State of Minnesota, Appellant,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0257

State of Minnesota,
Appellant,

vs.

Koulton Ugene Robinson,
Respondent.

Filed September 20, 2021
Affirmed
Cochran, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-20-721

Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorn ey, Adam E. Petras , Assistant County
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kassius O. Benson, Fourth Dist rict Public Defender, Paul J. Maravigli, Assistant Public
Defender, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Worke, Presidi ng Judge; Cochran, Judge; and Slieter,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
COCHRAN, Judge
In this pretrial prosecution appeal, the state challenges the district court’s order
granting respondent’s motion to suppress evid ence seized after officers stopped a vehicle
in which respondent was a passenger. The st ate argues that the district court erred by
2
(1) determining that respondent had standing to challenge the expansion of the traffic stop,
and (2) determining that the officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to expand the
scope of the stop. We affirm.
FACTS
In March 2019, appellant State of Minne sota charged respondent Koulton Ugene
Robinson with one count of unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition and one count
of fifth-degree possession of methamphetamine . The charges arose after police officers
stopped a vehicle, in which Robinson was a passenger, for a speeding violation. The
officers ordered the driver out of the vehicle to question him about possible drug activity.
The officers later ordered Robinson out of th e car. During a subsequent search of the
vehicle, the officers discovered methamphetamine, a firearm, and ammunition.
Robinson moved to suppress the evidence ob tained during the search, arguing that
the traffic stop, the expansion of the stop, and the search of the vehicle violated the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Following an eviden tiary hearing, the
district court granted Robinson’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing, the district court heard testimony from the officer who
conducted the traffic stop as well as a sergea nt who assisted. The district court also
admitted a squad car video of th e traffic stop. The following provides a summary of that
evidence.
On the morning of March 20, 2019, the o fficer was monitoring a residence in the
city of Bloomington. Law enforcement had gone to that residence a few weeks earlier and
3
arrested one of the residents for possession of a handgun. The officer knew that person
was not present at the house on March 20 because the person was still in custody. Law
enforcement had also previously received mu ltiple calls about “narcotics activity and
suspicious activity” at the address. Law enforcement was concerned about possible
ongoing drug activity at the residence based, in part, on an increase in short-term vehicle
traffic at the address.
While monitoring the reside nce that morning, the offi cer observed a black Ford
Taurus park across the street from it. Two individuals exited the vehicle and went inside.
The officer asked the sergeant, who was on the scene in a separate vehicle, to drive by the
Taurus and give the officer its license plate nu mber. The officer then ran a search of the
number and learned that the registered owner of the vehicle had been involved in drugs and
weapons violations in other ju risdictions. The officer also learned that the owner was
associated with the resident who had been arrested. Based on the database photograph, the
officer believed that the registered owner wa s one of the individuals who had exited the
vehicle. The other individual was later identified as Robinson.
Robinson and the other individual remain ed in the house for about 50 minutes.
After they exited the house, they returned to the car and drove away. The other individual
was driving, and Robinson was sitting in the front passenger’s seat.
The officer followed the vehicle. She estimated that the vehicle was traveling about
33 to 34 miles an hour, which was in excess of the 30-mile-per-hour speed limit. The
officer decided to stop the vehicle based on the traffic violation and based on her belief that
the occupants were involved in drug activity. As she was making the traffic stop, the officer
4
observed that Robinson “moved forward or le aned forward slightly.” When asked to
describe the motion, she testified that she “saw his head kind of bow down from the visible
field” but gave no further details. The sergea nt followed behind the officer as the officer
made the traffic stop.
The officer went to the driver’s side wind ow and spoke with the driver. The driver
provided identification and in surance information. The o fficer asked the two occupants
where they were coming from. The driver told the officer that they were coming from the
Bloomington residence. The driver said that he was friends with the resident of the house.
While speaking with the driver, the offi cer observed Robinson in the passenger’s
seat. According to the officer, Robinson “appeared to be very nervous” and did “not want[]
to make direct eye contact.” Based on these observations, the officer believed that
Robinson had “something to hide.” The offi cer told Robinson that he looked “really
familiar” and asked him for his name. Robinson told her that he did not have to identify
himself. The officer responded: “People that don’t want to identify themselves to the police
generally have something to hide.” According to the officer, Robinson “again avoided eye
contact and seemed very nervous.”
