In re the Marriage of: Jessica Elizabeth Solinsky, n/k/a Jessica Elizabeth Grimm, petitioner, Respondent,

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A21-0272

In re the Marriage of:
Jessica Elizabeth Solinsky, n/k/a Jessica Elizabeth Grimm, petitioner,
Respondent,

vs.

Joseph Clark Solinsky,
Appellant

Filed January 31, 2022
Affirmed
Halbrooks, Judge*

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-19-6576

Alexandra M. Reynolds, Atticus Family Law, S.C., Stillwater, Minnesota (for
respondent/cross-appellant)

Joseph Clark Solinsky, Citrus Heights, California (pro se appellant/cross-respondent)

Considered and decided by Reyes, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Halbrooks,
Judge.
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
HALBROOKS, Judge
In this appeal from a marital-dissolution judgment, appellant-husband challenges
the district court’s division of property, and respondent/cross-appellant wife challenges the

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to
Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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district court’s finding that husband produced sufficient tracing evidence to justify the
district court’s classification of some property as nonmarital. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Joseph Solinsky and respondent Jessica Solinsky, n/k/a Jessica Grimm,
were married in 2012 and separated in 2017. They have no children together. In 2019,
Grimm petitioned the district court to dissolve the marriage. At trial, the district court
found that Grimm’s gross monthly income was $4,220.10 and her monthly expenses were
$4,168.66. The district court also found that Solinsky had a gross monthly income of
$12,655.06 but did not find his monthly expenses. Neither party sought an award of
spousal maintenance. Grimm was represented by counsel. Solinsky was self-represented.
At the conclusion of the trial, which focused on the valuation and division of real
property, vehicles, and retirement assets, the district court left the record open for
approximately three weeks to receive additional post-trial submissions. The district court
then issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order for Judgment. After the
district court administrator entered judgment, Solinsky filed this appeal, and Grimm filed
a notice of related appeal. This court then referred the appeal to the Family Law Appellate
Mediation process, which proved unsuccessful.
DECISION
The parties challenge aspects of the district court’s classification of property as
marital or nonmarital and its division of their property. When dissolving a marriage, the
district court “shall make” an “equitable” division of the parties’ marital property. Minn.
Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1 (2020). “[W]hile the district court must make a just and equitable
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division of the [parties’] marital property, ‘[a]n equitable division of marital property is not
necessarily an equal division.’” Sirek v. Sirek, 693 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Minn. App. 2005)
(quoting Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 297 (Minn. App. 1998), rev. denied (Minn.
Feb. 18, 1999)). “All property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is presumed
to be marital property, without regard to the form of ownership. To overcome the
presumption that property is marital, a party must demonstrate by a preponderance of the
evidence that the property is nonmarital.” Antone v. Antone, 645 N.W.2d 96, 100-01
(Minn. 2002) (citations omitted), rev. denied (Minn. July 16, 2022); see Minn. Stat.
§ 518.003, subd. 3b (2020) (defining marital and nonmarital property).
To successfully claim a nonmarital interest, the claiming party must show both the
existence and the amount of the alleged nonmarital interest. See, e.g., Hafner v. Hafner,
406 N.W.2d 590, 593 (Minn. App. 1987) (noting that a spouse’s recovery in a personal
injury suit is nonmarital to the extent it is for that spouse’s loss of good health and stating
that “[t]he burden of proving that the amount of the recovery was awarded for personal
injuries and not for replacement of marital property . . . is on the party seeking the
nonmarital classification”). A nonmarital interest in property can be established through
credible testimony. Doering v. Doering, 385 N.W.2d 387, 390 (Mi nn. App. 1986). And
“[w]hen marital and nonmarital assets have been commingled, the party asserting the
nonmarital claim must adequately trace the nonmarital funds in order to establish their
nonmarital character.” Kerr v. Kerr, 770 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. App. 2009).
Whether property is marital or nonmarital is a legal question that appellate courts
review de novo. Gill v. Gill, 919 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Minn. 2018). In reviewing that
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determination, however, appellate court s defer to a district court’s underlying findings of
fact unless those underlying findings are clearly erroneous. Olsen v. Olsen, 562 N.W.2d
797, 800 (Minn. 1997). The supreme court recently discussed the clear-error standard for
reviewing findings of fact in detail, noting, among other things, that a district court’s
findings of fact are not clearly erroneous unless the appellate court, viewing the record in
the light most favorable to the finding being challenged, is left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake was ma de. In re Commitment of Kenney, 963 N.W.2d 214, 221
(Minn. 2021).
When reviewing a district court’s division of property, an appellate court recognizes
that, in dividing property, the district court has broad discretion and that the district court’s
division of property will not be altered on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Antone,
645 N.W.2d at 100. A district court abuses its discretion by making findings that are
unsupported by the evidence, by misapplying the law, or by resolving the discretionary
question in a manner that is contrary to logic and the facts on record. Honke v. Honke, 960
N.W.2d 261, 265 (Minn. 2021).
Solinsky and Grimm argue that the district court erred in its identifications of the
nonmarital interests in the property in dispute. On appeal, we address the following issues:
1) Solinsky’s SEI Capital account; 2) Solinsky’s SEI Trust (IRA) account; 3) the Crystal
house; 4) the Plymouth and Citrus Heights, California homes; 5) the parties’ vehicles;
6) Grimm’s rental income from the Crystal, Minnesota home; 7) the parties’ COVID relief
check and 2018 federal and state tax payments; and 8) Grimm’s MSRS pension fund.

