A21-0250 Nonprecedential Reversed and remanded Processed

In re the Marriage of: Maureen A. Chevalier, Respondent,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed November 15, 2021

The holding in the court’s own words

Because the plain meaning of the parties’ language unambiguously limits the provision’s application to modification of spousal maintenance, we conclude that the district court misinterpreted and improperly relied on the stipulated judgment and decree.

Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.

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Opinion text

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0250

In re the Marriage of: Maureen A. Chevalier,
Respondent,

vs.

Mark K. Thomas,
Appellant.

Filed November 15, 2021
Reversed and remanded
Florey, Judge

Ramsey County District Court
File No. 62-FA-14-2855

Susan M. Gallagher, Gallagher Law Office, L.C.C., Eagan, Minnesota (for respondent)

Michael P. Boulette, O. Joseph Balthazor, Jr., Yuka Shiotani, Taft, Stettinius & Hollister,
L.L.P., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presiding Judge; Florey, Judge; and Bryan,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
In this spousal-maintenance dispute, appellant argues that the district court erred by
relying on a provision in the parties’ stipulated judgment and decree to deny appellant’s
motion to deny a cost -of-living adjustment (COLA). Because the district court
misinterpreted and improperly relied on an inapplicable provision, we reverse and remand.
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FACTS
Appellant and respondent divorced by Stipulated Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, Order for Judgment and Judgment and Decree (“stipulated judgment and decree”) on
March 29, 2016 . Although appellant’s income was higher , spousal maintenance was
established based on appellant’s income measured at $650,000 in accordance with the
parties’ agreement. Appellant paid respondent spousal maintenance of $19,500 per month
until March 2018, when respondent applied for a COLA. Appellant did not oppose the
request, and his spousal-maintenance obligation automatically increased to $20,260.50 per
month in April 2018.
Respondent sought another COLA in 2020. In response, a ppellant filed a motion
with the district court requesting that the COLA be denied, arguing that his income has
consistently decreased since 2017 , and will continue to decrease as he is not w orking at
capacity due to the COVID pandemic. In support of his motion, appellant provided his
2017-2019 tax returns, a May 2020 pay stub showing a gross monthly income of
$50,953.15, and a letter from the Chair of the Orthopedics Department of Park Nicol let
Clinic stating that appellant’s compensation would be reduced by 30% on May 1, 2020.
According to appellant’s federal income taxes, his gross income was $1,168,296 in 2017,
$1,072,938 in 2018, and $1,064,475 in 2019. Appellant predicted that his gros s annual
income for 2020 would be $914,475.
The district court determined that the parties agreed any reduction in appellant’s
income would be measured against his income at $650,000 based on the stipulated
judgment and decree. Without making specific fin dings as to appellant’s income, the
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district court found that appellant failed to meet his burden establishing an insufficient
increase in income and increased his monthly maintenance obligations to $21,152. The
district court reasoned that appellant’s projected income of $914,475 was above $650,000
and that, even if appellant’s monthly income remained consistent with the May 2020 pay
stub, his gross annual income of $764,548 would still be above $650,000.
Appellant moved for amended findings, challenging the district court’s finding that
the parties agreed that “ any reduction in [appellant’s] income in the future shall be
measured from $650,000.” Appellant argued that the parties’ agreement to use a baseline
income of $650,000 was specifically limited t o future motions to modify the maintenance
and was not applicable to respondent’s request for a COLA. The district court denied
appellant’s motion for amended findings.
This appeal follows.
DECISION
The issue here is whether the terms within the spousal-maintenance provision of the
stipulated judgment and decree properly apply to a contested COLA.
Generally, the terms of a stipulated -dissolution judgment are construed using
contract-law principles. In re Estate of Rock, 612 N.W.2d 891, 894 (Minn. App. 2000).
When the language of such a judgment is reasonably subject to more than one
interpretation, it is ambiguous. Id. Whether a dissolution judgment is ambiguous presents
a question of law, which we review de novo. Tarlan v. Sorensen, 702 N.W.2d 915, 919
(Minn. App. 2005). Resolution of any ambiguity is a question of fact, reviewed for clear
error. Id.
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Stipulated judgments are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts” and are
therefore construed using the ordinary rules of contract interpretation. Ertl v. Ertl , 871
N.W.2d 410
, 415 (Minn. App. 2015). We review the language of a contract to determine
the intent of the parties. Ertl, 871 N.W.2d at 415. When the “language employed by the
parties is plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction,” and we construe it
according to its plain meaning. Starr v. Starr , 251 N.W.2d 341, 342 (Minn. 197 7). A
writing is ambiguous if, judged by its language alone and without resort to parol evidence,
“it is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.” Ertl, 871 N.W.2d at 415.
In Minnesota, spousal -maintenance obligations are subject to bien nial COLAs
based on the Consumer Price Index to preserve the value of the maintenance award at the
time it was set by adjusting for inflation. Minn. Stat. § 518A.75, subd. 1(a) (2020);
McClenahan v. Warner , 461 N.W.2d 509, 51 0 (Minn. App. 1990). A district court may
“waive” the adjustment “if it expressly finds that the obligor’s occupation or income, or
both, does not provide for cost-of-living adjustment.” Id. at subd. 1(b) (2020). The burden
is on the obligor to show why a COLA should be waived or reduced. Bartl v. Bartl, 497
N.W.2d 295
, 301 (Minn. App. 1993). Thus, if an obligor shows an insufficient increase in
income, the court “may” order that all or part of the COLA increase not take effect. Minn.
Stat. § 518A.75, subd. 1(b). If the obligor fails to show an insufficient increase in income,
the COLA “shall” take effect. Id. at subd. 3 (2020). District courts have broad discretion
over issues of spousal maintenance, and this court will not rever se a decision absent an
abuse of discretion. Grachek v. Grachek , 750 N.W.2d 328, 330-31 (Minn. App. 2008),
rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 19, 2008).
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Here, the stipulated judgment and decree, in relevant part, states:
[Husband’s] spousal maintenance obligation shall be subject to
cost-of-living adjustments in accordance with the provisions of
Appendix A attached hereto and incorporated herein.

