A21-0269 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Matthew Sawatzky, Relator,

Minnesota Court of Appeals · Filed July 19, 2021

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Opinion text

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This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0269

Matthew Sawatzky,
Relator,

vs.

Harris Rochester, Inc.,
Respondent,

Department of Employment and Economic Development,
Respondent.

Filed July 19, 2021
Affirmed
Florey, Judge

Department of Employment and Economic Development
File No. 39783913-3

Matthew Sawatzky, Montgomery, Minnesota (pro se relator)

Harris Rochester, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (respondent employer)

Anne B. Froelich, Keri A. Phillips, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic
Development, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent department)

Considered and decided by Florey, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Smith,
Tracy M., Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
FLOREY, Judge
Relator challenges a decision by an unemployment -law judge (ULJ) dismissing as
untimely relator’s administrative appeal from a determination that he is ineligible for
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unemployment benefits because he quit his employment. Because the record could not
support a finding that relator substantially complied with the deadline to appeal the initial
determination, we affirm.
FACTS
Relator Matthew Sawatzky was employed at Harris Rochester, Inc. , as a union
sheet-metal worker from October 1, 2018 to January 5, 2019. On January 6, 2019,
Sawatzky applied for unemployment benefits with the Minnesota Department of
Employment and Economic Development (DEED), indicating that he was laid off from his
employment at Harris, and began receiving unemployment benefits.
Sometime after that, Harris raised the issue of whether Sawatzky quit his
employment. DEED directed that Harris and Sawatzky complete questionnaires to
determine whether Sawatzky was eligible to receive unemployment benefits.
On June 25, 2020, DEED issued a determination of ineligibility, stating that
Sawatzky had quit his employment and was therefore ineligible to receive benefits. The
letter stated that Sawatzky had received an overpayment of $11,452.00. Under the heading
“Right of Appeal, the letter informed Sawatzky of the following:
This determination will become final unless an appeal is filed
by Wednesday, July 15, 2020. The ‘filed’ date is the postmark
date, if mailed, or the date received by the Unemployment
Insurance Program, if sent by fax or internet. The
recommended method for filing an appeal is by internet. You
can do so by logging in to your account at
www.uimn.org/uimn/ and following the prompts. If filing by
fax or mail please send this determination, or a photocopy,
along with a short statement explaining why you are filing the
appeal to the fax number or address listed below.

