Fairmont Housing and Redevelopment Authority, Respondent,

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0244

Fairmont Housing and Redevelopment Authority,
Respondent,

vs.

Tom Winter, et al.,
Appellants.

Filed November 22, 2021
Affirmed
Jesson, Judge

Martin County District Court
File No. 46-CV-21-91

Keri J. Nelson, Abriter PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Peter J. Hemberger, KyLee Manthei, Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc.,
Mankato, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Jesson, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and
Bratvold, Judge.
SYLLABUS
The eviction moratorium phaseout, 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 5, at
1381, enacted to replace and phase out the su spension by emergency ex ecutive orders of
lease terminations and eviction actions duri ng the COVID-19 pandemic, terminated the
executive orders but did not extinguish rights and defenses accrued under them.
2
OPINION
JESSON, Judge
After guests of appellants Thomas Winter and Jean Marti broke a lockbox that
housed a master key to every unit in their ap artment building, Winter and Marti failed to
report the damage for over a month to respo ndent Fairmont Housing and Redevelopment
Authority (the HRA). The HRA gave notice of termination of the lease, and when Winter
and Marti failed to vacate after an extension, filed an eviction action. Winter and Marti
defended by claiming that the action did not fit into the exceptions to the moratorium on
evictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic by executive order. The district court
ruled in favor of the HRA, and Winter and Marti appealed.
During the appeal process, the legisl ature passed a session law replacing and
phasing out the protections of the executiv e order and declared the underlying executive
orders “null and void” the day following final enactment. We conclude that Winter and
Marti’s rights and defenses under the applicable executive order were not extinguished by
the “null and void” lang uage in the session law. But b ecause the district court properly
interpreted the language of the executive order and conclu ded that Winter and Marti
seriously violated a material term of their lease, authorizing its termination, we affirm.
FACTS
Winter and Marti rent an apartment at Fr iendship Village in Fairmont, which the
HRA owns. Teenage guests of Winter and Marti were “goofing around” outside the
apartment in October 2020 when they discovered they could open a lockbox that hung on
the doorknob of the utility room, next door to Winter and Marti’s apartment. The lockbox
3
held a master key that could gain access to any apartment. Only emergency dispatch had
the code to open the lockbox. After the teenage guests left , the lockbox was broken and
could no longer close, allowing anyone who lo oked within to have access to the master
key.
A month after the lockbox was broken , Winter called the Fairmont police
department and reported the damage. When maintenance came to fix the lockbox, Marti
came out and mentioned that it had been broken for a month. The executive director of the
HRA then called Winter and Marti and asked what happened.1 In the call, Marti said that
she not only knew the box had be en open for a month, but al so had personally used the
master key to get into her ap artment on one occasion. The broken lockbox was replaced
with a functioning lockbox after roughly a week.
The HRA gave written notice of terminat ion of Winter and Marti’s lease for
seriously endangering the health or safety of other residents. 2 After Winter and Marti
refused to leave, the HRA f iled an eviction action. Both the lockbox incident and
subsequent eviction action occurred during a period of time wh en an executive order that
suspended most lease terminations and ev iction actions was in place to prevent
homelessness during the COVID-19 pandemic. Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-79, Modifying
the Suspension of Evictions and Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime

1 The conversation was recorded and later played at the eviction hearing.
2 The lease prohibits residents from perm itting family or guests “to undertake any
hazardous acts or do anything that will damage the property” and requires residents to give
the landlord prompt notice of defects in the building. The lease may be terminated for
“[a]ctivity that threatens the health, safety, or rights to peaceful enjoyment of the premises
by other residents or employees.”
4
Emergency (July 14, 2020) (executive order 20-79 ). But executive order 20-79 did not
completely suspend evictions—it contained limited exceptions, including when a tenant
“seriously endangers the safety of other reside nts” or when a material breach of a lease
endangers others on the premises. Id. In its notice of leas e termination and eviction
complaint, the HRA contended that Winter’s and Marti’s failures to contact management
about the broken lockbox fell within these exceptions. Winter and Marti filed a motion to
dismiss, arguing that execu tive order 20-79 precluded the eviction action because the
lockbox was fixed and that there was no proof th at they or their guests were the ones to
damage the lockbox.
At the eviction hearing, th e HRA executive director, Wi nter, and Marti testified
about the lockbox. The executive director said that she was unaware of any thefts that
occurred during the month the lockbox was broken. Winter explained that their guests did
not enter any code into the lockbox before it popped open. Winter said that he contacted
the police because he was afraid he would be blamed for the dama ge to the lockbox.
Despite not notifying the HRA or maintenance, Winter did warn several neighbors that the
lockbox was open because he was concerned about safety. Both Winter and Marti testified
that they were scared and uncomfortable that the lockbox was broken due to the possibility
of open access to apartments, so they used their chain lock at night.
The district court entered judgment in favor of the HR A, finding that Winter and
Marti seriously endangered the safety of others (noting their own admitted fear), that they
materially violated the lease by failing to report the broken lockbox, and that they failed to
vacate after termination of the lease.
5
Winter and Marti appeal. 3 After the filing of this appeal, the legislature passed a
session law replacing and phasing out the protections of executive order 20-79 at the end
of the June special session. 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 5, at 1381
(moratorium phaseout). The moratorium phase out begins by declaring “Notwithstanding
Minnesota Statutes, chapter 12, or any other law to the contrary, Executive Orders 20-14,
20-73, and 20-79 are null and void.” Id., § 1, at 1381. The legislature also terminated the
peacetime emergency in the special session. 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 12, art.
2, § 23; see also Minn. Stat. § 12.31, subd. 2(b) (2020) (explaining the legislature’s power
to terminate a peacetime emergency). We re quested supplemental briefing, which the
parties provided, to address three issues: the e ffect on this appeal of legislation declaring
executive order 20-79 “null and void,” the applicability of Minnesota Statutes
section 645.35 (2020), and the mootness doctrine.4
ISSUES
I. What is the effect on this appeal of legislation declaring executive order 20-79 null
and void as of June 30, 2021?

II. Did the district court err in interpreting executive order 20-79?
III. Did the district court fail to conclude that Winter and Marti “seriously” violated a
material term of their lease?

3 The district court granted Winter and Marti a stay pending appeal. See Minn. Stat.
§ 504B.371, subd. 5 (2020) (stating that, if a party appeals, the district court shall grant a
stay at appealing party’s request).
4 While we asked these three questions for supplemental briefing, we do not need to reach
the mootness-doctrine issue.
6
ANALYSIS
We begin by addressing the history and language of the executive orders suspending
eviction actions and the subsequent morato rium phaseout. The first executive order
suspending most eviction actions and lease te rminations was signed in March 2020, days
after COVID-19 was known to be in Minne sota. Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-14,
Suspending Evictions and Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime Emergency
(Mar. 23, 2020) (executive or der 20-14). This first evic tion-related executive order
suspended eviction actions and lease termin ations except when a tenant seriously
endangers the safety of other residents or vi olates Minnesota Statutes section 504B.171,
subdivision 1 (2020). 5 Id. In June, the governor sign ed a new executive order that
amended executive order 20-14. Emerg. Exec. Order No. 20-73, Clarifying Executive
Order 20-14 Suspending Evictions and Writs of Recovery During the COVID-19 Peacetime
Emergency (June 5, 2020). The “cla rification” added an exce ption allowing termination
or eviction actions “where the tenant serious ly endangers the safety of others on the
premises, including the common area and the curtilage of the premises, if the serious
endangerment of others who are not residents is a material violation of the lease.” Id. A
month later, the governor signed a third eviction-related executive order, executive order
20-79, that in part stated:
The ability of property owne rs, mortgage holders, or
other persons entitled to recover residential premises to file an

5 This subdivision provid es that, as part of every reside ntial lease, a landlord and tenant
agree to not unlawfully allow controlled s ubstances, prostitution, the unlawful use or
possession of a firearm, or stolen property in the premises or common areas of a rented
building. Minn. Stat. § 508B.171, subd. 1.
7
eviction action on the grounds that a residential tenant remains
in the property after a notice of termination of lease, after a
notice of nonrenewal of a lease, after a material violation of a
lease . . . is suspended . . . . This suspension does not include
eviction actions where the tenant:
a. Seriously endangers the safety of other residents;
. . . [or]
d. Materially violates a residential lease by the
following actions on the premises, including the
common area and the curtilage of the premises:
i. Seriously endangers the safety
of others; or
ii. Significantly damages property.

