Eugene Francis Cuypers, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0171

Eugene Francis Cuypers, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed November 1, 2021
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-K1-00-004784

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hydukovich, Stillwater, Minnesota
(for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from an order denying a motion to correct his sentence, appellant
argues the district court erred by treating his motion as a time-barred postconviction
petition. He also argues equity supports his request to be sentenced like his codefendant.
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Because appellant’s sentence impacts a negotiated plea agreement, the district court did
not err by treating appellant’s motion to correct his sentence as a postconviction petition
and denying it as untimely. In the alternative, we also reject appellant’s equitable
sentencing argument. Thus, we affirm.
FACTS
In 1990, a jury convicted appellant Eugene Francis Cuypers of first-degree
premeditated murder, and the district court imposed a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. State v. Cuypers,
481 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Minn. 1992).
In August 2000, while Cuypers was an inmate at the Minnesota Correctional Facility
in Stillwater, he and Israel Ray Gaitan Jr. were indicted for the first-degree murder of
another inmate. In 2001, Cuypers reached a plea agreement, pleaded guilty to an amended
charge of second-degree unintentional murder, and admitted beating the deceased inmate
with a steel bar. At sentencing, the district court followed the parties’ request under the
plea agreement and imposed a 130-month prison sentence, a downward durational
departure from the presumptive sentence under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. The
sentence was to be served consecutively to his sentence for the 1990 conviction (“the 2001
sentence”). Cuypers did not appeal his 2001 conviction or sentence.
In 2002, codefendant Gaitan reached a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to an
amended charge of second-degree unintentional murder. At sentencing, the district court
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followed the parties’ request under the plea agreement and imposed a 169-month prison
sentence, to be served concurrently with the sentence Gaitan was already serving.1
Nineteen years later, Cuypers moved to correct his 2001 sentence. Cuypers’s motion
argued that the disparity between his consecutive sentence and Gaitan’s concurrent
sentence was inequitable and violated his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The district court first determined Cuypers’s 2001 sentence was imposed as
part of a negotiated plea agreement, therefore, the district court lacked authority to correct
the sentence. The district court then reasoned Cuypers’s motion should be treated as a
petition for postconviction relief, determined his petition was time-barred, and denied relief
without a hearing.
Cuypers appeals.
DECISION
A convicted defendant may seek relief from an illegal sentence in two ways. The
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that a “sentence not authorized by law”
may be corrected “at any time.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9. Minnesota’s
postconviction statute allows a convicted defendant to petition to correct a sentence when
the sentence “violate[s] the person’s rights under the Constitution or the laws of the United
States or of the state.” Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1(1) (2020). A petition for

1 When Gaitan and Cuypers killed the inmate, Gaitan was incarcerated for a 1993
first-degree murder conviction. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Gaitan’s 1993
conviction. State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11, 12 (Minn. 1995).
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postconviction relief, however, must typically be filed within two years of the date when a
conviction becomes final. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a) (2020).
Appellate courts review a district court’s order denying a motion to correct a
sentence for abuse of discretion. Townsend v. State, 834 N.W.2d 736, 738 (Minn. 2013).
An appellate court reviews “the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual
findings under the clearly erroneous standard.” Id. When “[t]he parties’ arguments present
issues regarding the interpretation of a procedural rule and statute,” like whether a district
court erred by treating a motion to correct a sentence as a petition for postconviction relief,
appellate review is de novo. State v. Coles, 862 N.W.2d 477, 479 (Minn. 2015).
Cuypers raises two issues, which we discuss in turn.
I. The district court correctly determined that Cuypers’s motion is an untimely
petition for postconviction relief.

