State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0193

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Christopher Dwayne Leckner,
Appellant.

Filed July 6, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Koochiching County District Court
File No. 36-CR-18-790

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Jeffrey S. Naglosky, Koochiching County Attorney, International Falls, Minnesota (for
respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defen der, Abigail H. Rankin, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Cochran,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion
for a dispositional sentencing departure because it failed to properly consider the bases
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supporting departure and because substantial and compelling circumstances warranted a
departure. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Christopher Dway ne Leckner with first - and
second-degree assault in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.221, subd. 1, .222, subd. 2 (2018),
alleging that on November 1, 2018, Leckner argued with a woman, punched her in the face,
and stabbed her three times. Leckner entered a Norgaard1 plea, indicated that he could not
remember the incident due to his intoxication at the time, confirmed his review of the
state’s evidence, and agreed that the evidence would be sufficient to convict him. The
district court scheduled a sentenci ng hearing and ordered probation to prepare a
presentence investigation (PSI) report.
During the PSI interview, Leckner recalled that he and his then -girlfriend were
drinking, that they argued, that she threatened him, and that she punched him. The next
thing he remembered was yelling to his father to call 911.
Probation noted Leckner’s history of chemical -dependency and mental -health
issues, including daily marijuana use, occasional methamphetamine use, depression,
anxiety, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, and borderline personality disorder.
Probation summarized Leckner’s prior crimes, which included a conviction for escaping
from custody. Based on an offense severity level of nine and a criminal -history score of

1 See State ex rel. Norgaard v. Tahash, 110 N.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Minn. 1961).
3
five, probation recommended that the district court impose the presumptive sentence of
146 months’ imprisonment. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 4.A (2018).
Leckner moved for a downward dispositional departure to probati on, highlighting
his history of mental -health struggles, cognitive impairment, and substance -abuse issues.
Leckner emphasized that prior imprisonment had exacerbated his mental-health issues, but
that he had improved when he previously participated in mental-health treatment programs.
He also indicated that he was remorseful for his actions and was willing to accept
responsibility for them. Leckner argued that a long -term inpatient treatment program and
continued therapy would allow him to address issues related to his mental health and
chemical dependency.
At sentencing, a doctor detailed Leckner’s various diagnoses spanning his childhood
and adulthood. The doctor indicated that Leckner’s cognitive function tested at a level
which rendered it difficult to work or succeed in school. He opined that Leckner required
long-term group dialectical behavioral therapy and individual therapy. Although he was
uncertain whether such therapy was available in prison, he believed “without a doubt” that
the better option for Leckner was treatment outside of prison. The doctor recommended
inpatient treatment and opined that such treatment would increase Leckner’s chances of
success on probation. The doctor also testified that there was a higher likelihood that
Leckner would reoffend if he were merely sent to prison without receiving treatment.
Leckner’s father testified that treatment on probation would be better for Leckner
because prison “just makes him worse.” Leckner’s sister testified that Leckner had “gotten
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a lot worse from being in prison” and that it would be better for him to get “very intense
treatment” for his mental-health and chemical-dependency issues.
Leckner testified that he experienced mental illnesses since childhood and that,
though he received so me chemical-dependency treatment in his life, his mental illnesses
had gone largely untreated. Leckner was imprisoned for seven years, from 2005 to 2012,
and an additional five years, from 2013 to 2018. On cross-examination, Leckner clarified
that his seven-year term of imprisonment stemmed from an 18 -month sentence with five
years of supervised release, the terms of which he violated. Regarding his five -year term
of imprisonment, Leckner admitted that he was released in September 2017, violated the
terms of supervised release, and was returned to prison by October 2017. Leckner claimed
that he received very limited mental-health services during his imprisonment. He recalled
spending most of his time in solitary confinement. Leckner testified that he was committed
to completing treatment, remaining law -abiding, and complying with probationary terms.
He also expressed remorse for the crime.
The district court accepted Leckner’s plea and adjudicated his guilt. But the district
court indicated it was goi ng to “do some studying” and continued the sentencing hearing
to a later date. When Leckner reappeared for sentencing, the district court explained that
it had “walked through” the prison facilities offering treatment and that it believed Leckner
would “get more services in prison [ than he] could ever get in the public.” The district
court denied Leckner’s departure motion and sentenced him to 150 months’ imprisonment.
Leckner appealed, arguing that the district court’s independent investigation
deprived him of the right to a fair sentencing proceeding. State v. Leckner, No. A19-1007,
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2020 WL 3172651, at *3 (Minn. App. June 15, 2020). We agreed, reversed his sentence,
and remanded the case for resentencing before a different judge. Id. at *4.
On remand, Leckner renewed his request for a downward dispositional departure.
In addition to reviewing transcripts of the testimony from the first sentencing proceeding,
the district court heard new testimony from the same witnesses. The doctor testified
consistently with his prior testimony and clarified his opinion that Leckner needed
treatment with the condition that treatmen t be provided in a confined, in patient setting.
Leckner’s father and sister repeated their claims that prison was detrimental to Leckner,
that treatment on probation would best serve him, and that he would have their support.
Leckner again recounted his history of mental -health struggles , emphasized his
remorse, and made clear his desire to receive treatment and comply with probationary
terms. He also claimed, “[H]ad I not . . . been . . . as heavily intoxicated as I was, . . . that
crime would have never been committed.”
The district court denied Leckner’s request for a dispositional departure, finding that
there were no substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the
presumptive guidelines sentence. It conceded that there was a risk to Leckner’s mental
health but indicated that it was not a “foregone conclusion.” The district court also
acknowledged that Leckner expressed genuine remorse and that he took responsibility for
his actions by pleading guilty. The district court also explained:
I do n ot believe that [Leckner] is particularly amenable to
probation. I look at his past history, including the fact that he
got a stay of imposition, and that he didn’t do well on
conditional release and the fact that he has had insufficient
treatment is not unlike most other people that I send to prison,
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unfortunately, and so there are not identifiable substantial and
compelling circumstances to support a departure.
The district court further noted that it had public-safety concerns and questioned Leckner’s
ability to comply with court orders. The district court emphasized that Leckner’s criminal
history included escaping from custody and crimes of violence against women. The district
court sentenced Leckner to 130 months in prison. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Leckner challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a downward
dispositional departure, arguing that (I) the district court failed to appropriately consider
the evidence of mitigating circumstances and (II) ample evidence demonstrated his
mitigated culpability and his particular amenability to probation. 2 We review a district
court’s denial of a departure motion for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Soto , 855
N.W.2d 303, 307 -08 (Minn. 2014). Because the decision to depart is disc retionary with
the district court, only in a “rare case” will we reverse the imposition of a presumptive
sentence. See State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
“The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines . . . limit the sentencing court’ s discretion
by prescribing a sentence or range of sentences that is presumed to be appropriate.” Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 308 (quotation omitted). Pursuant to Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.1 (2018),
“The [district] court must pronounce a sentence of the applicable disposition and within
the applicable range unless there exist identifiable, substantial, and compelling

