State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0208

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Warren Earl Barry,
Appellant.

Filed January 3, 2022
Affirmed
Bratvold, Judge

Crow Wing County District Court
File No. 18-CR-19-3022

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Donald F. Ryan, Crow Wing County Attorney, Lindsey S. Lindstrom, Assistant County
Attorney, Brainerd, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant
Appellate Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Bratvold, Judge ; and Frisch,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRATVOLD, Judge
Appellant challenges a final judgment of conviction for first-degree driving while
impaired (DWI), arguing the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress
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blood-test evidence. Because the stop of appellant’s vehicle was supported by reasonable
articulable suspicion and the expansion of the stop was lawful, we affirm.
FACTS
The following summarizes the district court’s factual findings following an
evidentiary hearing. On August 1, 2019, just after 12:47 a.m., a Baxter police officer began
following a pickup truck because it had a “damaged side tail lamp.” The officer saw the
truck’s taillight “emit a white light to the rear” when the vehicle braked. The truck stopped
for a red light, and the officer pulled up behind the truck at the stoplight. The light turned
green, but the truck “remain stopped for approximately 8-10 seconds before moving.” The
officer conducted a traffic stop and identified the driver as appellant Warren Earl Barry.
The officer observed Barry “to be restless and have a hard time sitting still in his
seat.” The officer invited Barry to the squad car to verify information about Barry’s driver’s
license and the vehicle’s proof of insurance. While they were in the squad car, the officer
“observed [Barry] to be restless, frequently moving, [and] twitching his fingers.” The
officer also noticed Barry’s pupils reacted “little to none to light, and [Barry] had bumps
on the back of his tongue,” a common sign of drug use. The officer performed field sobriety
tests, which Barry “performed poorly on.”
The officer arrested Barry and, after obtaining a search warrant , secured a blood
sample which the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension analyzed . Barry’s blood
sample tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. The state charged Barry
with felony DWI under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 1(2) (2018); gross misdemeanor
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driving after cancellation under Minn. Stat. § 171.24, subd. 5 (2018); and misdemeanor
driving without proof of insurance under Minn. Stat. § 169.791, subd. 2(a) (2018).
Barry moved to suppress evidence obtained from the traffic stop, and the district
court held a contested evidentiary hearing. Barry argued the traffic stop was unlawful and,
alternatively, the expansion of the stop was unconstitutional. The district court heard
testimony from the officer who stopped Barry’s truck and received into evidence two
recordings of the traffic stop and subsequent investigation. One recording was from the
officer’s squad car and the other recording was from the officer’s body camera. After
receiving briefs from both parties, the district court denied Barry’s motion.
The district court first determined the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion
to stop Barry’s truck. The district court found the video recording was unclear as to whether
“white light [was] emitting from the taillight,” but “clearly” showed “the coloration
between the two taillights is different.” The district court determined this difference in
color violated Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 1 (2018), and determined the equipment
violation established reasonable articulable suspicion for the stop. T he district court also
reasoned Barry’s “extended pause at a green light with no opposing traffic” combined with
the equipment violation to create “reasonable suspicion [of impaired driving] as outlined
in the DWI training manual provided to officers.”
Second, the district court considered the first expansion of the traffic stop: when the
officer invited Barry to the squad car. The district court reasoned the officer’s request was
justified by “probable cause” because Barry “was driving with a license cancelled [inimical
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to public safety]” and lacked proof of insurance. Barry asked to make a phone call to get
proof of insurance, which he did while in the officer’s squad car.
Finally, the district court considered the second expansion of the traffic stop: when
the officer shone a light in Barry’s mouth and eyes and conducted other field sobriety tests.
The district court found the video showed Barry’s “speech was mumbled and slurred and
his speech pattern and behaviors indicated that he was under the influence.” The district
court concluded Barry’s actions, combined with the officer’s testimony about his training
and experience as a drug-recognition evaluator, established reasonable articulable
suspicion for the second expansion of the traffic stop. Based on its analysis, the district
court denied Barry’s motion to suppress evidence.
Under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subdivision 4, Barry maintained his not-guilty plea,
waived his right to a jury trial, and stipulated to the state’s facts to obtain review of the
district court’s pretrial ruling denying his motion to suppress. The district court issued its
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order finding Barry guilty of all three charged
offenses and sentenced him to 72 months in prison.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
I. The district court did not err by denying Barry’s motion to suppress evidence
from the traffic stop.
“When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we review the district court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard and the
district court’s legal determinations de novo.’” State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502
5
(Minn. 2008) (quoting State v. Jordan, 742 N.W.2d 149, 152 (Minn. 2007)). “When facts
are not in dispute, as here, we review a pretrial order on a motion to suppress de novo and
‘determine whether the police articulated an adequate basis for the search or seizure at
issue.’” State v. Williams, 794 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Minn. 2011) (citation omitted).
A. The district court did not err by determining reasonable articulable
suspicion justified stopping Barry’s truck.

