Aaron Olson, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0179

Aaron Olson,
Appellant,

vs.

Central Housing Associates LP, et al.,
Defendants,

Christopher Kalla,
Respondent.

Filed October 4, 2021
Affirmed
Slieter, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CV-19-10584

Aaron Olson, Minneapolis, Minnesota (pro se appellant)

Christopher T. Kalla, Hanbery & Turner, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Slieter, Judge; and Rodenberg,
Judge.


 Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
SLIETER, Judge
Appellant claims the district court erred by denying his motion to join
respondent-attorney Christopher Kalla as a defendant to this action. Appellant wished to
amend his complaint against his former landlord to allege defamation by Kalla.1 Because
the district court correctly concluded that Kalla possessed absolute privilege, the motion
was properly denied, and we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Aaron Olson sued his former landlord, Central Housing Associates LP
(CHA), alleging various claims including purported violati ons of the Minnesota Human
Rights Act. In an underlying eviction acti on, CHA sought to remove appellant from the
Holmes Greenway apartments. Holmes Greenway is an apartment building for individuals
with physical disabilities. The sole issue in this appeal i nvolves review of the district
court’s decision to deny appellant’s motion, initiated long after responsive pleadings were
served, to join res pondent Christopher Kall a—an attorney who ha d represented CHA in
the underlying eviction proceedings. Appellant wished to sue Kalla for defamation based
upon comments he allegedly made while representing CHA.2

1 The dismissal by the district court of all ot her claims by appellant against his former
landlord is not before us.

2 Kalla was named as a defendant to claims other than defamation in appellant’s initial
complaint against CHA. The district court dismissed all claims against Kalla in an October
16, 2019 order, concluding that the claims alleged either were untimely, were more
properly asserted against CHA, or otherwise failed as a matter of law.
3
Appellant’s motion to add Kalla indicated that it was “based on new evidence
acquired through discovery and not known to [appellant] previously despite his diligent
investigation.” (quotation omitted). In denyi ng the joinder motion, the district court
concluded that appellant’s claims of defama tion were “futile” due to Kalla’s absolute
privilege as an attorney for CHA. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Once a responsive pleading has been se rved, “a party may amend a pleading only
by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given
when justice so requires.” Minn. R. Civ. P. 15.01. “Generally, the decision to permit or
deny amendments to pleadings is within the discretion of the district court and will not be
reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Johns v. Harborage I, Ltd., 664 N.W.2d 291,
295 (Minn. 2003). “Whether the district c ourt has abused its discretion on a motion to
amend may turn on whether it was correct in an underlying legal ruling.” Doe v. F.P., 667
N.W.2d 493, 500-01 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied , (Minn. Oct. 21, 2003). Such
questions of law are reviewed de novo. Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard , 729 N.W.2d
302, 306 (Minn. 2007).
Appellant argues that the district cour t erred by concluding that Kalla was entitled
to absolute privilege and, consequently, it w ould be “futile” to grant the joinder motion.
We disagree.
The district court properly applied the law as it relates to the pr ivilege afforded to
attorneys in the context of defamation. In Mahoney & Hagberg v. Newgard, the supreme
court, in examining a claim of defamation against a former law firm secretary, held that:
4
[s]tatements, even if defamatory, may be protected by absolute
privilege in a defamation lawsuit if the statement is (1) made
by a judge, judicial officer, attorney, or witness; (2) made at a
judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding; and (3) the statement at
issue is relevant to the subject matter of the litigation.

Id. at 306. “ When absolute privilege applies, the speaker is completely shielded from
liability for her statements, even statements that are intentionally false or made with
malice.” Id. “Absolute privilege extends to stat ements published prior to the judicial
proceeding, but in order for the privilege to apply, such statements must have some relation
to the judicial proceeding.” Id.
The district court concluded that the alleged defamatory statement was (1) made by
an attorney (Kalla), (2) during a judicial proceeding (the March 2018 eviction proceeding),
and (3) relevant to the subject matter of th e litigation (the investig ation of appellant’s
conduct with relation to a possible physical di sability). The record s upports the district
courts conclusion.
CHA was represented by Kalla as its attorney in an eviction action against appellant.
The basis of its eviction action against appellant was that he was not physically disabled as
required for tenancy at Holmes Greenway apar tments. During appellant’s deposition of
one of the partners of CHA, the partner relayed to appellant a statement from Kalla
suggesting that appellant fraudulently claimed to be physically disabled. It is undisputed
that Kalla made the alleged defamatory statements while acting as attorney for CHA during
the March 2018 eviction proceedings. Moreover, Kalla’s statement directly related to the
subject matter of the litigation—appellant’s ev iction. Therefore, a ll the requirements for
absolute privilege are satisfied. Id.
5
Appellant argues that absolute privilege sh ould not be granted where, as allegedly
occurred here, the statements in question were “false” and we re made without any intent
to “further[] the litigation.” However, as made clear in Mahoney, absolute privilege
equally applies to false statements. Id.
Because Kalla was entitled to absolute pr ivilege, the claims for which appellant
sought to join Kalla to this matter could not have been maintained. Therefore, the district
court did not abuse its discre tion in denying the motion. Hunt v. Univ. of Minn. , 465
N.W.2d 88, 95 (Minn. App. 1991) (“[A]n amendment to a complaint may properly be
denied when the additional alleged claim cannot be maintained.”).
Affirmed.