2 The state filed no response brief and we ordered that the case be decided pursuant to
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 142.03.
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circumstances to support a departure.” A downward dispositional departure “occurs when
the Guidelines recommend a prison sentence but the court stays the sentence.” Minn. Sent.
Guidelines 1.B.5.a.(2) (2018). In general, a dispositional departure depends on the
defendant’s individual characteristics. See State v. Solberg, 882 N.W.2d 618, 623 (Minn.
2016). The guidelines provide a list of mitigating circumstances wh ich may warrant a
departure, two of which are at issue on appeal: the existence of “substantial grounds . . .
that tend to excuse or mitigate the offender’s culpability,” and the defendant’s “particular[]
amenab[ility] to probation.” Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(5), (7) (2018).
I. The district court appropriately and carefully consider ed the bases for
Leckner’s motion.
Leckner argues that “the district court failed to appropriately and carefully consider
[his] mitigated culpability and particular amenabili ty to probation” and that the “decision
demonstrates a failure to appropriately and carefully consider mitigating factors.” We
disagree.
Generally, a district court “ is not required to explain its reasons for imposing a
presumptive sentence.” State v. Johnson, 831 N.W.2d 917, 925 (Minn. App. 2013), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 17, 2013). And in most cases, “ We will affirm the imposition of a
presumptive guidelines sentence when the record shows [that] the sentencing court
carefully evaluated all the testim ony and information presented before making a
determination.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). “If the district court has
discretion to depart from a presumptive sentence, it must . . . deliberately consider[]
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circumstances for and against departure.” State v. Mendoza, 638 N.W.2d 480, 483 (Minn.
App. 2002).
The record demonstrates that the district court carefully considered the bases
supporting Leckner’s motion. It heard testimony from Leckner and other witnesses, and it
reviewed their prior testimony. It received sentencing memoranda from Leckner and the
state. And the district court’s analysis addressed the core of Leckner’s argument,
conceding Leckner’s need for treatment and acknowledging the potential detriment of
imprisonment to Leckner’s mental health. But the district court also considered numerous
circumstances in context, including Leckner’s remorse, his accountability, his criminal
history, his previous failures to comply with terms of supervised release, his similarity to
others sentenced to prison, and an overarching concern for public safety. Accordingly, we
discern no abuse of discretion in the depth of the district court’s deliberation.
II. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that no substantial and
compelling circumstances existed in support of a sentencing departure.
Leckner contends that the district court abused its discretion by failing to find a
substantial and compelling reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines based on either:
(A) the existence of substantial grounds tending to excuse or mitigate his culpabi lity, or
(B) his particular amenability to probation. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(5), (7).
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find the
existence of substantial grounds tending to excuse or mitigate Leckner’s
culpability.
Leckner contends that he demonstrated substantial grounds tending to excuse or
mitigate his culpability. See Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(5). He emphasizes that he
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has a below -average cognitive ability, that he endured a difficult upbringing, that he has
struggled with mental -health and chemical -dependency issues that contributed to his
commission of the assault, and that he “made it clear that he would not have committed
this offense but for his intoxication resulting from his addiction.”
Leckner’s argument regarding his below-average cognitive ability likely falls under
the purview of Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(3) (2018), which permits a sentencing
departure when a defendant “lack[s] substantial capacity for judgment when the offense
was committed” due to a mental impairment. Regardless, Leckner did not demonstrate
how his below-average cognitive level reduced or mitigated his culpability with respect to
the crime for which he was sentenced. The doctor’s testimony linked Leckner’s tendency
toward impulsivity to Leckner’s difficulty with “think[ing] through problems in the
moment.” But Leckner fails to cite any portion of the record indicating that the level of
