State of Minnesota, Appellant,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0201

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Derek Michael Chauvin,
Respondent.

Filed March 5, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Larkin, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-12646

Keith Ell ison, Attorney General, Matthew Frank, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota; and

Neal Kumar Katyal (pro had vice), Hogan Lovells U.S. LLP, Washington, D.C. (for
appellant)

Eric J. Nelson, Halberg Criminal Defense, Bloomington, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and d ecided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Gaïtas,
Judge.

2
SYLLABUS
A precedential opinion of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is binding authority for
this court and district courts immediately upon its filing.
OPINION
LARKIN, Judge
In this pretrial appeal, the State of Minnesota challenges the di strict court’s order
denying the state’s motion to reinstate a charge of third-degree murder against respondent,
which was previously dismissed for lack of probable cause. The state argues that this
court’s precedential opinion in State v. Noor, ___ N.W.2d ___, 2021 WL 317740 (Minn.
App. Feb. 1, 2021), review granted (Minn. Mar. 1 , 2021), is binding authority and that
Noor supports reinstatement of the charge. The district court acknowledged that Noor
supports the state’s motion for reinstatement, but nonetheless denied the motion, reasoning
that Noor was not yet a binding precedent because further appellate review was possible in
that case. Because a precedential opinion of this court is binding authority upon its filing,
the district court erred by not applying Noor. We therefore reverse the district court’s order
and remand for the district court to reconsider the state’s motion to reinstate the third -
degree murder charge in light of this court’s precedential opinion in Noor.
FACTS
Appellant State of M innesota charged r espondent Derek Mic hael Chauvin with
second-degree unintentional murder, third -degree murder, and second -degree
manslaughter based on the death of George Floyd. Chauvin moved the district court to
dismiss the charges against him for lack of probable cause. On October 21, 2020, the

3
district court denied the motion with respect to the second -degree murder and second-
degree manslaughter charges, but the court granted the motion with respect to the third-
degree murder charge. In doing so, the district court reasoned that “a third-degree murder
charge can be sustained only in situations in which the defendant’s actions were ‘eminently
dangerous to other persons’ and were not specifically directed at the particular person
whose death occurred. ” (Emphasis omitted.) The district court concluded that because
Chauvin’s alleged death -causing actions were not eminently dangerous to anyone other
than George Floyd and were specifically directed at him, there was no basis to charge
Chauvin with third-degree murder.
On February 1, 2021, this court issued a precedential opinion in State v. Noor, which
involved a former police officer convicted of third -degree murder in a shooting death that
occurred while the officer was responding to a 911 call. 2021 WL 317740, at *1. Noor
challenged his third -degree-murder conviction arguing, in part, that the facts proved did
not meet the statutory definition of third-degree murder because his death-causing act was
directed at a specific person. Id. at *4. This court affirmed the third-degree murder
conviction in a 2-1 decision and held that “a conviction for third -degree murder . . . may
be sustained even if the death-causing act was directed at a single person.”1 Id. at *7.
On February 4, 2021, the state moved the district court to reinstate the third-degree
murder charge against Chauvin, arguing that this court in Noor had expressly rejected the

1 In the Minnesota Court of Appeals, “ Each case shall be submitted to a panel of at least
three judges. The decision of a majority of the judges to which it is submitted shall be the
decision of the court.” Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 1 (2020).

4
basis on which the district court had dismissed that charge. The district court denied the
state’s motion . The district court explained that if this court’s “ Noor opinion is
precedential,” the district court was duty -bound to follow it. However, the district court
reasoned that even though the Noor opinion was “labele d as ‘precedential ,’” the opinion
“does not become final and have precedential effect until the deadline for granting review
by the Minnesota Supreme Court has expired.” The district court then reasoned that the
Noor opinion is unpersuasive, stating that the district court’s “earlier decision . . .
dismissing the charge of Murder in the Third Degree was correct and nothing in the
majority opinion in Noor persuades the Court otherwise.”
In sum, the district court agreed with the analysis in the Noor dissent and declined
to follow the Noor holding because further appellate review was possible in Noor’s case.
In denying the state’s motion, the district court did not address “any other objections
[Chauvin] might make to reinstating” the third-degree murder charge.
On February 12, 2021, the state filed this pretrial appeal. On February 25, 2021,
Noor filed a petition for further review to the Minnesota Supreme Court. On March 1,
2021, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted Noor’s petition. This appeal by th e state
followed.
ISSUE
Did the district court err by declining to treat this court’s opinion in State v. Noor as
binding precedent?

