In re the Marriage of:

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0180

In re the Marriage of:

John Edward Warrington, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Karen Lee Warrington,
Appellant

Filed January 3, 2022
Affirmed as modified; motion denied
Bratvold, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-16-3836

Anne M. Honsa, Deborah M. Gallenberg, Honsa & Mara, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Matthew J. Gilbert, Gilbert Alden Barbosa PLLC, Burnsville, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
In this appeal from the district court’s order granting in part and denying in part
motions to modify child support and spousal maintenance, appellant argues the district

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court erred by (1) providing child support would terminate “when the child is 18 or
deceased” even though their child will be attending secondary school after his eighteenth
birthday; ( 2) determining no substantial change in circumstances rendered appellant’s
existing spousal maintenance award unreasonable and unfair; (3) denying appellant’s
motion to compel discovery about respondent’s financial status; and (4) denying
appellant’s motion for need-based attorney fees. We conclude the district court committed
a clerical error when it granted the motion to modify child support, therefore, we correct
the clerical error by modifying the district court’s ruling on that point. We also conclude
the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s motions to modify
spousal maintenance, compel discovery, and award need-based attorney fees. Thus, we
affirm as modified.
FACTS
A. 2017 dissolution
Appellant Karen Lee Warrington and respondent John Edward Warrington were
married in 2002.1 In re Marriage of Warrington, No. A19-0482, 2020 WL 1501972, at *1
(Minn. App. Mar. 30, 2020) ( Warrington I). They have one joint child, born in 2003. Id.
The district court dissolved their marriage on July 6, 2017. Id. Before dissolution, the
parties agreed on legal custody, but disputed other issues, including spousal maintenance
and child support, which were tried to the district court. Id. at *2-3. Our previous opinion,

1 For clarity, this opinion will refer to the parties by their first names.
3
portions of which we recount below as relevant to the issues in this appeal, summarizes the
district court’s dissolution decree.
John was employed as a pilot with FedEx, with a gross monthly income of $28,729,
or approximately $345,000 per year. Id. at *1. Karen “was self-employed as a commodities
broker, operated as a sole proprietor, . . . and had been affiliated exclusively with McVean
Trading & Investments LLC (McVean) since 1994.” Id. To calculate spousal maintenance
and child support, the district court found Karen’s income was $167,476. Id. But the district
court declined to rely on this number, finding Karen had “credibly and sufficiently
demonstrated that he r income from McVean ha[d] decreased and [would] decrease
further.” The district court relied in part on Karen’s own testimony that she was
contemplating a change in her career and this change would temporarily decrease her
income. Id. The district court also relied on the cash-flow analysis by Karen’s expert, who
opined that, after entry of the dissolution decree, Karen’s 2017 income would be only
$75,000.
The district court first found the parties had a high standard of living during the
marriage and that Karen was temporarily unable to provide for her reasonable needs. The
district court next awarded temporary spousal maintenance for three years of $7,750 per
month until the sale of the marital homestead and of $2,250 following the sale of the
homestead. Id. The district court also ordered John to pay child support of $1,027 per
month. Id. No appeal was taken from the dissolution decree.
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B. Karen’s 2018 motion to modify child support and maintenance
Karen moved to modify spousal maintenance about one year later. Id. at *2. Karen
alleged an increase in John’s income and a decrease in her income were substantial changes
in circumstances that made the existing order unreasonable and unfair. Id. Specifically,
Karen alleged her income had “plummeted from $167,484 to $89,568, reflecting a 46.5%
decrease.” Karen also requested an increase in monthly child support. Id. The district court
denied the motions, concluding Karen failed to prove a change in circumstances that
rendered the existing maintenance and support awards unreasonable and unfair, as “the
parties and the Court knew [at the time of dissolution] that [Karen’s] income would
decrease. What was expected to happen cannot be considered a change of circumstances.”
C. The first appeal
Karen appealed the order denying her motions. In Warrington I, this court reversed
and remanded, concluding the district court abused its discretion by “fail[ing] to make
findings necessary to determine whether the statutory presumptions apply to this case.” Id.
at *5. We first stated, “[a] decrease in [Karen’s] income of at least 20% through no fault or
choice of hers would require the district court to apply the two statutory presumptions to
[Karen’s] spousal maintenance modification motion.” Id., at *4 (citing Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5) (2018)). We therefore remanded with specific instructions for
“the district court to determine the change in [Karen’s] income and to determine whether
the change satisfies the thresholds set forth in section 518A.39, subdivision 2(b)(5).” Id .
We also stated:
5
It is not enough to conclude that [Karen’s] income decreased,
as anticipated in the 2017 judgment and decree. The degree of
decrease in income might exceed what had been anticipated at
the time of [Karen’s] initial testimony prior to the issuance of
the 2017 judgment and decree. Alternatively, the decrease may
have resulted from some reason other than what was
contemplated prior to the issuance of the 2017 judgment and
decree.

