In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of: J. R. W., Parent.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0198

In the Matter of the Welfare of the Child of:
J. R. W., Parent.

Filed August 16, 2021
Affirmed
Gaïtas, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-JV-20-1425

Anne M. Carlson, Anne M. Carlson Law Office, PLLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant
father J.R.W.)

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atto rney, Jacob McKnite, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Mark J. Miller, Assistant Hennepin County Public Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for
child)

Julie Mordhorst, Minneapolis, Minnesota (guardian ad litem)

Considered and decided by Ro ss, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
GAÏTAS, Judge
Appellant-father challenges the district c ourt’s order adjudicating his child in need
of protection and services (CHIPS). He claims the district court deprived him of a timely
trial in violation of due process, made unsupported factual findings, and erroneously relied
on three statutory grounds to conclude that adjudication was proper. We affirm.
2
FACTS
Appellant J.R.W. (father) has been the sole parent of J.W. (child), born in November
2003, since child wa s four years old. 1 Child was removed from father’s care in March
2020 and placed in foster care with a relative. After a court trial, child was adjudicated in
need of protection and services. Child is now 17 years old and remains in foster care under
the district court’s adjudica tion order. The relevant pr oceedings are summarized as
follows.
In March 2020, Henn epin County Human Se rvices and Public Health Department
(the county) received five child-protection re ports against father for educational neglect,
inadequate provision of physical needs, phys ical abuse, and mental injury. The county
filed a CHIPS petition on March 20, alleging that father unjustifiably prevented child from
attending school, child “has been kicked out of the home several times,” father disciplines
child with physical force, and child “fears for her safety.” The leading allegation, however,
was that father physically abused child during an altercation that occurred three days before
the petition was filed.
An emergency protective-care (EPC) hearing was held later that same day. The
district court found that the county made a prima facie showing “that a juvenile protection
matter exists” and that returning child to the home would be dangerous to her health, safety,
or welfare. Consequently, the district court ordered child’s removal from father’s care and
placement in a shelter pending a transfer into foster care with a relative. The district court

1 Father assumed full custody when child was three years old, about one year before child’s
mother passed away.
3
granted father supervised visitation “at the ch ild’s discretion.” Also , father agreed to
comply with a voluntary case plan the county offered to him during the EPC hearing, which
included various services: pa renting education, domestic -violence programming, anger
management counseling, and individual therapy for both father and child.
However, father did not comply with the case plan. Fath er also denied that child
was in need of protection and services and requested a trial on that issue.
Following the EPC hearing, there were several pretrial hearings. 2 In May 2020,
father requested a trial and the district court i ssued a pretrial order stating, “The Court is
not yet prepared to set a trial in this matter due to the scheduling difficulties caused by the
pandemic.” Two more pretrial hearings followed. Father maintained his request for a trial
at each pretrial hearing. The district court addressed various interim conditions and
continued the matter for trial.
Between October 2020 and late January 2021 , the district court held a trial on the
county’s CHIPS petition. At trial, several w itnesses testified in su pport of the county’s
petition, including child. Father also testified and called two witnesses who contested the
county’s allegations.
The county’s case at trial focused on two theories: educational neglect and physical
abuse. As to the educational-neglect claim, the county alleged that father withdrew child