(Emphasis added.)
It is this third and fina l eviction-related order—exec utive order 20-79—that is
central here. The moratorium phaseout begins by stating that executive orders 20-14, 20-
73, and 20-79, notwithstanding any other law to the contra ry, are “null and void.”
2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 5, § 1, at 1381. The effective date of section 1
is June 30, 2021—the day follo wing final enactment. Th e moratorium phaseout then
addresses two circumstances implicated by executive order 20-79: termination or
nonrenewal of residential leas es and filing of eviction actions . With regard to eviction
actions, the moratorium phaseout prohibits them except:
1) “Where the tenant seriously endangers the safety of others or significantly
damages property”;
2) For violations of Minnesota Statutes section 504B.171, subdivision 1;
3) Beginning 15 days after enactment, for material lease violations other than the
nonpayment of rent; and
8
4) Beginning 75 days after enactment, for those with outstanding rent who are
ineligible for emergency rental assistance.6
Id. The protections in the moratorium phase out end 105 days after enactment, except for
those tenants with pending applications for rent relief. Id., § 2(e), at 1383. All lease
termination and eviction protections are lifted as of June 1, 2022. Id., § 4, at 1383.
With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the issues in this case, whether: the “null and
void” language extinguishes ri ghts accrued under executive order 20-79, the exceptions
under executive order 20-79 require a current endangerment, and the district court properly
concluded that Winter and Marti seriously violated a material term of their lease.
I. The language “null and void” of the moratorium phaseout does not eviscerate
rights accrued under executive order 20-79.

First, we consider whether the language “null and void” in the moratorium phaseout
impacts Winter and Marti’s eviction appeal ch allenging the district court’s interpretation
and application of executive order 20-79.
We review questions of statut ory interpretation de novo. Roberts v. State ,
945 N.W.2d 850, 853 (M inn. 2020). The goal of statutory interpretation is to effectuate
the intent of the legislature. Id. The first step in statutory interpretation is to determine
whether the statute’s language, on its face, is ambiguous. Id. A statute is ambiguous only
if it is subject to “more than one reasonable interpretation.” Id. In interpreting statutes, we

6 Emergency rental assistance programs have household size and other financial limitations
for eligibility. See RentHelpMN, Overview of RentHelpMN Program
https://renthelpmn.org (deta iling the COVID-19 emergency rental-assistance program
guide) (last visited Oct. 18, 2021). Leases of those who are ineligible for emergency rental
assistance may be terminated 45 days after enactment. Id.
9
examine words in light of their context. Tapia v. Leslie, 950 N.W.2d 59, 62 (Minn. 2020).
We may also apply the canons of statutor y construction to resolve an ambiguity. State v.
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Minn. 2017). And we may look to legislative history
to determine the meaning of an ambiguous st atute. Minn. Stat. § 645.16 (2020). But
legislative history is relevant only if the statute is ambiguous. State v. Kirby, 899 N.W.2d
485, 492 (Minn. 2017).
We begin by analyzing whether the “null and void” language in the moratorium
phaseout is ambiguous. Winter and Marti argue that “null and void” means that the eviction
moratorium executive or ders are only voided as of the effective date . This would mean
that the moratorium phaseout would not affect lease terminations or eviction proceedings
started before June 30. The HRA interprets “null and void” to me an that the eviction-
related executive orders are an absolute nullity. This interpretati on likens the executive
orders to a legal instrument wh ich is void ab initio and cannot be enforced. Both parties
assert that their respective interpretations are based on the plain language of the statute.
There is a long history of caselaw in volving contracts, marriages, and other
agreements being held “null and void,” in which courts have determined the legal
instrument was unenforceable. See, e.g., Dodge v. Hollinshead, 6 Minn. 25, 39, 6 Gil. 1,
12-13 (1861) (concluding that a mortgage was null and void without legal effect); see also
Rochon Corp. v. City of St. Paul , 814 N.W.2d 365, 369 (Min n. 2012) (concluding that
construction contract was null and void). But none of these cases address the circumstance
here—legislation declaring an executive order passed under emergency powers “null and
10
void.”7 Because the parties’ interpretations of the phrase “null and void” in the limited
context of the moratorium phaseout are r easonable, we conclude that the phrase is
ambiguous.8 Adding to the ambiguity is the fact that the eviction-related executive orders
are the only ones ended explicitly by the legislature. The other COVID-19 executive orders
implicitly ended when the legi slature passed, and the govern or signed, the act ending the
peacetime emergency.9 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 12, art. 2, § 23, at 1651.
Because the language “null and void” is ambiguous, we turn to reviewing the
context of the legislation, canons of statutor y construction, and the legislative history to
discern the meaning of the phrase.