The officer returned to th e squad car to run a check on the driver’s license and
insurance. Before doing so, sh e conferred with the sergeant. She told the sergeant that
Robinson looked “super familiar” and that sh e thought he might have been arrested in
connection with a bank robbery more than a year earlier. Sh e also said that he refused to
identify himself. The officer stated that she intended to “pull” the driver and Robinson out
of the car, meaning that she wa s going to have the driver and Robinson get out of the car
5
so she could question them further. At the hearing, she explained that her reason for doing
so was to “separate the driv er and the passenger to inves tigate the possible narcotics
activity.”
Before doing so, the officer ran a check on the driver’s identification and insurance
information. The officer learned that the driver had unspecified “associations and reports
involving narcotics contacts relating to his name.” While the officer was checking the
driver’s information, the sergeant told th e officer that it looked like the passenger was
“digging around.” When asked to explain this observation, the sergeant testified that it
appeared Robinson was leaning forward “kind of almost to the point where it looked like
he might be reaching underneath the seat fo r something on the floorboard.” The officer
testified that she also observed Robinson “m oving around a little bit” during this time
frame. When asked to explain what she meant, she stated that she “saw movement in his
head.”
After conducting the identif ication check, the officer re turned to the driver’s
window and directed the driver to step out of the vehicle. The officer brought the driver in
front of the squad car and imme diately asked, “Who’s your b uddy in there?” The driver
identified the passenger as Robinson. The o fficer then questioned the driver about his
criminal history and what he was doing at the house. The driv er stated that he was at the
residence to pick up some clothes and othe r property belonging to the resident who had
been arrested. He also told th e officer that there were other people in the house that day,
although he did not know them.
6
While the officer questioned the driver, the sergeant stood to the side of the vehicle
and watched Robinson’s movements. The serg eant saw that Robinson “continued to be
moving around” in his seat and was handling a “cylindrical-shaped container.” The
sergeant also observed “foil wrapping,” which he believed to be c onsistent with drug
paraphernalia. The officer th en asked Robinson to step out of the vehicle. The officer
patted Robinson down for weapons and discove red a pair of brass knuckles and rubber
gloves in his back pocket. The officer placed Robinson un der arrest. During a search
incident to arrest, the sergeant discovered a methamphetamine pipe on Robinson.
Officers subsequently searched the vehicle. They discovered narcotics, handguns,
and ammunition throughout the car. Robinson was subsequently charged with fifth-degree
possession of methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm or ammunition.
District Court’s Order
Following the evidentiary hearing, the district court granted Robinson’s motion to
suppress. First, the district court rejected the state’s argument that Robinson lacked
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the traffic stop and concluded that a passenger
seized during a traffic stop may challenge the stop.
The district court then examined the constitutionality of the traffic stop. It
determined that the initial traffic stop wa s legally justified based on the officer’s
observation that the Taurus was speeding. The district court next concluded that the officer
expanded the traffic stop when she ordered the driver to get out of the car and began
questioning him about Robinson’s identity. The district court therefore addressed whether
this expansion of the traffic stop was supported by reasonable, articulable suspicion.
7
The district court considered Robinson ’s presence at the residence, which the
district court found to be “a kn own ‘drug house.’” The district court determined that this
factor was not conclusive and found that ther e was “no evidence either [the driver] or
Mr. Robinson carried anything out of the house when they exited.” Moreover, the district
court noted that the driver “provided a plau sible innocent explanation for being at the
house,” in that he was “there to pick-up pr operty from the house and left when he found
out it was not there.” The district court also believed that the length of time that the driver
and Robinson stayed in the house—about 50 minutes—was “unlike the traditional short
stay present in the vast majority” of cases suggesting drug activity.
