State of Minnesota, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0229

State of Minnesota,
Respondent,

vs.

Shawn Douglas Hager,
Appellant.

Filed February 22, 2022
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Kirk, Judge*

Washington County District Court
File No. 82-CR-19-794

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Pete Orput, Washington County Attorney, Nicholas A. Hy dukovich, Assistant County
Attorney, Stillwater, Minnesota (for respondent)

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Andrea Barts, Assistant Public
Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Ross, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Kirk, Judge.

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Ap peals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
KIRK, Judge
In this direct appeal from the judgment of conviction for first-degree criminal sexual
conduct, appellant Shawn Hager argues that th e district court erred (1) by permitting the
state to introduce relationship evidence, a nd (2) by imposing lifet ime conditional release
where the guilty verdicts were accepted simultaneously. We affirm in part, reverse in part,
and remand.
FACTS
Hager began dating A.S. in 20 15 and they married in 2017. They lived together in
Hugo, Minnesota with A.S.’s daughters A.A. (child 1) and G.A. (child 2), Hager’s daughter
K.H. (child 3), and his son G.H. (child 4).
In 2017, when she was 9 year s old, child 1 disclosed to A.S. that Hager had removed
her clothes and touched her vagina with his hands and tongue. A.S. confronted Hager, but
he denied the allegations. Child 1 did not talk to her mother about the abuse again because,
child 1 explained, her mother “didn’t believe [her] the first time.” However, according to
child 1, the abuse continued until February 2019.
On the evening of February 20, 2019, child 2, who was 7 years old at the time, began
crying and told her mother that Hager was showing her “sex videos.” She said that Hager
used his computer and phone, as well as her tablet, to show her por nography on multiple
occasions. She also told her mother that Hager had touched her sexually.
A.S. then asked child 1 about her previous disclosure, and A.S. called 911 to report
the allegations that Hager had shown child 1 and child 2 pornograp hy and that he had
3
touched them sexually. Deputies from the Washington County Sheriff’s Department went
to their home to investigate the allegations.
The next day, a social work er for the county conducted forensic interviews with the
children. Child 1 and child 2 disclosed to the social worker that Hager had sexually
assaulted them. Child 1 disclosed the sexual assault that she had previously disclosed to
her mother. She also disclosed that since then, Hager had forced her to watch pornography
and he would leave pornography displayed on her iPad. She also disclosed that on multiple
occasions Hager “touched and lic k[ed] her vagina” and that “[ h]e would stick his fingers
into her vagina.” Child 2 disclosed to the social worker that Hager watched pornography
with her, that she had seen Hager watching pornography with child 4, and that “porn would
just be on all the time.” She also disclosed that Hager pulled off her clothes and “touched
her vagina.”
On February 22, after reading him the Miranda warning, deputies interrogated
Hager. During the interrogation, Hager “admitte d to having inappropriate contact” with
child 1. He admitted to th e deputies that “approximately every three weeks” there was
some type of sexual contact with child 1. Du ring this disclosure he said he “touch[ed]”
and “lick[ed]” child 1. Hager also disclo sed that he showed th e children pornography,
“specifically kind of daddy-daughter style porn.” He told the deputies that “the whole point
was to make [the children] think it was okay.” Deputies obtained a search warrant and
confiscated Hager’s cell phone. Using com puter forensics, police found “[a] very
extensive pornography search w ith some phrases that were very disturbing” on Hager’s
4
cellphone. The list of websites and searches discovered on his phone was entered as exhibit
2 at trial without any objection.
Deputies arrested Hager and charged him wi th one count of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609. 341, subd. 1(a) (201 6), and one count of
first-degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 1(h)(iii)
(2016). After his arrest, Hager made a phone call from jail to J.G., who is the mother of
child 4. During this recorded phone call Hager said he sexually assaulted child 1 “a few
times.”
A few months after his arrest, child 3, Ha ger’s biological daughter, disclosed to the
counselor at her high school that Hager had sexually assaulted her. The state amended the
complaint to include a second count of first- degree criminal sexual conduct pursuant to
Minn. Stat. § 609.342 subd. 1(h)(iii) (2012) for allegations against Hager from child 3.
Before trial, the state moved to intro duce relationship evidence pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 634.20 (2020). At a pretrial hearin g, the judge granted the state’s motion to
introduce relationship evidence. The judge notified the parties that he would give the
following limiting instruction each time a witness was to testify to relationship evidence:
A portion of the evidence you ar e going to hear today will be
regarding the relationship of [witness] and Mr. Hager. It is not
used to prove the character of Mr. Hager or that he acted in
conformity with such charac ter. The evidence is to be
considered only for the limited purpose of putting into context
the relationship of [witness] a nd Mr. Hager leading up to our
charges in this case. The defendant is not being tried for and
may not be convicted of any o ffense other than the charged
offenses which were outlined in the formal complaint.