2 Around this time, the Minnesota Governor declared a peacetime emergency in response
to the COVID-19 pandemic and the Chief Justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court issued
administrative orders that placed limitations on district court proceedings. See e.g., Order,
Continuing Operations of the Courts of the State of Minnesota Under a Statewide
Peacetime Declaration of Emergency, No. ADM20-8001 (Minn. March 20, 2020).
4
from high school and failed to re-enroll her in school, causing child to miss between 7 and
14 school days. Father acknowledged that child missed some school. After withdrawing
child from high school, father enrolled child in programming at a mental-health facility.
According to father, ch ild was discharged from the fac ility earlier than expected and he
had not yet arranged for child to resume schooling.
The county’s physical-abuse allegations involved two incidents that both occurred
during the evening of March 17, 2020. The first incident occurred when father discovered
that child had obtained a ne w cell phone after he had confiscated her cell phone as a
disciplinary measure. During the incident , which father’s girlfriend partially video
recorded, father demanded that child turn over the new cell phone. When child refused,
father attempted to take the phone from child and a physical struggle ensued on child’s
bed. During this struggle, child told father that he had hurt her neck.
Shortly thereafter, a second physical confrontation occurred in the garage. Father
testified that child took his cell phone, texted a family member a request to call 911, and
then disabled father’s cell phone. According to father, child began throwing and breaking
things in the garage. He testified that he put child in a “bear hug” to gain control over her.
But child testified that father used a “cho kehold,” placing one arm around her neck and
shoulders, and his other arm around her waist. During this second physical struggle, both
father and child fell to the garage floor.
Police arrived. They took child to the hospital wher e she was interviewed and
examined for injuries. Photos of child’s neck showed obs ervable marks, which a child-
abuse physician found to be consistent with trauma from strangulation or a child’s own
5
hands struggling to release another’s hold. Based on this evidence and child’s interview
statements, a child-protection investigator made a maltreatment determination against
father.
In addition to the evidence concerning the incidents that prompted the county’s
CHIPS petition, the district court heard tes timony about underlying circumstances within
the family. For instance, father testified about child’s mental health and behavioral issues,
and child testified about father’s inability to regulate his anger. The district court also
received multiple exhibits, including a partial video recording of th e March 17 domestic
altercation between father and child.
After the trial, the district court issued detailed findings of fact and conclusions of
law in a written order. The district court rejected the county’s claim of educational neglect.
But the district court concluded that the county had proven by clear and convincing
evidence that father physically abused child on March 17, 20 20. Based on this evidence,
the district court adjudicated child in need of protection a nd services on three grounds:
(1) physical abuse, (2) child is without proper parental care , and (3) child’s home is a
dangerous environment. In fashioning a disposition, the district court considered father’s
noncompliance with his voluntary case plan, the family’s unresolved conflicts, and child’s
best interests. The district court transferre d legal custody of the ch ild to the county for
placement in foster care until father correct s the underlying issues that led to child’s
removal by substantially complying with his case plan.
Father appeals.
6
DECISION
I. Because father failed to raise his due-pro cess claim in the district court, we
decline to address the claim.

Father first argues that the district court’s failure to timely commence a trial on the
county’s CHIPS petition violated his constitutional right to due process.
“The parent-child relationship is amo ng the fundamental rights protected by the
constitutional guarantees of due process.” In re Welfare of Children of D.F. , 752 N.W.2d
88, 97 (Minn. App. 2008). A pa rent is entitled to due proce ss in the course of juvenile
protection matters. See In re Welfare of N.W. , 405 N.W.2d 512, 516 (Minn. App. 1987)
(“[D]ue process requires that juvenile pr oceedings comport with basic tenets of
fundamental fairness.”). One process that a parent is due in juvenile protection matters is
“a timely opportunity for a hearing.” D.F., 752 N.W.2d at 97.
The Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Protectio n provide specific timelines for child-
protection proceedings. The rules state that “a trial regarding a child in need [of] protection
or services matter shall co mmence within 60 days from the date of the emergency
protective care hearing or the admit/deny heari ng, whichever is earlier.” Minn. R. Juv.
Prot. P. 43, subd. 4, 49.01, subd. 1.
Here, the trial on the CHIPS petition comm enced outside of th e 60-day window
provided by the rules. Father argues that the district court’s failure to comply with the rules
violated his right to due process. See id. For relief, he asks us to “address this failure in
the interests of justice.”
7
But father did not raise this issue in the district court. Generally, a reviewing court
“will not address constitutional issues that were not raised before the district court.” D.F.,
752 N.W.2d at 97; see also Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (declining
to address issues raised for the first time on appellate review).
Father argues that he raised the issue be low by “request[ing] a trial at least three
times, on the record, prior to actually being prov ided one.” This argu ment is a stretch,
however. Merely requesting a trial does not raise a constitutional challenge to the timing
of a trial. Moreover, father fa iled to provide us w ith a record of these requests. “It is an
appellant’s burden to provide any transcri pt necessary for appellate review.” In re
Commitment of Johnson, 931 N.W.2d 649, 658 (Minn. App. 2019); Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
110.02, subd. 1(a). Because father did not provide this court with transcripts of the pretrial
hearings, we do not have a record of the disc ussions that occurred in connection with the
requests, including the district court’s responses. 3 Father did provide a transcript of the
trial that ultimately occurred. However, during the trial, father made no challenge to the
timing of the trial and did not allege any due-process violation.
Indeed, the record before us does not show that father ever objected to the timing of
the trial or presented the constitutional argume nt that he now raises on appeal. Because
father’s due-process claim was not raised below, we decline to consider it for the first time.