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SEI Capital Account
The district court valued the SEI Capital Fund at $100,646.52. Consistent with
exhibit 3.6, the district court noted that the fund had a value of about $80,000 in 2016. The
district court also noted that the record presented to it lacked documentation addressing the
account before 2016. Despite Solinsky’s testimony that the entire account was his
nonmarital asset, the district court ruled that there was a $20,647 marital interest in the
account and awarded Grimm half of that interest.
1. Solinsky’s argument: Based in part on “additional evidence” Solinsky claims to
have provided to Grimm’s appellate counsel during Family Law Appellate Mediation,
Solinsky challenges the district court’s failure to rule that the entire fund was his nonmarital
property. We reject this argument for three reasons.
First, on appeal, appellate courts generally do not consider evidence not presented
to the district court. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988); see also
Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (citing Thiele in a family
law appeal); see also Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01 (defining the record on appeal as the
record created in the district court). Therefore, to the extent Solinsky’s argument is based
on evidence not presented to the district court, it is based on evidence we cannot consider,
and the argument is not properly before this court.
Second, as noted, when reviewing a district court’s determination of whether
property is marital or nonmarital, this court defers to the district court’s underlying findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Here, the district court acknowledged Solinsky’s
testimony that the entire fund was his nonmarital asset but still ruled that it included a
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marital interest. Thus, the district court rejected, albeit implicitly, Solinsky’s testimony on
the point as not credible. Appellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility
determination, even if the determination is implicit. Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203,
210 (Minn. 1988) (credibility determinations); Pechovnik v. Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d 94,
99 (Minn. App. 2009) (implicit credibility determinations). Therefore, we cannot alter the
district court’s rejection of Solinsky’s testimony.
Third, given the d istrict court’s credibility determination and Solinsky’s failure to
present additional documentation to the district court regarding the $20,647 at issue, this
record simply does not support the findings that the district court w ould have to make to
rule that the funds at issue are Solinsky’s nonmarital funds. As we have noted: “On appeal,
a party cannot complain about a district court’s failure to rule in [his] favor when one of
the reasons it did not do so is because that party failed to provide the district court with the
evidence that would allow the district court to fully address the question.” Eisenschenk v.
Eisenschenk, 668 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Minn. App. 2003), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 25, 2003).
2. Grimm’s argument: Grimm argues that the district court erred in its treatment
of the SEI Capital Fund by treating $80,000 as Solinsky’s nonmarital property. The record
on all issues in this case is lean but strict tracing is not required, and mere testimony, if
credited by the district court, can be sufficient to trace a claimed nonmarital interest.
Doering, 385 N.W.2d at 390-91; see also Risk ex rel. Miller v. Stark, 787 N.W.2d 690, 697
(Minn. App. 2010) (stating that “tracing property to its nonmarital source does not require
intricate detail”), rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010). Here, Solinsky testified that the initial
funds for the SEI capital account were deposited “prior to 2006” and that those funds
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represent his nonmarital investment. I n contrast to its treatment of Solinsky’s testimony
about the $20,647 that accumulated in the fund after 2016, the district court clearly deemed
Solinsky’s testimony about the origin of the $80,000 credible. We defer to this
determination. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d at 210; Pechovnik, 765 N.W.2d at 99. Therefore, we
reject Grimm’s argument on this point.
SEI Trust Account
In a section of its judgment captioned “SEI Private Trust Account,” the district court
valued Solinsky’s SEI IRA at $235,541.36 as of September 30, 2019. The district court
noted that Solinsky “is making a total non-marital claim of $169,875.39 of the funds held
in the SEI [IRA]” and that much of the account was the result of consolidating monies from
several other accounts over time. The district court then ruled that Solinsky had a
$167,016.07 nonmarital interest in the SEI IRA account and awarded Grimm half of the
remaining $68,525.29. Both parties challenge aspects of these rulings. On this record, we
reject both parties’ challenges.
1. Solinsky’s arguments: Regarding his SEI IRA account, Solinsky asserts that
“the ruling states a lower than proven amount with no explanation of this change.” Citing
unspecified “[a]dditional evidence,” Solinsky asserts that “more precise calculations” can
