In re the Marriage of: Linsey Lee Milbrandt, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0165

In re the Marriage of: Linsey Lee Milbrandt, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Jeffrey Robert Milbrandt,
Appellant.

Filed November 29, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-FA-17-473

Linsey Lee Thomson, Chaska, Minnesota (pro se respondent)

John T. Burns, Jr., Burns Law Office, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
On appeal from the denial of his motion to modify child support, appellant argues
that (1) the district court erred in its interpretation of the child-support pr ovision in the
stipulated judgment, and (2) the child-support magistrate abused its discretion by deviating
upward from the presumptive child-support guidelines. We affirm.
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FACTS
On September 19, 2019, appellant Jeffrey Robert Milbrandt (father) and respondent
Linsey Lee Milbrandt (mother) stipulated and agreed to resolve all dissolution issues as
part of a “global settlement .” Both parties were represented by counsel and entered into
the agreement after nearly nine hours of negotiation .
Pursuant to that agreement, father agreed to pay mother child support for their three
children. The parties agreed to the child-support obligation based on father’s historical
income as a subcontractor . For roughly ten years, father operated a security-consulting
firm whereby he provided private security overseas. Specifically, the parties agreed on the
record:
Child support is based on Mr. Milbrandt making a hundred
thousand dollars a year which turn s out roughly to be $8,333
per month, and Ms. Milbrandt making, I believe it’s $1,249 per
month, which means that after the parenting time adjustment,
Mr. Milbrandt’s child support obligation to Ms. Milbrandt is
$837 per month. That’s due on the first day of each month.

Both the parties and the district court understood th at the child-support agreement was
effective starting October 1, 2019 , and was part of a “universal property settlement and
maintenance buyout ,” including all of father’s unpaid child support to date, as well as the
custody-evaluator fees that father owed to mother.
Also a s part of the agreement, mother agreed to waive her right to spousal
maintenance and father agreed to pay mother a lump sum of $20,000. The parties also
agreed to equal parenting time, though mother did not believe that this arrangement was in
the best interests of the children.
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Both parties agreed to be bound by the terms of the agreement . The district court
issued an order for judgment and decree, incorporating the parties’ agreement . Under the
terms of the decree, father was obligated to make the $20,000 payment to mother by
December 31, 2019. Additionally, father was required to secure his child -support
obligation by carrying a $500,000 life-insurance policy, with mother as the beneficiary.
Father neither paid mother the $20,000 nor compl ied with the life -insurance
obligation. Five days after entering into the agreement, father applied for a job as a welder.
Within two weeks of the parties’ agreement, father began working as a welder , making
substantially less income than the $100,000 per year that he previously earned. On October
29, 2019, less than two months after resolving the child-support obligations by agreement
and before the entry of the judgment and decree , father filed a motion to modify his child -
support obligation to reflect hi s change in income.
On June 22, 2020, t he child-support magistrate ( the CSM) heard father’s
modification motion. The CSM partially granted father’s motion to modify child support ,
ordering father to pay mother $800 per month , a $ 37-per-month decrease from the prior
order, as ongoing basic support. In its order, the CSM noted that the modified award
represented an upward deviation from the child-support-obligation guidelines. Father then
brought a motion before the district court to review the CSM’s order granting an upward
deviation. After the hearing, the district court denied father’s motion, adopted the findings
of the CSM, and independently concluded that father had agreed to and was bound by the
child-support obligation set forth in the stipulated judgment. Father appeals.

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DECISION
I. The stipulated judgment is unambiguous regarding child support.

As an initial matter, father argues th at the district court erred by finding that the
stipulated judgment is unambiguous and instead asserts that the agreement is ambiguous
and “susceptible of at least two interpretations. ” We disagree.
“Courts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a me ans of simplifying and
expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious
relationship between the parties.” Shirk v. Shirk, 561 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn. 1997). We
“treat stipulated marriage-dissolution judgments as contracts for purposes of construction.”
Nelson v. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d 870, 872 (Minn. App. 2011). We will construe contract
language only if it is ambiguous. Starr v. Starr , 251 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Minn. 1977).
Language is ambiguous if it has multiple reasonable interpretations. Nelson, 806 N.W.2d
at 872. Whether contract language is ambiguous is a question of law that we review
de novo. Id. If the language is ambiguous, its meaning is a question of f act that we review
for clear error. See id. We read contract provisions in the context of the entire contract,
deriving the parties’ intent from the whole document rather than the individual clauses.
Country Club Oil Co. v. Lee, 58 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Minn. 1953).
Here, the stipulated judgment provides for a basic child-support obligation of $837
per month. The findings of fact in the judgment and decree further provide :
Child support shall continue until further Order of the Court,
or until such times as the last minor child of the parties reaches
the age of 18 years of age, or is under 20 years of age and still
attending secondary school, dies, is emancipated, or is
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otherwise self -supporting, whichever occurs first, at which
time [father]’s child support obligation shall be terminated.