3 We do not question whether fath er made the trial requests. The district court’s orders
make clear that father requested a trial. But we do not have the benefit of the verbatim
record made when father made his requests.
8
See e.g., Bergstrom v. McEwen, 960 N.W.2d 556, 562 (Minn. 2021); Thiele, 425 N.W.2d
at 582.
II. The district court’s order ad judicating child in need of protect ion or services
is supported by sufficient factual findings and conclusions of law.

Father next challenges the district court’s determination that child is in need of
protection or services. He contends that the district court’s decision is unsupported by its
factual findings and those findings “fail to conform with its conclusions of law.”
To adjudicate a child in need of protection or services, th e district court must find
there is a basis for adjudication under Minnes ota Statute section 260C.007, subdivision 6
(2020),
4 and the child needs protection or services as a result. In re Welfare of Child of
H.G.D., 953 N.W.2d 735, 741 (Minn. App. 2021). The petitioning agency must prove the
basis for adjudication alleged in the CHIPS petition by clear and convincing evidence. Id.;
see Minn. Stat. § 260C.163, subd. 1(a) (2020); Minn. R. Juv. Prot. P. 49.03.

4 Section 260C.007 provides multiple bases fo r a CHIPS adjudication, including that the
child “is abandoned or without parent, guardia n, or custodian,” “has been a victim of
physical or sexual abuse,” “is without necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, or other
required care” because the child’s parent “is una ble or unwilling to prov ide that care,” is
without “special care made necessary by a p hysical, mental, or emotional condition,” “is
medically neglected,” is “one whose parent, guardian, or ot her custodian for good cause
desires to be relieved of th e child’s care and custody,” “has been placed for adoption or
care in violation of law,” “is without proper parental care because of the emotional, mental,
or physical disability, or state of immaturity of the child’s parent,” “is one whose behavior,
condition, or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child,” “is
experiencing growth delays . . . due to parent al neglect,” “is a sexually exploited youth,”
“has committed a delinquent act . . . before becoming ten years old,” “is a runaway,” “is a
habitual truant,” “has been found incompetent to proceed or has been found not guilty by
reason of mental illness or mental deficiency” in a juvenile or criminal matter, and “has a
parent whose parental rights to one or more other children were involuntarily terminated
. . . or transferred.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 6.
9
On review, our examination of a CHIPS adj udication order is twofold. First, we
review a district court’s factual findings for clear error by closely considering the record to
determine whether the evidence was clear and convincing. In re Welfare of Child of
D.L.D., 865 N.W.2d 315, 321-22 (Minn. App. 2015), review denied (Minn. Jul. 20, 2015).
Second, we review a district court’s statut ory basis for adjudication for an abuse of
discretion. Id. But we must be mindfu l of the district court’s superior position to assess
the credibility of witnesses. See In re Welfare of L.A.F. , 554 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn.
1996). We therefore defer to its credibility determinations. Id.
Father challenges a number of factual findings and all three statutory grounds
addressed in the district court’s CHIPS adjudication order. However, because his
arguments actually concern the district court’ s determinations on mixed questions of law
and fact, we pause to better clarify the applicable standard of review.
In juvenile protection matte rs, where courts are tasked with considering fact-based
statutory criteria, a district c ourt must often resolve issues that present both questions of
law and questions of f act—“mixed questions.” See Minn. Stat. §§ 260C.001, subd. 2(a),
.007, subd. 6, .212, subd. 2(b) (2020); see also In re Welfare of Children of J.R.B. , 805
N.W.2d 895, 899-901 (Minn. App. 2011) (discussing inherent two-part process required of
district courts in deciding juvenile-protection cases), review denied (Minn. Jan. 6, 2012).
In deciding these mixed questions, the district court considers the evidence and finds the
underlying facts relevant to the statutory basis for adjudication alleged by the agency. Id.
at 899-900 (applying same concept to review termination of parental rights appeal). Then,
10
in light of those underlying facts, the dist rict court must exercise its judgment and
ultimately determine whether a particular basis for adjudication exists. Id. at 900-01.
As noted, an appellate court reviews the district court’s findings of the underlying
facts for clear error. Id. But in reviewing the district court’s determinations on mixed
questions of law and fact, including the part icular statutory grounds relied upon for the
adjudication, we apply the abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Id. at 901.
With that standard of review in mind, we now consider the district court’s findings
of fact and ultimate determinations on the statutory bases provided for the adjudication.
Physical abuse
A child is considered “in need of protec tion or services” if the child has “been a
victim of physical . . . abuse as defined in section 260E.03, subdivision 18.” Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.007, subd. 6(2)(i). Section 260E.03, subdivision 18 (2020), defines “physical
abuse” as “any physical injury” to a child other than injuries caused by “accidental means.”
Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 18(a); see also Minn. Stat. § 260C.0 07, subd. 5 (2020).
“Abuse does not include reasonable and mo derate physical discipline of a child
administered by a parent.” Minn. Stat. § 260E.03, subd. 18(b). A parent’s “unreasonable
interference with a child’s breathing” is one such action explicitly considered “not
reasonable and moderate.” Id., subd. 18(c). Moreover, when determining whether to
adjudicate a child in need of pr otection or services, a district court must always consider
the child’s “health, safety, and best interests.” Minn. Stat. § 260C.001, subd. 2(a).
The district court found that, on March 17 , 2020, father used an “unreasonable”
degree of physical force to overcome child’s resistance while removing the cell phone from
11
child’s bedroom. Additionally, the district court found that father “intentionally placed
[child] in a ‘choke hold’ in the garage by placing one of his hands and arms around her
neck and shoulder area.” An d the district court noted concern about the unresolved
problems in the home, including father’s anger issues and his refusal to engage in the case
plan offered to him before trial.
Given these findings, the district court dete rmined that father “intentionally inflicted
physical injury on [child] w ithin the meaning of the statut e,” and his “physical discipline
of [child] was not reasonable or moderate.” And the district court found that the evidence
proved that father injured child’s neck during these altercations, which meets the definition
of physical abuse. The district court concluded that adjudication and continued placement
in foster care would serve child’s best interests until father demonstrates—through
substantial compliance with the case plan ordered to correct the conditions that led to
child’s removal—that “[he] can safely and appropriately parent his child.”
Father does not dispute the district c ourt’s determination that physical abuse
occurred. He argues that the district court failed to articulate why child needs protection
or services as a result of the abuse.5 Father also contends that the district court clearly erred
in finding that he has unresol ved anger issues, that the cond itions that resulted in child’s