5
ANALYSIS
A pretrial appeal by the state is authorized by r ule 28.04, subdivision 1(1), of the
Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. With certain exceptions not pertinent here ,
subdivision 1(1) permits the s tate to appeal as of right from “any pretrial order, including
probable cause dismissal orders based on questions of law.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.04, subd.
1(1). The alleged error must “have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial.” Id., subd.
2(2)(b). This court previously determined that the state has met the critical -impact
requirement and denied Chauvin’s motion to dism iss this appeal. State v. Chauvin , No.
A21-0201 (Minn. App. Feb. 23, 2021) (order).
Long ago, the supreme court stated that in a pretrial appeal by the state, it “will only
reverse the determination of the [district] court if the state demonstrates clearl y and
unequivocally that the [district] court has erred in its judgment and that, unless reversed,
the error will have a critical impact on the outcome of the trial. ” State v. Webber , 262
N.W.2d 157, 159 (Minn. 1977), overruled by State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476 (Minn. 2016).
But in State v. Lugo, the supreme court clarified that “Webber was not intended to, nor did
it, announce a rule of deference to district court pretrial legal conclusions that the State has
appealed.” 887 N.W.2d at 485 (emphasis added). The supreme court overruled Webber
“[t]o the extent the ‘erred prong’ in Webber suggests the contrary.” Id.
The state challenges the district court’s denial of its motion to reinstate the charge
of third -degree murder against Chauvin. Although the state’s motion was a request to
reinstate a previously dismissed charge, for the purposes of our analysis, the motion is

6
analogous to a motion to amend a criminal complaint because both seek permission to
charge an additional offense.
A district court is “relatively free” to permit the state to amend a complaint prior to
trial, “provided the [district] court allows continuances where needed.” State v. Bluhm ,
460 N.W.2d 22, 24 (Minn. 1990); see also Minn. R. Crim. P. 3.04, subd. 2. “The district
court has broad discretion to grant or deny leave to amend a complaint, and its ruling will
not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” State v. Baxter, 686 N.W.2d 846,
850 (Minn. App. 2004). A district court abuses its discretion when its “decisio n is based
on an erroneous view of the law or is against logic and the facts in the record.” Riley v.
State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).
The sole basis for the district court’s denial of the state’s motion to reinstate the
third-degree murder charge against Chauvin was its conclusion that even though this court
designated Noor as a precedential opinion, the Noor decision was not final and would not
have “precedential effect” until the deadline for filing a petition for further rev iew ha d
passed without such a filing or the Minnesota Supreme Court denied further review .
Because neither event had occurred, the district court concluded that it was not bound to
follow this court’s opinion in Noor and that it was free to reject this court’s reasoning as
unpersuasive.
The state assigns error to that conclusion, arguing that the Noor opinion is
precedential and that the district court was obligated to follow it. Chauvin counters that
the district court correctly refused to treat Noor as precedential authority because when the
court ruled on the motion, there was a possibility of further appellate review in Noor’s case.

7
Given the district court’s limited reasoning, the sole issue in this appeal is whether
the district court erred by refusing to treat Noor as binding precedent. That issue is one of
law, which we review de novo , without defer ence to the district court . See L ugo, 887
N.W.2d at 483 (rejecting suggestion that in a state’s pretrial appeal, “if an issue of law
decided by the district court against the [s]tate is a close call, we should not make the call
ourselves, but should defer to the district court’s legal conclusion.”).
A.
In the words of the United States Supreme Court: “[U] nless we wish anarchy to
prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by
the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it
to be.” Hutto v. Davis , 454 U.S. 370, 375, 102 S. Ct. 703, 706 (1982) . T his court has
similarly stated that its published opinions are binding on this court and on the district
courts.2 See, e.g., State v. Peter, 825 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Minn. App. 2012), review denied
(Minn. Feb. 27, 2013); State v. M.L.A., 785 N.W.2d 763, 767 (Minn. App. 2010), review
denied (Minn. Sept. 21, 2010).