Id.
Before we issued our opinion in Warrington I, Karen moved for this court to award
need-based appellate attorney fees of $22,163. Warrington v. Warrington, No. A19-0482
(Minn. App. Mar. 30, 2020) (order). We remanded the motion to the district court because
Karen’s supporting documentation was “insufficient to facilitate this court’s determination
as to the reasonableness of the claimed time and fees” and “the proceedings on remand
may affect the parties’ ability to pay attorney fees.” Id. at *3.
D. Karen’s 2020 motion to modify maintenance
Three months after Warrington I was issued, and while Karen’s remanded motions
to modify child support and maintenance and for need-based fees were before the district
court, Karen again moved to modify spousal maintenance and sought need-based attorney
fees. This 2020 motion did not include child support and reiterated Karen’s request to
increase maintenance, asking for the same amount as Karen’s 2018 motion, $9,632 per
month.
But Karen’s 2020 motion requested for the first time that maintenance be modified
to continue indefinitely, until the death of a party, Karen’s remarriage, or further order of
the district court. Karen argued permanent maintenance was warranted as “it is unknown
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whether [Karen] will ever be able to earn sufficient income to meet her budget consistent
with the marital standard of living.” Karen claimed several intervening circumstances had
occurred since her 2018 motion to modify.
In the affidavit provided in support of her motion, Karen averred that two years
earlier, shortly before the 2017 dissolution decree was issued, McVean had “dissociated
with [her], leaving [her] without a CFTC registration, without clients, and without an
ability to immediately earn income.”2 Karen attested she founded her own business, “Ryder
Capital LLC in an effort to continue working in the commodity trading industry” because
she “believed [she] had the best chance to make a similar income to what [she] had earned
at McVean.” She also attested she had had no income over a long time during which she
was not registered and based on “the lengthy process of re-registering with the CFTC and
NFA.”
Karen averred her income remained low after she formed Ryder due to market
forces such as low commodity prices, a decline in assets allocated to commodity trading
advisors, tighter compliance with regulatory requirements, and the effect of the COVID-19
pandemic. Karen attested that “while [she was] still agreeable to the Court imputing income
to [her] of $89,568 (the amount [she] last earned with McVean), the reality is [she] cannot
realistically earn this amount and [she did] not know if [she would] ever be able to earn

2 Registration with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and National
Futures Association (NFA) is a prerequisite for much of Karen’s work as a commodities
trader.
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[that] amount again.” Karen also submitted exhibits about her finances and a real estate
company she started as an attempt to earn more income.
Several months later, Karen moved to compel discovery, requesting John be
compelled to produce documents related to employee benefits, bank statements,
bank-account statements, credit-card statements, and other business documents relating to
John’s business “J&W Air LLC,” which she alleged provided commercial flights.
The district court conducted a hearing on Karen’s 2018 and 2020 motions to modify
and her motion to compel discovery and the remanded motion for attorney fees. In a written
order, the district court denied Karen’s 2018 and 2020 motions to modify spousal
maintenance and granted her motion to modify child support. As for Karen’s 2018 motion,
the district court found that Karen’s income had decreased, but also found this decrease
was no greater than had been contemplated at the time of dissolution decree, and therefore
no substantial change in circumstances had occurred. As for Karen’s 2020 motion, the
district court found that while Karen’s income had “markedly decreased [] since the June
2018 motion,” this was in part because of Karen’s failure to make “reasonable efforts to
become self-supporting.” The district court concluded Karen was “not entitled to an award
of further spousal maintenance.”
The district court also denied Karen’s motions to compel discovery and for
need-based attorney fees. 3 The district court granted Karen’s motion for increased child