The district court rejected other facts that the state emphas ized as supporting
reasonable suspicion. While the officer tes tified that Robinson appeared nervous, the
district court dismissed this observation as “a subjective assessment derived by the officer’s
perception” and “not an objective fact.” The district court also rejected the state’s reliance
on Robinson’s “furtive movements” observed by the officer and the sergeant while the
officer was conducting the driv er’s license and insurance ch eck, determining that these
movements were irrelevant to the question of reasonable suspicion because they all
occurred after the officer had made the decisi on to expand the stop. Finally, the district
court declined to rely on Robinson’s refusal to identify himself when asked, noting that he
had the right not to identify himself at that time.
Based on these facts, the district court c oncluded that the officer lacked reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify expanding the traffic stop by ordering the driver out of the
8
car for questioning. Accordingl y, the district court ordered the suppression of the drugs
and ammunition found during the officers’ subsequent search of Robinson and the vehicle.
The state appeals.
DECISION
The state challenges the district cour t’s order granting Robinson’s motion to
suppress evidence. The state may appeal from “any pretrial order” in which the district
court’s alleged error of law has a “critical imp act” on the outcome of the trial. Minn. R.
Crim. P. 28.04, subds. 1(1), 2(2)(b). Here , it is undisputed that the critical-impact
requirement is satisfied because the suppression of the ammunition and methamphetamine
will certainly affect the state’ s ability to prosecute Robinson for unlawful possession of
those items.
Accordingly, we turn to the state’s subs tantive arguments regarding the district
court’s decision to grant Robinson’s motion to suppress. When reviewing a pretrial order
on a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and
its legal determinations de novo. State v. Gauster , 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008).
We independently review the facts and determ ine as a matter of law whether the district
court erred in suppressing the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999).
The state raises two arguments on appea l: (1) the record does not establish that
Robinson had standing to challenge the officer’s expansion of the traffic stop; and (2) the
district court erred by determining that the officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion
to expand the traffic stop beyond a speeding violation. We address each argument in turn.
9
I. Robinson had standing to challenge the expansion of the stop.
The state argues that the district court erroneously concluded that Robinson had
standing to challenge the expansion of the tr affic stop. The concept of “standing” under
the Fourth Amendment is based on the idea th at a person challenging a search or seizure
as unlawful must show that his own cons titutional rights were violated and cannot
vicariously assert a violation of another person’s rights. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
133-34 (1978). To have standing under the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must show
that he had “a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.” Id. at 143. It is
well-established that a passenger in a vehicle stopped by police ordi narily does not have
standing to challenge a search of the vehicle. Id. at 148-49. But a passenger has standing
to challenge the stop of the vehicle, because the stop is considered a seizure of the
passengers as well as the driver. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007).
Here, the district court determined that Robinson had standi ng under the Fourth
Amendment because he was challenging the constitutionality of the stop, not the later
search of the vehicle. The state does not di spute that Robinson had standing to challenge
the initial stop, which was for a speeding violation. But the state argues that “it is far less
clear whether Robinson, as the passenger in a vehicle, ha[d] standing to challenge the
legality of the expansion of the scope of a stop of that vehicle.” The state maintains that
the record does not establish whether Robinson was seized at the time the officer expanded
the stop and that, “if Robinson was not seized at that time and was instead free to walk
away from the scene, he would lack standing.” The state therefore asks us to remand for
10
the district court to determine whether Robi nson had standing at the time the stop was
expanded.
The state’s argument is premised on th e assumption that a passenger may have
standing to challenge an initial stop of a ve hicle, but that the pa ssenger may not have
standing to challenge an expansion of the stop. The state’ s position appears to conflict
with United States Supreme Court case law. The Court has defined the ordinary scope of
a seizure during a traffic stop: “The temporary seizure of driver and passengers ordinarily
continues, and remains reasonable, for the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends
when the police have no further n eed to control the scene, and inform the driver and
passengers they are free to leave .” Arizona v. Johnson , 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009)
(emphasis added). This language indicates that a passenger ordinarily remains seized
throughout the expansion of a traffic stop, because the officers continue to control the scene
and have not informed the driver or passengers that they are free to leave.