Cuypers argues the district court erred by treating his rule 27.03 motion as a
postconviction petition because his motion “does not implicate material and bargained-for
terms of his plea bargain.” The state argues Cuypers’s 2001 sentence was negotiated as
part of his plea agreement so his motion must be treated as a petition for postconviction
relief and, as such, is time-barred.
Our analysis of whether Cuypers’s motion to correct his sentence must be treated as
a petition for postconviction relief is guided by the supreme court’s decision in Coles.
Coles, like Cuypers, moved to correct his sentence more than two years after his sentence
was imposed. Id. Before sentencing, Coles entered into a plea agreement in which the state
agreed to dismiss several charges, Coles agreed to plead guilty to a lesser charge, and the
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parties agreed to a sentence involving an upward durational departure from the sentencing
guidelines. Id. at 477.
Seven years later, Coles moved to correct his sentence under rule 27.03, arguing the
district court erred by departing from the guidelines. Id. at 479. The district court denied
the motion, concluding Coles’s request was a time-barred postconviction petition because
the motion implicated the plea agreement. Id. This court affirmed. State v. Coles,
A13-0789, 2013 WL 6570058 (Minn. App. Dec. 16, 2013). The supreme court granted
review and considered whether a defendant “may challenge his sentence in a motion to
correct his sentence,” under rule 27.03, subd. 9, or “whether his challenge must be brought
in a petition for postconviction relief.” Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 477.
The supreme court determined, “the plain language of Rule 27.03 is limited to
sentences.” Id. at 480. The supreme court reasoned that granting Coles’s motion would
mean “the terms of the plea agreement the parties reached will, in effect, have been
rejected.” Id. (quotation omitted). “If the defendant succeeds in reducing his or her
sentence, he or she retains the benefit of the reduced criminal charge but the State no longer
receives the benefit of the longer sentence.” Id . at 481. Because Coles moved to correct a
sentence “imposed as part of a plea agreement, a motion to change that sentence impacts
more than simply the sentence and Rule 27.03 does not apply.” Id. Thus, the supreme court
concluded Coles’s motion must be treated as a petition for postconviction relief, which was
time-barred, and therefore affirmed. Id. at 481–82.
With Coles in mind, we examine the record of Cuypers’s plea and sentence in 2001.
At the hearing, the parties outlined the terms of the negotiated plea agreement:
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DEFENSE ATTORNEY: . . . The state has agreed to amend
the charge to second degree unintentional murder . . . and
based on that amendment Mr. Cuypers is going to enter a plea
of guilty . . . .
We have an agreement that there would be a 130 month
cap on executed jail time, which would amount to a downward
departure, which is a negotiation between the parties. That’s
the agreement.

THE COURT: Do you have anything to add . . . ?
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Yes. The 130 months would
be consecutive to Mr. Cuypers current sentence that he’s
serving.

The district court then stated the presumptive sentence under the guidelines for
second-degree murder is 165 months. The district court accepted Cuypers’s guilty plea to
the amended charge, imposed a downward durational departure, and sentenced Cuypers to
130 months, to be served consecutively with his current sentence. Thus, the district court
imposed the 2001 sentence as part of its acceptance of the negotiated plea agreement. See
Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.04, subd. 3(2) (“[T]he district court judge must reject or accept the
plea of guilty on the terms of the plea agreement.”).
Cuypers’s appeal focuses on the consecutive term of his 2001 sentence. When a
defendant is sentenced for two or more crimes, whether committed at the same time or
separate times, the district court “shall specify whether the sentences shall run concurrently
or consecutively. If the court does not so specify, the sentences shall run concurrently.”
Minn. Stat. § 609.15, subd. 1(a) (2000). Whe n a defendant is sentenced for an offense in
prison while the defendant is serving a prison term, the guidelines presume the district court
will impose a consecutive sentence. Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F (2000); see State v.
Collins, 580 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 1998).
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Cuypers argues, “adjusting the consecutive nature of Cuypers’[s] sentence does not
deprive either side of the benefit of the bargain reached in the plea agreement because the
term was not a material and bargained-for term of the plea agreement.” He contends all
parties believed “Cuypers would be in prison his entire life on his initial murder
conviction” at the time of the sentencing hearing. According to Cuypers, whether he
received “a consecutive versus a concurrent sentence would not have mattered to the state
in negotiating the plea—what mattered was that Cuypers was convicted of the offense.”
Cuypers is correct that during the 2001 plea and sentencing hearing, the prosecuting
attorney, defense attorney, and the district court discussed that Cuypers would be in prison
for the rest of his life—until 2088, 2089, or 2091—regardless of the duration of the 2001
sentence.2 Cuypers is also correct that the consecutive term of his 2001 sentence was not
mentioned in his written plea petition. But during the hearing, the parties and the district
court expressly discussed that the 2001 sentence would be served consecutively to the
sentence Cuypers was then serving. For example, before imposing the 2001 sentence, the
district court stated:
I will go along with the joint request for a downward
durational departure based on the agreement of the
prosecution plus the fact that [Cuypers’s] supervised released
date on [his] present offense is so far into the distant future with