7 The parties did not raise, so we do not addr ess, whether the legisl ative branch has the
authority to declare laws “void.” We observe the Minnesota Emergency Management Act
of 1996 (the act) describes a way to end a peacetime emergency. Minn. Stat. §§ 12.01-.61
(2020). The act states that “[b]y majority vote of each house of the legislature, the
legislature may terminate a peacetime emergency extending beyond 30 days.” Minn. Stat.
§ 12.31, subd. 2(b). The executive council, which may renew an emergency declaration
by order every 30 days, can also expressly te rminate an emergency declaration or let it
lapse by not continuing it after 30 days. Minn. Stat. § 12.31, subd. 2(a).
8 While the HRA’s reference to a legal nullity is the basis of a reasonable interpretation—
negating a phrase that can be construed ac cording to its plain language—legislation
declaring an executive order null and void is not the same as a court declaring an ordinance
or a contract null and void. And the HRA points to no other executive order or law which
has been declared null and void by the legislat ure. The only time of which we are aware
that the legislature came cl ose to doing so was in in Fleck v. Spanis, a case in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court was asked if the le gislature deeming a state law null and void
“render[ed] any pending matters totally without effect.” 251 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn.
1977). But Fleck is factually distinct, as it involved the state legislature passing a law that
explained the principles of its anticipated preemption by pending federal legislation—not
like here, where state legislation declared an order by a different branch of state
government void. As a result, while other usages of the phr ase “null and void” create an
ambiguity, they do not—in and of themselves—provide a plain-language definition in this
context.
9 We are not reviewing the applicability or legal force of any other executive order enacted
under the governor’s peacetime emergency authority.
11
Rather than a myopic focu s on the three words “null a nd void,” we look to the
overall context of the moratorium phaseout to inform our interpretation. See Roberts, 945
N.W.2d at 850 (explaining that we look to statutes as a whole). While eventually the
moratorium phaseout will be complete, there are tenant protections matching those in the
eviction-related executive orders that last fo r weeks and in some cases months from the
date of enactment. 2021 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. ch. 8, art. 5, § 2(b)(2), at 1382. The
first phase of the moratorium phaseout, for example, includes nearly identical protections,
rights, and exceptions to those set forth in executive order 20-79. Those rights then, over
time, scale back as federal programs for rent al assistance become available and housing
law practices return to pre-pandemic status. In short, executive order 20-79 is the starting
line for the moratorium phaseout. Given this context, it is difficult to read the phrase “null
and void” to mean that executive order 20-79’s protections are an absolute nullity.
With this context in mind, we turn to the rules of statutory construction. One such
rule is the general savings clause. State v. Chicago Great W. Ry. , 25 N.W.2d 294, 297
(Minn. 1946). The savings clause statute states, in part, that “[t]he repeal of any law shall
not affect any right accrued , any duty imposed, any penalty incurred, or any proceeding
commenced, under or by virtue of the law re pealed.” Minn. Stat. § 645.35 (emphasis
added).10 When applying the general savings clause as a rule of statutory construction to
a new law replacing another, the supreme court explained that “unless a contrary legislative

10 Executive orders have the “full force and effect of law,” and we have concluded that they
are subject to the principles of statutory interpretation. Minn. Stat. § 12.32; In re Murack,
957 N.W.2d 124, 127–28 (Minn. App. 2021).
12
intent plainly appears from the repealing statute or amendment,” the rights retained under
the repealed law remain. Chicago Great W. Ry. , 25 N.W.2d at 297 (quotation omitted).
And as we concluded above, the phrase “null and void” is ambiguous. It does not plainly
present a contrary legislative intent to the ru le of construction “saving” accrued rights.
Thus, despite certain protections in the morato rium phaseout only lasting for the first 15
days, this portion of the session law is in distinguishable from executive order 20-79,
meaning the legislature could not have intende d for the rights under that order to be
extinguished immediately.11
Legislative history bolsters the view th at the moratorium pha seout was meant to
extend protections, not eviscer ate them. Described as an “off-ramp” for the executive
order’s broad protections, the goal was to keep people housed during the global COVID-19
pandemic and to give tenants enough time to apply for rental assistance to prevent a future
eviction. See Mike Cook, Housing Panel Reviews Agreement on Ending State’s Eviction
Moratorium, Session Daily (June 21, 2021),
https://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/SessionDaily/Story/15986 (recounting statement by co-
author State Representative Michael Howard that “Minnesotans who have fallen behind on

