Dylan Matthew Deling, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0197

Dylan Matthew Deling, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 4, 2021
Affirmed
Reilly, Judge

Nicollet County District Court
File No. 52-CR-17-513

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Christopher L. Mishek, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michelle M. Zehnder Fischer, Nicollet County Attorney, Me gan E. Gaudette Coryell,
Assistant County Attorney, St. Peter, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Re illy, Judge; and Bratvold,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REILLY, Judge
Appellant challenges the district court’ s denial of his pos tconviction petition,
arguing that the district court erred by concluding that (1) his guilty plea and certification
2
hearing waivers were intelligen tly made, and (2) he receive d effective assistance of
counsel. We affirm.
FACTS
In September 2017, respondent State of Minnesota filed a juvenile delinquency
petition charging appellant Dylan Matthew Deling with eight felony counts of possessing
pornographic work involving a minor. The pe tition alleged that in November 2016, the
online storage service, Dropbox, sent a “cybertip” to the National Center for Missing and
Exploited Children (N CMEC) that one of its users was accessing files containing
“suspected videos of apparent child pornog raphy.” NCMEC shared the information with
the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (the BCA). The BCA reviewed the files
and found 293 videos containing child pornography. The BCA traced the Dropbox account
to appellant and executed a search warrant at his home. During the search, appellant
admitted to a BCA agent that he accessed the Dropbox files and had joined a group chat.
Appellant admitted the purpose of the group chat was to “trade” sexual images, including
images of “little kids being raped.” The BCA found additio nal pornographic images of
minors on appellant’s email platform.
Although appellant was a juvenile when he accessed the child pornography, the state
moved to certify him for prosecution as an adult. In December 2017, appellant waived his
right to a contested certification hearing under a plea agreement. Appellant agreed to plead
guilty to two counts of possessing child pornography and the state agreed to recommend a
20-month stayed sentence. The district court determined that appellant properly waived
his right to a contested certific ation hearing. The state th en filed an adult criminal
3
complaint asserting the same crimes alleged in the delinquency petition. Appellant pleaded
guilty to two counts of the complaint under the plea agreement.
In March 2018, the district court imposed a stayed sent ence and ordered appellant
to follow the recommendations of probation. The probation conditions required appellant
to: (1) refrain from purchasing or possessing any sexually exp licit materials; (2) disclose
all computers, internet-capab le devices, or other digita l storage devices within his
possession; and (3) refrain from accessing, cr eating, maintaining, or viewing personal
webpages or social-media accounts on platforms that permit mino rs to create or maintain
personal webpages. The district court remanded appellant into custody at the county jail
for 45 days.
Appellant was released from custody in Ap ril 2018. In July 2018, about three
months after his release from custody, a BCA agent advised appellant’s probation officer
that appellant continued to have contact w ith minors that was sexual in nature. Law
enforcement again searched appellant’s home and found a smartphone with internet access.
Appellant acknowledged he was not supposed to have the phone. Appellant also admitted
he had accessed social media sites and th reatened minors into sending him nude
photographs. In August 2018 , the state filed a probation viol ation report asserting that
appellant violated the conditions of his probation by possessing sexual images of children.
In February 2019, the U.S. District Atto rney for Minnesota filed an indictment
charging appellant with the production or attempted production of child pornography,
commission of a felony by a registered sex o ffender, and interstate communication with
intent to extort. Appellant agreed to plead guilty to two counts of the federal indictment
4
and the U.S. Attorney’s Office agreed to cap the sentencing recommendation to 40 years.
The federal court later sentenced appellant to 35 years in prison.
In August 2019, appellant waived his righ t to a probation-violation hearing in the
state case and admitted that he violated the conditions of his probation by extorting minors
for nude photographs. The district court re voked appellant’s probation and executed his
stayed sentence.
In March 2020, appellant petitioned for postc onviction relief. Appellant sought to
withdraw both his certification hearing waiver and his guilty plea, claiming that he did not
make an intelligent waiver of his rights and received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied appellant’s petition. The district
court determined that appellant failed to prove that his certification waiver and guilty plea
were unintelligent or that appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant argues the district court erred by denying his postconviction petition. We
review a denial of postconviction re lief for an abuse of discretion. Reed v. State , 793
N.W.2d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010). We review the “[district] court’s legal determinations de
novo, and its factual findings for clear error.” Brown v. State, 895 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Minn.