3 The district court issued additional rulings on conduct-based attorney fees, a motion for
ex parte relief, and a motion to exclude certain expert testimony, but none of these issues
are raised in this appeal.
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support, determining a substantial change in circumstances occurred under Minn. Stat.
§ 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1). The district court found, based on the parties’ new income, the
amount of child support was “at least 20 percent and at least $75 per month higher or lower
than the current support order.”
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. Clerical error in the order modifying child support
For purposes of child support, a “child” is statutorily defined as “an individual
under 18 years of age, [or] an individual under age 20 who is still attending secondary
school . . . .” Minn. Stat. § 518A.26, subd. 5 (2020) (emphasis added). Here, noting that
the parties’ child will attend secondary school after the child turns 18 and that neither party
asked the district court to deviate from the statutory definition of “child,” Karen argues that
the district court erred by requiring John to pay child support only “until the child is 18 or
is deceased.” John candidly concedes that the duration of his support obligation is based
on a clerical error.4 This court can correct clerical errors on appeal. See Johnson v. Johnson,
379 N.W.2d 215, 218 (Minn. App. 1985) (addressing clerical errors); Minn. R. Civ. P.
60.01. We therefore modify the duration of John’s support obligation to require him to pay
support while the parties’ child is under age 18 or is under age 20 and attending secondary
school. Thus, we affirm this portion of the district court’s order as modified.