11 The HRA argues that the general savings statute only applies to a law “repealed,” not to
those declared “null and void.” But we do not need to reach this issue because we are only
using the general savings statute as a tool of statutory construction, and not concluding that
section 645.35 applies to executive orders. Usually when the legislature replaces a statute
that action is described as a “repeal.” Here, the legislature is effectively repealing a law it
did not enact. But considerin g that the executive orders we re replaced with equivalent
language under legislative power instead of executive authority delegated by the
legislature, termination is a more appropria te way to frame the moratorium phaseout’s
effect on executive order 20-79.
13
their rent during the pandemic through no fault of their own will have strong protections in
law as we prevent evictions while ensuring rental assistance flows to landlords.”); see also
Minn. Senate Counsel, Research, and Fiscal Analysis, S.F. No. 16–Housing Omnibus
Budget Bill , 1st Spec. Sess. (June 22, 2021),
https://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/billsumm/2021-ss1/SF16.pdf) (describing the
beginning of the moratorium phaseout as a “transition period” from the eviction-related
executive orders).
Finally, when interpreting the phrase “null and void,” we are mindful of the due-
process concerns attendant to voiding all accrued rights under executive order 20-79. In
re Minn. Dep’t of Com. for Comm’n Action Against AT & T, 759 N.W.2d 242, 251 (Minn.
App. 2009) (explaining the different due-pro cess implications of a repealed law and an
expired law), rev. denied (Minn. Apr. 21, 2009). The HRA argues that because there is an
expiration date in the moratorium phaseout, tenants have sufficient notice and there are no
due-process concerns with their interpretation. While it is true that there are no due-process
concerns when a law “has expired by its ow n terms,” executive order 20-79—the legal
authority that Winter and Marti are in part relying on for a defense—does not have a built-
in expiration date. Id. A party relying on the protectio ns and exceptions in the eviction-
related executive orders would not have proper notice that those protections were ending
until the date of the enactment—and could thereby be denied one chief component of due
process.
Being mindful of the due-p rocess implications of voiding accrued rights, we
reiterate that the language “null and void” is ambiguous. And considering the context of
14
the moratorium phaseout exte nding—not immediately ending—protections, the spirit of
the general savings clause, and the legislative history referencing the moratorium phaseout
as a “transition period,” the legislative inte nt behind the moratorium phaseout was to
temporarily extend the protections acquired under the eviction-related executive orders.
Still, the HRA contends that this interpre tation is in error, because by interpreting
the moratorium phaseout as extending the protections under the eviction-related executive
orders, we are giving Winter and Marti perpetual rights. We are not. The lockbox incident,
the eviction action, and the ev iction judgment all occurred before the enactment of the
moratorium phaseout. Our decision does not provide sweeping protection from all
evictions for perpetuity—instead we are narrowly concluding that the rights accrued while
executive order 20-79 was in e ffect did not evaporate when our state’s legal mechanism
for eviction protections transitioned from ex ecutive order 20-79 to the moratorium
phaseout.
In sum, the phrase “null and void” in the context of the moratorium phaseout does
not extinguish rights accrued by landlords or tenants from the eviction-related executive
orders before the enactment date. Instead, the rights accrued by tenants and landlords
before the executive orders were replaced remain.
II. Executive order 20-79 does no t require a current endangerment.
Because we conclude that any rights accrued under executive order 20-79 were not
extinguished by the mora torium phaseout, we turn to ex amine whether the district court
erred in permitting the HRA’s eviction action to proceed despite the executive order.
15
Winter and Marti contend that the executive order prohibits eviction proceedings where
neither current endangerment nor another exception applies.
This presents yet another issue of interpretation, but here one of interpretation of an
executive order, rather than a session law. Our approach, however, remains the same. We
apply principles of statutory interpretation to the interpretation of executive orders issued
under the authority of the Minnesota Emergency Management Act of 1996. Murack,
957 N.W.2d at 128. And recall that when the language of a rule is clear, this court will
enforce that plain language without looking further. Engfer v. Gen. Dynamics Advanced
Info. Sys., Inc. , 869 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Minn. 2015); Minn. Stat. § 645.16. Words and
phrases should be construed “according to rules of grammar and according to their common
and approved usage.” Minn. Stat. § 645. 08(1) (2020). Finally, we review these
interpretation issues de novo. Pepper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 813 N.W.2d 921,
925 (Minn. 2012).
With these standards in mind , we turn to the phrase in question. Executive order
20-79 states in relevant part that eviction actions are suspended unless a tenant “seriously
endangers the safety of other residents.” Winter and Marti argue that because “endangers”
is present tense, we should read the executive order to require a current endangerment.12
This interpretation would mean the endangerment to the other tenants was over once the
lockbox was replaced, wh ich preceded the fili ng of the complaint. 13 The HRA contends