2 The rationale for believing that Cuypers would remain in prison until 2088, 2089, or 2091
is unclear. Cuypers’s brief argues that the parties’ belief was “erroneous” and that Cuypers
moved to correct his 2001 sentence “[a]fter learning he was eligible for supervised release
on his 1990 murder conviction.” For his 1990 conviction, Cuypers likely was eligible for
supervised release after serving 30 years of his life sentence. See Minn. Stat. § 244.05,
subd. 5 (2020). But Cuypers’s likely release date for his 1990 conviction is immaterial to
the issue on appeal. As explained in this opinion, the record shows that Cuypers’s 2001
sentence was part of a negotiated plea agreement.
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this consecutive sentence added onto it the likelihood that [he]
will ever see the light of day again is slim to none, no matter
[the] sentence I impose.

(Emphasis added.) Cuypers’s argument is therefore unpersuasive because his 2001
sentence—including the district court’s decision to impose the sentence consecutively —
was part of the negotiated plea agreement.
Cuypers asks this court to follow State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141 (Minn. 2007),
and Reynolds v. State, 888 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2016). He contends that, based on these two
cases, we should conclude his sentence was not the product of a plea bargain, therefore, it
may be corrected under rule 27.03. We disagree.
In Maurstad, the supreme court ordered the district court to corr ect a sentence
imposed after a plea agreement , relying, in part, on rule 27.03. 733 N.W.2d at 147. The
plea agreement provided only that the defendant would “be sentenced according to the
Minnesota sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 143. The district court, however, imposed a
sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score, which the supreme court determined
was an illegal sentence. Id. at 147. Coles differentiated the facts in Maurstad: “Unlike
Coles’ requested relief, adjusting Maurstad’s sentence to the correct sentence under the
guidelines did not deprive either side of the benefit of the bargain reached in the plea
agreement.” Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481 n.4.
In Reynolds, the parties reached a plea agreement, and the appellant pleaded guilty
to failing to register as a predatory offender; the district court imposed a sentence of one
year and one day in prison. 888 N.W.2d at 128. Months later, acting sua sponte, the district
court modified appellant’s sentence to include a ten-year conditional-release term. Id. On
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an appeal from the modified sentence, the supreme court determined the modified sentence
was not authorized by law and could be corrected under rule 27.03, in part, because the
ten-year conditional-release term was not contemplated in the plea agreement. Id. at 130.
In short, the appellants’ requests for relief in Maurstad and Reynolds did not
implicate the bargained-for plea agreement. Our review of Cuypers’s 2001 sentencing
hearing shows the opposite. Cuypers’s attorney described the parties’ negotiated agreement
as including a dismissed change, an amended charge, and the downward durational
departure. The prosecuting attorney stated that the parties agreed the 2001 sentence would
be consecutive to Cuypers’s 1990 sentence. The district court also stated it was accepting
the parties’ “joint request for a downward dispositional departure” because Cuypers would
be released “in the distant future,” in part noting that “this consecutive sentence [would be]
added onto it.” Thus, the record shows the parties bargained for and the district court
accepted the consecutive term of Cuypers’s 2001 sentence.
To conclude, any modification of Cuypers’s sentence would impact “more than
simply the sentence,” therefore, Cuypers’s motion to correct his sentence must be treated
as a petition for postconviction relief. See Coles, 862 N.W.2d at 481. Cuypers’s petition
for postconviction relief is therefore untimely because he filed it 19 years after he was
sentenced. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(a).
3 For that reason, we affirm the district
court’s order denying Cuypers’s motion as a time-barred postconviction petition.

3 Cuypers had more than two years from his 2001 sentence in which to bring a
postconviction petition. The postconviction statute became effective in July 2005.
2005 Minn. Laws ch. 136, art. 14 § 13, at 1097. The postconviction statute provides : “[a]
defendant whose conviction became final before August 1, 2005, had until July 31, 2007,
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II. Alternatively, Cuypers did not meet his burden of proving his sentence is
unlawful.