Similarly, the Supreme Court in Brendlin explained the likely effect of a traffic stop
on a passenger: “[A] sensible person would not expect a poli ce officer to allow people to
come and go freely from the physical focal point of an investigation into faulty behavior
or wrongdoing.” 551 U.S. at 257. The Supreme Court further commented that an “attempt
to leave the scene would be so obviously likely to prompt an objection from the officer that
no passenger would feel free to leave in the first place.” Id. We believe these comments
about a passenger’s inability to leave the scene are just as lik ely to be true —if not more
so—when an officer expands the stop beyond a mere traffic violation and begins to
investigate possible criminal activity. Based on Supreme Court precedent, the conclusion
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that a passenger continues to be seized during an expansion of the stop is almost
inescapable. And we are unaware of any ca se law suggesting that a passenger, who has
standing to challenge the legality of the initial stop, might lose standing when the scope of
the stop is expanded. Thus, we conclude that a passenger who reasonably believes that
they are not free to leave the scene when a traffic stop is expanded has standing to challenge
that expansion.
Finally, we reject the state’s contention th at the record is unclear as to whether
Robinson was free to terminate the encounter, and therefore was no lo nger seized, at the
time the officer ordered the driver out of th e car. A passenger is seized if a reasonable
person in the passenger’s position wo uld not feel free to leave. In re Welfare of E.D.J. ,
502 N.W.2d 779, 783 (Minn. 1993). Nothing in the record su ggests that Robinson might
have felt free to leave the scen e. The officer and the sergea nt never gave any indication
that Robinson could leave. And when Robinson had earlier refused to identify himself to
the officer, she told hi m that “people that don’t want to identify themselves to the police
generally have something to hide.” In this situation, no reasonable person would have felt
free to get out of the car a nd walk away while the officer was questioning the driver.
Because the record establishes that Robins on remained seized at the time the officer
expanded the stop, the district court properly concluded that Robinson had standing to
challenge the expansion of the stop.
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II. The officer lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug-related activity to
justify expanding the traffic stop.
We next consider the state’s argument that the district court erred by granting the
motion to suppress because it incorrectly determined that the officer did not have
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug activity to expand the traffic stop. We conclude
that district court did not err in this regard either.
The United States and Mi nnesota Constitutions prot ect individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. If
an individual is illegally seized before officers have reasonable suspicion to seize him, then
all evidence obtained after the seizure must be suppressed. Harris, 590 N.W.2d at 97.
A traffic stop is considered a seizure akin to a Terry investigative stop.
State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 359-60 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968)). Under the Terry framework, courts undertake a “dual inquiry,” determining first
“whether the stop was justified at its incep tion,” and second “whether the actions of the
police during the stop were r easonably related to and justif ied by the circumstances that
gave rise to the stop in the first place.” Id. at 364. An officer may expand the scope of a
traffic stop to investigate other suspected criminal activity “onl y if the officer has
reasonable, articulable suspicion of such other illegal activity.” State v. Wiegand,
645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 20 02). A mere hunch is not suffi cient to satisfy the test of
reasonableness. State v. Diede , 795 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn. 2011); see also Terry ,
392 U.S. at 27. An office r’s reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
13
warrant that intrusion.” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quoting Terry,
392 U.S. at 21). When articulating reasonable suspicion, officers are permitted to rely on
“inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained person.” State v. Flowers,
734 N.W.2d 239, 251-52 (Minn. 2007).
In determining whether reasonable, articul able suspicion exists, we look to the
totality of the circumstances. Id. at 251. In addition, the proffered factual bases and any
inferences drawn therefrom are assessed against an objective st andard of reasonableness.
State v. Schrupp , 625 N.W.2d 844, 847 (Minn. App. 2001), rev. denied (Minn. July 24,
2001). An officer’s subjective good-faith belief will not suffice. Id. And, as noted above,
we independently review the facts and determ ine as a matter of law whether the stop and
the expansion meet the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d
at 247, 251-52.
Here, the district court determined that the traffic stop was justified at its inception
based on the speeding violation, and neither party challenges that determination on appeal.
