Dennis Field, Relator,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0227

Dennis Field,
Relator,

vs.

Casey’s Services Co.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 39739355-3

Ashley R. Thronson, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator)

Casey’s Services Co., Ankeny, Iowa (respondent employer)

Anne B. Froelich, Keri Phillips, Minnesota Department of Empl oyment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Cochran, Judge.

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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Relator challenges the denial of his request for unemployment benefits, arguing that
(1) the factual findings of the unemployment-law judge (ULJ) are unsupported by
substantial evidence, (2) relator’s actions do not constitute employment misconduct , and
(3) the ULJ committed evidentiary and procedural errors. We affirm.
FACTS
Relator Dennis Field worked as a truck driver for respondent Casey’s Services Co.
from January 7, 2013 to April 23, 2020 . His responsibilities included obtaining gas from
terminals and delivering the gas to Casey’s convenience stores. Casey’s discharged Field
for two incidents of insubordination related to policy changes Casey’s made in early 2020.
In February, Casey’s changed the time at which the terminals opened to 4:30 a.m.,
instructing drivers not to request loads of gasoline bef ore that time. 1 Despite the policy
change and instruction, Field requested loads before 4:30 a.m. several times. On April 13,
Field’s supervisor directed him via text to stop requesting loads before 4:30 a.m. Field
responded by text asking, “what the h ell is the difference” and “why can’t we ask for a
load” before 4:30 a.m. Field’s supervisor considered this reply insubordinate and
suspended Field for one day.
Later i n the spring of 2020 , Casey’s modified its a ttendance-reporting policy in
response to the lack of work for drivers brought on by the COVID -19 pandemic. Under

1 Prior to February, Field and other drivers routinely requested loads before their shifts
began so they would not have to wait when they arrived at the terminals.
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the modified attendance-reporting policy, Casey’s evaluated the workload before each shift
and supervisors would then call drivers and tell them to stay home if there was not enough
work. Those drivers receive d a lump sum minimum payment for the day. Drivers who
contacted dispatch and volunteered to stay home rather than waiting for a call from their
supervisor did not receive the minimum payment. Instead, they were required to use (and
enter) sick or vacation time or get preapproval to take an unpaid absence. Field volunteered
to stay home on April 6, 7, 8, and 9. He did not enter time for those days and did not have
preapproval for an unpaid absence. Both Field’s supervisor and an administrative assistant
told Field he needed to enter sick or vacation time for those days. Field did not enter time
for any of the four days. Casey’s considered Field’s failure to do so insubordinate and
terminated Field’s employment.
Field filed for unemployment benefits . R espondent Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED) determined he was ineligible for
benefits because he was discharged for employment misconduct. Field appealed, and a
ULJ affirmed the de termination of ineligibility. The ULJ found that Field requested
gasoline loads before his start time in violation of Casey’s load-request policy and was
insubordinate in responding to his supervisor’s direction that he stop doing so. And the
ULJ found that Field violated Casey’s attendance-reporting policy and was insubordinate
in not following express directions to enter sick or vacation time for the days he volunteered
to take off. The ULJ expressly credited the testimony of Field’s supervisor and Casey’s
transportation manager over Field’s testimony. And the ULJ concluded that Field’s
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conduct—for which Casey’s discharged him—constituted employment misconduct. Field
requested reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed the decision.
Field appeals by writ of certiorari.
DECISION
An employee who is discharged for employment misconduct is ineligible for
unemployment benefits. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 4(1) (20 20). Whether an employee
committed employment misconduct is a mixed question of law and fact. Stagg v. Vintage
Place Inc., 796 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn. 2011). On review of a ULJ decision, we defer to
the ULJ’s credibility determinations and uphold the ULJ’s findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (5) (2020); Wilson v. Mortg. Res.
Ctr., Inc., 888 N.W.2d 452, 460 (Minn. 2016). But we review de novo whether the facts
found by the ULJ constitute employment misconduct. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp. , 644
N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” Gonzalez Diaz v. Three Rivers Cmty. Action, Inc. ,
917 N.W.2d 813, 816 n.4 (Minn. App. 2018) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). We
do not reweigh conflicting evidence ; we look to the record only to determine whether the
evidence reasonably supports the ULJ’s factual finding. See Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 460.
And we will not reverse a ULJ’s decision when the claimed error did not prejudice the
relator’s substantial rights. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d). A ULJ’s decision does not
prejudice a relator’s substantial rights where the error is harmless. Ywswf v. Teleplan
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Wireless Servs., Inc. , 726 N.W.2d 525, 5 30 (Minn. App. 2007) (rejecting the relator ’s
argument of an unfair hearing in the absence of prejudice).
I. Substantial evidenc e supports t he ULJ’s factual findings and credibility
determinations.