or should be made. If the unspecified additional evidence mentioned by Solinsky is the
evidence he claims to have provided to Grimm’s appellate counsel during the Family Law
Appellate Mediation, his argument on this point is not properly before this court for the
same reasons that his argument regarding the SEI Capital account is not properly before
us. See Thiele, 425 N.W.2d at 582-83; Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d at 477-78. Additionally,
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even if the district court erred in awarding Solinsky a $167,016.07 nonmarital interest in
the SEI IRA account rather than the $169,875.39 interest he claimed, the difference is
$2,859.32—a very small portion of a single account that, itself, was only part of the parties’
estate. On this record, any such error can be ignored as de minimis. See Risk, 787 N.W.2d
at 694 n.1 (noting that a district court’s failure to account for $400 in value of land worth
$99,000 and with $54,900 in equity was a de minimis error and declining to remand).
2. Grimm’s argument: Grimm argues that Solinsky failed to adequately trace
$38,486 of the nonmarital interest in the SEI IRA awarded to him by the district court. The
district court found that this portion of Solinsky’s nonmarital interest in the account was
due to “[Solinsky] consolidating accounts.” This, Grimm argues, is improper because the
district court’s finding is not supported by evidence Solinsky presented.
Evidence of tracing, however, can be established through credible testimony.
Doering, 385 N.W.2d at 390. We give deference to the “district court’s opportunity to
evaluate witness credibility.” Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008).
Solinsky testified to providing “every statement that was available” and that he “rolled”
other accounts together and then rolled those consolidated accounts “completely in[to] the
SEI” account. In relying on this testimony, the district court relied on the available
information in the record. Grimm has not shown that the district court erred in ruling the
that the $38,486 was nonmarital.
Real Property
A district court has broad discretion in dividing and evaluating “property in a marital
dissolution and will not be overturned except for abuse of discretion. [An appellate court]
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will affirm the [district] court’s division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and
principle even though we might have taken a different approach.” Antone, 645 N.W.2d at,
100 (citation omitted); see also Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Minn. 2009) (stating that
a district court has “broad discretion regarding the division of property” and that its division
of property “will only be reversed on appeal if the [district] court abused its discretion”).
A district court abuses its discretion in dividing property if it resolves the matter in a
manner “that is against logic and the facts on record.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47,
50 (Minn. 1984).
1. Crystal House
After the parties separated, Grimm bought a house in Crystal. Grimm testified that
she used marital funds to purchase the home. The district court found there was no
indication “from the testimony that [Grimm] was seeking any sort of nonmarital claim to
the funds used to purchase this property.” The Crystal house had a market value of
$147,900. The unpaid balance on the Crystal house was $121,653.99 at the time of
valuation. The district court found the $26,247 of equity in the Crystal house to be marital
property but awarded the house and the associated debts to Grimm.
2. Plymouth & Citrus Heights Homes
In February 2019, Solinsky paid earnest money toward, made a down payment on,
and purchased a $358,000 home in Citrus Heights, California. In April 2019, Grimm, at
Solinsky’s request, executed an Interspousal Transfer Grant Deed (ITGD) regarding her
interest in that home. In June 2019, the parties sold their marital home in Plymouth, netting
$192,650.47. It is undisputed that Solinsky owned the Plymouth home before the parties’
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married, that he failed to enter any evidence of the value of the Plymouth home as of the
date of the parties’ marriage, and that Solinsky used all the net proceeds of the Plymouth
home to reduce the lien on the Citrus Heights home. As of August 8, 2019, the mortgage
balance on the Citrus Heights home was $130,062.47.
Based on the sparse record presented to it, the district court ruled that the funds
Solinsky used for earnest money and the down payment on the Citrus Heights home were
marital and that Grimm was entitled to half of those funds ($19,279). The district court
also ruled that Solinsky had a nonmarital interest in the Plymouth home and, “as a matter
of fairness,” ruled that Solinsky was entitled to about two thirds ( $128,432) of the net
proceeds of that home as the sum of the values of (a) his nonmarital interest in the Plymouth
home1 and (b) his share of the marital interest that home. The district court further ruled
that the remaining $64,218 of the net sale proceeds should be attributed to Grimm as her
share of the marital interest in the Plymouth home. Recognizing that Solinsky had a