The officer later directed the driver out of the vehicle and bega n questioning him about
Robinson’s identity and possible dr ug activity. Because the officer’s actions in ordering
the driver out of the car went beyond the justification fo r the initial stop, the officer
expanded the scope of the traffic stop at that point. See State v. Fort , 660 N.W.2d 415,
418-19 (Minn. 2003) (concluding that officer expanded scope of traffic stop by ordering
passenger out of vehicle and questioning him about drug-re lated activity). The question
on appeal is therefore whether the officer ha d reasonable, articulable suspicion of other
criminal activity to justify e xpanding the stop. In addressing this question, we consider
14
only the facts as they existed at the time the officer ordered the driver out of the car; we do
not consider any circumstances that arose after that moment.
The state points to the fo llowing circumstances as supporting reasonable, articulable
suspicion: (1) Robinson’s association with th e driver and their presence together at a
“known drug house”; (2) Robinson’s ne rvousness; and (3) Robinson’s “furtive
movement[s]” during the stop. We first discuss these circumstances individually and then
consider whether, when viewed together, th ey provided the officer with reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Robinson may have been involved in criminal activity.1
The state argues that reasonable suspicion was supported by the fact that Robinson
and the driver—who had prior drug-related o ffenses—had been at a “known drug house”
just prior to the stop. 2 Case law makes clear that th ese facts alone do not establish
reasonable suspicion. “Mere proximity to, or association with, a person who may have
previously engaged in criminal activity is not enough to support reasonable suspicion of
possession of a controlled substance.” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 844. Similarly, “[p]resence

1 The state contends that the district cour t failed to properly appl y the totality-of-the-
circumstances test and viewed these circumstances in isolation rather than all together. We
disagree. While the district court did comment that certain facts by themselves or “without
more” did not support reasonable suspicion, the district court ultimately discussed the most
relevant circumstances and explained why, a ll together, they did not support reasonable
suspicion. We are satisfied that the district court properly considered the circumstances in
their totality.
2 Robinson disputes the state’s characterization of the residence as a “known drug house.”
He notes that the officer never testified that she saw any ongoing drug activity at the house
and did not testify specifically about drug-related arrests. We reject Robinson’s contention.
The officer testified that police had received multiple drug-related calls to that house and
that she had been involved in some of those contacts. We therefore accept the district
court’s finding that the residence was a known drug house.
15
in a known drug house is a relevant, but not conclusive, factor for an officer to consider.”
State v. Lugo, 887 N.W.2d 476, 48 7 (Minn. 2016) (citing Illinios v. Wardlow ,
528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000)).
Here, the district court determined th at Robinson had a “plausible innocent
explanation for being at the house” because the driver told the officer that he was at the
house to pick up some of the resident’s belo ngings. We agree with the district court’s
analysis on this point. In examining the totality of the circumstances, courts are to consider
“possible innocent explanations for the alleged suspicious activity.” State v. Baumann ,
759 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn. App. 2009), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 31, 2009). We see no
error in the district court’s finding that Robinson and the driver’s explanation for being at
the house was plausible. Their 50-minute stay at the house was much longer than the type
of stays that are characteristic of drug transactions. See Utah v. Strieff , 136 S. Ct. 2056,
2059 (2016) (noting that frequent visitors wh o leave a house a few minutes after arriving
raise suspicions that drug de aling is happening inside). A nd the district court correctly
noted that there was no evidence that Robinson or the driver were carrying items that might
conceal drugs or paraphernalia when they left the residence.
The state nonetheless contends that, despite this plausible innocent explanation, it
was reasonable for the officer to suspect that Robinson and the driver may have been doing
something else inside the reside nce. The state emphasizes that the driver told the officer
that he knew the resident of the house was still in jail and that he did not know anyone else
at the house. The state correctly notes that even facts that are consistent with innocent
activity may support reasonable suspicion when considered in their totality.
16
State v. Martinson, 581 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Minn. 1998). But, while we cannot say that the
officer’s suspicions were necessarily unreas onable given these facts, we believe, like the
district court, that Robinson’s innocent explanation was stronger in light of the surrounding
circumstances. Based on our case law and the district court’s finding of a plausible
innocent explanation for being at the house, we conclude that Robinson’s association with
the driver and his presence at the known drug house by themselves are insufficient to
support reasonable suspicion of drug activity.