Because we affirm the district court’s denial of Cuypers’s postconviction petition
as untimely, we need not reach Cuypers’s equity-in-sentencing argument. Even if we
assume Cuypers’s petition is timely, however, his second argument fails. When a defendant
moves to correct his sentence, the defendant bears the burden of proving the illegality of
his sentence. Williams v. State, 910 N.W.2d 736, 742–43 (Minn. 2018). Cuypers argues his
sentence is unlawful because equity requires that he be treated the same as his similarly
situated codefendant, Gaitan, who received a concurrent sentence of 169 months to
Cuypers’s consecutive sentence of 130 months. The state contends Cuypers’s rule 27.03
motion fails because Cuypers provided no “viable basis for comparison of his culpability
compared with that of Gaitan.”
Minnesota caselaw and the sentencing guidelines recognize equitable principles in
sentencing codefendants. See State. v. McClay, 310 N.W.2d 683, 685–86 (Minn. 1981)
(affirming as modified identical sentences for codefendants because conviction offense,
criminal history, and basis for upward departure was identical for both defendants); see
also Minn. Sent. Guidelines I (2000) (“equity in sentencing” requires “convicted felons

to file a timely petition for postconviction relief. After July 31, 2007, such a defendant is
not entitled to petition for postconviction relief unless the defendant satisfies one of the
exceptions in Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b).” Staunton v. State, 842 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Minn.
2014) (citations omitted). Because Cuypers’s sentence was final in 2001, he had until July
2007 to petition for postconviction relief.
We note that the postconviction relief statute includes five exceptions under which
a court may consider an otherwise untimely petition. See Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)
(2020). Cuypers does not contend that any exceptions apply to his case.
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similar with respect to relevant sentencing criteria ought to receive similar sanctions”). An
appellate court may “modify the sentence of an appealing defendant if that appears to be
in the interests of fairness and uniformity.” State v. Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d 110, 112 (Minn.
1983).
Cuypers makes two arguments to support his claim that he and Gaitan were similarly
situated. First, Cuypers argues in his primary brief that he and “Gaitan had the same
criminal histories.” In his reply brief, however, Cuypers concedes this statement was
“likely inaccurate” because “it appears Cuypers had additional convictions from 1988 and
1989.” It is correct, as Cuypers argues, that “[o]n the date of offense in 2000 both Cuypers
and Gaitan were in prison for one prior murder conviction.” But it is insufficient to simply
establish one similar prior conviction. See, e.g. , Vazquez, 330 N.W.2d at 112 (rejecting
equitable-sentencing argument based on codefendant’s sentence of shorter duration even
though both had the same criminal history because appellant’s sentence was “not a
relatively harsh sentence”).
Second, Cuypers argues he and Gaitan “both pleaded guilty to unintentional
second-degree murder for causing the death of an inmate in prison in the same incident”
and the lesser sentence Cuypers received shows “that the judge found his conduct less
severe.” We are not convinced. Both Cuypers and Gaitan pleaded guilty to second-degree
unintentional murder. T his court has repeatedly stated, however, that “a defendant is not
entitled to a reduction in his sentence merely because a codefendant received a lesser
sentence.” State v. Olson, 765 N.W.2d 662, 665 (Minn. App. 2009); see also State v.
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Krebsbach, 524 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn. App. 1994), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 13, 1995);
State v. Starnes, 396 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Minn. App. 1986).
Cuypers admitted at the plea hearing that he killed the victim with a “cold-rolled
steel bar,” hitting him “five, maybe six” times, with two or three blows to the head. After
this admission by Cuypers, the district court followed the negotiated plea agreement and
imposed a downward durational departure. We agree with the state that the downward
departure does not show the district court found Cuypers had lesser responsibility.
Based on this record, Cuypers did not meet his burden of proving he and Gaitan
were similarly situated. The only evident similarity is that both Cuypers and Gaitan were
in prison for a prior murder conviction when they were indicted as codefendants for another
murder, which is insufficient. Thus, Cuypers’s sentence is lawful.
Affirmed.