The United States and Minnesota Constitutions protect against “unreasonable
searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. “Temporary
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a
brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure,” which requires reasonable
articulable suspicion. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996) (quotation
omitted); see also State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 137 (Minn. 1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
In determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion justifies a stop, Minnesota
courts consider the totality of the circumstances. State v. Richardson, 622 N.W.2d 823, 825
(Minn. 2001). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, no matter how
insignificant, that observation forms the requisite particularized and objective basis for
conducting a traffic stop.” State v. Anderson, 683 N.W.2d 818, 823 (Minn. 2004). Also,
when assessing the totality of the circumstances, we recognize that trained
law-enforcement officers may make inferences and deductions beyond the competence of
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an untrained person. State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d 525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (citing United
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)).
Barry argues the district court’s decision “to not suppress the evidence was
erroneous” because the officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Barry’s
pickup truck. Barry contends the district court clearly erred by finding an equipment
violation because the squad-car video does not show a white light projecting from the
taillight. Barry also argues no statute “prohibits operating a vehicle with a cracked taillight
if a small amount of white light is being emitted.” Barry finally contends his pause at the
intersection for eight to ten seconds “after the light turned green was also not a basis for
stopping [his] vehicle.” Thus, Barry concludes neither of the officer’s reasons for the traffic
stop “amounted to an ‘objectively reasonable suspicion’ that a person inside [his] vehicle
was engaged in criminal activity,” making the stop unwarranted.
The state counters , arguing Barry committed two equipment violations, either of
which provided reasonable articulable suspicion for a traffic stop. First, the state argues the
district court’s finding that Barry’s taillights were different colors establishes a violation
of Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a) (2018) (“When a vehicle is equipped with stop lamps
or signal lamps, the lamps must at all times be maintained in good working condition.”).
The state argues that “observation of a brake light in not good condition gives rise to an
objective, reasonable, articulable suspicion justifying a traffic stop.” Second, the state
argues the district court’s finding of different colored taillights also shows Barry violated
Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 1(a) (requiring a vehicle equipped with two stop lamps on the
rear that “shall emit a red or yellow light”). The state argues this alternate violation “would
7
also give rise to reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle.” The district court ’s decision
relied on the second violation.
Before addressing the parties’ arguments, however, we first consider whether the
district court’s factual finding of two different-colored taillights is clearly erroneous. Barry
argues “the squad video does not support the officer’s testimony.” At the evidentiary
hearing, the officer testified he “observed a vehicle in front of [him] that projected a white
light to its rear.” On cross-examination, the officer testified “part of [the taillight] was red
and part of it was white.” The officer also testified he stopped Barry’s truck because the
“[v]ehicle [was] projecting a white light to the rear.” 1 The district court did not discredit
the officer’s testimony but found the video recording showed “some ambiguity as to
whether or not there was a white light emitting from the taillight.” Still, the district court
found “there is clearly a difference in color between the two [tail]lights.” The officer’s
testimony supports the district court’s factual finding of two different colored taillights, as
does the squad-car video recording. 2 Thus, the district court’s finding of two
different-colored taillights is not clearly erroneous.

1 The officer also testified that, while his squad car and Barry’s truck were stopped at the
traffic signal, he saw Barry’s truck “pause for about 8 to 10 seconds” before proceeding
through a green light, and that “[a]bnormal pauses at green lights such as [Barry’s] is an
indicator of impaired driving in the NHTSA [(National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration)] DWI enforcement manual.”