4 We appreciate John’s candor on this point.
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II. Karen’s motions to modify spousal maintenance
Karen argues the district court abused its discretion by denying her 2018 and 2020
motions to modify spousal maintenance. District courts have broad discretion in deciding
spousal maintenance, and their orders are reversed only if the district court abuses that
discretion. Honke v. Honke, 960 N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021). “An abuse of discretion
occurs when a district court makes findings unsupported by the evidence or when it
improperly applies the law.” Id. (quotation omitted). A district court abuses its discretion
if it makes findings unsupported by the evidence, or if it improperly applies the law, or if
it resolves the discretionary question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on
record. Id.; see also Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997).
By statute, “[t]he terms of an order respecting maintenance or support may be
modified upon a showing of one or more of the following, any of which makes the terms
unreasonable and unfair.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(a). The statute then lists eight
circumstances that could allow modification of an existing maintenance or support
obligation, the first two of which are “substantially increased or decreased gross income of
an obligor or obligee[,]” and “substantially increased or decreased need of an obligor or
obligee or the child or children that are the subject of these proceedings.” Id., subd. 2(a)(1),
(2). Parties seeking a modification of support or maintenance (or both) have the burden of
proving both the change in circumstances and that the change in circumstances renders the
order unreasonable and unfair. Rose v. Rose, 765 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Minn. App. 2009);
Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 818 (Minn. App. 2001).
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Subdivision 2(b) also provides specific thresholds at which a change in
circumstance is presumed to be “substantial.” Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b). For
example, one threshold is whether “the gross income of an obligor or obligee has decreased
by at least 20 percent through no fault or choice of the party.” Id. The statutory presumption
works in two steps. Id.; Rose, 765 N.W.2d at 145; Frank-Brewtisch v. Ryan, 741 N.W.2d
910, 914 (Minn. App. 2007). First, a movant who establishes the threshold receives an
irrebuttable presumption that a substantial change has occurred. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2(b); Rose, 765 N.W.2d at 145. Second, a movant who establishes the threshold also
receives the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the existing support order is
unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b); see also Rose, 765 N.W.2d at
145; O’Donnell v. O’Donnell, 678 N.W.2d 471, 477 (Minn. App. 2004).
A. Karen’s 2018 motion
Regarding the 2018 motion to modify spousal maintenance, Karen argues the
district court erred by determining her income had decreased by less than the 20% threshold
that, under Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5), would entitle her to the statutory
presumptions discussed above. The district court compared Karen’s anticipated 2017
income of $75,000 at the time of the July 2017 dissolution judgment to her actual 2017
income of $89,568. By doing so, Karen contends “[t]he district court impermissibly relied
upon [Karen’s] speculation at trial [regarding future income] as the rationale for denying
[her] motion to modify spousal maintenance.” Karen explains the district court should have
compared her actual 2017 income of $89,568 to her actual pre-dissolution income of
$276,484. Karen argues her drop in actual income was greater than 20%, entitling her to
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the presumptions that a substantial change has occu rred and that the existing order is
unreasonable and unfair under section 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5).
The district court followed our remand instructions, as it must. See Janssen v. Best
& Flanagan, LLP, 704 N.W.2d 759, 763 (Minn. 2005) (district court “may act in any way
not inconsistent with the remand instructions provided.”). As a result, we reject Karen’s
argument. Warrington I remanded Karen’s 2018 motion and instructed the district
court to first determine Karen’s “current income” (i.e., her 2018 income) because “the
[modification] statute requires the district court to compare the current income to the
income findings in the 2017 judgment and decree.” Warrington I, at *4. Thus, on remand,
the district court correctly determined Karen’s current income, as of the time of the 2018
motion, and compared it to the income finding in the 2017 dissolution judgment. This
complies with relevant caselaw, which states that the baseline from which any change in
circumstances is measured is the later of when the award was set or the last time the award
was modified. Youker v. Youker, 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied
(Minn. Aug. 5, 2003).
Our remand instructions also directed, “[i]t is not enough to conclude that wife’s
income decreased, as anticipated in the 2017 judgment and decree.” Warrington I, at *4
(emphasis added). We stated a 20% decrease in Karen’s income would establish the
statutory presumptions in either of two situations: (1) “[t]he degree of decrease in income []
exceed[ed] what had been anticipated at the time of wife’s initial testimony prior to
the . . . 2017 judgment and decree”; or (2) “the decrease . . . resulted from some reason
other than what was contemplated prior to the issuance of the 2017 judgment and decree.”
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Id. Our remand instructions for the second situation provided that a decrease in Karen’s
income cannot establish the statutory presumptions unless the decrease resulted from a
cause not anticipated when the 2017 dissolution decree was issued. Id.
Karen’s brief to this court implies the district court erred but does not argue that the
remand instructions were unclear. While not entirely clear, Karen’s argument to this court
could be construed as a request that we reexamine parts of Warrington I. Any invitation to
do so would constitute a request that this court rehear the relevant part of Warrington I.
There is, however, no petition for rehearing in this court. Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01.
Thus, we decline any invitation to reexamine the remand instructi ons in Warrington I,
which are law of the case. See Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 744 n. 1 (Minn. 1994) (“The
doctrine of law of the case is a rule of practice followed between the Minnesota appellate
courts and the lower courts . . . . It ordinarily applies where an appellate court has ruled on
a legal issue and has remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings.”)
(citation omitted).
We conclude t he district court complied with our remand instructions. In
considering the first situation outlined in Warrington I, the district court determined
whether the “changed circumstances” prong of the test for modifying maintenance had
been satisfied. The district court began by relying on testimony by Karen and her expert
that, because of anticipated career changes, her actual income was expected to decrease for
the 2017 tax year to $75,000. The district court next found Karen’s 2017 actual income
was $89,568. The district court finally determined that, while Karen’s actual 2017 income
13
was a decrease from her income as found in the dissolution judgment,5 it was a “19%
increase” over the amount anticipated by the dissolution judgment. This analysis correctly
applies section 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5), and our remand instructions. In short, while
Karen’s actual 2017 income decreased, that decrease was less than “what had been
anticipated at the time of wife’s initial testimony.” See Warrington I, at *4.
The district court also considered the second situation outlined in Warrington I,
whether Karen’s income decrease “resulted from some reason other than what was
contemplated prior to the issuance of the 2017 judgment and decree.” Id. The district court
determined that “[none] of the reasons [Karen] identifie[d] for her decreased income during
the first year after dissolution were not known at the time of trial or long before trial.”
Again, the district court relied on Karen’s trial testimony that she was contemplating
pursuing new career options and expected that this route offered the best opportunity to
become self-supporting but would cause a short-term decrease of income. Because the
district court’s analysis tracks our remand instructions, we conclude the district court
correctly determined Karen failed to establish the statutory presumption of a substantial
change in circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(b)(5).6

5 As noted above, the district court found Karen’s income to be $167,476 for calculating
initial spousal maintenance and child support.

