Mark Arnold Wadekamper, petitioner, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0252

Mark Arnold Wadekamper, petitioner,
Appellant,

vs.

Commissioner of Public Safety,
Respondent.

Filed December 20, 2021
Affirmed
Reyes, Judge

Carver County District Court
File No. 10-CV-20-485

Richard L. Swanson, Chaska, Minnesota (for appellant)

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Ryan Pesch, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul,
Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Connolly, Judge; and Reyes,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
REYES, Judge
Appellant argues on appeal that the district court failed to provide him meaningful
due process by issuing an order sustaining the revocation of appellant’s driver’s license.
We affirm.

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FACTS
On June 3, 2020, p olice arrested a ppellant Mark Arnold Wadekamper for driving
while impaired (DWI). Appellant had five prior impaired-driving incidents for offenses
that occurred in 1974, 1977, 1983, 1986, and 1994. Because the June 2020 DWI was his
sixth impaired-driving incident , respondent commissioner of public safety (the
commissioner) sent appellant a notice and order of revocation revoking his driver’s license
for six years pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd. 4 (a)(6) (2018) (the license -
revocation statute).
Appellant filed an implied-consent petition seeking judicial review and requested a
hearing. The district court granted appellant a hearing at which he conceded that there
were no factual disputes and that he had already pleaded guilty to the June 2020 DWI.
Appellant stated at the hearing that he only wanted to raise the issue of the length of his
six-year license revocation. He then told the district court that h e only wanted to submit
written briefs. The hearing ended with no additional testimony or oral argument.
Appellant submitted a written argument in the form of a letter to the district court ,
again challenging only the lawfulness of the six -year license-revocation period . He
acknowledged that, under the license -revocation statute, the revocation period is not less
than six years for a person with four or more prior impaired-driving offenses and conceded
that he had more than four prior DWIs. Appellant nevertheless argued that his prior DWIs
should not be considered in determining the length of his license revocation b ecause the
prior impaired-driving incidents were “stale .” Appellant also argued, in a short, three -
sentence paragraph , that the license-revocation statute requiring the district court to

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consider all prior DWIs , without requiring a prior enhancement warni ng, violated due
process. Appellant cited no legal authority in support of his due-process argument.
The district court rejected appellant’s arguments and sustained the commissioner’s
license revocation. The district court first determined that, because the length -of-
revocation issue is outside of the exclusive list of issues that the district court is authorized
to review at an implied-consent hearing under Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b), appellant
could not raise it. See Axelberg v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 848 N.W.2d 206, 208-09 (Minn.
2014) (holding that issues a driver may raise at an implied -consent hearing are limited to
those falling within topics listed in Minn. Stat. § 169A.53, subd. 3(b)). The district court
then stated that the revocation period is mandated by the license-revocation statute and the
commissioner had no discretion to ignore any qualifying prior impaired -driving offenses.
The district court noted that appellant cited no legal authority for his claim that the lack of
an enhancement-warning requirement in the license-revocation statute violated his due-
process rights and declined to consider it. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Appellant’s argument is difficult to understand, but he appears to argue, for the first
time on appeal, that the district court did not provide him with a meaningful hearing to
argue his case. We are not convinced.
As an initial matter, the commissioner argues that appellant raises a new procedural
due-process issue that he did not raise before the district court. We agree. Appellant argued
at the district court that the license-revocation statute permitting old DWI incidents to be
used in imposing a six-year revocation period, without an enhancement warning, violated

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his due-process rights. Appellant now appears to argue on appeal that his procedural due-
process rights were violated because he did not receive a meaningful hearing at which to
argue his case. Appellant never argued or raised that issue before the district court. As an
error-correcting court, we generally do not consider issues that are raised for the first time
on appeal. See Thiele v. Stich , 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988). We also generally
decline to address constitutional issues that were not raised before t he district court. See
In re Welfare of C.L.L. , 310 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Minn. 1981). Nevertheless, because the
record is clear on this issue, we will address appellant’s procedural due-process argument.
Appellant appears to argue that the district court denied him procedural due process
by denying him a meaningful hearing. Whether the government violated a person’s
procedural due-process rights is a question of law that we review de novo. Sawh v. City of
Lino Lakes , 823 N.W.2d 627, 632 (Minn. 2012). The United States and Minnesota
Constitutions prohibit the state from depriving any person of liberty or property without
due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. The suspension of
a driver’s license implicates a property interes t that triggers due-process protections. See
Mackey v. Montrym , 443 U.S. 1, 12 (1979). Due process generally requires “adequate
notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d
298, 304 (Minn. App. 2007) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)).
Here, appellant received a meaningful opportunity to be heard . The district court
granted his request for an implied -consent hearing after the commissioner revoked his
license. Appellant had an opportunity to argue his case before the district court. At the
hearing, appellant stated that “the only issue was the length of his license revocation” and

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told the district court that he just wanted to submit briefs. The district cour t allowed
appellant to submit a written argument after the hearing , which he did in the form of a
letter. Appellant therefore had every opportunity to argue his case before the district court
in both oral and written form. He received a meaningful hearing and all the procedural due
process to which he was entitled.
To the extent that appellant’s argument on appeal could be construed as a challenge
to the district court’s denial of his constitutional c laim that the lack of an enhancement
warning violated his due-process rights, appellant’s argument still fails. In his letter to the
district court, appellant’s only explicit reference to his due -process claim is a single line
stating that “The legislation . . . permitting the use of incidents over twenty years ago to be
used, without an enhancement warning, as a lifelong stepping stone for six years of ignition
interlock is a violation of due process.”1 The district court declined to address appellant’s
due-process challenge because he cited no legal authority in support of his position. Courts
do not consider claims that are unsupported by argument or citation to legal authority. See
Stephens v. Bd. of Regents, 614 N.W.2d 764, 769 (Minn. App. 2000), rev. denied (Minn.
Sept. 26, 2000). We therefore discern no error in the district court’s rejection of appellant’s
undeveloped constitutional challenge.
Affirmed.

1 “The legislation” appellant refers to here appears to be the license -revocation statute,
Minn. Stat. § 169A.52, subd.4(a)(6).