2 The district court’s finding about the video recording being “unclear” is supported by the
squad-car video recording, which is not as clear as the officer’s body-camera video
recording. The body-camera video shows a while light emitting from Barry’s right rear
taillight as the officer walks toward the truck to speak with Barry.
8
We next consider the district court’s determination of a taillight equipment
violation. Minnesota has many statutes about vehicle stop lamps and taillights. Minn. Stat.
§ 169.57, subd. 1, requires vehicles manufactured or assembled after January 1, 1960, to
be “equipped with at least two stop lamps on the rear which shall emit a red or yellow
light.” Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3(a), states when a vehicle is equipped with “stop
lamps,” the lamps must “at all times be maintained in good working condition.” Minn. Stat.
§ 169.50, subd. 1(a) (2018) states, “[e]very motor vehicle . . . must be equipped with at
least one taillamp, exhibiting a red light plainly visible from” the rear. Minn. Stat. § 169.50,
subd. 1(b) (2018), states any vehicle manufactured after January 1, 1960, “must be
equipped with at least two taillamps mounted on the rear” and “[w]hen lighted, the
taillamps must comply with the provisions of this subsection,” which includes subdivision
1(a) that requires taillamps to be red.
The district court determined “taillight[s] of a different color is a violation of Minn.
Stat. § 169.57(1).” But Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 1(a), requires a vehicle to have two stop
lamps on the rear “which shall emit a red or yellow light.” (Emphasis added.) Neither the
plain language of this section nor caselaw suggests differently colored stop lamps violate
this provision. Rather, the legislature’s use of the disjunctive word “or” suggests stop lamps
may be either red or yellow, or both, and comply with the statute. See generally Aberle v.
Faribault Fire Dept. Relief Ass’n, 41 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. 1950) (“The word ‘or’ is a
disjunctive and ordinarily refers to different things as alternatives.”). On the other hand,
operating a vehicle with a white taillight violates section 169.57, subd. 1(a). State v.
DeRose, 365 N.W.2d 284, 286 (Minn. App. 1985) (citing Minn. Stat. §§ 169.50, subd. 1,
9
.57, subds. 1, 3 (1984)) (“The driver was also violating the law by operating the car with a
white taillight.”). But the district court did not find Barry’s taillight emitted a white light .
Rather, the district court found “it is unclear in the video footage that there is white light
emitting from the taillight.” Thus, the district court erred by determining Barry violated
section 169.57, subd. 1.
Still, the evidence supported the determination that Barry violated another of the
taillight statutes.3 Minn. Stat. § 169.50, subd. 1 , requires vehicles to have “two taillamps
mounted on the rear” that “[w]hen lighted” must exhibit “a red light plainly visible from”
the rear of the vehicle. The district court’s finding that Barry’s taillights were “clearly”
different colors implies it found only one taillight was red, a violation of section 169.50,
subd. 1. Thus, the officer’s observation of an equipment violation established reasonable
articulable suspicion to stop Barry’s vehicle. See Anderson, 683 N.W.2d at 823 (holding

3 Neither party discussed section 169.50, subd. 1, in the briefs submitted to the court. This
court must “decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be diluted
by counsel’s oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant
authorities.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (quotation
omitted) (determining the supreme court could consider applying the severance doctrine to
a search warrant even though neither party discussed its applicability in their briefs or oral
arguments). We note “it is proper for an appellate court to decide an issue not raised on
appeal only when the reasoning relied upon by the appellate court is neither novel nor
questionable.” State v. Glidden, 455 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Minn. 1990) (citing Hannuksela,
452 N.W.2d at 673–74 n.7) (determining the court of appeals should not have raised and
decided an issue because it was a novel issue the supreme court had not decided before).
Here, our consideration of Minn. Stat. § 169.50, subd. 1, is neither novel nor questionable.
See, e.g., DeRose, 365 N.W.2d at 286 (determining a driver violated section 169.50,
subd. 1, by operating a car with a white taillight). In fact, we wonder whether the district
court’s memorandum simply miscited the statute it was applying.
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officers have cause to stop a vehicle if they observe any traffic violation, no matter how
insignificant).
We also consider the state’s reasoning about two suspected equipment violations.
The state argues a violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.57, subd. 3, requiring stop lamps to be in
“good working condition,” for the first time on appeal. We seldom review arguments and
issues raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Goebel, 654 N.W.2d 700, 702 (Minn.
App. 2002). 4 The state also failed to present evidence of a violation of section 169.57,
subd. 3. During the evidentiary hearing, the prosecuting attorney elicited testimony about
the officer’s observation of a white taillight and did not address the “working condition”
of the stop lamps. Thus, we decline to consider the “working condition” violation. See
Garza v. State, 632 N.W.2d 633, 637 (Minn. 2001) (“ Because the state failed to take
advantage of its opportunity to build a factual record with respect to standing, we do not
believe that resolution of the standing issue is necessary to the interests of justice.”) ; see
also Grunig, 660 N.W.2d at 137. The state also argues Barry violated Minn. Stat. § 169.57,
subd. 1. But, as discussed above, this section does not require stop lamps to be red; instead,
it requires stop lamps to be either yellow or red.
In conclusion, the district court did not err by determining reasonable articulable
suspicion supported a traffic stop of Barry’s truck because the officer observed a suspected

4 While the state may “raise alternative arguments on appeal” to defend the district court’s
“underlying decision,” they may do so only when sufficient record facts allow this court to
consider the alternative argument, the argument has legal support, and the relief previously
granted will not be expanded. See State v. Grunig, 660 N.W.2d 134, 137 (Minn. 2003).
Here, the state did not offer proof of the “working condition” of Barry’s taillight.
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equipment violation of Minn. Stat. § 169.50, subd. 1, which requires vehicles to have “two
taillamps mounted on the rear” that “[w]hen lighted” must exhibit “a red light plainly
visible from” the rear of the vehicle.5
B. The district court did not err by determining additional reasonable
articulable suspicion supported the officer’s expansion of the traffic
stop.