2 The Minnesota Supreme Court promulgates the Minnesota Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure. On July 22, 2020, the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated an amendment
to the rules of civil appellate procedure that provided that written decisions in appeals filed
on or after August 1, 2020, would be designated as either “precedential” or
“nonprecedential” rather than “published” and “unpublished” as they had previously been
identified. Order Promulgating Amendments to the Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure ,
No. ADM09-8006 (Minn. July 22, 2020) ; see Minn. R. C iv. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1.
Accordingly, we identify opinions according to the version of rule 136.01 that was in effect
when the opinions were issued.

8
This court’s statements regarding the binding force of its published opinions are
based on the fundamental principle of stare decisis,3 or “ stare decisis et non quieta
movere,” which means, “[t]o stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1626-27 (10th ed. 2014). Stare decisis is “a foundation stone of
the rule of law” that instructs appellate courts to “stand by yesterday’s decisions.” Kimble
v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (quotation omitted).
“Stare decisis is the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991). Our supreme court
has stated, “The doctrine of stare decisis directs us to adhere to our former decisions in
order to promote the stability of the law and the integrity of the judicial process.” Schuette
v. City of Hutchinson, 843 N.W.2d 233, 238 (Minn. 2014). Adherence to the principle of
stare decisis promotes the important values of “stability, order, and predictability.”
Fleeger v. Wyeth, 771 N.W.2d 524, 529 (Minn. 2009).

3 There are two forms of stare decisis: horizontal and vertical. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140
S. Ct. 1390, 1416 n.5 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Horizontal stare decisis is the
respect that an appellate court owes to its own precedents and the circumstances under
which that court may appropriately overrule a precedent. See id. By contrast, vertical stare
decisis is absolute and is the respect that a district court owes to appellate decisions. See
id. (“In other words, the state courts and the other federal courts have a constitutional
obligation to follow a precedent of [the United States Supreme] Court unless and until it is
overruled by [the United States Supreme] Court.”). The stare decisis issue in this case is
one of vertical stare decisis.

9
Consistent with the principle of stare decisis , the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Appellate Procedure indicate that district courts must “stand by things decided” by this
court until a different decision is made by the s upreme court. For example, rule 136.01
provides that a panel of this court “deciding the merits of an appeal also determines the
form of the written opinion, which may be a precedential opinion, nonprecedential opinion,
or order opinion.” 4 Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, sub d. 1(a). Rule 136.01 specifically
provides that “[n]onprecedential opinions and order opinions are not binding authority .”
Id., subd. 1(c). But rule 136.01 does not impose any limitations or restrictions on the
immediate authoritative force of a precedential opinion. Specifically, the rule does not
provide that a precedential opinion is not immediately authoritative upon its filing or that
the occurrence of any subsequent event or expiration of any subsequent deadline is
necessary to trigger the opinion’s precedential effect. If the supreme court had intended
for precedential opinions of this court to have limited or no precedential effect until a
particular time or event, the supreme court presumably would have expressly said so in
rule 136.01.
It is true that a rule regarding entry of judgment afte r a decision by this court
provides for a stay if further review is sought. The rule provides:
Unless the parties stipulate to an immediate entry of
judgment, the clerk of the appellate courts shall enter judgment
pursuant to the decision or order not less than 30 days after the
filing of the decision or order. The service and filing of a
petition for review to, or rehearing in, the Supreme Court shall

4 See also Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.01, subd. 2 (“To the extent applicable, the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Appellate Procedure govern appellate procedure unless these rules direct
otherwise.”).

10
stay the entry of the judgment. Judgment shall be entered upon
the denial of a petition for review or rehearing.

