John Stephen Woodward, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0234

John Stephen Woodward, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

State of Minnesota,
Respondent.

Filed October 25, 2021
Affirmed
Frisch, Judge

Rice County District Court
File No. 66-CR-10-2907

Zachary A. Longsdorf, Longsdorf Law Firm, PLC, Inver Grove Heights, Minnesota (for
appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

John Fossum, Rice County Attorney, Sean R. McCarthy, Ass istant County Attorney,
Faribault, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Frisch, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.

2
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FRISCH, Judge
Appellant challenges the denial of his second petition for postconviction re lief,
arguing that his claims are not time- or Knaffla-barred. We affirm.
FACTS
The Underlying Offense, Trial, Conviction, Sentence, and First Appeal
In 2007, appellant John Stephen Woodward was convicted of aiding and abetting
several controlled -substance crimes and sentenced to 94 months in prison. While
incarcerated, Woodward met Thomas Jackson, a fellow inmate. Woodward told Jackson
that he had been “set up” by the Dakota C ounty Attorney and wished t hat the county
attorney were dead. When Woodward learned that Jackson was about to be released,
Woodward suggested that Jackson kill the county attorney for him.
In June 2010, Woodward and Jackson met to plan to kill the county attorney. They
drew a map of the county attorney’s home, his route to work, locations to execute the crime,
and where to dispose of the gun. Woodward agreed to pay Jackson $10,000 in furtherance
of the scheme and did in fact pay Jackson $2,500 through an intermediary.
Approximately four weeks later, Jackson approached a special investigations officer
to inform him of Woodward’s plan. The officer instructed Jackson to record Woodward
to confirm that Woodward did in fact plan to have Jackson kill the county attorney for him.
Woodward ultimately confirmed on the recordings that he wanted to hire Jackson to kill
the county attorney.
3
In September 2010, the state charged Woodward with conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder. 1 We have summarized the state’s case against Woodward in two
previous opinions: State v. Woodward , No. A13 -0703, 2014 WL 2921837 (Minn. App.
June 30, 2014), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2015), and Woodward v. State, No. A18-0253,
2018 WL 6729761 (Minn. App. Dec. 24, 2018), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 1 9, 2019). At
trial, Woodward alleged that Jackson coerced and intimidated him and argued that he was
entrapped. In December 2012, a jury found Woodward guilty of conspir acy to commit
first-degree murder, and the district court sentenced him to 192 months in prison. In 2014,
Woodward appealed, and we affirmed his conviction.
First Petition for Postconviction Relief
In August 2017, Woodward petitioned for postconviction relief. The postconviction
court denied the petition without a hearing . In February 2018, Woodward appealed,
arguing that the postconviction court abused its discretion in not granting him a hearing.
We affirmed and held that Woodward’s claims were proced urally barred under State v.
Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (Minn. 1976) (holding that “where direct appeal has once
been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be
considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

1 The state also charged Woodward with a second count of conspiracy to commit first -
degree murder and with conspiracy to commit first-degree assault. He was acquitted on
both counts.
4
Second Petition for Postconviction Relief
In 2020, Woodward filed a second postconviction petition raising allegations that
he (1) was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel at trial , (2) discovered new
exculpatory evidence justifying a new trial, and (3) that this evidence was concealed by the
state. In other filings in support of his petition, Woodward summarily alleged that he was
denied the right to effective assistance of counsel in his direct appeal and that “exculpatory
evidence was destroyed or not preserved under circumstances that suggest the presence of
bad faith.”
The arguments in the petition concern a recording of a phone call between Jackson’s
sister, Brenda Benedict, and the special investigations officer. Woodward alleged that the
recording showed that Jackson “ma[de] up the allegations against Woodward.” In support
of his petition, Woodward submitted a new affidavit from Benedict wherein she attested
that she “clearly stated [to the officer] Mr. Woodward was innocent.” Woodward argued
that the phone call between Benedict and the officer was “not adequately disclosed to him
or his trial counsel prior to trial .” Woodward, however, conceded that a recording of the
call was “disclosed, but in a way that was designed to obfuscate the importance of these
documents.” Woodward also alleged that the officer improperly allowed Jackson to turn
his recording device on an d off while Jackson secretly recorded Woodward and that the
officer did not properly record calls that Jackson made through other inmates’ phone
accounts.
The postconviction court held that all of Woodward’s claims were time - and
Knaffla-barred, denied his request for an evidentiary hearing, and dismissed his petition for
5
postconviction relief. Specifically, the postconviction court held that Woodward asserted
claims past the two-year statutory period to obtain postconviction review, that neither the
newly-discovered-evidence exception nor the interests-of-justice exception saved
Woodward’s claims from the time -bar, and that Woodward’s claims were procedurally
barred because Woodward could have asserted, or did in fact assert, all of the identified
issues either on direct appeal or as part of his first postconviction proceeding.
Woodward appeals.
DECISION
An individual convicted of a crime may petition for relief from a conviction. Minn.
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (2020). “Unless the petition and the files and records of the
proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief,” the postconviction
court must hold an evidentiary hearing, make findings and conclusions, and either deny the
petition or order appropriate relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2020). “In determining
whether an evidentiary hearing is required, a postconviction court considers the facts
alleged in the petition as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the
petitioner.” Andersen v. State, 913 N.W.2d 417, 422-23 (Minn. 2018) (quotation omitted).
“But a court need not hold an eviden tiary hearing when the petitioner alleges facts that, if
true, are legally insufficient to entitle him to the requested relief.” Jackson v. State , 929
N.W.2d 903, 905 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted).
We review the denial of a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing for
an abuse of discretion . Colbert v. State , 870 N.W.2d 616, 621 (Minn. 2015) . “A
postconviction court does not abuse its discretion unless it has exercised its discretion in
6
an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made
clearly erroneous factual findings.” Henderson v. State , 906 N.W.2d 501, 505 (Minn.
2018) (quotation omitted).
I. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Woodward’s
second petition as untimely.