Field argues that several of the ULJ’s factual findings are unsupported by substantial
evidence and contests the ULJ ’s determination that his supervisor and Casey’s
transportation manager are more credible than him. We consider these arguments in turn.
A. Substantial evidence supports the ULJ’s findings that Field did not
follow company policy and was insubordinate.

Field asserts that substantial evidence does not support the ULJ’s finding that he
was discharged in part because of his prior suspension for failing to follow the load-request
policy. We disagree. Both Field’s supervisor and Casey’s transportation manager testified
that Field requested gasoline loads before his start time on several occasions after being
repeatedly told not to do so. Field acknowledged that he was aware of the new load-request
policy before he received and responded to his supervisor’s April 13 text. And Field’s
supervisor testified that he considered Field’s text message regarding the load -request
policy in deciding to terminate Field’s employment.
Field next challenges the ULJ’s finding that his conduct constitutes a pattern of
insubordination. This argument is unavailing. As noted above, Field was aware that he
was not permitted to request gasoline loads before the beginning of his shift. Yet, he
continued to do just that and, when confronted by his supervisor, responded by using
profanity and ques tioning company policy. The record also shows that Field was aware
that he needed to enter vacation or sick time for the four days he volunteered to stay home
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from work. Even if , as Field contends, the modified attendance-reporting policy w as
unclear, Field was specifically told to enter the time for those days. His supervisor and the
transportation manager testified—and Field himself acknowledged—that his supervisor
and an administrative assistant both informed Field that he needed to enter sick or vacation
time for those days. It is undisputed that Field did not follow these directions. In short,
the record supports the ULJ’s finding that Field was insubordinate on multiple occasions.
Finally, we agree with the parties that two of the ULJ’s finding s lack the requisite
evidentiary support. The evidence does not support the findings that drivers who
volunteered to take a day off received both a minimum payment and vacation pay, and that
Field’s act of calling dispatch to volunteer to take the days off was, itself, insubordinate.
But we discern no prejudice to Field’s substantial rights. The first unsupported finding is
irrelevant; there is no dispute as to pay in this case. The second unsupported finding is
harmless; the ULJ made several other findings of Field’s insubordination, primarily based
on Field’s failure to enter time after being instructed to do so by both his administrative
assistant and his supervisor. Because the two unsupported findings of fact do not prejudice
Field’s substantial rights, they provide no basis for reversal.
B. The ULJ’s credibility determinations are adequate and supported by
substantial evidence.

A ULJ’s credibility determinat ions must “set out the reason for crediting or
discrediting” testimony . Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 1a(a) (2020) . This statutory
requirement is met when the ULJ “ma[kes] a basic finding that she did not find specific
testimony by the relator credible.” Wichmann v. Travalia & U.S. Directives, Inc. , 729
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N.W.2d 23 , 29 (Minn. App. 2007) (discussing Ywswf, 726 N.W.2d at 53 2-33). This
requirement is not met when “credibility was central to the decision” and the ULJ “ma[kes]
no similar findings” and “never address[es] credibility.” Id.
Field contends that the ULJ’s credibility findings are too “generic” to meet the
section 268.105 requirement. We are not persuaded. The ULJ found that “[t]o the extent
their testimony is i n disagreement, [Field’s supervisor’s] and [the transportation
manager’s] testimony is more credible than Field’s testimony, because it is a more
convincing, logical, and likely explanation of events, and they corroborate each other.”
The ULJ further explained that “[t]he series of close events show a pattern of
insubordination and not following policy, making it more likely that it was insubordinate
and a knowing violation of policy versus Field’s assertion that he misunderstood.” This
explanation is like the “basic finding” we found sufficient in Ywswf. See 726 N.W.2d at
532-33. And it is not at all like the instances where we have reversed a ULJ’s credibility
findings for lack of any explanation. See, e.g., Wichmann, 729 N.W.2d at 28 (“The ULJ
did not make any express findings on the witnesses’ credibility.”).
The ULJ’s credibility determinations are also supported by substantial evidence.
The record includes evidence that Field and other drivers did not understand how the
modified attendance-reporting policy interacted with Casey’s general attendance policy.
But the record also contains evidence that the modified attendance-reporting policy clearly
set out the timekeeping requirements. Field’s supervisor and Casey’s transportation
manager both testified consistent with Casey’s load -requesting policy and modified
attendance-reporting policy. And Field agreed that he was aware of both policies. This
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evidence reasonably supports the ULJ’s determination that Field’s supervisor and the
transportation manager were more credible than Field.
II. Field’s actions constitute employment misconduct.
Employment misconduct is “any intentional, negligent, or indifferent conduct . . .
that is a serious violation of the standards of behavior the employer has the right to
reasonably expect of the employee.” Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(a) (2020). But “simple
unsatisfactory conduct” and “good faith errors in judgment if judgment was required” are
not employment misconduct. Id., subd. 6(b) (2020).
Field argues that neither his text to his supervisor nor his failure to enter time for
the days off constitute a serious violation of his employer’s standards. 2 Whether an
employee committed a serious violation “is an objective determination: was the employer’s
expectation for the employee reasonable under the circumstances?” Jenkins v. Am. Express