The state also cites Robinson’s nervous ness as a fact supporting reasonable
suspicion. The officer testifie d that Robinson “appeared to be very nervous” and did not
want “to make direct eye cont act” with her. The district court correctly noted that
“[n]ervousness alone is not an objective fact, but a subjective assessment derived from the
officer’s perceptions.” State v. Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d 278, 282 (Minn. App. 2003). And
“ordinary drivers may become nervous during a routine traffic stop.” State v. Smith ,
814 N.W.2d 346, 353 (Minn. 2012). For these reasons, courts have repeatedly recognized
that a defendant’s nervousness in the face of police questioning, without more, does not
support reasonable, articulable suspicion. State v. Burbach , 706 N.W.2d 484, 490
(Minn. 2005) (determining that defendant’s demeanor, “which was nervous, fidgety, and
talkative in a way that the o fficer found more extreme than usual” did not contribute to a
finding of reasonable suspicion); Syhavong, 661 N.W.2d at 282 (noting that a defendant’s
nervousness “must be coupled with other particularized and objective facts” to contribute
to reasonable suspicion).
17
The state nonetheless insists that “it was permissible for [the officer] to deduce that
Robinson’s nervousness was not reasonable under the circumstances.” We disagree.
While the officer testified that Robinson’s behavior was not typical of “people that do not
want to hide anything from law enforcement,” this fact does not show that his nervousness
was unreasonable. The supreme court in Burbach rejected a similar argument, and it
declined to rely on the arresting officer’s testimony that the defendant’s nervousness “was
significantly more than normal nervousness during a traffic stop” when the nervousness
arose from police questioning. 706 N.W.2d at 490. We agree with the district court’s
characterization of the officer’s testimony as merely a “subjective assessment,” and there
are no objective facts suggesti ng that Robinson’s nervousness went beyond the ordinary
type of nervousness that might be typical during a traffic stop . Thus, Robinson’s
nervousness provides no support for an objectiv e, reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.3

3 The state also points to two additional fact s regarding the office r’s interaction with
Robinson when she first approached the vehicle. We conclude that neither fact supports
reasonable suspicion. First, the state cites the officer’s statement that Robinson looked
familiar and that he reminded her of a bank-robbery suspect who had been arrested a year
and a half earlier. The officer did not explain any connection between the past robbery and
the drug-related activity the officers were investigating that day. We therefore do not see
how this fact is relevant to the officer’s de cision to expand the scope of the traffic stop.
Second, the state notes that Robinson refused to identify himself when the officer asked.
The district court determined that this fact did not support reasona ble suspicion because
Robinson had the right not to identify himself. We agree with the district court’s decision
not to consider this fact. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that, during a
traffic stop, “the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine
his identity and to try to obtain informati on confirming or dispelling the officer’s
suspicions,” but “the detainee is not obliged to respond.” Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S.
420, 439 (1984). Because Robinson had the right to choose not to respond to the officer’s
18
Finally, the state argues that law enforcement testimony about “furtive movements”
that Robinson made while in th e Taurus supports a conclusi on of reasonable suspicion.
The state first points to the officer’s testimony that the officer observed Robinson make a
“furtive movement” before she stopped the vehicl e. At the hearing, the officer testified
that, as she followed the ca r, she observed Robinson “move [] forward or lean[] forward
slightly.” When asked to explain the moveme nt further, she said th at she “saw his head
kind of bow down.” The district court did not discuss this movement, so we deem the
district court to have attributed no significan ce to the officer’s test imony for purposes of
its reasonable-suspicion analys is. And we agree with the district court’s implicit
conclusion. The officer’s limited description indicated that Robinson, at most, may have
leaned forward slightly—an ordinary movement for passengers riding in a moving vehicle.
The officer’s description of Robinson’s movement did not suggest that Robinson may have
been attempting to hide someth ing or avoid notice. This m ovement can hardly be called
“furtive.” We conclude that Robinson’s simp le act of leaning forward while the officer
was following the Taurus adds no value in terms of reasonable suspicion.
