State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0212

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Travis O’Neal Dillard,
Appellant.

Filed January 3, 2022
Affirmed
Bryan, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-19-25170

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Kelly O’Neill Moller, Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Ap pellate Public Defender, Melissa Sheridan, Assistant
Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presid ing Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BRYAN, Judge
In this direct appeal of his conviction for second-degree crim inal sexual conduct,
appellant challenges the district court’s de cision to permit appellant to discharge his
counsel and represent himself without appointing substitute counsel. We conclude that the
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district court did not abuse its discretion because appellant’s stated reasons for discharging
his attorney did not justify appointment of substitute counsel and because the district court
and the public defender made a thorough inquiry.
FACTS
On October 10, 2019, respo ndent State of Minnesota charged appellant Travis
O’Neal Dillard with aggravated second-degree criminal sexual conduct, in violation of
Minnesota statutes section 6 09.343, subdivision 1(e)(i) (201 8). In January 2020, the
district court appointed the public defender’s office to represent him.
A few months later, Dillard expressed ge neral dissatisfaction with his attorney
(B.L.), claiming in a letter to the district court that B.L. was “biased and doing things such
as bluntly suggesting I take a life sentence, as if he’s working for the accused-victim
[rather] than me. [B.L.] is not working in my best interest.” On June 30, 2020, the district
court held a hearing regarding the claims. B.L. was not present and Dillard was instead
represented by a managing attorney with the public defender’s office (L.S.). At the start
of the hearing, L.S. informed the court that Dillard wanted to represent himself. L.S.
explained that she had advised Dillard rega rding the request and proceeded to question
Dillard on the record about his request for a new attorney:
L.S.: Mr. Dillard, we met this afternoon; correct?
DILLARD: Correct.
L.S.: And . . . you initially had asked me about whether or not
you could get another attorney other than [B.L.;] is that
correct?
DILLARD: Correct.
L.S.: And I explained to you that our office policy for obvious
reasons doesn’t reassign cases?
DILLARD: Correct.
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L.S.: And the bench and I know the county attorney’s office
is aware of that because we can’t reassign cases every time
someone’s not happy with something that’s happening to them
or their case and . . . we don’t do that, and I explained that to
you; correct?
DILLARD: Correct.
L.S.: I explained that either your choices were to either
proceed with [B.L.,] or if you didn’t want that, ultimately your
choice was to either hire a lawyer or to represent yourself. We
had that conversation; correct?
DILLARD: Correct.

Dillard continued to express a desire to represent himself, repeating the general
criticism of B.L. “I feel it would be in my best interest to defend myself because I noticed
several instances where my so-called alleged pu blic defender, . . . he didn’t have my best
interest at heart.” L.S. then inquired further:
L.S.: And so we talked about how lawyers are kind of in a
unique situation—
DILLARD: Mm-hm.
L.S.: --is that they—we can’t al ways give people the news
they want.
DILLARD: Right. Right.
L.S.: --we can only tell people kind of what they’re working
with on their case, and we can’t always give people—we’re not
just hired guns, we can’t just do everything that everybody
wants—
DILLARD: Mm-hm. Mm-hm.
L.S.: --and sometimes we have to just tell people what a case
is worth.
DILLARD: Mm-hm.
L.S.: We talked about that; right?
DILLARD: Mm-hm.

L.S. then advised Dillard on the record that she did not see a basis for Dillard’s concerns,
explaining that it “doesn’t seem that [B.L.’s] doing anything that would rise to the level to
cause our office to give you a new attorney. [B.L .] is a very seasoned attorney. . . . He’s
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been trying felony cases for a very long time a nd is very able to defend difficult cases.”
L.S. also explained that should B.L. fail to provide effective representation, Dillard could
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel claim on appeal. In response, Dillard
again repeated his dissatisfaction: “[F]igur atively I felt like I couldn’t breathe anymore
. . . . So I basically wanted to separate myself as far away as having him as my attorney as
possible.” Dillard also repeated his belief that B.L. did “not have [Dillard’s] best interest
at heart, unfortunately.”
The district court then directly questio ned Dillard’s rationale for requesting to
discharge his attorney:
THE COURT: Why do you think [B.L.] doesn’t have your best
interest at heart?
DILLARD: Um, just several occasions; like, I just noticed he
seemed so apathetic and distan t from defending me, like, this
is a case where I’m looking at potentially 25 years or as
mentioned potentially life. And like, for instance, I have not
seen nor heard from him since February or March, and we’re
talking about 25 years or life. That is a long time. If I’m
looking at such an extensive amount of time if I lose, I need to
have an attorney that’s consistent—dealing with me
consistently on if not a monthly basis at least every month and
a half or two months.
THE COURT: So you say . . . February is the last time you
had contact with him? . . .
DILLARD: It was on the phone.
THE COURT: . . . And so, was your expectation that he would
come out to visit you?
DILLARD: Either come out to visit me or have at least, like,
several additional conversations about what to do.
THE COURT: Because it seems to me that’s a big step to take
to represent yourself because [B.L.] isn’t calling you. I agree
with [L.S.] . . . he’s a very expe rienced attorney . . . [T]his
decision is totally yours. You can discharge him for any reason
you want to. That’s not the point here. The point is [] that you
have a significant felony case . . . one in which you’re facing
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. . . life in prison . . . and like you said one in which the offer is
25 years, which is a long time.
DILLARD: Mm-hm.
THE COURT: And discharging your layer in a significant case
like this is serious. And so I want to make sure that that’s what
you want to do.