Minn. R . Civ. App. P. 136.02. R ule 136.02 does not say that such a stay limits the
precedential effect of the underlying opinion of this court. Once again, the supreme court
could have easily promulgated a rule stating that the precedential effect of a precedential
opinion of this court is stayed pending further review. But the supreme court has not done
so.
Finally, the rules permitting a party to petition the supreme court for review of a
decision of the court of appeals do not state that the filing of such a petition or the
opportunity to do so in any way impacts the precedential effe ct of th is court’s decision.
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 117; Minn. R. Crim. P. 29.04. Moreover, the Minnesota Supreme
Court routinely grants petitions for review of this court’s precedential opinions without
vacating or otherwise altering the precedential eff ect of those opinions. For example, in
granting the petition for further review in State v. Noor, the supreme court did not vacate
this court’s opinion or make any other statement affecting the precedential value of that
opinion. The relevant text of the supreme court’s order is as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition of
Mohamed Mohamed Noor for further review of the decision of
the Court of Appeal s be, and the same is, granted. The
petitioner shall proceed as the appellant, and briefs shall be
served and f iled in the quantity, form, and within the time
limitations contained in Minn. R. Crim. P. 29 .04, subd. 8, and
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 131 and 132. Oral argument will be held
on a date in June 2021, on one of the days scheduled for
argument before this court. Counsel must file no tices of any
conflicts with the scheduled dates in June for oral arguments
on or before April 19, 2021.

11
State v. Noor, No. A19-1089 (Minn. Mar. 1, 2021) (order). If the supreme court does not
intend for precedential opinions of this court to have precedential effect once a petition for
further review is filed or granted, the supreme court could clearly say so.
In sum, deciding whether an opinion of this court is precedential is a fundamental
judicial function. The plain language of the relevant rules and the supreme court’s practice
of not vacating this court’s precedential decisions pending further review support the
state’s argument that a precedential opinion of this court has immediate authoritative effect.
Moreover, by applying this court’s precedential opinions in similar cases even though
further appellate review is possible or pending, we promote consistency, predictability, and
stability in the law, consistent with the principle of stare decisis.
B.
The district court cited State v. Collins, 580 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. App. 1998), review
denied (Minn. July 16, 1998), for the proposition that Noor was not b inding precedent
because there was a possibility of further appellate review in Noor’s case. Chauvin also
relies on Collins.
In Collins, this court considered the applicability of this court’s opinion in State v.
Loewen, 565 N.W.2d 714 (Minn. App. 1997), review granted (Minn. Aug. 26, 1997),
remanded (Minn. Jan. 22, 1998). 580 N.W.2d at 43. In Loewen, the supreme court granted
further review and requested briefing. See State v. Loewen , No. CX -96-2062 (Minn.
Aug. 26, 1997) (order). After briefing, the supreme court struck the case from its oral
argument calendar and “remanded to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in light
of State v. Machholz,” 574 N.W.2d 415 (Minn. 1998), superseded by statute, 1998 Minn.

12
Laws ch. 367, art. 2, § 23, at 696. State v. Loewen, No. CX-96-2062 (Minn. Jan. 22, 1998)
(order); see also Collins, 580 N.W.2d at 43. On remand, this court determined that, in light
of Machholz, the statute under which Loewen was convicted was “unconstitutionally
overbroad” and that Loe wen’s “conviction . . . must be reversed.” State v. Loewen, No.
CX-96-2062 (Minn. App. Apr. 20, 1998) (order op.).
One month later, the Collins court determined that this court’s initial, published
Loewen opinion was not precedential because of its subsequent history, reasoning as
follows:
This court’s decisions do not have precedential effect until the
deadline for granting review has expired. See Hoyt Inv. Co. v.
Bloomington Commerce & Trade Ctr. Assocs. , 418 N.W.2d
173, 176 (Minn. 1988) (discussi ng court of appeals decision
that became final when supreme court denied review).
Because review was granted and the decision was not affirmed,
Loewen is not binding precedent.

Collins, 580 N.W.2d at 43. The district court and Chauvin rely on the first sentence in the
above-quoted excerpt from this court’s Collins opinion. That reliance is unavailing
because the sentence was dictum.
“Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case in hand are
obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication.” Wandersee v. Brellenthin Chevrolet
Co., 102 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Minn. 1960) (quotation omitted). Generally, “in expressing
dicta, a court has not had the benefit of adversarial briefing and argument focusing on the
issue.” Pecinovsky v. AMCO Ins. Co ., 613 N.W.2d 804, 808 (Minn. App. 2000) , review
denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 2000).