The conclusions of law in the judgment and decree also provide that “[father’s] child
support obligation shall continue to be calculated according to the Findings of Fact above.”
These provisions are susceptible to only one reasonable interpretation: the parties agreed
that father’s child-support obligation would continue pursuant to the terms of the stipulated
judgment. Father suggests that the provision “could mean” that future child support
(1) “should be calculated according to the method utilized in the CSM’s findings, while
still being subject to statutory modifica tion provisions” or (2) “must be calculated strictly
according to the facts found in those findings, freezing support regardless of any statutory
modification provisions.” But father’s suggested alternate reading of the judgment both
reads language into the judgment and disregards statutory-modification procedures, neither
of which is reasonable. Accordingly, f ather does not set forth an alternative reasonable
interpretation of the unambiguous language in the judgment and we therefore discern no
error by the district court in its interpretation. 1

1 We observe that father’s contention that the agreement is ambiguous is based on matters
extrinsic to the agreement itself, notably his change in circumstance and his subjective
understanding at the time that he entered into the agreement. We do not consider such
extrinsic evidence when the language of an agreement is unambiguous. Erickson v.
Erickson, 449 N.W.2d 173, 178 (Minn. 1989); see also Starr, 251 N.W.2d at 342. We
observe that father was represented by counsel throughout the underlying proceedings,
expressed his understanding of the agreement at the time consistent with the unambiguous
stipulation, and entered into the agreement after a full day of negotiation.
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II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting an upward deviation
from the presumptively appropriate guideline s child-support amount.

Father argues th at the district court abused its d iscretion by affirming the CSM’s
award to mother of $800 per month in child support , representing an upward deviation
from the presumptive support amount of $408 per month under the guidelines .
Specifically, father contends th at the upward deviation was n ot supported by sufficient
findings under Minn. Stat § 518A.43, subd. 1 (2020). We disagree.
The district court has broad discretion to determine the appropriate support of the
parties’ children, and we will only reverse such a determination for an abuse of that
discretion. Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984) (“There must be a clearly
erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record before this court will find
that the trial court abused it s discretion.”). When a district court affirms a CSM’s ruling,
the affirmed ruling becomes the ruling of the district court, and this court reviews that
affirmed ruling as if it were made by the district court. Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 673 N.W.2d
528, 530 n.2 (Minn. App. 2004). Our standard of review of that affirmed ruling is the same
as if the decision had been made by a district court in the first instance. Ludwigson v.
Ludwigson, 642 N.W.2d 441, 445 -46 (Minn. App. 2002). We view the evidence in th e
light most favorable to the district court’s findings. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d
468, 474 (Minn. App. 2000).
A district court may deviate from the presumptive ly appropriate guideline s
child-support obligation to prevent the children and parent from living in poverty. Minn.
Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1; see also Marden v. Marden , 546 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App.
7
1996) (noting that “a court may deviate upward from the guidelines if the custodial parent
is unable to sustain a child’s accustomed standard of living, and the obligor has the ability
to do so”). The statute provides:
In addition to the child support guidelines and other factors
used to calculate the child support obligation under section
518A.34, the court must take into consideration the following
factors in setting or modifying child support or in determining
whether to deviate upward or downward from the presumptive
child support obligation:
(1) all earnings, income, circu mstances, and resources
of each parent, including real and personal property, but
excluding income from excess employment of the obligor or
obligee that meets the criteria of section 518A.29 , paragraph
(b);
(2) the extraordinary financial needs and resources,
physical and emotional condition, and educational needs of the
child to be supported;
(3) the standard of living the child would enjoy if the
parents were currently living together, but recognizing that the
parents now have separate households;
(4) whether the child resides in a foreign country for
more than one year that has a substantially higher or lower cost
of living than this country;
(5) which parent receives the income taxation
dependency exemption and the financial benefit the parent
receives from it;
(6) the parents’ debts as provided in subdivision 2; and
(7) the obligor’s total payments for court -ordered child
support exceed the limitations set forth in section 571.922.