2017) (quotation omitted). We will not revers e a district court’s postconviction order
“unless the [district] court exercised its disc retion in an arbitrary or capricious manner,
based its ruling on an erroneous view of th e law, or made clearly erroneous factual
findings.” Reed, 793 N.W.2d at 729.
5
I. Appellant’s certification hearing waiv er and guilty plea were intelligently
made.
Appellant challenges the validity of his cer tification waiver and guilty plea. “A
child may waive the right to a certification hearing if the waiver is made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently after the child is fully and effectively informed of the right.”
Vang v. State, 788 N.W.2d 111, 115 (Minn. 2010). Similarly, for a guilty plea to be valid,
it must be “accurate, volunt ary and intelligent.” State v. Ecker , 524 N.W.2d 712, 716
(Minn. 1994). “If a plea fails to meet any one of these requirements, it is invalid.” State
v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 650 (Minn. 2007). Appellant bears the burden of showing that
a plea is invalid. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 94 (Minn. 2010). We apply a de novo
standard of review when determining the validity of a guilty plea. Id.
Appellant challenges only the intelligence requirement of his waiver and plea. This
requirement “ensures that a defendant understands the charges against him, the rights he is
waiving, and the consequences of his plea.” Id. at 96. A defendant need not know every
consequence of his plea for the plea to be intelligent. Taylor v. State , 887 N.W.2d 821,
823 (Minn. 2016). Appellate courts distin guish between the “direct” and “collateral”
consequences of a guilty plea. State v. Ellis-Strong , 899 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Minn. App.
2017). “Direct consequences are those wh ich flow definitely, immediately, and
automatically from the guilty pl ea,” including “the maximum sentence to be imposed.”
State v. Crump , 826 N.W.2d 838, 841-42 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotations omitted), rev.
denied (Minn. May 21, 2013). Collateral c onsequences, by contrast, “do not flow
definitely, immediately, and auto matically from the guilty plea.” Id. at 842. The
6
intelligence requirement applies to the direct consequences of a guilty plea, but not to any
collateral consequences. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96. The failure to inform a defendant of
direct consequences renders a plea unintelligent. Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900, 903-
04, 907 (Minn. 2002). But “a defendant’s lack of awareness of a collateral consequence of
a guilty plea does not render th e guilty plea unintelligent and entitle a defendant to
withdraw it.” Taylor, 887 N.W.2d at 823 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant claims he was not advised that pleading guilty to a child-pornography
crime in state court could enhance a subseque nt federal conviction. He argues that the
since the federal enhancement stemmed from his guilty plea in state court, the district court
erred when it determined that the enhancement was a collateral consequence of the guilty
plea. We disagree. The potential for a subse quent sentence enhancement if the offender
commits a later offense is a collateral consequence to the guilty plea. Crump, 826 N.W.2d
at 842-43. “[T]he possible e ffect that appellant’s plea ha s upon a future charge is a
collateral . . . consequence,” such that “a defendant’s ignorance of those consequences does
not render the guilty plea uni ntelligent or invalid.” Id. Similarly, an intelligently made
guilty plea “will not be invalidated simply because a defendant is not informed that if he
commits additional crimes in another jurisdiction, that jurisdiction may sentence him as a
habitual offender.” State v. Garritsen, 371 N.W.2d 251, 253 (M inn. App. 1985). Based
on caselaw, appellant’s sentence enhancement in the federal proceeding was a collateral,
rather than direct, consequence of his state conviction.
The evidentiary record also shows that appellant was ad vised of the consequences
of his plea vis-à-vis the potential for a federal prosecution. Counsel asked appellant if he
7
understood that the plea agreement extended on ly to the state inve stigation. Counsel
inquired, “So at the time that you offered your waiver of certification, you understood . . .
that you could be charged for other crimes. Do you understand that and do you agree with
that?” Appellant responded, “Yes.” Counsel asked appellant if he could identify anything
in the record “that would have indicated that there was a federal indictment for receiving
or distributing and receiving child pornography . . . looming” at the time of his waiver and
plea. Appellant could not identify any evidence. Appellant also acknowledged that most
of the facts in the federal case occurred after he was released from state custody. Appellant
was released from custody in April 2018. Co unsel inquired, “So approximately 20 days
after you were released from jail you started your offenses that led to the federal charges,
correct?” Appellant responded, “Yes.”