1 A spouse claiming a nonmarital interest in property acquired while married has the burden
of showing the existence and extent of the claimed nonmarital interest. Antone , 645
N.W.2d at 100-01; Hafner, 406 N.W.2d at 593. When an asset has both marital and
nonmarital components, a party’s failure to adequately trace a claimed nonmarital interest
can result in the entire asset being treated as marital property. Wiegers v. Wiegers, 467
N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn. App. 1991); see Baker v. Baker , 753 N.W.2d 644, 653 (Minn.
2008) (noting this aspect of the Wiegers opinion). When there are marital and nonmarital
interests in an asset owned by a spouse before marriage, proper identification of the extent
of a claimed nonmarital interest in that asset requires, among other things, knowledge of
the value of the asset when the spouses married. See Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 102 (reciting
a formula for apportioning the equity in an asset between that asset’s marital and
nonmarital components that requires identification of the value of the asset at the time of
marriage). Here, it is undisputed that Solinsky failed to enter evidence of the value of the
Plymouth home at the time of the marriage. Thus, he failed to adequately trace the extent
of his claimed nonmarital interest in the Plymouth home, and the district court could have
treated all the proceeds of its sale as marital.
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$13,123 interest in Grimm’s home, the district court then netted Solinsky’s $13,123 interest
in Grimm’s home against Grimm’s $64,218 marital share of the proceeds of the sale of the
Plymouth home and her $19,279 interest in the funds used for the down payment on the
Citrus Heights home to award Grimm $70,373 net interest in the Citrus Heights home.
In district court, Solinsky asserted that the ITGD precluded Grimm from having any
interest in the Citrus Heights home. The district court, however, made its award without
explicitly addressing that assertion. On appeal, Solinsky argues that Grimm’s claim to any
equity in the Citrus Heights home is precluded by the ITGD, which, he asserts, can only be
challenged according to the California Family Code.
In California, an ITGD is used to, among other things, “transmu te community
property to separate property of either spouse.” Cal. Fam. Code § 850(a) (2020); see In Re
Marriage of Kushesh & Kushesh-Kaviani, 238 Cal. Rptr.3d 174, 175 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018)
(discussing ITGDs). Minnesota dissolution law, however, has neither “community
property” nor “separate property.” Nor does Minnesota dissolution law address the concept
of “transmutation” of property interests. The questions of whether, to what extent, and
how (if at all) the concepts of transmutation, separate property, and community property
might be applied in Minnesota’s legal scheme for dividing property when a marriage is
dissolved were not argued to, or otherwise unpacked for, the district court. Thus, it is not
surprising that the district court did not address those matters. Nor are those matters briefed
in any detail to this court. Appellate courts need not address matters that are inadequately
briefed. State Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480
(Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed question); see Brodsky v.
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Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a family-law appeal).
It is based on this lack of adequate briefing that we decline to address these matters.2
Valuation of the Vehicles
The district court treated the parties’ cars as marital property and awarded each car
to its respective owner, valuing the car awarded to Solinsky at $27,152, and the car awarded
to Grimm at $22,322. Solinsky contends that the district court failed to recognize his
nonmarital interest in the car awarded to him and that the difference in the values of the