13
“Dictum can be either judicial dictum or obiter dictum, depending on how involved
the parties’ arguments and the court’s analysis are.” State v. Atwood , 914 N.W.2d 422,
425 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d, 925 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 2019). Obiter dictum is a comment
made in passing in a judicial opinion that is unnecessary to the decision; such a comment
may be disregarded and not given precedential status. Id. Judicial dictum, however, is “an
expression of opinion on a question directly involved and argued by counsel though not
entirely necessary to the decision.” State v. Rainer, 103 N.W.2d 389, 396 (Minn. 1960).
Unlike obiter dictum, judicial dictum “is entitled to much greater weight . . . and should
not be lightly disregarded.” Id.
As stated above, when this court decided Collins, the supreme court had already
accepted review and disposed of the Loewen case by remanding it to this court for further
consideration in light of an intervening supreme court opinion. See Collins, 580 N.W.2d at
43. This court therefore concluded that Loewen was not binding precedent. Id.
Consequently, there was no need for this court to comment on a situation in which the
“deadline for granting review ” of one of this court’s opinions had yet to expire. Id.
Moreover, the Collins opinion does not suggest that such a situat ion was the subject of
adversarial briefing and argument by counsel on appeal. 5 Thus, the first sentence quoted

5 The issues presented in Collins were: (1) whether the district court erred by implicitly
determining that two acts could constitute acting “repeatedly” within the meaning of Minn.
Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(6) (1996); (2) whether the district court erred by allowing reference
to Collins’s stipulation to his earlier conviction; (3) wh ether the district court erred by
failing to instruct the jury on specific intent with regard to the harassment charges;
(4) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of tampering with a
witness; and (5) whether the district court erred in sentencing Collins. Collins, 580 N.W.2d
at 40. Whether t his court’s decisions have precedential effect prior to expiration of the

14
above is an “expression[] in a court’s opinion which go[es] beyond the facts before the
court and therefore [is] . . . not binding in subsequent cases.” See State ex rel . Foster v.
Naftalin, 74 N.W.2d 249, 266 (Minn. 1956). To be clear, the statement in Collins that
“[t]his court’s decisions do not have precedential effect until the deadline for granting
review has expired” is obiter dictum and is therefore not binding precedent.
The district court and Chauvin also rely on the supreme court’s opinion in Hoyt,
which was cited in the Collins opinion. In Hoyt, the supreme court held that “[o] nce a
decision of the court of appeals becomes final following denial of a petiti on for further
review, the [district] court is required to direct the entry of judgment in accordance with
that decision.” 418 N.W.2d at 173. The relevant portion of the Hoyt opinion states, “It is
our view that once the original court of appeals’ decision . . . became final by virtue of the
denial of the petition for further review, the [district] court was required to cause the entry
of judgment in accordance with that decision . . . .” Id. at 176. Thus, the Hoyt opinion
concerned the timing of the entry of judgment in one case . It did not address the issue
presented in this case, that is, whether a precedential opinion of this court is binding on the
district court in another case even though the opinion may be subject to further review.
In sum, neither Collins nor Hoyt provides valid support for the proposition that a
precedential opinion of this court is not binding authority immediately upon its filing.

“deadline for granting review,” Collins, 580 N.W.2d at 43, was not “ a question directly
involved.” Rainer, 103 N.W.2d at 396.

15
C.
The district court and Chauvin also rely on the concept of “finality.” Chauvin
explains that finality means entry of final judgment and argues that a precedential opinion
of this court does not have precedential effect until final judgment in the underlying case
is entered.
Chauvin’s assertion fails to appreciate the difference between a “precedent” and a
“judgment.” Precedent is defined as “[s]omething of the same type that has occurred or
existed before” and as “[a]n action or official decision that can be used as support for later
actions or decisions; esp., a decided case that furnishes a basis for determining later cases
involving s imilar facts or issues.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1424 (11th ed. 2019). By
comparison, a judgment is “[a] court’s final determination of the rights and obligati ons of
the parties in a case .” Id. at 1007. T he concept of “finality” with regard to a judgment
simply “means that it ends or terminates the matter or proceeding in which it is rendered.”
In re Enger’s Will, 30 N.W.2d 694, 700 (Minn. 1948).
One commentator has described the difference between a precedent and a judgment
as follows:
A precedent . . . is a judicial decision which contains in itself a
principle. The underlying principle which thus forms its
authoritative element is often termed the ratio decidendi. The
concrete decision is binding between the parties to it, but it is
the abstract ratio decidendi which alone has the force of law as
regards the world at large.