12 In grammatical terms, what Winter and Marti describe is the “progressive present tense.”
See The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.135 (Univ. of Chicago Press ed., 17th ed. 2017).
13 To further this interpretation, Winter and Mar ti also cite to a special term order of this
court that interpreted a phrase in the first eviction-related executive order, which was the
16
that “endangers” is in the present indefinite tense (also described as the simple present
tense), which is a verb that does not require an ongoing act, meaning once the lockbox was
damaged and Winter and Marti failed to report it, an eviction action was proper regardless
of when or if it was fixed. See The Chicago Manual of Style § 5.129 (Univ. of Chicago
Press ed., 17th ed. 2017).
Our precedent informs the answer to this grammatical issue. In cases involving the
definition of tenses, we have explained that present-tense verbs in statutes do not require
ongoing behavior.14 See, e.g., In re Civil Commitment of Breault , 942 N.W.2d 368, 377
(Minn. App. 2020) (rejecting the argument that the use of a present-tense verb in a statute
requires current behavior). Moreover, despite being written in the present tense, executive
order 20-79 does not use the wo rds “current” or “currently” to modify the endangerment.
Because executive order 20-79 om its those words, we will not read them into an
unambiguous rule under the gu ise of interpretation. See 328 Barry Ave., LLC v. Nolan
Props. Grp., LLC , 871 N.W.2d 745, 750 (Minn. 2015) (applying this principle to the

same as in executive order 20-79. See In re Olson Prop. Inv., No. A20-1073 (Minn. App.
Sept. 1, 2020) (order). Specifically, Winter and Marti quote the phrase stating that “cases
where the tenant seriously endangers the safety of other residents . . . [be construed] to
contemplate circumstances in which physical safety is at current risk, warranting expedited
processing.” Id. But not only is this special-term order nonprecedential, our conclusion in
that case that there was no “current risk” re quiring mandamus relief for the landlord was
based on the landlord’s decision to await the natural expiration of the lease before seeking
to evict based on serious endangerment. Here, in contrast, the HRA took immediate action
to terminate the lease and evict when it learned that Winter and Marti had failed to report
the broken lockbox, damage which allowed easy access to all units for an extended time.
14 This is also in line with the general principle that a landlord’s right to evict “is complete
upon a tenant’s violation of a lease condition.” Minneapolis Cmty. Dev. Agency v.
Smallwood, 379 N.W.2d 554, 556 (Minn. App. 1985), rev. denied (Minn. Feb. 19, 1986).
17
interpretation of statutes). Rather, readi ng the executive order through the lens of
commonly accepted rules of grammar, the ex ception to the evic tion moratorium was
triggered when the serious endangerment occu rred. Accordingly, the phrase “seriously
endangers” is plain and does not require a current or ongoing endangerment.
Therefore, because Winter and Marti’s in terpretation of exec utive order 20-79 is
unavailing and does not require that the lockbox still be inoperable at the time the eviction
complaint was filed, the district court prop erly concluded that the exception from the
executive order allowed for the HRA’s eviction action to proceed.
III. The district court properly concluded that Winter and Marti seriously violated
a material term of their lease.