The scope of an investigatory stop of a vehicle or the investigatory detention of a
person is limited to what is reasonably related to the circumstances which gave rise to the
seizure. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004). When a stop is lawful,
police may expand the scope of that stop only if there is “reasonable articulable suspicion”
of criminal activity beyond the original purpose of the stop. State v. Fort, 660 N.W.2d 415,
419 (Minn. 2003). “ [E]ach incremental intrusion” must be “tied to and justified
by . . . (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or
(3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012)
(quoting Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 365). The reasonable-articulable-suspicion standard is
“not high.” State v. Bourke, 718 N.W.2d 922, 927 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). The
officer need only articulate specific facts which, taken together with rational inferences
from those facts, objectively support the officer’s suspicion. State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d
173, 182 (Minn. 2007).

5 Barry also challenges the district court’s determination that Barry’s “extended pause at a
green light with no opposing traffic” combined with the equipment violation to create
reasonable articulable suspicion. Because we uphold the traffic stop based on a suspected
equipment violation alone, we need not address this alternative argument. Rather, we
discuss the officer’s observation of Barry’s driving conduct below, in our analysis of the
second issue.
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Barry argues, even if the traffic stop were lawful, the evidence from the stop should
be suppressed because the expansion of the stop was unlawful. Barry concedes the officer’s
first expansion of the scope of the stop—asking Barry to accompany him to his squad car
to verify the status of his driver’s license and determine whether he had proof of
insurance— was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.
Barry contends the officer unconstitutionally expanded his investigation by
conducting field sobriety tests, including using “a flashlight to look in [his] eyes and
mouth.” The state argues the expansion was reasonable because the officer saw indications
of Barry’s impairment: (1) Barry’s “long pause at the light which Officer Halverson knows
from the NHTSA DWI enforcement manual is an indicator of impaired driving”; and
(2) Barry was restless in his truck, and when he moved to the squad car, continued “to be
restless, frequently moving, and twitching his fingers.”
The district court determined the officer’s expansion of his investigation was
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion because the officer’s suspicion of
impairment was based on Barry’s conduct while seated in the squad car. The district court
found “[i]n the squad video, it is clear that [Barry] is exhibiting symptoms of being under
the influence.” And t he district court credited the o fficer’s testimony, based on his
experience as a drug- recognition evaluator, that Barry showed indicia of impairment
throughout their interaction.
6

6 The officer testified he is a certified drug-recognition evaluator, he saw Barry’s truck
pause for “8 to 10 seconds before the vehicle proceeded through” the green light, and that
“[a]bnormal pauses at green lights such as that is an indicator of impaired driving in the
NHTSA DWI enforcement manual.” The officer also testified Barry was restless and
13
The district court specifically found the officer observed, while seated in the squad
car, that Barry was “restless, frequently moving, [and] twitching his fingers.” The district
court also found, during the exchange in the squad car, Barry’s “speech was mumbled and
slurred and his speech patterns and behavior indicated that he was under the influence.”
We reject Barry’s claim that the video evidence does not support these findings. Thus,
based on the officer’s observation of Barry’s behavior, the officer’s expertise in drug
recognition, and the inferences he made, the district court did not err by determining there
was reasonable articulable suspicion to expand the officer’s investigation because Barry
displayed indicia of impairment.
In conclusion, the officer saw Barry commit an equipment violation, which
established reasonable articulable suspicion to stop Barry’s truck. The officer, based on his
training, also observed signs of impairment in Barry’s driving conduct and as Barry spoke
while seated in the truck. After Barry moved to the squad car, the officer observed Barry
exhibit additional signs of impairment, which established reasonable articulable suspicion
to expand the scope of the traffic stop. Thus, the district court did not err by denying Barry’s
motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.
Affirmed.

struggled to sit still in his truck; this restlessness continued when Barry moved to the squad
car. Barry had “a hard time sitting still,” and was “tapping and twitching his finger.”
Additionally, the officer’s body-camera recording shows Barry acted restlessly in his truck
and in the squad car. The recording also shows Barry’s speech is sometimes delayed and
slightly slurred.