ s 587-day out-of-home
placement. The record demonstrates that , despite the agency’s efforts, the conditions
persisted. From the beginning, the district court told mother sh e needed to comply with
her case plan and to demonstrate that her home environment would be safe for the child .
When no local resources were available to evaluate mother’s home , t he social worker
offered to perform a virtual home visit; mother never installed the necessary application on
her phone. Mother was required to complete parenting education. Again, no local
resources were available, so the social worker enrolled mother in an online course; mother
completed barely any of it and lied about he r progress. Mother was required to maintain
consistent and appropriate contact with the child. She regularly missed or truncated phone
calls in favor of her other children or “chores .” And despite the persistent efforts of t he
social worker, the child’s therapist, and the foster parent to improve the quality of her
communication with the child, mother regularly made comments that disregarded the
child’s significant mental-health needs, causing the child distress and leading to further
interruptions of co ntact. We discern no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
determination that clear and convincing evidence shows the agency’s reasonable efforts
failed to correct the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.
Because this statutory ground is sufficient for us to affirm the district court ’s
termination of parental rights, we need not address the other two statutory grounds. J.R.B.,
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805 N.W.2d at 906. Nonetheless, we note that we have carefully reviewed the record and
conclude that clear and convincing evidence also supports these alternative grounds.3
III. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that termination
is in the child’s best interests.

The child’s best interests are the paramount consideration in a termination -of-
parental-rights proceeding. Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 7 (2020). When analyzing a
child’s best interests, the court must balan ce: “(1) the child’ s interest in preserving the
parent-child relationship; (2) the parent’ s interest in preserving the parent -child
relationship; and (3) any competing interest of the child.” J.R.B., 805 N.W.2d at 905
(quotation omitted); see Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 58.04(c)(2)(ii) (same). We review a district
court’s best-interests determination for abuse of discretion. In re Welfare of Child of
A.M.C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. App. 2018).
Mother argues termination is not in the child’s best interests, pointing t o her own
testimony that she is aware of the child’s needs and is prepared to meet them in Mexico if
the child is returned to her. The district court expressly discredited this testimony. It also
made several findings regarding the child’s best interests that mother does not dispute —
that mother has not seen or provided support for the child since 2017; mother’s conduct
has shown that she is unwilling to provide the safe and stable environment that the child

3 Mother argues that the record does not support the district court’s finding that she has the
financial ability to comply with parental duties , as required for termination based on
neglect of parental duties. See Minn. Stat. § 260C.301, subd. 1(b)(2). Although we do not
address this statutory ground in depth, we observe that the record confirms that mother was
not prevented from complying with parental dutie s because of financial barriers —her
significant other is employed and they have two houses. More importantly, mother fell
short of parenting duties and case-plan requirements that were not related to finances.
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requires; the parent/child bond is now “extremely limited” because of the lack of
consistent, appropriate communic ation; and the child is “flourishing in foster care.” On
this record, we see no abuse of discretion by t he district court in determining that
termination is in the child’s best interests.
Affirmed.