In the Matter of the Medical License of Michael D. Castro, D.O.

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0232

In the Matter of the Medical License of Michael D. Castro, D.O.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Worke, Judge

Office of Administrative Hearings
File No. OAH 21-0903-36311

David M. Aafedt, Cody M. Zustiak, Kyle R. Kroll, Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota (for relator Michael D. Castro)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Daniel S. Schueppert, Assistant Attorney General,
St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent Minnesota Board of Medical Practice)

Considered and decided by Worke, Pres iding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Relator challenges respondent’s order to issue a public reprimand against his
medical license. Relator argues that the order is (1) an error of la w, (2) unsupported by
substantial evidence, and (3) arbitrary and capricious. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2018, respondent Minnesota Board of Medical Practice (board) received
a complaint regarding relator Dr. Michael D. Castro’s care of a patient. In April 2018, the
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board sent a letter to Castro’s address requesting the patient’s medical records. Castro did
not respond to the board’s request. In June, the board sent another request for the patient’s
medical records to Castro. Castro again failed to respond to the board’s request. In July,
the board sent a third request by way of certified mail. The United States Postal Service’s
tracking system indicated that the letter was de livered on July 25. Castro again failed to
respond.
In November, the attorney ge neral’s office served on Ca stro by mail at the same
known address documents which included a no tice requesting Castro’s appearance at a
conference to discuss the complaint. Castro did not attend this conference.
In May 2019, the board rece ived a complaint from a second patient of Castro. In
June, the board sent Castro a letter requesting the patient’s medical records. Castro did not
respond to this letter.
On June 20, the board sent a request to Castro regarding an audit of his continuing-
medical-education (CME) requirements. This re quest was sent to the same address that
the requests for medical information were sent. Castro replied to th e board’s inquiry by
informing them that his CME requirements were satisfied.
In August, the board served Castro with a notice and order for prehearing conference
and hearing. The purpose of the conference was to determine whether discipline against
Castro’s medical license was appropriate fo r his failure to coop erate with the board
investigations into the patients’ complaints. Castro attended the conference.
An administrative-law judge (ALJ) held a hearing in July 2020 to determine if
Castro’s medical license should be disciplined for his failure to cooperate with board
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investigations. The ALJ dete rmined that Castro failed to cooperate with the board’s
investigations. The board adopted the ALJ’s conclusion that Castro failed to cooperate
with the investigations and ordered that Castro be reprimanded. This certiorari appeal
followed.
DECISION
An administrative agency’s decision is presumed correct. In re Cities of Annandale
& Maple Lake NPDES/SDS Permit Issuance , 731 N.W.2d 502, 513 (Minn. 2007). We
review an agency’s final decision in a cont ested case in accordance with the Minnesota
Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA), Minn. Stat. §§ 14.001-.69 (2020). Eneh v. Minn.
Dep’t of Health, 906 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Minn. App. 2018). A reviewing court may remand,
reverse, or modify the agency’s decision if the decision: (a) violates a constitutional
provision, (b) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, (c) is made upon
unlawful procedure, (d) is affected by other error of law, (e) is unsupported by substantial
evidence, or (f) is arbitrary or capricious. Minn. Stat. § 14.69.
“Boards and commissions like the Board of Medical Examiners are appointed
because of their special expertise regarding the standards of thei r own professions.”
Padilla v. Minn. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 382 N.W.2d 876, 886 (Minn. App. 1986), rev.
denied (Minn. Apr. 24, 1986). Th erefore, “[w]hen a professional person must be
disciplined for breaching these standards, the nature and dur ation of the discipline is best
determined by his or her fello w professionals, who are in a superior position to evaluate
the breaches of trust and unprofessional conduct.” Id. at 886-87.
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Error of law
Castro argues that the board’s decision to publicly reprimand him for failing to
cooperate with their investigation is based on an error of the law. Although the correctness
of an agency’s decision is presumed, appellate courts may reverse a decision if it “was
affected by an error of law.” N. States Power Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n , 344
N.W.2d 374, 377 (Minn. 1984). “Appellate courts retain the authority to review de novo
errors of law which arise when an agency decision is based upon the meaning of words in
a statute.” In re Claim for Benefits by Meuleners, 725 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. App. 2006)
(quotation omitted).
The board determined that Castro failed to fully cooperate with two investigations
regarding patient complaints. Castro argues that he never received actual notice of the
board’s investigations, and his failure to reply does not amount to a failure to cooperate.
The board argues that the standard procedure for physician notification of an investigation
was followed, and that Castro received sufficient notice.
At the hearing before the ALJ, the manager of the bo ard’s complaint review unit
(CRU) testified to the board’s procedures following the receipt of a complaint from a
patient. She testified that after receipt of a complaint, one of the fi rst steps would be to
“request a response from the licensee involved, and they would do that by . . . sending a
letter to the address on file with the Board. ” The manager was then asked if she had
participated in the investigations of each complaint since she began working with the CRU
in 2017. She confirmed that she had. Wh en asked if she was involved in Castro’s
investigations, the manager replied, “Yes, I was involved in managing the file.” The
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manager’s testimony supports the argument that the board followed standard practices to
notify Castro of their investigations.1
The board “may impose disciplinary action as described in section 147.141 against
any physician.” Minn. Stat. § 147.091, subd. 1 (2020). Castro’s “[f]ailure to make reports
as required by section 147.111 or to cooperat e with an investiga tion of the board as
required” allows for this remedy. Id., subd. 1(u). Castro is c onsidered a “physician who
is the subject of an investiga tion by or on behalf of the bo ard [who] shall cooperate fully
with the investigation.” Minn. Stat. § 147. 131 (2020). Castro’s mandated cooperation
with the board’s investigations “includes re sponding fully and promptly to any question
raised by or on behalf of the board relating to the subject of the investigation and providing
copies of patient medical records, as reasonably requested by the board, to assist the board
in its investigation.” Id.
Castro is required by statute to “maintain a current name and address with the board
and shall notify the board in wr iting within 30 days of any ch ange in name or address.”
Minn. Stat. § 147.091, subd. 2(e) (2020). Castro is required to “cooperate fully” with any
board investigation. See Minn. Stat. § 147.131. The ph rase “cooperate fully” is not
expressly defined by statute. However, Castro is required to ensure that the board had a
valid mailing address on file to receive board communications. The record supports Castro
receiving communications from the board duri ng the timeframe of th e investigations.