2 Even if California’s concepts of community and separate property are directly analogous
to Minnesota’s concepts marital and nonmarital property, much of Solinsky’s argument is
still suspect. First, Grimm executed the ITGD in April 2019. The ITGD states Grimm
“[h]ereby GRANT(S)” (present tense) Solinsky the Citrus Heights home as his “separate
property.” The parties’ sale of their Plymouth home, and Solinsky’s use of its proceeds to
reduce the lien on the Citrus Heights home, however, did not occur until June 2019. Thus,
whatever interests the ITGD purported to transfer, they did not include the later-created
marital interest generated by Solinsky’s post-ITGD use of the marital share of the proceeds
of the sale of the Plymouth home to reduce the lien on the Citrus Heights home. Second,
in addition to the marital funds used in the acquisition of the Citrus Heights home, Solinsky
used his nonmarital share of the proceeds of the Plymouth home to reduce the mortgage on
the Citrus Heights home. Thus, the Citrus Heights home had both marital and nonmarital
interest in it. California’s ITGD statute states: “Nothing in [the section of the California
statutes addressing the requirements for an ITGD] affects the law governing
characterization of property [like the Citrus Heights home] in which separate property and
community property are commingled or otherwise combined.” Cal. Fam. Code § 852(d)
(2020). Solinsky addressed the impact of this provision on the interests in the Citrus
Heights home in neither the district court nor this court. Finally, even if the ITGD is read
to preclude the existence of a marital interest in the Citrus Heights home, that fact, by itself,
would not preclude the district court from awarding Grimm an interest in that home. Under
Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 2 (2020), a district court can, in certain circumstances, award
one spouse a portion of the other spouse’s nonmarital property. Given the exceptionally
lean record, and the even leaner briefing, on the impact of the ITGD on the interests in the
Citrus Heights home presented to the district court, it is not surprising that the district court
did not address whether those circumstances were present here, and we do not fault it for
not doing so.
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cars was “omitted from the district court ruling, showing either an abuse of discretion, or a
prejudicial error.”
A district court’s valuation of an item of property is a finding of fact, and it will not
be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous. Maurer v. Maurer, 623 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn.
2001); see also Muschik v. Conner-Muschik, 920 N.W.2d 215, 224 (Minn. App. 2018).
Here, the district court heard the parties’ testimony on the valuation of the vehicles
and Grimm provided evidence of the Kelley Blue Book valuation for both vehicles.
Solinsky argued to the district court that his testimony on the values of the vehicles was
more credible because he is “one of the founders of the Tesla club and active nationally in
electric vehicles and ha[s] personal relationships with executives at Tesla.”
This court, however, does not disturb findings of fact based on conflicting evidence
unless the findings are “manifestly and palpably contrary to the evidence as a whole.” In
re S.G., 828 N.W.2d 118, 127 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted). Further, “when evidence
relevant to a factual issue consists of conflicting testimony, the district court’s decision is
necessarily based on a determination of witness credibility, which we accord great
deference on appeal.” Alam v. Chowdhury, 764 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Minn. App. 2009). The
district court relied on Grimm’s unchallenged testimony with respect to the Blue Book