16
John Salmond, Jurisprudence § 60, at 201 (7th ed. 1924 ); see also In re Mem’l Hosp. of
Iowa County, Inc., 862 F.2d 1299, 1302 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that “litigation is conducted
to resolve the parties’ controversies; precedent is a byproduct of resolving disputes”).
Chauvin fails to persuade us that a precedent should not apply in other cases simply
because the rights and obligations of the parties in the underlying case have not been
reduced to judgment. Adopting that approach would yield results entirely inconsistent with
the important values served by the principle of stare decisis such as the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent application of law, which contribute to the actual and perceived
integrity of the judicial process. For example, if this court’s precedential opinion in Noor
is not authoritative unless the supreme court affirms the opinion on further review, district
courts will be free to disregard the legal principles set forth in Noor and similarly situated
defendants could be treated differently simply because district court judges could choose
whether or not to follow Noor.
Chauvin seems to acknowledge that such an approach would result in uneven,
unpredictable, and inconsistent application of law. He also acknowledges that when the
supreme court grants further review in a criminal case, the ensuing appellate process may
take months. Chauvin recognizes that under his approach to appellate precedent, the law
regarding the circumstances necessary to support a charge of third -degree murder would
be uncertain as Noor’s case undergoes final review. Chauvin suggests that during that
period of uncertainty, the state should ex ercise its prosecutorial discretion and either
decline to charge potential third-degree murder offenses or delay charging decisions while

17
the Noor case makes its way through the appellate process. The state describes Chauvin’s
position as “radical.”
Given the choice between a system in which this court’s precedential opinions are
binding authority immediately upon filing, which must be applied consistently in factually
similar cases, and a system in which this court’s precedential opinions are of no effect until
further review is denied or completed, it is obvious that the former—and only the former—
results in the evenhanded, predictable application of law that is necessary to promote
confidence in the judicial system. That is likely why Chauvin is unable to identify any
jurisdiction that does not treat a precedential decision of an intermediate appellate court as
binding authority while further review is possible or pending.
In sum, because a precedent and a ju dgment serve different purposes and because
enforcing a precedent while awaiting entry of judgment promotes the important values of
stare decisis, we reject Chauvin’s argument that the authoritative force of a precedent i s
dependent on entry of appellate judgment.
D.
In conclusion, we discern no valid authority supporting Chauvin’s argument that a
precedential opinion of this court is not binding authority so long as further review is
possible or pending. The plain language of the relevant rules of procedure indicates that a
precedential opinion of this court has immediate precedential effect , which is not limited
by the availability or grant of further appellate review. Nor is it dependent on entry of
judgment. Although parties, attorneys, district court judges, and the public may di sagree
with this court’s precedential decisions, district courts are bound to follow them. If it were

18
otherwise, there would be uncertainty in the law and the integrity of our judici al system
would be undermined. We therefore hold that a precedential opinion of this court is binding
authority for this court and district courts immediately upon its filing. Thus, the district
court erred by refusing to follow this court’s precedential opinion in Noor.
Because the district court denied the state’s motion to reinstate the third -degree
murder charge based solely on the ground that this court’s opinion in Noor was not
precedential without addressing any other objections to reinstatement of the charge, we do
not consider Chauvin’s other appellate arguments against reinstatement. Such arguments
must be considered and determined in the first instance in district court. See State v.
Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn. 1989) (stating that an appellate court usually “will
not decide issues which are not first addressed by the [district] court”).
DECISION
This court’s precedential opinion in Noor became binding authority on the date it
was filed. The district court therefore erred by concluding that it was not bound by the
principles of law set forth in Noor and by denying the state’s motion to reinstate the charge
of third-degree murder on that basis. We reverse the order of the district court and remand
for reconsideration of the st ate’s motion. On remand, the district court has discretion to
consider any additional arguments Chauvin might raise in opposition to the state’s motion.
But the district court’s decision must be consistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.