6 Karen also argues the district court erred by failing to apply the language of section
518A.39, subd. 2(b)(1), to her motion to modify spousal maintenance. This subdivision,
however, refers only to “child support.” Karen provides no caselaw applying the cited
subdivision to motions to modify spousal maintenance, therefore, we decline to consider
this argument because it lacks legal authority. See Scheffler v. City of Anoka, 890 N.W.2d
437, 451 (Minn. App. 2017) (“An assignment of error on mere assertion, unsupported by
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Karen also argues that, even if the statutory presumptions under section 518A.39,
subd. 2(b), do not apply to her 2018 motion, she demonstrated that a substantial change in
circumstances rendered the existing maintenance award unreasonable and unfair. But, as
already discussed, the record supports the district court’s finding there was no unexpected
change in circumstances. In other words, Karen’s decrease in actual 2017 income was
anticipated at the time of dissolution and was therefore not a change in circumstances
supporting modification.
Finally, while John’s 2017 income increased , our remand instructions stated that
“for purposes of [Karen’s] spousal maintenance modification motion, the district court
should consider decreases to [Karen’s] income.” Warrington I, at *3 (emphasis added). As
a result, any arguments about John’s increased income were beyond the narrow scope of
remand. The district court also followed existing caselaw stating that “a favorable change
in an ex-spouse’s income, absent a showing that the second threshold of Minnesota Statutes
§ 518.64, subd. 2 (unreasonableness and unfairness) has been met, does not by itself
constitute sufficient grounds to change [spousal maintenance].”
7 Cisek v. Cisek,
409 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. App. 1987).
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Karen’s 2018
motion to modify spousal maintenance.

argument or authority, is forfeited and need not be considered unless prejudicial error is
obvious on mere inspection.”).

7 Section 518.64 was later renumbered section 518A. 39. See generally Leifur v. Leifur,
820 N.W.2d 40, 42 n.2 (Minn. App. 2012) (noting the child-support statutes were
renumbered in 2005).
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B. Karen’s 2020 motion
Karen also challenges the district court’s denial of her 2020 motion to modify
spousal maintenance. This motion repeated Karen’s 2018 request for an increased amount
of spousal maintenance, and specifically requested that maintenance be made permanent.
The district court found Karen’s actual income had decreased 41% from the income she
expected for the period July 1, 2018, through June 30, 2019, as stated in the dissolution
decree, and that “this constitutes a change in circumstances.” The district court still denied
Karen’s motion after finding Karen failed to make reasonable efforts to become
self-supporting. On appeal, Karen argues the district court erred.
A party who receives an award of temporary maintenance must make reasonable
efforts to become self -supporting. Hecker v. Hecker , 568 N.W.2d 705, 710 n.4 (Minn.
1997) (“[The supreme court has] recognized an implicit requirement that a temporary
maintenance recipient make a reasonable effort to become self- supporting in accordance
with the expectations of the parties.”) (citing Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 198
(Minn. 1987)). Youker v. Youker clarified, indicating “[a]fter temporary maintenance has
been awarded, an obligee generally has the duty to rehabilitate” and “the obligee must
make reasonable efforts to become self-supporting.” 661 N.W.2d 266, 269 (Minn. App.
2003).
The district court stated, “[t]his is the central and all-consuming conflict between
the parties: what reasonable efforts did [Karen] make to rehabilitate?” The district court
concluded Karen failed to make reasonable efforts to become self- supporting and made
detailed findings of fact. Among other things, the district court stated it was “struck by the
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absence of any explanation why [Karen] did nothing for 18 months following the trial.” In
other words, Karen offered no evidence to explain why she did not leave McVean for
18 months after trial when, during trial, she testified that leaving McVean and forming her
own business would give her the best chance of increasing future income. The district court
also found Karen received significant assets during the dissolution and “was in an
extraordinarily strong financial position at least for the first half of the period of temporary
spousal maintenance.”
The district court reasoned Karen’s failure to become self-supporting was
unreasonable given this strong economic position and her prior education and skills. The
district court questioned Karen’s decision to invest significant assets into real estate, an
area in which Karen admitted she had little experience. The district court was not persuaded
by Karen’s argument that the COVID- 19 pandemic had interfered with her ability to
become self-supporting. The district court found Karen could have conducted business
virtually, as many other professionals did during the pandemic.
The district court summarized its reasoning about Karen’s failure to become
self-supporting:
In sum, the Court finds [Karen] did none of the things
she testified at trial she would do to reverse the downward
trend of her income and become a self-supporting in the
commodities markets. She never accepts responsibility for this
and never even considered working as a salaried employee or
becoming credentialed in a related field. Instead she offers
weak and sometimes contradictory explanations regarding her
failure to rehabilitate. The Court does not find her activity in
real estate to be a reasonable effort to rehabilitate because
[Karen] admits she spends little time on this activity, she has
no experience or track record earning income from real estate,
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and [she] does not even try to show that her few real estate
investments can be considered a full-time profession now or in
the future. In sum, she has shown very little to rehabilitate and
certainly not the genuine effort that is required by Minnesota
law.