Leckner’s cognitive ability contributed to the specific crime against the victim. And the
nature of Leckner’s plea was such that he had no recollection of the actual stabbing.
Separately, Leckner’s attempt to link his crime to his addiction and intoxication runs
afoul of the sentencing guidelines. Although Leckner presents his argument under the
catch-all provision of Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(5), the language of Minn. Se nt.
Guidelines 2.D.3.a.(3) clearly precludes “[t]he voluntary use of intoxicants (drugs or
alcohol) from the purview of [that] factor.” (Emphasis added.)
Third, the district court was familiar with the various difficulties Leckner had faced
during his lif etime, including issues of mental health and chemical dependency. The
district court acknowledged these circumstances. But Leckner fails to develop any
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argument demonstrating how these circumstances, either independently or collectively,
excuse or mitigate his culpability for stabbing the victim. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by failing to find the existence of any substantial grounds tending to excuse
or mitigate Leckner’s culpability.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Leckner
was not particularly amenable to probation.
Leckner contends that the district court abused its discretion by finding that he was
not particularly amenable to probation. A district court may grant a dispositional departure
if “[t]he offender is particularly amenable to probation,” which “may, but need not, be
supported by the fact that the offender is particularly amenable to a relevant program of
individualized treatment in a probationary setting.” Minn. Sent. G uidelines 2.D.3.a.(7).
“By requiring a defendant to be particularly amenable to probation . . . we ensure that the
defendant’s amenability to probation distinguishes the defendant from most others and
truly presents the substantial and compelling circumstances that are necess ary to justify a
departure.” Soto, 855 N.W.2d at 309 (quotation omitted). Numerous factors may be
relevant to the district court’s determination of a defendant’s particular amenability to
probation, including the age of the defendant, his past criminal r ecord, his remorse for the
crime, his cooperation, his support group, and his motive to reform. See State v. Trog, 323
N.W.2d 28, 31 (Minn. 1982); State v. Malinski, 353 N.W.2d 207, 210 (Minn. App. 1984),
review denied (Minn. Oct. 16, 1984).
We discern no abuse of discretion on this record. The district court weighed
Leckner’s remorse and accountability in his favor, and we assume for the sake of Leckner’s
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argument that his age, family support, and motive to reform weighed in his favor. Even
so, the district court cited public-safety concerns, emphasized the unavailability of a secure
treatment facility outside of prison, referenced Leckner’s criminal history, and explained
that Leckner “didn’t do well on conditional release.” Where certain circumstances directly
contradicted Leckner’s claimed amenability to probation, the district court did not abuse
its discretion by finding that Leckner was not particularly amenable to probation. See Soto,
855 N.W.2d at 309.
Leckner suggests that the district court’s public-safety analysis “goes against logic”
because “if a defendant needs treatment to ensure rehabilitation and public safety and he
will not get the treatment in prison, a commitment to prison is not the rational sentence.”
The argument ig nores the relevant fact, as noted by the district court, that there was no
secure treatment facility available. The question before the district court was not simply
whether imprisonment or probation would provide better treatment for Leckner, but
“whether public safety would be served” by placing Leckner on probation. See id. at 313;
see also State v. Heywood , 338 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Minn. 1983) (affirming departure that
was based, in part, on district court’s finding that defendant “was not a threat to the public
safety”). The district court’s analysis in this respect logically balanced competing interests.
Leckner also argues that the district court’s decision was “against logic and the facts
in the record” because it committed Leckner to a prison system which had “repeatedly
failed him and . . . the public that [the prison] system is intended to protect.” But the
relevant consideration is not whether imprisonment has succeeded in its capacity for
rehabilitation, but whether Leckner demonstr ated his particular amenability to probation
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such that a departure was permissible. Here, the record supports the district court’s
determination that Leckner was not particularly amenable to probation.
Affirmed.