Cited by
- In the Matter of: Minn. Ct. App. 2024
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Christie v. Estate 911 N.W.2d 833
- Landmark Cmty. Bank, N.A. v. Klingelhutz 927 N.W.2d 748
- Steeves v. Campbell 508 N.W.2d 817
- Madson v. Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. 612 N.W.2d 168
- 907 N.W.2d 233 not in our corpus
- 906 N.W.2d 495 not in our corpus
- Pechovnik v. Pechovnik 765 N.W.2d 94
- 963 N.W.2d 214 not in our corpus
- Marriage of Matson v. Matson 638 N.W.2d 462
Opinion text
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0177
A21-0178
In the Matter of:
Xiaoyan Sun, petitioner,
Respondent,
vs.
Qiang Yang,
Appellant,
and
In the Matter of:
Qiang Yang, and OBO minor children, petitioner,
Appellant,
vs.
Xiaoyan Sun,
Respondent.
Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Smith, Tracy M., Judge
Ramsey County District Court
File Nos. 62-DA-FA-20-451, 62-DA-FA-20-507
Lucas J.M. Dawson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)
Edward R. Shaw, Brainerd, Minnesota (for appellant)
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Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and
Gaïtas, Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SMITH, TRACY M., Judge
In these consolidated app eals, appellant Qiang Yang challenges the district court’s
grant of an order for protection (OFP) sough t by his estranged wife, respondent Xiaoyan
Sun, and the district court’s denial of his petition for an OFP against Sun. Yang argues that
the district court erred by denying his postdecision motions for a new trial and for amended
findings. Yang also argues that the district court’s orders gran ting and denying the OFP
petitions are not supported by the evidence. Finally, Yang challenges the limitations on his
parenting time imposed by the district court as part of the OFP against him. We affirm.
FACTS
Sun and Yang are married and have two children, born in 2014. On April 22, 2020,
Yang called the police to Sun and Yang’s home following an incident that occurred in the
presence of the children while the children were playing outdoors. Sun reported that Yang
had become angry with her and pushed her, a nd Yang denied it and claimed that Sun had
“dragged” the children away from him. The following week, following petitions filed by
both parties, the district court granted Sun an ex parte OFP against Yang and denied Yang’s
request for an ex parte OFP against Sun.
The district court thereafter held a seri es of hearings in which it heard from the
parties and other witnesses re garding Sun and Yang’s relations hip as well as the specific
events of April 22. The testimony from Sun and her witnesses included accounts that Yang
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had been violent toward Sun in the past and that Yang had disparaged Sun to their children
and had told them to falsely report that Sun had hurt them. Yang denied these accounts and
claimed that Sun abused the children and that he was very scared of her.
On October 9, the district court granted Sun’s petition for an OFP against Yang and
denied Yang’s petition for an OFP against Sun. The district court stated that it found Sun’s
testimony credible and Yang’s testimony not credible. The district court also ordered
Yang’s parenting time to be limited, supervised, and conducted in English if the supervisor
does not speak Mandarin Chinese.
Yang filed postdecision motions in both cas es, requesting that the district court
“set[] aside” its factual findi ngs, conclusions of law, and orders. In his motions, Yang
requested a new trial and that the district court amend its findings of fact based on the
introduction of what Yang a lleged was newly discovered ev idence. With re spect to the
OFP against him, Yang also alternatively reque sted modifications to the order regarding
Yang’s parenting time. On Decem ber 11, the district court de nied these motions in their
entirety.
Yang appealed the district court’s denial of both motions. This court consolidated
the appeals. Following informal briefing, a special-term panel of this court issued an order
determining that the December 11 order was not appealable. The special term panel
construed the consolidated appeals as being taken from the district court’s October 9 orders
granting and denying the petitions for the OF Ps. The special-term panel also concluded
that Yang’s appeals are not untimely beca use Yang’s postdecision motions, while not
appealable, nevertheless tolled the time to file an appeal.
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DECISION
I. The district court did not abuse its disc retion by denying Yang’s postdecision
motions.
Yang first argues that the district cour t erred by denying his postdecision motions
for a new trial and for amended findings. An appellate court reviews a district court’s
decision on a motion for a new trial or for amen ded findings for an abuse of discretion.