5
Hager, proceeding pro se, did not object to this instruction or to the judge’s decision
to allow the admission of relationship evidence.1
At trial all three victims testified, as did A.S., J.G., the social worker, and deputies.
Hager also testified on his ow n behalf. At no point during trial did Hager object to the
admission of relationship evidence or to the lim iting instructions given to the jury each
time the testimony about to be given was going to include relationship evidence. The jury
found Hager guilty of all thre e counts of first-degree crim inal sexual conduct. On
November 23, 2020, the district court held a sentencing hearing. The judge sentenced
Hager to consecutive sentences and lifetime conditional release. Hager appeals.
DECISION
I.
Hager argues that the district court co mmitted reversible plain error when it
admitted the evidence that he searched for pornography on his cellphone, watched
pornography in the home, showed the children pornography, and asked child 3 to sexually
touch child 1.2 Hager did not object to the admission of the relationship evidence at any
point in the proceedings.

1 For reasons not clear in th e record, Hager had been appo inted three different public
defenders. At trial he represented himself with advisory counsel who was appointed by
the district court.

2 Hager filed a pro se supplemental brief. However, he did not make any legal arguments
in this brief. An assignment of error in a brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported
by argument or authority is waived unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection.
Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (Minn. 1971).
6
As with other evidentiary rulings, a review ing court generally de fers to the trial
court’s discretion in admitting relationship evidence, State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 336
(Minn. 1998), and reviews unobject ed-to evidence for plain error, State v. Word , 755
N.W.2d 776, 781 (Minn. App. 2008). “An unobjected-to error will be corrected only upon
a finding of the following: (1) e rror; (2) that is plain; and (3 ) that affects the defendant’s
substantial rights.” Id. Even if all three prongs are sa tisfied, an appellate court should
grant relief only if the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” State v. Scruggs , 822 N.W.2d 631, 642 (Minn. 2012) (quoting
Montanaro v. State, 802 N.W.2d 726, 732 (Minn. 2011)). If a reviewing court determines
that any of the prongs of plain-error review are not satisfied, the court need not address the
others. Montanaro, 802 N.W.2d at 732.
As a threshold matter, the state argues that Hager forfeited any claim regarding the
relationship evidence because not only did he not object to the admission of the relationship
evidence dealing with pornography, but he also used the evidence “to his advantage” in his
opening and during cross-examination of the witnesses claiming that they were the ones
searching pornography. See State v. Whisonant , 331 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Minn. 1983)
(concluding that when a defendant responds to an alleged error as opposed to objecting to
it, he forfeits consideration of the issue on appeal). We decline to apply a harsh forfeiture
standard when the case the state relies on is not squarely on point with our case and
forfeiture was not sufficiently argued by the parties. Furthe rmore, we need not decide
whether Hager forfeited his appellate arguments because we conclude that there was no
error in admitting the relationship evidence. We turn to that issue now.
7
Hager first argues that the evidence is not admissible as relationship evidence under
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 because it does not meet the statutory defi nition of “domestic
conduct” and is “highly prejudicial prior-bad-act evidence.” Whether or not the admitted
evidence falls under the definition of “domestic conduct” in Minn. Stat. § 634.20 presents
an issue of statutory interpretation which we review de novo. Sanchez v. State, 816 N.W.2d
550, 556 (Minn. 2012).
The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine whether a statute has a plain,
unambiguous meaning. State v. Jones, 848 N.W.2d 528, 535 (Minn. 2014). A court “must
give a plain reading to any statute it construes, and when the language of the statute is clear,
the court must not engage in any further construction.” State v. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d 153,
159 (Minn. 2004) (citation omitted). “A statute is ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible
to more than one interpretation.” State v. Larkin, 620 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Minn. App. 2001).
Minnesota Statutes section 634.20 provide s that “[e]vidence of domestic conduct
by the accused against the victim of domestic conduct, or against other family or household
members, is admissible unless the probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.” Evidence admi ssible pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 is
commonly referred to as “relationship evidence.” See State v. Bell, 719 N.W.2d 635, 638
n.4 (Minn. 2006) (not ing that “evidence admitted under section 634.20 is a subtype of
general relationship evidence”). The purpose of admitting relationship evidence “is to
illuminate the relationship between the defenda nt and the alleged victim and to put the
alleged crime in the context of that relationship.” State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 637
(Minn. App. 2010), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). The admission of relationship
8
evidence also helps jurors to better judge the credibility of those in the relationship.
McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161. Therefore, rela tionship evidence “is admissible unless the
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20.
Prior relationship evidence is admissible against an accused when the victim alleges
that he or she was subjected to defendant’ s act of “domestic conduct.” Minn. Stat.
§ 634.20. “Domestic conduct” includes, but is not limited to, evidence of domestic abuse
against “family or household members.” Id. Domestic abuse is defined pursuant to Minn.
Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 2 (2020). Id. Domestic abuse includes the infliction of “physical
harm, bodily injury, or assault,” as well as criminal sexual conduct. Minn. Stat. § 518B.01,
subd. 2(a)(1), (3). Under Minn. Stat. § 634.20 , the state may introduce evidence of a
defendant’s act of domestic abuse committed against another family member. Id.
Hager argues that because showing child ren pornography does not fall under the list
of domestic abuse crimes in Minn. Stat. § 634.20, it should not ha ve been admitted as
relationship evidence. The state argues that under the statute, domestic conduct “includes,
but is not limited to,” the enumerated crim es. Therefore, domestic conduct must
encompass more than the enumerated crimes defined as domestic abuse.
Under the statute, “domestic conduct” incl udes more than just domestic abuse or