Next, the state argues that, after stopping the Taurus, the officer and the sergeant
both “saw Robinson [make] a furtive moveme nt” during the time that the officer was
checking the driver’s identity and insurance. At the hearing, the officer testified that while
she was in her squad car and around the ti me she was talking w ith the sergeant, she
observed Robinson “moving around a little bit.” When asked what she meant, she stated,

request to identify himself, we do not consider Robinson’s exercise of this right when
determining the existence of reasonable suspicion.
19
“I saw movement in his head.” She added nothing more. During this same time frame, the
sergeant noticed that it looked like Robinson was “diggi ng around like he is hiding
something.” When asked to explain what he saw, the sergeant testified that Robinson
appeared to be “leaning forw ard.” But the sergeant was equivocal when he described
Robinson’s movement, stating: “He was kind of almost to the point where it looked like he
might be reaching underneath the seat for something on the floorboard.” (Emphasis added.)
The state argues that these observations of “furtive movement” by Robinson after the stop
and before the officer pulled the driver from the car support the conclusion that the officer
had reasonable suspicion to believe that the vehicle contained drugs.4
Even considering Robinson’s “furtive” m ovement during this time, we conclude
that it does not add much to support reasonabl e suspicion. The offi cer’s testimony that
Robinson was “moving around” is so vague that it hardly suggests suspicious behavior.
While the sergeant was somewhat more speci fic in saying that Robinson was leaning
forward and “might” have been reaching unde r the seat, his testimony was uncertain.
Moreover, both the officer and the sergeant described minor movement by Robinson. This
slight movement stands in sharp contrast to the type of furtive movements that courts have

4 The district court did not consider this movement by Robinson, reasoning that the officer
had already made the decision to order the driver out of the car for further questioning by
that point. We agree with the state that the district court erred by looking at the time the
officer decided to expand the stop, rather th an the time that the o fficer actually expanded
the stop. Under our de novo review of reasonable, articulable suspicion, we consider that
movement in our analysis. Additionally, the sergeant observed Robinson “moving around”
inside the vehicle and handling a cylindrical-shaped container after the officer had ordered
the driver out of the car. The parties agree that we do not consider these movements by
Robinson in our reasonable-suspicion analysis because they occurred after the expansion
of the stop.
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recognized as supporting reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Flowers, 734 N.W.2d at 245, 252
(holding that defendant’s “frantic, furtive mo vements” in vehicle, which lasted for about
45 seconds and during which he leaned all the way into front passenger seat, gave officers
reasonable suspicion that defendant ma y have been armed and dangerous);
State v. Gallagher, 275 N.W.2d 803, 807-08 (Minn. 1 979) (determining that defendant’s
“immediate exit from his car” and passenger’s “awkward movements” in attempting to
shield a brown paper bag from officer’s view supported probable cause to search the bag).
We are not persuaded that Ro binson’s brief, minor movement observed while the officer
was checking the driver’s li cense and insurance leads to the objectively reasonable
inference that he may have been engaged in criminal activity. 5 This fact therefore adds
little to the reasonable-suspicion analysis.
Having determined that the facts that the state relies on do not support reasonable
suspicion by themselves, we consider whether the facts support reasonable suspicion when
considered together. We conclude that th ey do not. These circumstances—Robinson’s
association with the driver, his coming from a known drug house, his nervousness, and his
leaning forward in his seat during the stop—are weak by themselves, and they are not much
stronger even when considered as a whole. The totality of the circumstances may, at most,
have provided the officer with information to form a “hunch” that Robinson was engaged
in drug-related criminal activity at the time she ordered the driver out of the car for

5 The squad car video that was admitted at the hearing shows the driver and the passenger
while they are in the vehicle, but it is difficult to see the passenger and whether he makes
any movements.
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questioning. But, taken in the aggregate and viewed objectively, they did not establish
reasonable suspicion of such behavior. Becau se the officer who ordered the driver from
the car to question him about Robinson lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity to expand the scope of the traffic stop, the district court properly granted
Robinson’s motion to suppress.
Affirmed.