While appellant claims he did not understa nd the consequences of his waiver and
plea, the record shows he understood the charges against him and understood that the plea
agreement extended only to the state’s investigation. The federal sentencing enhancement
arose from crimes appellant committed after his release from state custody. And caselaw
is clear that “a warning that the sentences for fu ture convictions after a plea may be
enhanced is needless.” Crump, 826 N.W.2d at 843 (quotation omitted). Crump reasoned
that such a warning w ould be premature because the possi bility of an enhanced sentence
in another case is not automatic, as it is “w ithin the control of the defendant” whether
additional charges will occur. Id. Ignorance of the collateral consequences of appellant’s
waiver and plea does not render them unintelligent.
8
We are also unpersuaded by appellant’s reliance on Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356 (2010). Padilla held that counsel had a duty to inform the defendant that a guilty plea
subjected the defendant, a non-citizen, to auto matic deportation. 559 U.S. at 369, 374.
Appellant claims that in both his case and in Padilla, the federal penalties had a “close
connection” to the state proceedings and “dire” consequences for the defendant. Appellant
claims there was a “close connection between a prior state conviction for child pornography
in adult court and an enhanced sentence in a subsequent federal case for child
pornography.” Appellant also argues the cons equences of his prior conviction are dire
because he received a much larger federal prison sentence based on the enhancement.
Padilla is easily distinguishable. First, Padilla is limited to “the unique nature of
deportation” and does not extend to “any of the other myriad consequences of a guilty
plea.” Sames v. State , 805 N.W.2d 565, 569-70 (Minn. Ap p. 2011) (declining to apply
Padilla’s holding in unlawful-possession case), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 21, 2011). We
decline to extend Padilla’s holding to a child-pornography case. Second, the consequences
of the defendant’s guilty plea in Padilla were “truly clear.” 559 U.S. at 369. In this case,
by contrast, appellant’s sentencing enhancemen t for a subsequent crime was not a “truly
clear” consequence of his guilty plea. Inst ead, appellant’s own conduct following his
release from state custody led to his federal charges and the later enhancement of his federal
sentence. Padilla is not controlling in this context.
In sum, we determine that the sentencing enhancement in the later federal case was
a collateral consequence of appellant’s guilty plea. And the record shows that appellant
was advised of the potential consequences of his plea. “[I]gnorance of such consequence
9
does not render the guilty plea that led to the conviction unintelligent or invalid.” Crump,
826 N.W.2d at 844. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying appellant’s postconviction petition on this basis.
II. Appellant received effective assistance of counsel.
Appellant challenges the district court’s or der rejecting his ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel claim. This claim requires appe llant to show that: (1 ) counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) absent counsel’s unreasonable
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984). “We review a district court’s application
of the Strickland test de novo because it involves a mixed question of law and fact.” State
v. Mosley, 895 N.W.2d 585, 591 (Minn. 2017). We consider whether the “[district] court’s
factual findings . . . are supported in the re cord, conduct a de novo review of the legal
implication of those facts on the ineffective assistance claim, and either affirm the court’s
decision or conclude that the court abused its discretion because pos tconviction relief is
warranted.” State v. Nicks, 831 N.W.2d 493, 503-04 (Minn. 2013).
Appellant argues the legal representation he received fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness because his atto rney failed to advise him of the potential
consequences of waiving certif ication and pleading guilty. “T he objective standard of
reasonableness is defined as representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills
and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perfo rm under similar
circumstances.” State v. Vang, 847 N.W.2d 248, 266-67 (Minn. 2014) (quotation omitted).
10
“[T]here is a strong presum ption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Andersen
v. State, 830 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Minn. 2013).
“In Minnesota, an attorney ’s representation does not fall below the objective
standard of reasonableness . . . if the attorney fails to inform a defendant of the collateral
consequences of a guilty plea.” Ellis-Strong, 899 N.W.2d at 536. Here, the federal
government indicted appellant for offens es committed as early as October 2017 and
through August 2018. Appellant stipulated to conduct involving at least 13 known victims,
which were treated as separate counts. Two of these offenses occurred before sentencing
in the state case and the remaining eleven co unts occurred after appellant’s release from
state custody. At the postconviction hearing, appellant could not identify any evidence that
federal charges were pending while the state charges were unresolved. And the record
shows that defense counsel tried to discover whether there were any other charges pending
before the state case was resolv ed. Defense counsel could no t have known at the time of
the certification waiver and plea hearing th at appellant would commit additional crimes
after his release from state custody. Appellant has not shown that counsel’s performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
On review, we determine that appellant’s attorney’s representation did not fall
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Based on this determination, we need not
consider whether appellant suffered prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant’s petition for postconviction relief.
Affirmed.