1 During the manager’s testimony, Castro ’s foundation and he arsay objection was
sustained, twice. The ALJ sustained the objections without clarification as to whether the
objection was sustained on foundational ground s or as hearsay. Both objections were
sustained as improper foundation.
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Castro replied to a letter mailed by the board about mandatory CME requirements. The
board sent the CME letter to the same address as letters sent by the board to notify Castro
of two separate investigations. Castro demonstrated that he could receive board
correspondence at this address. Therefore, we agree with the ag ency’s decision that
Castro’s failure to respond to the board’s wr itten notices would be considered a failure to
cooperate fully.
Substantial evidence
Next, Castro argues that the board failed to present substantia l evidence that he
received proper notice of the investigations. “With respect to factual findings made by the
agency in its judicial capacity , if the record contains substantial evidence supporting a
factual finding, the agency’s decision must be affirmed.” In re Excelsior Energy, Inc., 782
N.W.2d 282, 290 (Minn. App. 2010) (quota tion omitted). An agency’s decision is
considered supported by substantial evidence when that decision “is supported by (1) such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
(2) more than a scintilla of ev idence; (3) more th an some evidence; (4) more than any
evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety.” Minn. Ctr. for Env’t. Advoc. v.
Minn. Pollution Control Agency , 644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn. 2002). An analysis of a
substantial-evidence determination requires the reviewing court to “determine whether the
agency has adequately explained how it derived its conclusion and whether that conclusion
is reasonable on the basis of the record.” Minn. Power & Light Co. v. Minn. Pub. Utils.
Comm’n, 342 N.W.2d 324, 330 (Minn. 1983).
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The board’s decision to publicly reprimand Castro was reasonable after viewing the
record in its entirety. Castro is required to “cooperate fully” with a board investigation.
Minn. Stat. § 147.131. Castro is required to “maintain a current name and address with the
board.” Minn. Stat. § 147.091, subd. 2(e). The board presented substantial evidence
showing that Castro received their letter referencing his CME requirements at the address
Castro designated to the board. Based on the evidence presente d by the board, it is
reasonable that the board found Castro’s failure to respond to their mailings as a failure to
cooperate on his part.
Here, the board’s findings of fact, conclusions, and order were thoroughly detailed
by well-supported documentation. The board’s conclusion is well supported by the record
and by “such relevant evidence as a reasonabl e mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” See Minn. Ctr. for Env’t Advoc., 644 N.W.2d at 464. Therefore, we reject
Castro’s argument that the board’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
Arbitrary or capricious
Finally, Castro argues that the board’s d ecision was arbitrary or capricious. An
agency’s decision is arbitrary or capricious if it represents the agen cy’s will and not its
judgment. Pope Cnty. Mothers v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 594 N.W.2d 233, 236
(Minn. App. 1999). An agency’s decision is considered arbitrary or capricious if
the agency (a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature;
(b) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem; (c) offered an explanat ion that runs counter to the
evidence; or (d) the decision is so implausible that it could not
be explained as a difference in view or the result of the
agency’s expertise.

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Citizens Advocating Respon sible Dev. v. Kandiyohi Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs , 713 N.W.2d
817, 832 (Minn. 2006). “If there is room for two opinions on a matter, the [board]’s
decision is not arbitrary and capricious, ev en though the court may believe that an
erroneous conclusion was reached.” In re Rev. of 2005 Ann. Automatic Adjustment of
Charges, 768 N.W.2d 112, 120 (Minn. 2009).
Here, the board’s decision to publicly repr imand Castro was reasonable. Castro is
required to maintain an updated contact addr ess with the board. The board sent written
notice of their investigations to the address Ca stro provided to the board. Castro did not
respond to these letters. Howe ver, Castro did respond to a board letter unrelated to the
investigations during the same timeframe as the investigations. Castro’s failure to reply to
letters pertaining to board investigations, wh ile responding to a board letter unrelated to
their investigations, amounts to a failure to cooperate on his part. The board’s decision to
publicly reprimand Castro’s license had a rati onal connection to his conduct. Therefore,
the board’s decision was not arbitrary or capricious.
Affirmed.