State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0188

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Keon La Shawn Thomas,
Appellant.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Connolly, Judge

Kandiyohi County District Court
File No. 34-CR-14-723

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Julianna Passe, Assistant Kandiyohi County
Attorney,
Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)

John E. Mack, New London Law, P.A., New London, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
CONNOLLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to revoke his probation and impose
a 36-month prison sentence. Because we discern no abuse of discretion in that decision,
we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Keon La Shawn Thomas was cha rged with four counts of third -degree
criminal sexual conduct in 2014 for sexually assaulting a minor several times between 2008
and 2010. He entered a guilty plea in early 2015 and was sentenced to a stay of adjudication
for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, 30 days in jail, a fine, and 15 years of probation.
He was also ordered to complete a psychosexual evaluation, follow all resulting
recommendations, have no contact with minors, remain law abiding, and cooperate with
his probation.
Thomas committed ten probation violations over the next six years. The first was
in June 2016. He violated the terms of his probation by going to Iowa without permission
to visit a woman with whom he was in a relationship and by having unsupervised contact
with her minor child. This violation resulted in a probation sanction.
Thomas committed his second probation violation later that same month for being
terminated from sex offender treatment. This violation also resulted in a probation
sanction, and he was instructed to re-enter treatment within two weeks’ time.
Thomas committed his third probation violation in late 2016. He violated the terms
of his probation by failing to pay his fine and for failing to remain law abiding.
Specifically, he had bee n convicted in December 2016 in Cerro Gordo County, Iowa, for
misdemeanor assault causing injury or illness after he was arrested for throwing a female
victim across the room in front of a minor child. He was found to have violated the terms
of his probation and he was reinstated with all previous conditions.
His fourth probation violation came two months later after he was terminated from
sex offender treatment for failing to make adequate progress, and for using internet-capable
devices to make threats against the victim of his Iowa offense. He was found to have
violated the terms of his probation in several ways: for assaultive and threatening behavior,
unauthorized internet use, failing to follow through on treatment recommendations, having
contact with the Iowa victim, and failing to remain law abiding. He was reinstated on
probation with additional conditions, including restricting his internet use to pre-approved
and monitored uses only, restrictions from owning internet-capable devices, that he comply
with treatment, that he have no contact with the Iowa victim, that he follow all agent
directives, that he have no out -of-state travel, and that he engage in no assaultive or
threatening behavior.
Thomas’s fifth probation violation came in June 2018 for unauthorized internet use.
He received a probation sanction reaffirming that he follow internet monitoring
requirements.
He committed his sixth probation violation in October 2018 . He had once again
failed to complete sex offender treatment, an d had unsupervised contact with minor
females. He was ordered to serve seven days in jail as a result.
Thomas committed his seventh and eighth violations in 2019. He violated his
probation in April by possessing three unauthorized internet -capable devic es, by using
social media, and by continuing to contact the victim of the Iowa offense. He violated his
probation in October by failing to complete sex offender treatment. After a contested
revocation hearing on the two violations, the district court revoked the stay of adjudication,
convicted Thomas of third-degree criminal sexual conduct, stayed imposition of sentence,
reinstated the terms of his probation, and ordered that he serve 120 days in jail.
Thomas committed his ninth probation violation in Ju ly 2020 for leaving the state
without permission, traveling outside the county of his residence without permission, and
for continued contact with the Iowa victim. This violation resulted in a probation sanction
that imposed a curfew and GPS monitoring.
Thomas committed his tenth and final probation violation in August 2020. He
violated his probation by continued contact with the Iowa victim, by again being terminated
from sex offender treatment, and for continuing his unauthorized internet access. The
district court held a contested revocation hearing in January 2021. At the hearing, Thomas
admitted to two of the alleged violations —that he failed to complete treatment and had
unauthorized internet access. His counsel acknowledged Thomas was “on thin ice with the
courts” and requested sanctions “that do not include execution of his sentence.”
The district court held a disposition hearing later that same month. Thomas again
requested a lesser sanction than execution of a prison sentence—either electronic home
monitoring or limited jail time while continuing treatment on probation. But the district
court noted Thomas’s “total disregard over the last six years” of his original sentencing
order. The district court found “that the policies favoring probation in this case have been