5 In his brief to this court, father also asserted that the district court misapplied the relevant
statutes to define “physical abuse” as a ground for adjudication. His counsel withdrew this
argument during oral argument after conceding that the district court correctly referenced
the maltreatment reporting statute, section 260E .03, subdivision 18, to define physical
abuse under section 260C.007, su bdivision 6. Because we ag ree that the district court
properly applied these provisions and father withdrew his claim of error, we need not
address his argument.

12
removal from his care have not been correct ed, and ultimately that adjudication was in
child’s best interests.
We agree with father that , to grant the coun ty’s CHIPS petition, the district court
was required to find facts supporting a statutory ground for adjudication and facts
supporting a determination that child consequently requires protection or services. See In
re Welfare of Child of S.S.W. , 767 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn. App. 2009). But our review
of the record confirms that the district court made both of these required determinations—
including that child required protection and se rvices as a result of physical abuse—and
supported its determinations with factual findings drawn directly from the trial evidence.
Specifically, the district court fo und that father’s “unaddressed and
unacknowledged anger issues” interfere with hi s ability to safely pa rent child. Although
father contends that the district court clearly erred in finding that he has anger issues, the
district court supported this finding with ev idence in the record, highlighting portions of
the social worker’s and child’s trial testimony regarding father’s anger. 6 In addition to
these observations about father’s anger issu es, the district court noted that father
“minimizes the severity of his conduct on the evening in question and places all of the
blame on [child].” This finding related to father’s own trial testimony that the CHIPS case
was about child and her behavior , and not him. Given fathe r’s anger and his inability to
accept responsibility for his role in conflicts with child, the district court found that “the