Comparing these factual findings to the record, they are not clearly erroneous.
“Findings of fact are clearly erroneous where an appellate court is left with the definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279,
284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). The record, including the facts recited by Karen,
support the district court’s finding that Karen mismanaged her financial position
post-dissolution and failed to make reasonable efforts to become self-supporting. Karen
had a duty to undertake reasonable efforts to become self -supporting, and the record
supports the district court’s findings that Karen did not do so. We see no clear error.
Karen, though, argues the district court misapplied the relevant caselaw, and that
“[t]he district court should have analyzed [her] shortfall in meeting her monthly
expenses . . . based upon her imputed employment income of $89,568.” Karen points to a
nonprecedential opinion for the proposition that even when there is “willful failure to
rehabilitate” the district court should not deny a motion to modify maintenance outright,
but rather should “impute income to [the obligee] spouse.”
First, nonprecedential opinions are not binding legal authority. Minn. R. Civ. App.
P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Second, w e are not persuaded by Karen’s argument that Hecker
required the district court to grant permanent maintenance based on imputed income. It is
accurate, as Karen argues, that in Hecker, the supreme court affirmed a district court’s
decision to impute income to a maintenance recipient who had failed to make reasonable
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efforts to become self- supporting and still awarded permanent maintenance. 568 N.W.2d
at 710.
At the same time, nothing in the Hecker opinion mandates that a district court must
impute income after a maintenance recipient fails to make reasonable efforts during a
period of temporary maintenance. Rather, the supreme court in Hecker merely stated that
awarding permanent maintenance under these circumstances was “within the bounds of the
trial court’s considerable discretion” and complied with the mandate that maintenance
awards be “just.” Id. (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2) (emphasis added). Like the
supreme cou rt in Hecker , we defer to the district court’s “considerable discretion” in
crafting a just outcome based on Karen’s failure to make reasonable efforts to become
self-supporting. The district court properly exercised its discretion and applied Nardini,
Hecker, and Youker, when it concluded Karen failed to make reasonable efforts to become
self-supporting and then denied her motion to make temporary maintenance permanent.
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Karen’s 2018 and
2020 motions to modify spousal maintenance.
III. Karen’s motion to compel discovery
Karen challenges the district court’s decision denying her motion to compel
discovery. Generally, parties may discover only evidence relevant to the claim or defense
of any party. Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02. “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Minn. R.
Evid. 401. The district court has wide discretion to issue discovery orders, and, absent a
19
clear abuse of discretion, such orders will not be disturbed. In re Comm’r of Pub. Safety,
735 N.W.2d 706, 711 (Minn. 2007).
Karen sought to compel John’s disclosure of documents related to employee
benefits, bank statements, bank- account statements, credit-card statements, and business
documents related to John’s business, “J&W Air LLC.” The district court denied this
motion after finding “while [John’s] income is [] not straightforward, the Court is confident
that it can be calculated reasonably accurately without access to [his] bank accounts, credit
card statements, etc.” and that “information related to [John]’s private business” were not
needed because “he report[ed] no income from this business.” The district court concluded
Karen’s request was unlikely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. The issues presented by Karen’s
motions to modify maintenance depended in the first instance on the district court’s
determination of Karen’s current income and her lack of reasonable efforts to become
self-supporting. John’s ability to pay spousal maintenance was uncontested—at every stage
in the proceedings John acknowledged he has substantial income and was able to pay
spousal maintenance. Because Karen sought more documentation of John’s income and his
ability to pay maintenance was not in dispute, the district court’s denial of Karen’s motion
to compel was not an abuse of discretion.
IV. Karen’s motions for need-based attorney fees
Karen challenges the district court’s denial of her motion for need-based attorney
fees. During Warrington I, Karen first sought need-based fees of $22,163. We remanded
this motion to the district court, which denied the motion. During this appeal, on August 31,
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2021, Karen filed a second motion for need -based attorney fees, seeking fees of $20,867
for fees incurred in pursuing this appeal. The accompanying affidavit stated that between
February 1, 2021, and August 31, 2021, Karen incurred $19,367.25 in attorney fees, and
anticipated another $1,500.00 in attorney fees and costs related to oral argument.
We first review the district court’s decision to deny Karen’s first motion for
need-based attorney fees. “The standard of review for an appellate court examining an
award of attorney fees is whether the district court abused its discretion.” Gully v. Gully,
599 N.W.2d 814, 825 (Minn. 1999). Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2020), provides that
courts “shall” award attorney fees if the district court finds
(1) that the fees are necessary for the good-faith
assertion of the party’ s rights in the proceeding and will not
contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the
proceeding;
(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and
(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and
disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay
them.