overridden by [Thomas’s] behavior and decisions which are anti -social and pro -criminal
and have . . . resulted in numerous sanctions, violations, and the sense of this court that as
soon as we would discharge [Thomas] from prob ation he would reoffend.” The district
court further determined Thomas was a risk to public safety, and that “the department of
corrections will be in a better place to provide treatment and long -term monitoring” for
Thomas. The district revoked the stay of imposition and executed a 36-month prison
sentence. Thomas appeals.
DECISION
A district court may revoke probation and execute a probationer’s sentence if it
“finds or the probationer admits a probation violation.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.04, subd.
3(2)(b)(v). Before revoking probation, the district court must undertake a “three -step
analysis”—it must (1) “designate the specific condition or conditions that were violated,”
(2) “find that the violation was intentional or inexcusable,” and (3) “find tha t need for
confinement outweighs the policies favoring probation.” State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246,
250 (Minn. 1980). In making this third finding, a district court must consider whether
“confinement is necessary to protect the public from further crimin al activity by the
offender,” or whether “the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most
effectively be provided if he is confined,” or if “it would unduly depreciate the seriousness
of the violation if probation were not revoked.” State v. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d 319, 330
(Minn. App. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 883 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. 2016). Determining
whether the district court made these required findings is a question of law reviewed de
novo. State v. Modtland , 695 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Mi nn. 2005). But the district court is
afforded “broad discretion in determining if there is sufficient evidence to revoke
probation,” and its decision “should be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of that
discretion.” Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 249-50.
Thomas challenges the district court’s findings on the third Austin factor. He
contends the record does not support that he is a risk to public safety, needs treatment that
cannot be provided except through confinement, or that his violations were serious enough
to warrant revocation. These arguments are unavailing.
The district court specifically found that “the policies favoring probation in this case
have been overridden” by Thomas’s “anti-social and pro-criminal” decisions and behavior.
The district court relied on Thomas’s numerous sanctions and violations during his time
on probation in determining that he remains a risk to public safety. Th omas’s “limited
compliance with probation” also drove the district court’s conclusion that “[t]he corrections
system and the department of corrections will be in a better place to provide treatment and
long-term monitoring of [Thomas] over the course of the next twelve years.” The record
amply supports both conclusions.
The district court recounted most of Th omas’s history of violations while making
its ultimate findings. These violations include failing to complete sex offender treatment
five times over six years , and repeatedly violat ing his probation in similar ways—
possessing internet -capable devices, using the internet inappropriately, continuing
unsupervised contact with minors, leaving the state without permission, and continuing to
contact the victim from his Iowa offense. And, contrary to Thomas’s asserti on on appeal,
he has not remained law abiding —he committed a violent offense in Iowa in 2016. That
the district court “provided fact -specific reasons explaining its findings” as to the risk
Thomas poses to public safety and the need for his confinement de monstrates the district
court properly exercised its discretion in revoking his probation. Fleming, 869 N.W.2d at
331.
Thomas further contends these findings are insufficient to override the policy
consideration that a decision to revoke probation “canno t be a reflexive action to an
accumulation of technical violations.” Id. at 330. But this policy is overridden where there
is “a showing that the offender’s behavior demonstrates that he or she cannot be counted
on to avoid antisocial activity.” Id. The record of multiple violations due to repeated
behaviors demonstrates that Thomas “cannot be counted on to avoid antisocial activity,”
and the district court did not abuse its discretion by coming to this conclusion.
Because the district court made findings supported by the record in concluding that
the need for Thomas’s confinement outweigh the policies favoring probation, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Thomas’s probation and executing his prison
sentence.1
Affirmed.

1 Thomas also argues that the district court erred by rejecting his request for alternative
sanctions. But the district court considered and expressly rejected his request in reliance
on the probation officer’s recommendation that Thomas’s “high level of d eviancy,
unaccountability, and lack of concern for his conditions of supervision make him a poor
candidate for supervision.” This decision is not an abuse of discretion. See Fleming, 869
N.W.2d at 331 (affirming the district court’s decision to revoke pr obation instead of
applying alternative sanctions where the district court considered and rejected a request for
alternative treatment, and the probation officer believed all alternative treatment options to
have been exhausted).