Christie v. Estate of Christie, 911 N.W.2d 833, 838 (Minn. 2018); Landmark Cmty. Bank,
N.A. v. Klingelzhutz, 927 N.W.2d 748, 754 (Minn. App. 2019).
As for the district court’s denial of Yang’s motion for a new trial, this court, as noted
above, already issued an or der determining that the dist rict court’s December 11 order
denying the motion for a new trial is not a ppealable. We made that decision because a
motion for a new trial is not authoriz ed in a domestic-abuse proceeding. See Steeves v.
Campbell, 508 N.W.2d 817, 817-18 (Minn. App. 1993) (conclu ding that domestic-abuse
proceedings are “special proceedings” in which motions for new trial are not authorized).
Instead, appeal must be taken from the original order or judgment. Id. Because a motion
for a new trial is not authorized in a domes tic-abuse proceeding, a district court cannot
abuse its discretion by denying such a motion.
Yang argues, though, that this court coul d not have accepted jurisdiction over his
appeals unless we believed that his motion fo r a new trial was meritorious. He contends
that our special-term panel decision would otherwise be incomprehensible. The argument
is incorrect. Our special-term panel accepted re view of the district court’s OFP decisions
on the ground that Yang’s postdecision motions properly tolled his time to appeal,
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regardless of the substantive merit of those motions. See Madson v. Minn. Mining & Mfg.
Co., 612 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. 2000) (holding that a postdecision motion may toll the
time for appeal even if the motion lacks merit). The special-term panel did not address the
merits of the postdecision motions.1
As for the district court’s denial of Yang’s motion for amended findings, Yang
argues that the district court should have granted his motion based on new evidence. But
“a motion for amended findings must be based on the record previously submitted to the
district court, and the distri ct court may neither go outside the record, nor consider new
evidence when addr essing the motion.” Cook v. Arimitsu , 907 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn.
App. 2018) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2018). Because the district
court cannot consider new evidence when addressing the motion, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Yang’s motion for amended findings.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Sun an OFP against
Yang and denying Yang an OFP against Sun.
Yang next argues that the district court di d not have sufficient evidence to support
its decisions to grant an OFP against him and to deny his petition for an OFP against Sun.
“[Appellate courts] review the decision to grant an OFP for an abuse of discretion.
A district court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on an erroneous view of the
1 For her part, Sun argues that this court la cks jurisdiction to consider Yang’s appeals
because they were untimely. Because the special-term pane l already determined that
Yang’s postdecision motions tolled the appeal period and that this court has jurisdiction to
consider the consolidated appeal, Sun’s ar gument also amounts to an impermissible
petition for rehearing. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 140. 01. Thus, Sun’s jurisdictional
argument fails.
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law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Thompson v. Schrimsher, 906 N.W.2d
495, 500 (Minn. 2018) (quotation and citation omitted).
The district court’s grant and denial of the respective petitions for OFPs were based
on its findings of fact made after evidentiary hearings. “Findings of fact, whether based on
oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the cr edibility of the
witnesses.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01.
[I]n our review of an OFP, we review the record in the light
most favorable to the district court’s findings, and we will
reverse those findings only if we are left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made. . . . [W]e neither
reconcile conflicting evidence no r decide issues of witness
credibility, which are exclusiv ely the province of the
factfinder.
Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotations and citations
omitted); see In re Civil Commitment of Kenney , 963 N.W.2d 214, 221-23 (Minn. 2021)
(addressing clear-error standard of review).
The record in these cases contains tes timony from both parties and from several
witnesses. Sun testified that, on April 22, Yang became angry when she joined him and the
children outside and that he pushed her when she approached one of the children who had
started crying. She testified that, in the past, Yang had broken several items in the home in
anger, had choked her, and had slapped her. Sun also testified that Yang exhibited
controlling behavior, including ordering her to wear certain clothes and forcing to her
purchase $500 phone cards that he would then cut up. She testified that Yang exhibited
similar controlling behavior toward the children. Additionally, Sun testified that Yang told
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the children that she was “a liar, a b*tch, and a murderer.” Several of Sun’s neighbors and
colleagues testified, largely corroborating her testimony.
Yang also testified, denying that he had pu shed Sun on April 22. He testified that
Sun forcefully took the children from him and “dragged” them to the garage. He also
testified that it was Sun wh o had broken items throughout the home. He denied Sun’s
allegations that he had been violent toward her. Yang testified that he filed for an OFP
against Sun because he was “very scared” of her and that she “abuse[d]” the children.