violation of a protective order. See State v. McCurry, 770 N.W.2d 553, 560 (Minn. App.
2009) (stating that “the ‘not limited to’ language is more likely meant to encompass general
testimony about the relationship”), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 28, 2009). It has also been
allowed when admitting evidence pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 634.20 relating to a defendant’s
9
attempt to “manipulate, control, and restrain” the victim. State v. Andersen, 900 N.W.2d
438, 441 (Minn. App. 2017).
We are also mindful of the reasons wh y evidence of prior domestic abuse is
admissible as relationship evidence. “Domestic abuse is unique in that it typically occurs
in the privacy of the home, it frequently invo lves a pattern of activ ity that may escalate
over time, and it is often underreported.” McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161 (discussing the
rationale for Minn. Stat. § 634.20’s lax standard of prior-relationship-evidence admission).
“Evidence of prior domestic abuse . . . may be offered to illuminate the history of the
relationship, that is, to put the crime charged in the context of the relationship.” Id. at 159.
“[E]vidence showing how a defe ndant treats his family or household members . . . sheds
light on how the defendant inter acts with those close to him, which in turn suggests how
the defendant may interact with the victim.” Valentine, 787 N.W.2d at 637. This rationale
applies with the same force to the evidence at issue in this case.
The state introduced eviden ce that Hager showed the children pornography to put
their relationship in context, and to establish that he was grooming the children.
“‘Grooming’ is a process that sexual predators use to shape a child’s perspective and lower
the child’s inhibitions w ith respect to later crim inal sexual acts.” State v. Muccio , 890
N.W.2d 914, 924 (Minn. 2017). Grooming often involves the offender “desensitiz[ing] the
child to sexual conduct by exposing the child to sexual content.” Id. The grooming process
“increases the likelihood that the child will cooperate with the adult and reduces the
likelihood that the child will disclose the adult’s wrongful acts.” Id. Hager admitted during
interrogation that “the whole point” of showi ng the children pornography “was to make
10
[the children] think it was okay.” Multiple victims and witnesses also testified that Hager
had shown them pornography as minors, or that they had seen Hager watching pornography
with children. This evidence was offered by the state to show a “pattern of activity” that
occurred between Hager and th e children in his home. McCoy, 682 N.W.2d at 161. We
hold that this evidence of sexually manipulative, groomin g activity toward the minor
children is the type of “domes tic conduct” that is relationshi p evidence contemplated by
Minn. Stat. § 634.20 and that, therefore, the district court properly admitted the evidence.
Hager next argues that even if the eviden ce was properly admitted as relationship
evidence, it still should have been excluded because it had no probative value and it was
highly prejudicial.
Relationship evidence must be excluded when the danger of its unfair prejudice
substantially outweighs its probative value. Minn. Stat. § 634.20. “Evidence that helps to
establish the relationship between the victim and the defendant or which places the event
in context bolsters its probative value.” State v. Lindsey , 755 N.W.2d 752, 756 (Minn.
App. 2008) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Oct. 29, 2008). “When balancing the
probative value against the potential prejudice, unfair prejudice is not merely damaging
evidence, even severely dama ging evidence; rather, unfair prejudice is evidence that
persuades by illegitimate means, giving one party an unfair advantage.” Bell, 719 N.W.2d
at 641 (quotation omitted).
Here, the judge gave the jury a limiting in struction each time a witness was about
to testify regarding relationship evidence. Th is limited the jury’s use of the relationship
evidence to “putting into context the relationship of [the witnesses] and Mr. Hager leading
11
up to our charges in this case.” The instructions also reite rated that Hager “is not being
tried for and may not be convict ed of any offense other than the charged offenses which
were outlined in the formal complaint.” These cautionary instructions “lessened the
probability of undue weight being give n by the jury to the evidence.” State v. Kennedy,
585 N.W.2d 385, 392 (Minn. 1998).
Additionally, each victim testified in detail to the sexual abuse conducted by Hager.
Child 1 testified that Hager ab used her multiple times over th e course of more than one
year. And she testified that he would touc h and lick her vagina and described specific
incidents of abuse by Hager. Child 2 testified that Hager “would pull off [her] pants.” She
testified that he would then put his fingers in her vagina. Child 3 testified that Hager had
sexual contact with her multiple times, mostly before she was eleven. She testified that
when she was thirteen, Hager forced her to “[gi ve] him a blow job.” It is likely that the
description of the abuse was far more influential on the jury than the descriptions that Hager
showed them pornography.
Hager finally argues that the district court erred when it admitted exhibit 2, the list
of searches and the pornography websites vis ited on his phone as relationship evidence.
We note that this evidence is not relations hip evidence but rather relevant evidence
admissible under Minn. R. Evid. 402. This e xhibit corroborated what Hager said in his
confession, that he showed the children “d addy-daughter porn” because it listed several
videos of this type. When the exhibit was admitted, the judge asked Hager if he needed to
speak to his advisory counsel, and Hager chose not to. Hager did not object to the
12
admission of this exhibit, and the district court did not err, and certainly did not plainly err
in admitting exhibit 2.3
II.
Hager next argues that the district cour t erred when it imposed lifetime conditional
release because the district court accepted all three guilty verdicts at the same time. The
state agrees with Hager, and it recommends that this court remand for imposition of a ten-
year conditional release period for count 3.
“[W]hen a district court convicts an offender simultaneously of multiple sex
offenses in the same hearing, the offender does not have a prior sex-offense conviction and
is not subject to a lifetime conditional-releas e term under Minn. Stat. § 609.3455, subd.
7(b), absent another qualifying conviction.” State v. Brown, 937 N.W.2d 146, 157 (Minn.
App. 2019), rev. denied (Feb. 18, 2020). However, if the convictions are entered
consecutively, the first conviction serves as a “prior sex offense conviction” for the purpose
of section 609.3455. State v. Nodes, 863 N.W.2d 77, 82 (Minn. 2015). These convictions
may occur during the same hear ing, and no set time must pass between them for the first
offense to become “prior.” Id.

