Lacey C. Washington, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0224

Lacey C. Washington,
Respondent,

vs.

State of Minnesota, et al.,
Defendants,

Minnesota Department of Corrections,
Appellant.

Filed September 7, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Worke, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-CV-19-5691

Zorislav R. Leyderman, The Law Office of Zorislav R. Leyderman, Minneapolis,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Janine Kimb le, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presidi ng Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for summary
judgment on respondent ’s negligent-supervision claim. Because appellant has statutory
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immunity from the negligent-s upervision claim, we reverse and remand for the district
court to enter summary judgment in favor of appellant.
FACTS
Michael J. Martin, a sentence-to-service (STS) supervisor for appellant Minnesota
Department of Corrections (the DOC), was charged with several counts of criminal sexual
conduct after respondent Lacey C. Washin gton reported that he coerced her into
performing sexual acts on numerous occasions while she was incarcerated and working on
the STS crew. The complaint summarizes the incidents by stating:
In summary, [Martin] took [Washington] out on the
crew and got her alone. He as ked her to perform fellatio or
have sexual intercourse. In return, he provided her with extra
freedoms not allowed by jail rule s, cigarettes and pop, and
would drop her off to see her ki ds and tell her that it would
“cost her” for doing that. [Martin] also told [Washington] not
to tell anyone about the sexual relationship as she would get
into trouble and he “knows people.” He also said he is a person
with power. [Washington] was afraid that if she did not do as
[Martin] wanted, she would get into trouble at the jail or not be
taken to see her kids.

Martin pleaded guilty to two counts of criminal sexual conduct.
The DOC terminated Martin and completed an internal investigation on Martin’s
supervisor. The investigation revealed that Martin did not complete his required 40 hours
of annual training since his first year, and the supervisor agreed that he should have marked
Martin below standard on his performance evaluations because of this. The investigation
did not find anything to indicat e that the concerns of Martin bringing inmates to buy pop
and cigarettes were brought to the supervisor’s attention.
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The supervisor stated that there was no policy preventing one officer transporting a
single inmate of the opposite gender. He also stated that who led the STS transports was
limited based on the number of STS crew leaders assigned to an area. He stated that
“because Martin was the only STS crew l eader for Yellow Medicine and Chippewa
[C]ounties, he would be the only DOC driver for taking crew members to/from jail and
project sites, regardless of the size or gend er makeup of the work crew.” Finally, the
supervisor noted that he is generally not present with the STS work crew when they are on
project sites.
Washington filed a civil complaint against the state, the DOC, the commissioner of
corrections, and Martin. The DOC moved to dismiss Washington’s claims against it. The
district court granted the DOC’s motion on every claim except two: discrimination and
sexual harassment under the Minnesota Hu man Rights Act (MHRA) and negligent
supervision. The DOC moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The
district court granted the DOC’s motion in part by dismissing the MHRA claim as
untimely. The district court denied the DOC’s motion on the negligent-supervision claim.
The district court concluded that “a reas onable jury could find that the [DOC] was
negligent in its supervision of . . . Martin and that the source of [Washington]’s assault
was related to . . . Martin’s employment and a foreseeable ri sk of the profession.” This
appeal followed.
DECISION
The DOC argues that the district court erred by not granting summary judgment in
its favor on Washington’s negligent-supervis ion claim because the DOC has immunity.
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“[D]enial of a motion for summary judgment is not ordinarily appealable, [but] an
exception to this rule exists when the denial of summary judgment is based on rejection of
a statutory or official immunity defense.” Anderson v. Anoka Hennepin Indep. Sch.
Dist. 11, 678 N.W.2d 651, 655 (Minn. 2004). “W e review a district court’s summary
judgment decision de novo. In doing so, we determine whether the district court properly
applied the law and whether there are genuine issues of material fact that preclude summary
judgment.” Riverview Muir Doran, LLC v. JADT Dev. Grp., LLC, 790 N.W.2d 167, 170
(Minn. 2010) (citation omitted). We review the facts in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Montemayor v. Sebright Prods., Inc. , 898 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn.
2017).
We review de novo whether immuni ty applies to the government. Shariss v. City
of Bloomington, 852 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Minn. App. 2014). The party asserting immunity
bears the burden of proving entitlement to that immunity. Rehn v. Fischley, 557 N.W.2d
328, 333 (Minn. 1997).
The DOC argues that it is entitled to stat utory discretionary immunity under Minn.
Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(b) (2020). The district court recited the caselaw for this analysis in
its order but concluded that there was a genui ne issue of material fact regarding the
foreseeability of Martin’s conduct.
Minn. Stat. § 3.736, subd. 3(b) states that “the state and its employees are not liable
for . . . a loss caused by the performance or failure to perform a discretionary duty, whether
or not the discretion is abused.” “A discretionary act is one which requires a balancing of
complex and competing factors at the planni ng, rather than the operational, stage of
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development.” Koelln v. Nexus Residential Treatment Facility , 494 N.W.2d 914, 919
(Minn. App. 1993) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Mar. 22, 1993). “Statutory
immunity is narrowly construed because it is the exception to the general rule of
government liability.” Gleason v. Metro Coun cil Transit Operations , 563 N.W.2d 309,
320 (Minn. App. 1997), aff’d in part on other grounds , 582 N.W.2d 216 (Minn. July 30,
1998). “We have previously determined that decisions involving supervision and retention
of employees are discretionary acts entitled to statutory immunity.” Id.
Washington alleged in her complaint that the DOC owed her “a duty to control and
prevent . . . Martin from intentionally or negligently inflicting personal injuries upon [her].
[The DOC] breached this duty of care when [it] failed to take action to prevent . . . Martin
from sexually abusing [her].” Based on her br ief and oral argument, it appears that the
conduct she challenges is the policy allowing for single-officer transports of opposite-sex
offenders and the negligence of Martin’s supe rvisor. These claims are both discretionary
because they are based on policy-level activity.
The district court misapplied the law by not applying and following the Gleason
holding. The DOC is statutorily immune from Washington’s negligent-supervision claim.
We reverse the district court’s order denyi ng in part the DOC’s motion for summary
judgment and remand for the district court to enter summary judgment in favor of the DOC
on the remaining claim.
Reversed and remanded.