Woodward concedes that his second petition for postconviction relief was untimely
but argues that the newly -discovered-evidence exception and the interests -of-justice
exception exempt him from the time-bar. We address each exception in turn.
A. The newly-discovered-evidence exception does not apply.
A postconviction court may consider an untimely petition for relief upon the
production of newly discovered evidence, which requires the petitioner to allege (1) the
existence of newly discovered evidence, (2) the evidence could not have been ascertained
by the petitioner’s exercise of due diligence wit hin the two -year time period for filing a
postconviction petition , (3) the evidence is not cumulative with respect to the evidence
presented at trial, (4) the newly discovered evidence is not for impeachment purposes, and
(5) the evidence establishes by a clear-and-convincing standard that the petitioner is
innocent of the underlying offense for which he was convicted. Minn. Stat. § 590.01,
subd. 4(b)(2) (2020). “All five criteria must be satisfied to obtain relief.” Riley v. State,
819 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Minn. 2012).
7
Here, the evidence identified by Woodward is not newly discovered because the
evidence was produced prior to trial and Woodward could have discovered the evidence
with the exercise of due diligence within the required time to file a postconviction petition.2
First, neither the Benedict affidavit nor the phone call are newly discovered
evidence. The substance of the affidavit derives entirely from a recorded phone call
between Benedict and the special investigations officer. Woodward admits t hat the state
disclosed a recording of this call to him prior to trial, at least seven years before he filed
his petition. But Woodward now argues that the state disclosed the call “in a way that was
designed to obfuscate [its] importance.” Woodward’s pe tition and files contain no
evidence or allegation that the state intentionally obfuscated the call, affirmatively
misrepresented its contents, or described the evidence in a manner distinct from other
disclosed evidence to conceal its contents. And the p etition and files contain no evidence
that Woodward was prevented from reviewing the evidence before the expiration of the
time for filing a postconviction petition or that it was unduly burdensome for him to do so.
Because Woodward had access to the call between Benedict and the officer for at least
seven years before he filed his petition, this evidence (and Benedict’s new affidavit
regarding that evidence) is not newly discovered.
Second, even if the Benedict affidavit did constitute newly discovered evidence,
Woodward could have discovered this evidence years ago through the exercise of due