Having concluded that the district cour t properly allowed the eviction action to
proceed, we next consider whether the district court properly ruled in favor of the HRA on
the merits of its eviction complaint. The complaint alleged that Winter and Marti failed to
vacate after termination of the lease. Wint er and Marti defended on the ground that
termination of the lease was unauthorized. On appeal, they argue that the district court
failed to conclude that they seriously or repeated ly violated a material term of their lease.
The parties agree that serious or repeated violation of a material term is the correct standard
for termination, although Winter and Marti point to federal regulations to support their
argument, while the HRA references termin ation provisions in the lease itself.
Determining the proper standard to be applied is a question of law we review de novo.
Ayers v. Ayers, 508 N.W.2d 515, 518 (Minn. 1993). Because Friendship Village is a public
housing building, Winter and Marti rely on both federal housing law and their lease
18
provisions. Federal housing law provides that a public housing agency may not terminate
a tenancy except for “serious or repeated violations of the terms or conditions of the lease
or for other good cause” or “serious or repeated violations of material terms of the lease.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 1437d(l)(5) (2018); 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(l)(2)(i) (2020). The HRA argues that
Winter and Marti violated three provisions of the lease requiring that they (1) agree to give
the landlord “prompt notice” of any defects; (2) abide by th e “necessary and reasonable
rules” for the benefit and well- being of other residents; and (3) refrain from “any activity
that threatens the healthy, safety, or rights to peaceful enjoyment” by other residents.
Here, the district court concluded that “W inter and Marti seriously endangered the
lives of themselves and other residents when they knew that their guests had tampered with
the lockbox . . . and they failed to notify th e landlord for a month.” The district court
subsequently said that “whe n Winter and Marti failed to notify Fairmont HRA of the
broken lockbox, it was a material violation of the lease agreement that endangered the
safety of the residents.” Becau se the district court noted a se rious violation of a material
term of the lease, after concluding that a “serious endangerment” existed, we are satisfied
that the district court concluded that Winter and Marti seriously violated a material term of
their lease.
We are not persuaded otherwise by Winter and Marti’s assertion that because the
district court did not specifically conclude that there was a “serious or repeated violation
of a material term of the lease,” in the same phrase, the district court applied the wrong
standard. This is not reflected in the record. While the district court did not use the precise
language in the exact order as the federal housing regulations or the lease, it stated several
19
times that there was a “serious endangerm ent,” that Winter and Marti “seriously
endangered” their fellow residents, and that there was a “material vi olation of the lease
agreement that endangered the safety of the residents.” The language in the district court’s
conclusions, collectively, satisfies the standard for lease termination.15
While we acknowledge that reasonable minds might differ as to whether Winter and
Marti’s failure to notify their landlord was a se rious violation of thei r lease, the district
court did consider and rule based on the evidence presented and the language of the lease.
And it was the district court that heard the witnesses, judged their credibility, and, in doing
so, weighed the evidence. We will not reweigh that evidence here. See Landmark Cmty.
Bank v. Klingelhutz, 927 N.W.2d 748, 755 (Minn. App. 2019) (stating that we defer to the
district court’s credibility determinations and do not reweigh evidence).
Accordingly, because the district court satisfied the correct standard in its decision,
it properly concluded that Winter and Marti materially violated their lease by seriously
endangering the other tenants in Friendship Village.

15 Winter and Marti also contend that they did not “seriously” violate their lease. They cite
Wilhite v. Scott Cnty. Hous. & Redevelopment Auth. to contend that a serious violation is
limited to a deprivation “of ei ther a tangible property interest or a real, significant,
economic benefit.” 759 N.W.2d 25 2, 256 (Minn. App. 2009). But Wilhite involved the
termination of program assistance and interpreted what a “serious violation” constituted in
light of the requirement that a housing author ity “must terminate . . . for a family evicted
from housing assisted under the program fo r serious violation of the lease.” Id.
(interpreting 24 C.F.R. § 982 .552(b)(2) (2020)). While here the eviction action was
brought in part due to the failu re to vacate the premises, th e termination of the lease was
due to the serious endangerment caused by not reporting the damaged lockbox. This is not
a similar situation to Wilhite, and the narrow interpretation of “serious” from Wilhite should
not be extended here.
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DECISION
Winter and Marti’s rights and defenses under executive order 20-79 were not
eviscerated by the enactment of legislation repl acing the executive order, but the district
court properly interpreted the language of executive order 20-79 to allow the eviction
action to proceed. The district court properl y concluded that Winter and Marti seriously
violated a material term of their lease, and therefore the HRA was authorized to terminate
their lease. Because it is undisputed that Winter and Marti failed to vacate after termination
of the lease, we affirm the eviction judgment.
Affirmed.