3 Although the parties approached the porno graphy shown to the victims by Hager as
relationship evidence under Minn. Stat. § 634.20, it may have been admissible as
immediate-episode evidence. See State v. Riddley , 776 N.W.2d 419, 425 (Minn. 2009)
(describing immediate-episode evidence as a narrow exception to the general character
evidence rule, allowing the admission of a prior bad act when “there is a close causal and
temporal connection between the prior bad act and the charged crime”). The pornography
was used by Hager to groom the children to facilitate his sexual abuse of them and to
discourage them from disclosing the sexual abuse to others.

13
Because Hager did not have a previous co nviction for sexual assa ult, the district
court must have convicted him of the charge s consecutively in order to have imposed
lifetime conditional release. “A conviction oc curs when the district court accepts and
records a verdict of guilty by a jury.” Brown, 937 N.W.2d at 156 (quotation omitted).
Here, at sentencing, the district court judge stated: “So I accept the jury’s findings of guilt
as to all three of the counts.” The judge then proceeded to sentence Hager on each count
individually. Therefore, Hager was convicted of the three counts of criminal sexual
conduct concurrently. And, because Hager di d not have a prior conviction for criminal
sexual conduct, he cannot be subjected to lifetime conditional release. Brown, 937 N.W.2d
at 157. Therefore, we reverse Hager’s sentence of lifetime conditional release and remand
for resentencing consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.