values in determining the value of the vehicles. Given the deference we afford the district
court in making credibility determinations, the district court’s valuation of the two cars was
not clearly erroneous.
To the extent that Solinsky asserts that the district court ignored what he alleged
was his nonmarital interest in his car, we will, for purposes of this appeal, assume that
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Solinsky proved the existence of a nonmarital interest. On this record, however, we cannot
say that he adequately traced the extent of that interest as is required by caselaw. Therefore,
the district court had the discretion to treat the interest as marital. Wiegers, 467 N.W.2d at
344; see Baker, 753 N.W.2d at 653. Nor, on this record, can we say that the resulting
division of marital property was so disproportionate as to be inequitable. See Sirek, 693
N.W.2d at 900 (noting that a property division need not be equal to be equitable); White v.
White, 521 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Minn. App. 1994) (“The trial court is not required to make
an equal division of marital property but, rather, a ‘just and equitable’ division”).
Omissions from the District Court Order
Solinsky argues the district court abused its discretion or erred by omitting from its
ruling the COVID-19 relief check the parties received, the taxes due the parties from joint
filings in 2018, and the “marital business income” that Grimm receives from renting the
Crystal house. Solinsky also asserts that the district court erred in determining the value
of Grimm’s retirement account. As previously stated, a district court has “broad discretion
in evaluating and dividing property” and we will not overturn a decision “except for abuse
of discretion.” Antone, 645 N.W.2d at 100. All marital property is subject to equitable,
but not necessarily equal, division between the parties. White, 521 N.W.2d at 878.
Solinsky is incorrect in stating the district court omitted the rental income in the
finding of fact about Grimm’s income. Because the evidence was that the rental income
was completely offset by the expense of the mortgage and utility payments, the district
court did not assign any of the income to Grimm. We discern no error in this decision.
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Solinsky is correct in noting the district court did not address either the COVID-19
relief check or the parties’ tax burden from 2018. As marital property, including debt, is
subject to equitable division, the district court’s silence places the tax burden on Solinsky.
Distribution of the debt did not need to be equal, only “just and equitable.” See Justis v.
Justis, 384 N.W.2d 885, 888-89 (Minn. App. 1986), rev. denied (Minn. May 29, 1986).
Based on the difference in income between the two parties, the district court’s decision to
not assign the tax debt to Grimm or require Grimm to reimburse Solinsky for the COVID-
19 relief check meets the “just and equitable” standard. Id.
Finally, Solinsky argues the district court erred in determining the value of Grimm’s
MSRS retirement plan and uses an incorrect retirement age. The district court, however,
relied on the valuation of $39,329 provided by a consulting actuary agreed to by Grimm
and Solinsky. Grimm agreed that “the Court adopt the value of approximately $39,000.”
The district court properly relied on the testimony and the agreement when determining the
value of the retirement account at $39,329.
In conclusion, based on this lean record and even leaner briefing presented to the
district court and to this court, we cannot say that Solinsky demonstrated that the district
court abused its broad discretion in its evaluation and division of property.
Affirmed.