6 Father argues that his behavior with child-protection workers, as relayed during the social
worker’s testimony, has no bearing on his relationship with child. But we see no error in
the district court’s consideration of father’s behavior in addressing father’s willingness to
address the issues that led to child’s removal.
13
risk of future physical altercations occurring is high in the absence of intensive services for
the family.” And the district court concluded that father’s refusal to participate in the
voluntary case plan—which included services in tended to remedy the issues that resulted
in child’s removal, such as individual ther apy, domestic violence and anger management
programming, and parenting education—“d emonstrates an unwillingness to seriously
address the issues that led to [child] being placed in foster care.”
Because father physically abused child, and the dist rict court considered and
determined that child is consequently in need of protection and services, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating child on the basis of physical abuse.
Dangerous environment
To adjudicate a child in need of protectio n or services, the district court need only
rely on one statutory ground under section 260C.007, subdivision 6. See H.G.D., 953
N.W.2d at 741; S.S.W., 767 N.W.2d at 728. While the di strict court’s determination of
physical abuse and an associated need for protection or services is sufficient to affirm the
adjudication, we choose to br iefly address a second basis that is clearly supported by the
record.
In addition to physical abuse, the distri ct court also determined adjudication was
proper under section 260C.007, subdivision 6(9), “because the child’s behavior, condition,
or environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or others.” Father argues
that the district court failed to make any findings that “identify issues related to the child’s
environment, or how the environment is da ngerous, let alone why the child would need
protection or services as a result of her environment.”
14
We disagree. Child testified that the physical abuse made her feel “[s]cared,
anxious, [and] sad,” that she would not feel sa fe returning to the home, and that another
physical altercation could happen if there was another argument. The district court credited
child’s testimony as credible and we defer to that determination. L.A.F., 554 N.W.2d at
396.
Father contends that this ca se is factually similar to In re Welfare of Children of
N.F., which also involved an allegation that the child’s environmen t was injurious or
dangerous. 749 N.W.2d 802, 805 (Minn. 2008). There, the supreme court concluded that
evidence that parents paddled their child, causing pain but not injury, did not establish
physical abuse or a dangerous environment. Id. at 810-12.
Here, however, the county presented evidence that father physically abused child
by initiating two physical encounters and ultimately injuring child’s neck with a chokehold.
Given the proven physical abuse, father’s refusal to acknowledge his role in the violence,
and child’s reasonable fear, the district cour t did not abuse its disc retion in determining
that immediately reunifying child and father would expose child to a dangerous or injurious
environment.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating
child in need of services and protection on the grounds of physical abuse and a dangerous
or injurious environment. Because these grounds are suffi cient for us to affirm the
adjudication, we need not address the district court’s third ground for adjudication.
Finally, father challenges the district court’s findings regarding the disposition
ordered—child’s placement in foster care. He argues that the district court “clearly erred”
15
in finding that child’s placement in foster care is in child’s best interests, that there are no
dispositional alternatives that will adequately protect child’s safety, and that the county
made reasonable efforts to reunite the family by providing services.
Father’s challenges primarily relate to the district court’s findings from the EPC
hearing, when child was rem oved from father’s home and pl aced in foster care based on
the physical abuse. The county argues that the EPC order is not properly before us because
father did not appeal the EP C order and instead appealed from the district court’s
adjudication order. Because the EPC order was an interm ediate dispositional order,
however, father was not able to appeal it as a matter of right. See In re Welfare of E.G. ,
876 N.W.2d 872, 873-75 (Minn. App. 2016). But even assu ming that father can now
challenge that order, father has not provided us with the record that he asks us to review—
a transcript of the EPC hearing. See Johnson, 931 N.W.2d at 658 (explaining appellant has
the duty to provide the records necessary for appellate review); Minn. R. Civ. App. P.
110.02, subd. 1(a). Thus, we do not consider father’s challenges to the EPC proceedings.
Father also challenges the district court’ s consideration of th ese issues in the
adjudication order, asserting simply that the district court “clearly erred” or “failed to make
adequate findings.” An appellate court does not “discuss and review in detail the evidence
for the purpose of demonstrating that it supports the trial court’s findings.” Wilson v.
Moline, 47 N.W.2d 865, 870 (Minn. 1951). Rather, a reviewing court’s “duty is performed
when [it] consider[s] all the evidence . . . a nd determine[s] that it reasonably supports the
findings.” Id.; see also Cook v. Arimitsu , 907 N.W.2d 233, 240 n. 3 (Minn. App. 2018)
(applying this aspect of Wilson in a family law appeal), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17,
16
2018). We have carefully reviewed the district court’s order, which addresses why child’s
continued placement in foster car e is in child’s best interest s, the lack of dispositional
alternatives, and the efforts that the county made to re unite the family. See Minn. Stat.
§ 260C.201, subd. 2 (2020) (identifying facts that district court must address in ordering a
disposition after finding that a child is in need of protection and serv ices). The district
court explained in detail why it is not in child’s best interests to re turn home until father
acknowledges and addresses his anger issues, why foster care is the appropriate disposition
until father substantially engages in his case plan, and the services that the county has
offered to reunite the family. Based on the reco rd before us, we cannot conclude that the
district court clearly erred or failed to make sufficient findings.
Affirmed.