Id.
The district court determined that “[Karen] cannot establish that an award of fees is
necessary for the assertion of her rights in the appeal and she has not established that she
does not have the ability to pay her attorney fees.” The district court cited Hall v. Hall ,
417 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. App. 1988), where this court concluded that requiring both parties
to pay their own attorney fees was appropriate and affirmed a district court’s decision to
deny attorney fees. In Hall, we reasoned the marital home was “the only significant asset,”
the parties sold the home and distributed the proceeds, and the district court found that “the
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home sale proceeds would cover each party’s attorney fees and [movant] received $11,000
from the sale.” 417 N.W.2d at 303 (emphasis added). The district court also cited Schultz
v. Schultz, 383 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. App. 1986), where this court reversed a district court’s
decision to deny a motion for need -based attorney fees. In Schultz, we reasoned the
movant-spouse would have been required “to liquidate a substantial portion of her property
award to pay the fees.” 383 N.W.2d at 383 (emphasis added).
Here, the district court found Karen had sufficient assets to pay for her attorney fees,
stating:
[Karen] was awarded over half a million in assets at the time
of the dissolution . . . ; she also received another $60,000 in
June 2017 (half the proceeds of sale of the parties’ airplane)
and then received over $257,000 from the sale of the proceeds
of the house in October 2018. Given her amount of retirement
assets, cash of almost $320,000, in addition to her income,
spousal maintenance, child support, and nearly $1900 a month
from [John’s] pension plan, [Karen] cannot show that she
would have to invade a substantial portion of her assets to pay
for attorney fees of approximately $22,000 incurred in bringing
her appeal.

These findings are supported by the record, including the dissolution judgment.
The district court’s reasoning follows existing caselaw. In Schultz, the
movant-spouse would have had to liquidate “a substantial portion” of her property award
to pay her fees, so the movant-spouse made the necessary need-based showing.
383 N.W.2d at 383. In contrast, the amount of fees incurred by Karen is only a small
portion of her property award. Moreover, in Hall, we affirmed a denial of attorney fees
where the district court found both parties’ fees would be covered by sale of the marital
home, “the only significant asset.” 417 N.W.2d at 303. Karen is in a much better position
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than the parties in Hall because she received many marital assets, valued far more than the
approximately $22,000 she seeks.
Karen tries to distinguish her case from Schultz by arguing that Schultz was decided
at the time of dissolution, while this motion is being considered three and a half years after
dissolution. We are not persuaded. The passage of time does not explain why Karen would
be unable to pay $22,000.00 in fees, after she was awarded over half a million dollars in
the dissolution decree, besides her not insignificant income. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by denying Karen’s motion for need-based attorney fees.
We finally consider Karen’s motion, filed with this court, seeking need -based
attorney fees on appeal. Because the district court’s finding that Karen received sufficient
assets to cover her attorney fees is not clearly erroneous, we conclude Karen has failed to
demonstrate an inability to pay the $20,867, as required by Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1.
Thus, we deny Karen’s motion for need-based attorney fees.
Affirmed as modified; motion denied.