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Sawatzky did not appeal until October 6, 2020, and the ULJ summarily dismissed
his appeal as untimely. On October 15, Sawatzky timely filed a request with the ULJ to
reconsider his appeal. He explained that he did not file his appeal within the appeal period
“because of my misplacement of my letter that was mailed out to me on June 25, 2020.”
He also explained that during that time, he experienced “unforeseen family hardships.” In
addition, Sawatzky submitted documents related to the merits of the underlying issue of
how his employment was terminated, argui ng that Harris incorrectly reported that he had
quit.
Applying the procedure explained in Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 2 (2020), which
states an applicant must appeal a determination of ineligibility within 20 calendar days, the
ULJ determined the dismissal was factually and legally correct and affirmed the dismissal.
The ULJ explained that after the June 25, 2020 determination became final, “the [ULJ] has
no legal authority to address the case on its merits.”
On appeal, in addition to requesting that this court reconsider the ULJ’s dismissal
on timeliness grounds, Sawatzky argues that Harris inaccurately reported that he
voluntarily quit, alleging instead that he was laid off due to a reduction of work force. He
points to an email sent by Harris’s director of field operations on October 19, 2020, stating
that “[Sawatzky] was released for lack of work” as evidence that he was laid off.
DECISION
A determination of ineligibility for unemployment benefits “is final unless an appeal
is filed by the appli cant or employer within 20 calendar days after sending.” Minn. Stat.
§ 268.101, subd. 2(f) (2020). “The date of mailing commences the time for appeal.” Smith
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v. Masterson Pers., Inc., 483 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Minn. App. 1992). “A ULJ’s decision to
dismiss an appeal as untimely raises a jurisdictional question of law, which we review de
novo.” In re Murack, 957 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Minn. App. 2021).
The ULJ must dismiss untimely appeals for lack of jurisdiction . Stassen v. Lone
Mountain Truck Leasing, LLC, 814 N.W.2d 25, 29 (Minn. App. 2012); accord Minn. Stat.
§ 268.105, subd. 1a(c) (2020) (“The unemployment law judge must issue a decision
dismissing the appeal as untimely if the judge decides the appeal was not filed within 20
calendar days after the sending of the determination.”). The statutory time period “is
absolute and unambiguous,” Semanko v. Dep’t of Emp’t Servs. , 244 N.W.2d 663, 666
(Minn. 1976), and generally “there are no statutory provisions for extensions or exceptions
to the appeal period,” Kennedy v. Am. Paper Recycling Corp., 714 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Minn.
App. 2006).
But in Murack, this court determined that an executive order in response to the
COVID-19 peacetime emergency suspended the requirement of strict compliance with the
20-day administrative appeal period and instituted instead a requirement for substantial
compliance with the deadline. 975 N.W.2d at 131. Therefore, the proper question for the
ULJ to consider was “whether [relator] was in substantial compliance with the
administrative appeal deadline.” Id. at 131. The court stated:
A party may be said to have substantially complied with a
statute where she has a reasonable explanation for failin g to
strictly comply, has taken steps to comply with the statute, and
has generally complied with the statute’s purpose; and there is
reasonable notice and a lack of prejudice to other parties.

Id. at 130.
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The ULJ dismissed this appeal before Murack was decided, and thus did not apply
the “substantial compliance” standard. In some circumstances, it may be appropriate to
remand for the ULJ to consider the facts in light of that standard. But here, the record
could not support a finding of substantial compliance, and therefore, we affirm.
The 20-day appeal period began on June 25, 2020, when DEED’s determination
was mailed to Sawatzky at the address he provided, and expired on July 15, 2020. The
letter clearly explained the requirements and procedure to appeal. Sawatzky did not file an
appeal until October 6, 2020. Sawatzky explained that he missed the deadline because of
an “unforeseen family hardship” and because he misplaced DEED’s letter stating the
deadline. Even applying the less stringent “substantial compliance” standard, Sawatzky
has failed to provide a reasonable explanation for failing to appeal DEED’s ineligibility
determination until approximately three months after the 20 -day deadline. Sawatzky has
also failed to show that he took “steps to comply with the statute.” See Her v . FGT
Cabinetry, LLC , A20-1024, 2021 WL 1247956, at *2-3, (Minn App. April 5, 2021)
(unpublished) (finding relator’s late appeal failed to substantially comply with the appeal
period when relator provided a nonexistent address and relator’s excuse was that he did not
know how to apply); Miller v. Hollenback & Nelson, Inc. , No. A20 -0927, 2021 WL
955937, at *2 (Minn. App. March 15, 2021) (unpublished) (affirming the dismissal of a
late request for reconsideration where the relator did not provide any reason for filing late).1

1 Nonprecedential opinions are not binding authority, see Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01(c),
but because of the time -limited application of the pandemic emergency executive order,
they have persuasive authority.
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For these reasons, the record could not support a finding that Sawatzky substantially
complied with the administrative appeal period , and we affirm the ULJ’s dismissal of his
appeal.
Sawatzky also asserts that he did not quit his empl oyment with Harris, but rather
that he was laid off due to a reduction in workforce. When a ULJ dismisses an appeal as
untimely, the only question before this court is whether the ULJ erred in dismissing the
appeal, and this court does not have authority to address the merits of the appeal . See
Murack, 957 N.W2d at 127 (stating that “the statutory time for appeal is absolute” and “if
an appeal is not timely filed, it must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction”). Therefore, we
decline to review this issue.
Affirmed.