2 Because Woodward must satisfy all five factors for the exception to apply and because
we conclude that Woodward fails to establish factors (1) and (2), we decline to analyze the
remaining three factors.
8
diligence. Woodward concedes that the evidence was produced to him before trial. He
had access to this evidence for at least seven years prior to filing his petition. Although
Woodward summarily alleges that he was incarcerated in a segregated unit for a limited
period of time during which he claims he was unable to review evidence, he does not claim
that he was prevented from reviewing the evidence for the totality of the two -year
postconviction filing period. And his limited segregated incarceration does not explain the
lengthy delay in bringing the current postconviction petition, many year s after his
conviction. Woodward could have timely discovered the evidence if he had conducted a
reasonable search of the evidence that was produced to him before trial.
B. The interests-of-justice exception does not apply.
A second exception to the time -bar exists where “the petitioner establishes to the
satisfaction of the court that the petition is not frivolous and is in the interests of justice.”
Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(b)(5) (2020). The interests -of-justice exception is
“implicated only in exc eptional and extraordinary situations.” Carlton v. State , 816
N.W.2d 590, 607 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted). A claim under the interests-of-justice
exception “must relate to an injustice that delayed the filing of the petition, not to the
substantive merit of the petition.” Odell v. State , 931 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. 2019)
(quoting Hooper v. State , 888 N.W.2d 138, 142 (Minn. 2016)). Thus, “[t]his exception
only applies if a petitioner ‘alleges that an injustice occurred that prevented him from
timely petitioning for postconviction relief.’” Fox v. State, 938 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn.
2020) (quoting Odell, 931 N.W.2d at 106).
9
Woodward does not argue that an injustice delayed him from filing his petition. He
posits that his filing was delayed because, “[p]rior to his trial, and for another six months
after trial, Woodward was illegally held in the [segregation unit], which precluded
Woodward from taking part in his defense and working on his own behalf.” But Woodward
was only housed in the segregation unit until 2013; he does not explain why or how he was
prevented from filing this petition until 2020, seven years after his release from
segregation.
Even so, the alleged newly discovered evidence does not rise to the “exceptional”
circumstances required to justify the interests -of-justice exception. Carlton, 816 N.W.2d
at 607. The substance of the evidence—Benedict’s speculative personal belief that Jackson
“set up” Woodward —does not establish Woodward’s innocence and is not admissible
evidence at all; it is instead comprised of inadmissible hearsay, lay -witness opinion
testimony, and is lacking in foundation. Minn. R. Evid. 602, 701, 802.
The postconviction court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying
Woodward an evidentiary heari ng because his petition is time -barred and no exception
applies.
II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in denying Woodward’s
second petition as Knaffla-barred.

“Claims that were raised on direct appeal, or were known or should have been
known but were not raised on direct appeal, are procedurally barred.” Sontoya v. State ,
829 N.W.2d 602, 604 (Minn. 2013) (citing Knaffla, 243 N.W.2d at 741); see also Minn.
10
Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1. A claim is not Knaffla-barred, however, if “(1) the claim is novel;
or (2) the interests of fairness and justice warrant relief.” Sontoya, 829 N.W.2d at 604.
Woodward’s claims are procedurally barred because he could have raised them at
an earlier proceeding, either in his direct appeal or his first postconvi ction petition.
Woodward does not set forth any reason for why he could not have earlier raised the claims
that he currently asserts. Instead, Woodward contends, without authority, that “[a] newly
discovered evidence claim cannot be procedurally barred, because those bars apply to
claims that were either previously raised or known but not raised.” But the evidence upon
which Woodward bases his current petition is not newly discovered and has been in his
continuous possession for at least seven years prior to him filing his petition.
Woodward next argues that, because “his claims have merit” and “he had
impediments to raising these claims at an earlier time,” the interests of justice require
consideration of his petition. A court may consider an otherwise Knaffla-barred claim “in
limited situations when fairness so requires and when the petitioner did not deliberately
and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal.” Ademodi v. State , 616 N.W.2d
716, 718 (Minn. 2000) (quoting Russell v. State, 562 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn. 1997)). But
here, Woodward offers no excuse for his failure to previously raise issues related to
evidence he has had in his possession for many years.3

3 Woodward summarily asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but
he makes no argument that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness or that, but for his counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). “A petitioner
seeking postconviction relief has the burden of establishing by a fair preponderance of the
evidence that the facts warrant relief. ” Erickson v. State , 725 N.W.2d 532, 534 (Minn.
11
Accordingly, the postconviction court acted well within its discretion in denying
Woodward’s petition as both time- and Knaffla-barred.
Affirmed.

2007) (quotation omitted) . “If the petition and the files and records of the proceeding
conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, a petitioner is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing. ” Id. (quotation omitted). “Further, allegations in a petition for
postconviction relief must be more than argumentative assertions without factual support.”
Id. (quotation omitted).

Woodward bore the burden to allege facts in his petition sufficient to establish by a
fair preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to relief. Id. Mere “argumentative
assertions without factual support” are insufficient to meet the threshold re quirement for
an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction petition. Id. A district court may deny an
evidentiary hearing in the absence of proof supporting the allegations in the petition. Id.
at 537. In light of Woodward’s failure to set forth facts in his petition to support the claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel, we see no abuse of discretion by the postconviction
court in the denial of an evidentiary hearing.