For purposes of any future motion to modify spousal
maintenance based on a substantial change in circumstances,
[husband’s] retirement at any time after his 65 th birthday shall
be deemed to be in good faith. Additionally, for purposes of
any future motion to modify spousal maintenance based on a
reduction in [husband’s] income due to retir ement or
otherwise, it shall be assumed that [husband’s] income for
purposes of establishing the award of spousal maintenance
herein was $650,000 per year gross and that any reduction in
his income in the future shall be measured from $650,000 per
year gross, even if [husband’s] actual income was more than
$650,000 per year gross prior to the reduction in his income.

The language of the provision explicitly limits its applications to motions to modify
spousal maintenance. Both sentences in the provision with the stipulated income begin
with “for purposes of any future motion to modify spousal maintenance.” In addition to
this explicit limiting language, the substance of the provision also indicates the parties’
intent to limit its application to modification proceedings. First, because a party requesting
an adjustment need only send notice of the intended adjustment to the obligor, there is no
need to file a motion for the adjustment to take effect. See Minn. Stat. §518A.75, subd. 2.
(2020). Additionally, the provision specifically addresses the statutory criteria for spousal-
maintenance modifications, which are not relevant for COLAs. See Minn. Stat. § 518A.39,
subd. 2 (2020) (providing that a party seeking to modify a spousal-maintenance obligation
must demonstrate a “substantial change” has occurred in the parties’ circumstances); see
also id. at subd. 2(a)(1) (2020) (permitting modification upon a showing that the payor’s
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gross income has substantially decreased). Conversely, there is no language purporting to
apply the limiting aspects of this provision to COLAs. If the parties so intended, they could
have, and likely would have, included the stipulated income in the prec eding paragraph
governing COLAs.
Minnesota law is clear that the right to request a COLA is separate and distinct from
the right to seek a maintenance modification. Anderson v. Anderson, 897 N.W.2d 828, 833
(Minn. App. 2017). Therefore, a “party may re quest a COLA without seeking to modify
the maintenance award and vice versa.” Grachek, 750 N.W.2d at 331. Because the plain
meaning of the parties’ language unambiguously limits the provision’s application to
modification of spousal maintenance, we conclude that the district court misinterpreted and
improperly relied on the stipulated judgment and decree. Without adequate findings as to
appellant’s income, we are unable to conduct a meaningful review as to whether the district
court abused its discretion in granting the adjustment. Merrick v. Merrick, 440 N.W.2d at
142, 146 (Minn. App. 1989) (holding that appellate review of the record is not substitute
for specific district court findings). Accordingly, we remand the case to be decided
pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 518A.75 without reliance on the stipulated income of $650,000.
On remand, the district court may, in its discretion, reopen the record to receive additional
evidence and argument to analyze appellant’s income.
Reversed and remanded.