2 Field also asserts that he was not insubordinate because he misunderstood the applicable
policies, and he repeats his argument that he was discharged for a single, isolated incident
of failing to enter vacation time for his time off. These arguments essentially challenge the
ULJ’s factual findings and are, therefore, not subject to de novo review. See Stagg, 796
N.W.2d at 315. Even assuming these arguments do challenge the ULJ’s legal conclusions,
they still fail. First, Field relies on caselaw that predates the current statute and reflects a
knowledge-based test under which a misunderstanding cannot amount to employment
misconduct. See Burgeson v. W. Pub l’g Corp., No. A10-0975, 2011 WL 1546991, at *3
(Minn. App. Apr. 26, 2011) (citing Tuckerman Optical Corp. v. Thoeny, 407 N.W.2d 491,
493 (Minn. App. 1987)) . Negligent or indi fferent conduct may constitute employment
misconduct under the current statute. Minn. Stat. § 268.0 95, subd. 6(a). Second, there is
no single -incident exception to the definition of employment misconduct. See id.,
subd. 6(d) (2020). And an employee’s failure to correct a violation after they had the
opportunity to correct the violation is not a single incident. See Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at
462-63 (concluding an employe e’s failure to correct a misrepresentation to her employe r
after having the opportunity to do so was not a “single incident” under the old language of
the employee-misconduct statute).
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Fin. Corp., 721 N.W.2d 286, 290 (Minn. 2006). The circumstances of the case are key to
making this determination. Wilson, 888 N.W.2d at 462.
Employers have the right to establish and enforce reasonable rules governi ng
employee attendance. See Wichmann, 729 N.W.2d at 28. An employee who fails to follow
an employer’s reasonable attendance policy commits employment misconduct. Stagg, 796
N.W.2d at 317. Employees who are discharged for refusing to comply with a reasonable
request from their employer are discharged for employment misconduct. E.g., Schmidgall,
644 N.W.2d at 807 (holding employee committed misconduct by failing to follow a same-
shift reporting policy for workplace injuries after employer asked them to do so ). And
employers may reasonably expect that employees will not be disrespectful or insubordinate
when interacting with their supervisors. See, e.g., Montgomery v. F & M Marquette Nat’l
Bank, 384 N.W.2d 602, 603, 605 (Minn. App. 1986) (reasoning that employee was
insubordinate by saying to supervisor, “You don’t know what the hell you’re talking
about”), rev. denied (Minn. June 13, 1986); Tester v. Jefferson Lines, 358 N.W.2d 143, 145
(Minn. App. 1984) (stating that “employer had a right to expect Tester to refrain from
uttering unprovoked obscenities at management personnel”), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 13,
1985).
Here, the ULJ found that Field did not enter time for his days off as required by the
attendance-reporting policy, despite direction from his supervisor and an administrative
assistant; requested gasoline loads before his start time on six occasions , knowing that it
violated the load-request policy; and used profanity when responding to his supervisor’s
direction to stop doing so. We have no difficulty concluding that the two policies at issue
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and Casey’s requests were reasonable. Indeed, neither party urges us to conclude that
failure to comply with the policies and disrespecting a supervisor are anything other than
employment misconduct.
Field nevertheless asserts his actions do not constitute employment misconduct
because Casey’s has a history of not enforcing the load -request policy and other drivers
regularly disregarded the policy. This argument is unavailing. “Whether or not other
employees violated those same rules and were disciplined or discharged is not relevant” to
the employment-misconduct analysis. Sivertson v. Sims Sec., 390 N.W.2d 868, 871 (Minn.
App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1986); see also Stagg, 796 N.W.2d at 316 (“[A]n
employee’s expectation that the employer will follow its disciplinary procedures has no
bearing on whether the employee’s conduct violated the standards the employer has a
reasonable right to expect or whether any such violation is serious.”).
Nor are we persuaded by Field’s argument that his actions were “simply
unsatisfactory conduct ” or a “ good faith error [] in judgment ” that does not amount to
unemployment misconduct under Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 6(b). We have already
determined that the record supports the ULJ’s credibility determination that Field
committed a knowing violation of policy. And we are not convinced that the circumstances
show Field “attempted to be a good employee but just wasn’t up to the job and was unable