The district court then continued the case to give Dillard additional time to consider
whether he wanted to dismiss the public defender and procee d pro se. Dillard appeared
with B.L. at the next hearing on July 21, 2020. B.L. informed the district court that Dillard
still wanted to discharge the public defender’s office and proceed pr o se. In response,
Dillard clarified that he only wanted to disc harge B.L., but he understood that meant he
would have to represent himself at trial:
DILLARD: So, rather than di scharging the public defender’s
office, I am personally myself discharging [B.L.] because he
seems rather—he seems more like an oppressor rather than
someone who’s working for me. So—and also, as I don’t have
an attorney, I will choose to represent myself, sir.
THE COURT: All right. And so this is what happens, Mr.
Dillard . . . if you discharge [B.L.,] essentially what that means
is that you’re discharging the Hennepin County public
defender’s office.
DILLARD: Right. And that’s very unfortunate.
THE COURT: Yeah.
DILLARD: Mm-hm.
THE COURT: So, if you di scharge him, they won’t
automatically send another lawyer—
DILLARD: Right.
THE COURT: —to represent you. But I think you already
knew that—
DILLARD: Yeah, I did. I did.
THE COURT: —because I think we had some conversations
about that last time.
DILLARD: Mm-hm.

. . . .

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THE COURT: And so you want to discharge [B.L.]?
DILLARD: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: You want to proceed on your own?
DILLARD: Yes, I do.

The district court then reviewed Dillard’s wr itten petition to proceed pro se with him and
advised Dillard of the conseque nces of the decision. The district court then accepted
Dillard’s petition to proceed pro se and discharged the public defender’s office.
The case proceeded to trial in November 2020 and the jury found Dillard guilty of
second-degree criminal sexual conduct, with ag gravating factors. The district court
sentenced Dillard to life in prison. Dillard appeals.
DECISION
Dillard argues that the district court erre d when it allowed him to proceed pro se
without conducting a sufficient inquiry. Because Dillard did not identify “serious
allegations of inadequate representation” and because the public defender and the district
court thoroughly questioned Dillard regarding the basis of his dissatisfaction with B.L., we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by granting Dillard’s request to
represent himself.
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the
right to the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Minn. Const.,
art. I, § 6. If the defendant cannot employ counsel, the defendant is entitled to appointed
counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963). This right,
however, is not an “unbridled right to be represented by counsel of [the defendant’s]
choosing.” State v. Fagerstrom, 176 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1970).
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When a defendant raises complaints about the effectiveness of appointed counsel’s
representation, the district court should onl y appoint substitute counsel “if exceptional
circumstances exist and the demand is timely and reasonably made.” State v. Worthy, 583
N.W.2d 270, 278 (Minn. 1998 ) (citation omitted). Exceptional circumstances are those
that affect appointe d counsel’s “ability or competence to represent the client.” State v.
Gillam, 629 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 2001). A defendant’s general “dissatisfaction” with
appointed counsel is not an exceptional circumstance. Id. (citing Fagerstrom, 176 N.W.2d
at 265). Nor can an attorney’s honest statements to a defendant about their case constitute
exceptional circumstances, which require the de fendant to raise “serious allegations of
inadequate representation.” See State v. Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d 241, 245-55 (Minn. 1999)
(“Sometimes [an] attorney is going to have to be very blunt and very honest with [a
defendant] and [they are] going to say things th at [the defendant is] not going to like to
hear. But those matters don’t go to issues of ability or competen ce to represent [the
defendant]”); Worthy, 583 N.W.2d at 279 (“General dissa tisfaction or disagreement with
appointed counsel’s assessme nt of the case does not constitute the exceptional
circumstances needed to obtain a substitute attorney.”).
When a defendant “voices serious allegati ons of inadequate representation,” the
district court should conduct a “searchi ng inquiry” before determining whether the
defendant’s complaints warrant the appointment of substitute counsel. State v. Clark, 722
N.W.2d 460, 464 (Minn. 2006). The defendant bears the burden to establish the existence
of exceptional circumstances indicating inadequate representation, see State v. Munt, 831
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N.W.2d 569, 586-87 (Minn. 2013), and we review the district court’s decision for an abuse
of discretion, see Clark, 722 N.W.2d at 464-65.
In this case, we conclude that the distri ct court did not abuse its discretion for two
reasons. First, Dillard expressed only general dissatisfaction with B.L. and did not include
any specific examples of B.L.’s conduct that constituted serious allegations of inadequate
representation. See Gillam, 629 N.W.2d at 449; Voorhees, 596 N.W.2d at 244-45; Worthy,
583 N.W.2d at 278-79. Dillard believed that the state’s plea offer was unfair and expressed
his feelings that B.L. seemed “apathetic and distant.” At the same time, Dillard stated that
B.L. seemed “like an oppressor” who was “working for the accused-victim.” Dillard also
complained that B.L. did not communicate in person as frequently as Dillard had expected.
These general statements do not amount to the exceptional circumstances that would justify
appointment of substitute counsel.
Second, Dillard’s questioning on the record by L.S. and the district court was a
sufficient inquiry to dete rmine the basis of Dillard’s dissatisfaction. See Clark , 722
N.W.2d at 464. B.L.’s managing attorney met with Dillard prior to the hearing on June 30,
2020, and she inquired of hi s reasons for dissatisfaction with B.L. during an extended
colloquy during that hearing. The district court also inquir ed of Dillard, asking him to
provide specific examples of B.L.’s misconduct. The district court gave Dillard additional
time to consider his request, and on July 21, 2020, B.L. and the district court again inquired
of Dillard about the basis for his request. We conclude that the public defender and the
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district court made a sufficiently search ing inquiry and provided Dillard multiple
opportunities to identify specific conduct that might justify appointing substitute counsel.
Affirmed.