Yang’s mother testified from China, largely corroborating Yang’s testimony, with several
inconsistencies.
Regarding the April 22 incident, a neighbor testified that he saw Yang shove Sun
“really hard.” The neighbor also testified that he witnessed Yang tell the children, “When
the police get here use your English to tell them that your mother’s bad.” Another neighbor
testified that she observed Yang tell the children to tell the police, “Mommy hurt me.” The
responding officer testified that Sun and the children appeared “scared.”
Yang argues that this record is insufficient to support the district court’s findings.
With respect to the district court’s grant of an OFP, Yang argues that the evidence was
“undermined by the Respondent’s own descrip tions of the events, too general, or too
remote to sustain a finding that the Appellant was an i mmine nt threat.” To support his
argument, Yang restates a large portion of the account of events that he provided in the
evidentiary hearing. Yang makes similar argume nts in his appeal challenging the district
court’s denial of his petition for an OFP against Sun. He argues that the various witnesses’
8
testimony was “untrue, exaggerated, or evidence of the Respondent’s own behavior” and
that the court was inconsistent in its determinations of credibility.
These arguments are unavailing. At bottom, a ll of them challenge the district court’s
determinations of witness credibility, and we defer to those determinations. See Pechovnik,
765 N.W.2d at 99.
Yang also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not amending its
factual findings based on the affidavit and e xhibits that he offered in his postdecision
motions. As described above, however, Yang’s postdecision motion for amended findings
does not allow for the submission of new evidence.
In sum, because Yang fails to establish that the eviden ce is insufficient to support
the district court’s findings, the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Sun’s
petition for an OFP against Yang and denying Yang’s petition for an OFP against Sun.
III. The district court did not abuse its disc retion in its order regarding Yang’s
parenting time.
Yang next argues that the district court erred by limiting his parenting time.
Under the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act, a court may
award temporary custody or es tablish temporary parenting
time with regard to minor children of the parties on a basis
which gives primary consideration to the safety of the victim
and the children. In additio n to the primary safety
considerations, the court may cons ider particular best interest
factors that are found to be re levant to the temporary custody
and parenting time award.
Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 6( a)(4) (2020). The district c ourt has broad discretion in
making custody and paren ting-time determinations. Matson v. Matson, 638 N.W.2d 462,
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465 (Minn. App. 2002). When appellate courts review parenting-time awards made in an
OFP, we do so “in the light most favorable to the district court’s findings, and we will
reverse those findings only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake
has been made.” Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99 (quotations omitted).
In the OFP against Yang, th e district court established a schedule for Yang’s
parenting time, required that his parenting time be supervised, and directed that, unless the
supervisor speaks Yang’s native language of Mandarin Chinese, the parenting visits be
conducted in English.
Yang argues that the district court abused its discretion because it made no specific
findings of how he was a danger to the children. He also argues that limiting the children’s
access to him is not in their best interests. Finally, Yang asserts that the court’s ruling
“seriously threatens the children’s cultural upbringing” because it “cuts [the children] off”
from his heritage and native language.
We discern no abuse of discretion. The dist rict court found that, “for the safety of
[Sun]” and “the children’s best interest[s],” Yang’s parenting time sh ould be supervised
and in English unless the supervisor speaks Mandarin. The district court noted Sun’s
testimony, which it found credible, included allegations that Yang had been violent toward
her and also that Yang told the children in Chinese that Sun is a “liar, a b*tch, and a
murderer” and that they should lie to the po lice about the April 22 incident. The district
court also noted Sun’s concern that Yang would continue this type of behavior if he were
awarded unsupervised parenting time. The di strict court’s findings are supported by the
record, and those findings support the district court’s determinations that the safety of Sun
10
and the best interests of the children warra nt the limitations placed on Yang’s parenting
time.
Finally, contrary to Yang’s assertions, the limitations do not threaten the children’s
cultural upbringing. The district court’s order does not prohibit Yang from speaking
Mandarin Chinese when the visitation supervisor speaks that language; it simply attempts
to ensure meaningful supervision of Yang ’s parenting time by requiring Yang to speak
English when the supervisor does not speak Mandarin.
Affirmed.