Minn. Stat. § 518A.43, subd. 1.
The CSM considered each of these factors and made appropriate findings where
applicable, all of which were adopted by the district court . The findings specifically
considered both father and mother’s change in income and circumstances, the parenting
schedule, mother’s earning capacity, father’s ability to meet his needs and the needs of the
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children with mother, and the parties’ intentions and obligation s under the stipulated
judgment. The findings also noted that father’s new income as a welder was still “almost
three times as much as [mother’s income ],” that father was the sole provider before
dissolution, and specifically stated that father did not show that his new income was
insufficient to meet his needs while also supporting the children with mother. The findings
also stated that mother currently has a lower earning capacity than father and that deviation
is necessary both for the children’s reasonable standard of living and to prevent mother and
the children from living in poverty.
Importantly, the findings addressed the stipulated judgment, noting that it seemed
to intend an upward deviation . The findings also considered that a reduction in father’s
child-support payment would cause an unfair hardship to mother and the children ,
especially considering that he did not pay the $20,000 he owed to mother.
We have previously noted:
Generally, a stipulation fixing the respective rights and
obligations of the parties represents their voluntary
acquiescence in an equitable settlement, and the district court
should carefully and only reluctantly alter its terms. But, the
existence of a stipulation does not bar later consideration of
whether a change in circumstances warrants a modification.
Where child support is concerned, Minnesota caselaw
indicates that although a stipulation is one factor to be
considered in modification motions, ch ild support relates to
nonbargainable interests of children and is less subject to
restraint by stipulation than are other dissolution matters.

O’Donnell v. O ’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d 471, 475 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotations omitted).
Additionally, “[b]arring a showing of an actual substantial change in circumstance that
makes the terms of the order unfair and unreasonable,” the modification of child support
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simply based on a deviation from the presumptively applicable guideline “would be
contrary to the parties’ agreement and the judgment of the court.” Id. at 477. A stipulation
provides the “baseline circumstances against which claims of substantial change are
evaluated.” Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 709 (Minn. 1997) (making this statement
in the conte xt of a modification order) . We have held that a stipulated judgment with
findings explaining a support obligation that deviates from the presumptively applicable
guidelines obligation may rebut a presumption of unfairness and unreasonableness. See
O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d at 477 (“The stipulated judgment with findings is valid and rebuts
that presumption of unfairness and unreasonableness, and the propriety of modifying
support must then be determined based on whether there has actually been a substant ial
change in circumstances.”).
Here, the reason for father’s above-the-guidelines support obligation is self -evident:
to settle the marital-dissolution proceeding. The parties agreed to joint physical custody
and equal parenting time, mother waived her claims to spousal maintenance and certain
other amounts due from father, and father agreed to pay the above -the-guidelines
child-support obligation, to secure his obligation with life insurance, and to pay mother
$20,000. Father, however, neither procured the required life-insurance policy nor paid
mother the promised $20,000. Additionally, i mmediately after entering the stipulation,
father changed jobs and moved to reduce his child-support obligation based on his new ,
lower income. Thus, despite not sat isfying any of his obligations under the stipulated
judgment, father retains the benefits it awards him, including mother’s waiver of spousal
maintenance and other fees and arrears, joint physical custody, and equal parenting time.
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Mother currently earns significantly less than father and has a lower earning
capacity because she did not work for the majority of the time that the parties were married .
Mother testified that she received supplemental-nutrition-assistance-program benefits, that
the children were on free-and-reduced lunch plans , and that she and the children had
medical insurance through the state. Mother testified that she received these benefits based
on her limited income. Mother also testified that she had planned to use the $20,000 father
owed her to advance her career and better support her and the children’s needs.
The district court concluded that without an upward deviation in child support the
children would not be adequately sup ported in mother’s home. We see no clear error in
these findings and no abuse of discretion in the associated conclusions. The CSM and
district court appropriately considered the statutory factors and the parties’ stipulated
agreement and found that without the upward deviation mother and the children would live
in poverty. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting an upward deviation from the presumptive child -support guidelines.
Affirmed.