to perform her duties to the satisfaction of the employer.” Bray v. Dogs & Cats Ltd. (1997),
679 N.W.2d 182, 185 (Minn. App. 2004). To the contrary, the record reflects and the ULJ
found that Field disregarded repeated directions and used profanity when his supervisor
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confronted him, and that he was discharged for insubordination, not because he “just wasn’t
up to the job.” See id. Field’s actions constitute employment misconduct.
III. Field is not entitled to relief based on evidentiary or procedural error.
Field argues that the ULJ abused her discretion by declining to admit two pieces of
evidence, and by allowing testimony that varied from the reasons for denying benefits
stated in DEED’s determination of ineligibility and the notice of hearing. We address each
argument in turn.
A ULJ must assist parties in the presentation of evidence and must ensure that all
relevant facts are clearly and fully developed. Minn. R. 3310.2921 (2019). A ULJ “ may
exclude any evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable, or unduly repetitious.” Id.
Field contends that the ULJ improperly refused to admit the documents he offered
as Exhibi t 4 . We disagree for three reasons. First, as the ULJ noted, the documents
comprising Exhibit 4 are illegible , so it is impossible to discern their relevance or other
admissibility concerns. Second, the ULJ informed the parties that they had the right to ask
for the hearing to be continued to permit them to present additional documents and
witnesses. Field declined the offer. Third, Field identifies no prejudice caused by
excluding Exhibit 4. He points to no information contained in Exhibit 4 that was not
presented through witness testimony or other evidence submitted during the hearing.
Indeed, the ULJ elicited extensive testimony on the topics that Field asserts the documents
relate to, the modified attendance-reporting policy and Field’s suspension. Field did not
object to any exhibit or testimony.
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Field next argues that the ULJ erred by refusing to allow him to read into the record
an email Casey’s sent to employees about the attendance-reporting policy. We see no error.
Because Field does not point to information in the email that would have impacted the
ULJ’s decision, he has not demonstrated prejudice. He did read part of an email from
Casey’s into the record, which states the “[t]he enhancement will be provided, a minimum
shift-pay 200 for the current pay period through April 16.” It is unclear, but quite possible,
that the email Field read is the same email he references in this argument.
Finally, Field asserts that he was deprived of due process because the hearing notice
focused only on his failure to enter sick or vacation time for the four days he volunteered
not to work, not insubordination or his previous suspension. When assessing a due-process
challenge to the adequacy of notice, we consider “whether the notice was reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Godbout v. Dep’t of
Emp. & Econ. Dev., 827 N.W.2d 799, 802 (Minn. App. 2013) (quotation omitted).
The circumstances convince us that t he notice Field received was adequate. It is
true that the notice of hearing lists DEED’s initial determination as “Discharged – Absent
or late to work determination.” But other information Field provided to and received from
DEED demonstrates Field was apprised of the action, including the issues presented, and
he was afforded the opportunity to respond. In his initial request for benefits, Field stated:
“I was told that I was being terminated because I did not fill out a form to be paid for my
time off.” In response to a question asking when and how Field violated a n employment
policy, he indicated: “I took four days off at the beginning of April. I did not go into the
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[timekeeping] system and label them as no pay days.” And when later asked for additional
information, Field state d: “I was told I was being discharged for insubordination.” The
determination of ineligibility state s Field was discharged “f or a failure to follow an
employer policy” and that Field “did not follow the employer’s absence reporting policy.”
When read in context, the hearing notice adequately apprised Field of the pendency of the
action and afforded him an opportunity to present his objections. Field understood that his
discharge was related to what Casey’s considered insubordinate conduct, a contention he
was prepared to and did dispute during the hearing.
In sum, the ULJ’s pertinent findings of fact are not clearly erroneous, the actions for
which Field was discharged constitute employment misconduct, and Field is not entitled to
relief based on evidentiary or procedural error.
Affirmed.